2 August 2000, Volume
RADICAL POLITICS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE
PART VII: Bulgaria's Radical Transfigurations
It is in some ways an irony that the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) began the first chapter of its post-communist history by triggering the coming into being of a radical continuity grouping that turned against the party itself. The Bulgarian Committee for the Defense of National Interest (KZNI) was born in an effort to forestall the BSP government's decision to allow the Turkish minority to regain political rights and end the Bulgarization campaign launched under late (but then just deposed) President Todor Zhivkov. A new citizenship law, passed in March 1990, made it possible for Turks to take back their names, which Zhivkov had Bulgarianized, and in March 1991 a parliamentary committee submitted a draft bill that, though failing to meet the demands of the Turks, would have allowed minorities to study their language in elementary schools on an extracurricular basis of two hours a week. Moreover, ethnic Turks that had been forced to leave Bulgaria were to be allowed to return (Bugajski, 1995, pp. 242, 246; Bell, 1999, p. 244). Led by Dimitar Arnaudov, a deputy in the National Assembly, the KZNI was particularly vociferous in objecting to the registration and participation in the elections of the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) led by Ahmed Dogan. In April 1990, the National Assembly had passed a law prohibiting the registration of ethnic parties, but the DPS was nonetheless allowed to participate in the June 1990 elections, winning 23 seats and becoming the third-strongest force in the legislature (Bugajski, 1995, pp. 244, 250).
The KZNI supporters (many of whom, like those of the Party of Romanian National Unity [PUNR] in Romanian Transylvania had profited from the communist regime's nationalist drive and now feared the return of the Turks--respectively Romanians--forced to emigrate by Zhivkov or Nicolae Ceausescu) inundated the BSP with protests. They went as far as to declare an "independent Bulgarian Republic" in November 1990, claiming that the government was too lenient towards the Turks who, as it were, were threatening Bulgaria's integrity (Bugajski, 1995, p. 245; Bell, 1999, pp. 244-45). The parallel with Romania is again in place, for in Bulgaria, just like in Romania, claims were being made that Bulgarians were being persecuted in those areas where the country's largest minority was in the majority; as in Romania, local party and government officials in the areas inhabited by the minority were fearing that the government would turn them into scapegoats for its predecessor's deeds.
The BSP began having second thoughts about its new liberal policies vis-a-vis the Turkish minority, for these local party bosses formed the core of its support and of what would later develop into "entrepratchiks." The same group had also strong ties with structures connected with the former secret police. The Education Law was stalled in the parliament and when legislators finally voted on it in October 1991, the law as approved prohibited the teaching of minority languages in state schools (Bugajski, 1995, p. 246). In one more parallel with Romania, where an Education Law regarded by the Hungarian minority to be discriminatory was passed in 1995, the law was supported not only by the ruling party, but also by deputies from the so-called "democratic opposition."
The June 1990, elections gave the BSP a majority of 211 seats in the National Assembly, 10 more than the absolute majority in the 400-seat house, with its main competitor, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) having 144 seats. As already mentioned, the DPS had 23 seats, but one seat in the assembly went to the Fatherland Party of Labor (OTP). Just as in Romania, where the PUNR for many years was the "political arm" of the anti-Hungarian alleged "cultural" organization of "Vatra romaneasca," the KZNI in Bulgaria had set up the OTP. The OTP in 1990 succeeded to elect a deputy in a single-member constituency (Henderson and Robinson, 1987, p. 134; Bell, 1999, p. 135). But it was unclear at that stage whether the OTP would remain an isolated odd representative of radical continuity.
It did not. As the BSP became aware of both the damage it had inflicted on itself by alienating its nationalist clientele, and, moreover, as it became clearer and clearer that the DPS was moving towards cooperation with the SDS, the "reformed communists" began having second thoughts about the "reformation." In the elections of October 1991 the OTP was included in a four-party alliance headed by the BSP. In the run-up to the elections, the BSP sought to transform itself again into the chief defender of Bulgarians against the Turkish ethnic "threat," and "Islamic Fundamentalism" in general. It also sought to ban the participation in the elections of the DPS, on the grounds that the constitution approved in July 1991 prohibited ethnic parties. The DPS was close to being barred from running, but in September the Supreme Court, overturning its own earlier ruling, decided that the DPS could run after all, accepting the argument that the party had non-Turks on its lists, and choosing to regard the DSP's presence in the 1990 ballot as a legal precedent. The constitutional provision prohibiting ethnic parties, the court ruled, applies only to monoethnic, monoracial, and monoreligious organizations. On these grounds, several other parties, such as the Turkish Democratic Party and a party representing the Roma were subsequently prohibited, as was the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden (see below) (Engelbrekt, 1991, p. 2; ECRI, 2000, pp. 5-6).
