Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met for three hours last week with the revamped opposition Mekhk Kkhel, the alternative parliament established in early 2008 that has repeatedly denounced him to the Russian leadership. It's not clear from the published reports of those talks whether the two sides succeeded in reaching agreement on any of the issues over which they are at odds.

According to Mekhk Kkhel Chairman Idris Abadiyev, Yevkurov sought the opposition's "support" for the upcoming March 4 Russian presidential election. Abadiyev did not elaborate, but presumably he meant that Yevkurov wanted a pledge from the opposition not to challenge openly the outcome of the ballot the way they questioned the official results of the December 4 elections to the Russian State Duma.

The Mekhk Kkhel for its part made public after last week's meeting its list of 11 steps  its leaders believe Yevkurov should take to win back public trust.

Ingushetia's population of a little under half a million initially greeted with exultation the appointment in October 2008 of Yevkurov, a career military intelligence officer, to replace incumbent President Murat Zyazikov. Zyazikov was bitterly detested for having condoned massive corruption and inefficiency that compounded economic stagnation, and for having fuelled the ongoing low-level fighting between police and security forces and the North Caucasus insurgency by giving the former carte blanche to abduct and kill any young men suspected of links to the latter.

Yevkurov has indeed succeeded in stabilizing Ingushetia: the incidence of fighting has declined dramatically over the past two years, even though Yevkurov himself narrowly escaped death in a car bombing in June 2009. But young men are still sporadically abducted and either vanish or turn up dead, and Yevkurov has admitted that the security forces in all likelihood are behind at least some of those abductions.

Yevkurov has been less successful, however, in eradicating the endemic corruption that was a hallmark of the Zyazikov leadership, or in galvanizing the republic's stagnating economy, reducing its dependence on subsidies from the federal budget, and creating desperately needed new jobs. Moreover, some of Yevkurov's critics consider him and his family just as corrupt and untrustworthy as the previous leadership. The recent scandal involving a distant relative of Yevkurov who swindled dozens of villagers out of 5 million rubles ($170,000) with fraudulent promises of grants doubtless contributed to that perception.

Getting Back Prigorodny

Yevkurov made a point of meeting with opposition representatives soon after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev named him republic head. But he alienated them within months by pushing through the republican parliament a law on municipalities that did not designate the disputed Prigorodny district of neighboring North Ossetia as part of Ingushetia.

Until the 1944 deportation, Prigorodny was part of the then-Checheno-Ingush ASSR. Redrawing the current border between the two republics to return it to Ingushetian jurisdiction, in line with the 1990 U.S.S.R. law on the rehabilitation of the deported peoples, has long been one of the opposition's primary demands. Indeed, a recent article goes so far as to claim that the only criterion by which Ingushetia's population judges the republic head is his stance on winning back the territories Ingushetia "lost" to North Ossetia and Chechnya. 

Clarification of Yevkurov's position vis-a-vis Prigorodny and of how he intends to secure implementation of an agreement he signed in 2009 with his North Ossetian counterpart, Taymuraz Mamsurov, on the return to Prigorodny of Ingush who fled their homes there during a brief but bloody conflict in late 1992 figured prominently in the list of 11 demands the Mekhk Kkhel made public last week.

The first of those demands, however, focused on last December's simultaneous elections to the Russian State Duma, the republic's parliament, and to local municipal councils. According to the official State Duma election results, voter turnout in Ingushetia was 88 percent, of whom the overwhelming majority cast their ballots for the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. The Mekhk Kkhel claims to have evidence that those figures bear no relation to reality, and that no more than 6-15 percent of the electorate turned out to vote. It is demanding the parliamentary election results be annulled and a repeat ballot scheduled for the fall of this year.

Prominent oppositionist Magomed Khazbiyev sought unsuccessfully to induce Ingushetia's Shari'a Court to summon Yevkurov and Central Election Commission Chairman Musa Yevloyev to answer for the imputed vote-rigging under Shari'a law.  Mufti Isa Khamkhoyev countered that such issues do not fall under the court's jurisdiction. At the same time, the opposition began collecting signatures from persons who say they did not vote: to date they have amassed some 27,000 signatures.

The election debacle served as the catalyst for a congress of the Mekhk Kkhel in late December attended by some 300 delegates who elected Abadiyev as its new chairman. The following day, the republic's Interior Ministry searched Abadiyev's home on the pretext that his son was a suspect in a robbery, and briefly detained him for questioning.

Over the past two months, the Mekhk Kkhel has addressed three successive appeals to Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin outlining their grievances, but has apparently not received a response to any of them. Meanwhile, speculation is intensifying that once Putin is reelected Russian president, he may move immediately to replace Yevkurov, whose term as republic head expires in October.

It is therefore understandable that Yevkurov may have tried last week to co-opt the Mekhk Kkhel to endorse publicly whatever percentage of the vote Putin is said to garner in Ingushetia on March 4, rather than risk Putin bringing back Zyazikov (who like Putin, made his career in the KGB/FSB) to replace Yevkurov as republic head. Zyazikov emerged from obscurity last week to publish a glowing endorsement of Putin. 

If this is indeed what Putin has in mind, then given the hatred and mistrust many Ingush harbor toward Zyazikov, Putin will need to engineer Zyazikov's return to power before the proposal to bring back