The electoral outcome was a debacle for the BSP (106 seats), but this had nothing to do with its policies on the minority question, being rather the outcome of a protest vote against the reforms launched but only partially and badly implemented in the economic sphere. The SDS emerged as the largest parliamentary group, with 110 seats, though this majority was short of allowing the party to rule alone. It was dependent in the parliament on the vote of the DPS, still the third-largest faction, with 24 seats.
But the main significance of the 1991 elections was one that few observers noted: the BSP had become a party of radical continuity--a posture not to be abandoned again. The KZNI consequently dissolved itself in February 1992 (Bugajski, 1995, p. 247). But its influence did not dissolve with it. Be that as it may, it was somewhat ironic to witness the BSP being subjected by its political adversaries to treatment that is typical of the radical continuity's own handling of political foes. When the BSP nominated Georgi Pirinski as its candidate in the 1996 presidential elections, the central Electoral Commission ruled that Pirinski could not run, since he was born in New York and the constitution stipulates that the president must be born in Bulgaria. Pirinski's father had emigrated to the U.S. from Bulgaria, while his mother was a Slovak-American of Jewish descent. That was reason enough for the media supporting the "democratic opposition" to indulge in an exercise of "utilitarian anti-Semitism," presenting Pirinski as the candidate of the "American-Jewish lobby." The daily "Kontinent," for example, printed what claimed to be a secret report that went one step further, fully "Judaizing" Pirinski. According to the alleged report, he was the child of a Jewish family who had been adopted by his Bulgarian father and Slovak mother (cited in the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 1999).
That was not the only time when the seemingly "Western oriented," "liberal" SDS was stepping into the shoes of its political foes. Earlier, the SDS had proved unwilling and/or incapable of delivering the goods the Turks were expected from it, primarily in the realm of producing legislation that would meet their demands on education. As a result, when the minority government led by Filip Dimitrov was besieged by intrafactional struggles and came under the increasing criticism of its own "fundamentalists," the BSP in October 1992 moved a no-confidence motion that was carried with the support of the DPS. The new cabinet was formed by party non-affiliated Lyuben Berov (proposed by the DPS), and relied on the support of the DPS, the BSP, and "rebels" from the SDS. But a relatively large (20 deputies) nationalist wing in the BSP, refusing as a matter of principle to back a premier nominated by "the Turkish party," broke ranks (Henderson and Robinson, 1987, pp. 229-32; Bell, 1999, p. 246).
Berov resigned in September 1994, and after an interim cabinet headed by Reneta Indzhova prepared the elections, the ballot was held in December 1994. It was won by the BSP (125 seats), with the SDS being reduced to a representation of 69 deputies. The DPS, whose electorate was apparently dissatisfied with the indirect support rendered to the BSP by voting for the Berov cabinet, was also reduced in representation, having now only 15 deputies and losing third place to the People's Union, a right-of-center party formed by a group that split from the SDS and one by of Bulgaria's innumerable agrarian parties. Georges Ganchev's Business Bloc then made its parliamentary debut, being represented in the legislature by 13 deputies (Henderson and Robinson, 1997, pp. 352-3).
In new Premier Zhan Videnov's cabinet, the influence of radical continuity partisans was obvious, as demonstrated by the appointment of Ilcho Dimitrov as education minister. Dimitrov was an apologist for Zhivkov's policies of "Bulgarizing" minorities, and the DPS faction in the legislature walked out in protest of his appointment (Bell, 1999, p. 246). The Videnov cabinet did not see through its term, however. As the economy was seriously deteriorating and inflation sky-rocketed, violent protests took place in Sofia and elsewhere in Bulgaria, intensifying in early 1997 when the BSP had to agree to early elections. The SDS, running in alliance with other formations as the United Democratic Forces (ODS), was returned to power and had 137 seats. The BSP was again relegated to second place (58 seats). The DPS, running in alliance with pro-monarchy formations and other small parties, had 19 seats, ahead of the Euroleft Party (14 seats), which included many Socialist dissidents. Finally, the Business Bloc was last, with 12 mandates ("RFE/RL Newsline," 24 April 1999).
Under new Premier Ivan Kostov the BSP continued and sometimes even exacerbated its radical continuity postures. ODS-DPS relations, however, were not without tension, as nationalists in the ranks of the Bulgarian majority party were obviously attempting to dislocate the DPS in its stronghold regions. In the local elections held in October 1999 they managed to do so, taking over the mayoralty of the largely Turkish-inhabited Kurdzhali. Whether this was an indication that Bulgarian politics had "left behind" the ethnicity cleavage was however doubtful and Dogan, who claimed ballot forgery, threatened to "review" what was called the "Bulgarian model" of interethnic relations.
That nationalists cannot be squarely placed into a single (in this case, the BSP) camp is beyond dispute. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in East-Central Europe, what I call the "web of prejudice" cuts across party divisions and penetrates into "mainstream parties." Radical return influences were clearly present in the SDS from its very start. A Bulgarian Democratic Forum led by Vasil Zlatarov was admitted into the SDS in 1991, and two of its members became deputies on the SDS ticket later that year. The forum was but old wine in new bottles. Indeed, very old. It was composed mainly of octogenarians from the fascist National Legions set up in the 1930s by Ivan Donchev. Donchev, who managed to flee Bulgaria before the communist takeover, had been living in California and was active in right-wing emigre politics. In 1993, at the age of 87, he visited his country and was received at the airport by an official car dispatched by the parliamentary group of the SDS. He visited several gatherings of his old "Kammeraden," being met with shouts of "the Old Guard is on Guard" (Bell, 1999, pp. 248-9). Precisely the same form of greeting is heard also in Romania at meetings of members of the Iron Guard, one of whose slogans is "The Legion Never Dies." That may be so, but in Romania's case, Horia Sima, leader of the Guard, died a nonagenarian in exile in May 1993 before being able to visit his old (and his new) partisans.
It is unclear (to pursue scrutinizing the Bulgarian radical return) whether "Father" Georgi Gelemenov's Revival Movement derived its denomination from palingenetism or from Zhivkov's Revival Process (as the campaign for the Turk's de-nationalization was officially called). Maybe from both. Gelemenov first surfaced in Bulgarian politics in spring 1990 as the secretary-general of the small Christian Democratic Party-Center. In what circumstances he later "frocked" himself is unclear. Gelemenov had been active in the Revival Process, but after 1990 he turned into an admirer of Nazi ideology. In 1993 he told a newspaper that the Romany and the Turkish minorities should be "subordinated" to the Bulgarian majority. Gelemenov is also known to be a leading figure in Bulgaria's nascent skinhead movement, numbering about 200 members (Engelbrekt, 1994, p. 78; Oskar, Kertikov, Lenkova, 1996, p. 67; Lenkova, 1997, pp. 148-9; Bell, 1999, p. 249).
Also on the radical return spectrum is the Bulgarian National Radical Party (BNRP) led by Ivan Georgiev. In the 1990 elections, the BNRP garnered a meager 0.06 percent of the vote, doing better in the 1991 poll, when it scored 1.28 percent. It has never been able to enter the legislature, however. The BNRP is an irredentist formation focusing on regaining territories claimed by Bulgaria in the late 19th and early 20th century. These include Macedonia (divided between the now-independent former Yugoslav republic and Greek Macedonia), Western Thrace (now part of northeastern Greece), and southern Dobruja (now part of Romania). But the BNRP has also focused its political wrath on the DPS. Since August 1991, the party has been a member of the European National Union. The union (which includes such formations as the French National Front and the German Republican Party) was set up to coordinate the "struggle to protect Christian values against the offensive of Islam in Europe." During Zhirinovsky's visit to Bulgaria in late 1993 (see "East European Perspectives," Vol. 2, No. 10, 24 May 2000), the BNRP and the LDPR signed a cooperation agreement (Engelbrekt, 1994, p. 76; Bugajski, 1995, p. 248; Bell, 1999, p. 245).
Several other irredentist formations were resurrected in 1990 (Engelbrekt, 1994, p. 76; Bugajski, 1995, pp. 255-56), one of which was widely regarded as being anti-Bulgarian. This was the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden (OMOI), set up in January 1990. OMOI (with Ilinden deriving from St. Elija's Day of 2 August 1903, when a Macedonian rebellion against the Turks was launched by the terrorist organization known as Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) militated for the independence of all three Macedonian provinces in a unified state. The organization was immediately outlawed, on the grounds that it was aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the state and the unity of the Bulgarian nation, being thus in breach of two articles in the Bulgarian constitution. Subsequent attempts to revive it were also quashed (ECRI, 2000, p. 6). In reaction to OMOI's coming into being, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies (VMRO-OMD) was set up during the same month as OMOI. The VMRO-OMD took its name from a well-known terrorist organization that fought for independence against the Turks and later against Serbian control of Macedonia. The organization was in fact a revival of the Union of Macedonian Cultural-Educational Organizations, disbanded by the Zhivkov regime in 1957, and first emerged under a very similar denomination, changing its name into VMRO-OMD at its first national congress in December 1990.
In contrast to OMOI, the VMRO-OMD was pan-Bulgarian in nature. Its first chairman, Dimitar Gotsev, denied (as the Zhivkov regime did in the 1970s and 1980s) the existence of a separate Macedonian identity, considering it to have been artificially created by the Yugoslav authorities in order to undermine Bulgarian territorial integrity. In many ways, VMRO-OMD could be considered to be a formation of radical continuity, but that would be too simplistic. Its historic roots go way back to pre-communist times and some may justifiably consider it to be, on the contrary, one of radical return. In fact, party affiliations of VMRO-OMD members cut across the political spectrum, as Stoyan Boyadzhiev, who replaced Gotsev in 1993, pointed out: some were BSP members, others were members of the SDS. Although Bulgaria officially recognized independent Macedonia, the "historic conflict" pertaining to whether Macedonian was simply a Bulgarian dialect, as claimed by the pan-Bulgarians, or a language of its own, persisted until 1999, when it was settled with the signing in Sofia of a friendship treaty in both countries' "official languages" (see below).
The OMOI was allowed to run lists in the local elections of 1999, under the name OMO-Ilinden-PIRIN. It won five seats on municipal councils. The party had been set up in February 1998 under the full name United Macedonian Organization-Ilinden Party of Economic Development and Integration of the Population, with the last part of the denomination being chosen to produce the acronym PIRIN--the region where most Macedonian Bulgarians live. The decision of the Sofia tribunal to allow OMO-Ilinden-PIRIN to register triggered strong protests, since the organization had earlier been refused registration as a political party and even its registration as a cultural organization was revoked by a court in 1991 on the grounds of being unconstitutional. At that time, the OMOI had been deemed to threaten the sovereignty and national integrity of Bulgaria. Sixty-one deputies from various political formations appealed to the Constitutional Court against OMOI's having been allowed to run in the local elections. Several cabinet ministers subsequently supported the petition. On 29 February 2000, the court ruled by a majority vote to outlaw the party on the grounds of its advocacy for autonomy for the Pirin region (Bugajski, 1995, pp. 252-55; Bell, 1999, pp. 250-52, "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 March 2000; International Helsinki Federation, 2000b.). The decision threatened to endanger the recent spectacular mending of ties between Sofia and Skopje. Indeed, in Sofia in February 1999, Kostov and visiting Macedonian Prime Minster Ljubco Georgievski ended the long-standing "language dispute" by signing a treaty in the two-countries' "official languages." Bulgaria thus implicitly recognized Macedonian as being a separate language on its own and not a "Bulgarian dialect," as previously claimed. The two sides, furthermore, declared they have "no territorial claims on each other" and pledged not to "undertake, incite, or support actions of a hostile nature" against one another" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 23 February 1999). Sofia even went as far as to donate to Macedonia $3.5 million worth of decommissioned weaponry, including some 150 Soviet-made tanks.
The "thaw" appeared to be on its way to a renewed "freeze," as the Macedonian parliament in March passed a resolution moved by the opposition Social Democratic Alliance denouncing the Bulgarian Constitutional Court's decision. Some extra-parliamentary Macedonian far-right formations, wishing to exploit the situation to attract supporters, organized protests in front of the Bulgarian embassy in Skopje. To make matters worse, the Macedonian charge d'affaires in Sofia soon thereafter attended a commemorative service with the participation of OMO-Ilinden-Pirin members, which the local Bulgarian mayor of Sandaski had in vain tried to prevent and which prompted an official protest by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry (BTA, 12 and 13 March, 28 April, 2000).
Aware, as they were, that the Macedonian Social Democrats might well be serving the interests of Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milosevic, who certainly was not pleased by the Bulgarian-Macedonian rapprochement, Georgievski and President Boris Trajkovski did not go much beyond expressing "regret" at the decision of the Bulgarian court, and when Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov visited Skopje in May, the sides were obviously making an effort to minimize the consequences of the tension. Yet Stoyanov--by all means one of the more enlightened Bulgarian politicians--insisted when faced with a question from journalists that OMO-Ilinden-PIRIN was a "separatist" party whose activity was prohibited by constitutional stipulations (BTA, 12 and 13 March, 15 May 2000; "RFE/RL Newsline," 3 March, 16 May 2000). The issue, however, remains a sensitive one and may easily affect relations again in a future less dominated by the "Milosevic specter."
Similar to the VMRO-OMD was the All-Bulgarian Union, set up in early 1990 within KZNI's campaign for the "preservation of Bulgarian culture" but focusing on Macedonian, rather than Turkish issues. Its leaders denounced "pan-Serbian chauvinism" and "Macedonianism," as well as Serbian attempts to assimilate the "Bulgarians" in Vardar Macedonia, but also pledged to defend "Macedonian Bulgarians" in Thrace (Bugajski, 1995, p. 256). A rather outlandish form of "Macedonianism," closely resembling Nazi theories, had indeed been imported into Bulgaria as Bell (1999, p. 252) shows. Originating in emigre circles in Australia and Canada, its doctrines are based on race rather than nationality. It asserts that the ancient Macedonians were a pure Aryan people, whose language was the "ur-Slavic" tongue from which other Slavic languages later developed, having been taken by the inferior people used as farmhands by the original noble Macedonians. The very name "Slav," it is contended, derives from "slave." On the other hand, the "dark-skinned, Semitic" Greeks, said to have arrived in the Balkans in the 5th century B.C., are said to have borrowed from the "ur-Macedonians" their alphabet and, in general, their culture, which they nonetheless "polluted." Hellenism, spread by Alexander the Great, also known as Alexander Makedon, was thus "Macedonianism." Must one add that the doctrine predicts palingenetic "revival"?
As in practically all Central and Southeast European post-communist states, racism in Bulgaria targets the Roma with particular force. A European Commission report on racism and intolerance in that country released in 2000 emphasized that in breach of constitutional and Criminal Law provisions prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds and xenophobic activities, the Bulgarian Roma population has suffered mistreatment by official authorities as well as by the ethnic majority as a whole. For example, in November 1999, residents of the Meden Rudnik neighborhood in the Black Sea Port of Burgas petitioned the local authorities to demolish a Romany part of the neighborhood and expel its inhabitants in order to prevent the spread of disease and crime. In February 2000, the appeal was renewed (Human Rights Project, 2000). Unlike the Czech Republic, where local authorities in the town of Usti nad Labem in October 1999 tried to oblige by erecting a wall segregating Roma from the rest of the population, the Bulgarian authorities did not react, but the authors of the appeal were also not in any way sanctioned. The Usti nad Labem wall was eventually demolished, but walls erected by prejudice are less easily removable.
Not all Bulgarians that feel threatened by Roma are waiting for the authorities to act. In April 2000 the mayor of the Mechka village in the Pleven district himself headed a drive to expel Roma from the village, as retaliation for alleged crimes committed by members of that community. Villagers threatened to set ablaze Romany houses and denied them access to local public service facilities (Human Rights Project, 2000). In neighboring Romania, in several villages a similar threat was put into practice.
The few indictments for racist and xenophobic crimes directed against the Roma that were brought to the courts never resulted in convictions, the 2000 ECRI report said. In 1999 alone, 24 complaints of police brutality were filed by Roma with the Military Prosecutor's Office, but only in five of those complaints did the office launch an investigation, and in only two of the five cases were charges brought against alleged perpetrators (International Helsinki Federation, 2000a, p. 77). Most of these attacks never reach the courts, since the authorities either refuse to consider them as being racially-motivated or exert pressure on plaintiffs to drop charges. For example, the inhabitants of the above-mentioned Mechka village complained about being abused during a police raid in July 1998, when at least 15 people were reportedly injured. The plaintiffs were later intimidated into dropping a court case against the perpetrators (Amnesty International, 2000, p. 58). Furthermore, there is ample evidence of police discrimination against members of the Romany community and of mistreatment of those members while in police custody (on 18 May 2000, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg found evidence of brutality leading to the death of a Roma detained by police on charges of cattle theft and lack of proper investigation of the circumstances of the death. The plaintiff, who was the victim's partner and father of her three children, was awarded 100,000 French francs for "non-pecuniary damages," see Tolerance, 2000). Roma are overrepresented in prison populations and subject to the physical abuse of prison guards and other officials, none of whom have ever been indicted for such an offense. There is also ample evidence of discrimination in the education system, where a "de-facto segregation" persists and Romany children are denied equal access to education. Many of those children are being sent to so-called "special schools," which are in fact intended for children with mental disabilities (the same applies to the Czech Republic and to other countries in the region). And Roma also suffer from employment discrimination (ECRI, 2000, pp. 7, 13-16).
The cabinet headed by Ivan Kostov in 1999 approved a "Framework Program for Equal Integration of Roma into Bulgarian Society," but its implementation is doubtful in light of the widespread anti-Roma attitudes among the ethnic-majority population. Negative media reporting using anti-Roma stereotypes is frequent, and the levels of prejudice and intolerance displayed by attitude surveys are very high (ECRI, 2000, p. 9). In May 2000, for example, the weekly "Zora," which started out as a KZNI publication and is still pursuing extreme nationalist postures, published an open letter addressed to President Stoyanov and signed by a group of intellectuals and artists. The letter decried the "demographic eruption" and the "cultural expansion" of "the Gypsies," portraying them as a barbaric, inferior, and dangerous group that poses a threat to Bulgaria's European integration. The authors' racist discourse did not shy away from using terminology such as "the unbridled Gypsyization," the "terrorizing" of Bulgarians by "Gypsies," and the "arrogant and aggressive subscription of the Gypsy population to all kinds of social privileges." Bulgarian politicians were condemned in the letter for "concealing the real demographic picture of the country" and for "financing" the "demographic outburst of the Gypsies" through "prioritizing of social benefits for the Gypsies in the state budget." Although the penal code sanctions incitement to ethnic hatred, nothing was done by the authorities in reaction to the "Zora letter."
In addition, Bulgarian Roma are perceived as being themselves guilty for their economic and social plight, work (or rather "non-work") habits often being cited as a reason. The authorities themselves often refuse to see the discriminatory reasons beyond its social-economic causes (ECRI, 2000, p. 11). By and large, this also applies across the board. Indeed, it may apply even more in post-communist countries other than Bulgaria.
Amnesty International, Report 2000 (London: Amnesty International Publications).
Bell, J. D., 1999, " The Radical Right in Bulgaria," in Ramet, S. (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 67-83.
BTA (Sofia), 1999.
Bugajski, J., 1995, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties (Armonk, N. Y.: M E. Sharpe).
ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,) 2000, "Second Report on Bulgaria," (Strasbourg: Council of Europe).
Engelbrekt, K., 1991, "Movement for Rights and Freedoms to Compete in Elections," in "Report on Eastern Europe," Vol. 2, no. 40, pp. 1-5.
Engelbrekt, K., 1994, "Bulgaria," in " The Politics of Intolerance," " RFE/RL Research Report," Vol. 3, No. 16, pp. 75-79.
Henderson, K., Robinson, N., 1997, Post-Communist Politics: An Introduction (London: Prentice Hall).
Human Rights Project (Sofia), 2000, "Press Statement," 20 May.
Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 1999, Antisemitism in the World Today (London: http://www.jpr.org.uk/antisem/
International Helsinki Federation, 2000a, Human Rights in the OSCE Region: The Balkans, the Caucasus, Europe, Central Asia and North America Report 2000 (Events of 1999) (http://www.ihf-hr.org
International Helsinki Federation, 2000b, Periodic Reports from the OSCE Region (Balkan Countries), December 1999-March 2000, (http://www.ihf-hr.org
Lenkova, M., 1997, "Bulgarie," in Camus, J.Y. (ed.), Extremismes en Europe, (Paris: Centre Europeen de Recherche et d'Action sur le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme), pp. 146-149.
Oskar, S., Kertikov, K., Lenkova, M., 1996, "Bulgaria" in Camus, J-Y. (ed.), Extremism from the Atlantic to the Urals (Paris: European Center for Research and Action on Racism and Antisemitism, Editions de l'Aube/CERA), pp. 65-68.
"RFE/RL Newsline," 1999-2000.
Tolerance Foundation (Sofia), 2000, "Press Release," 19 May.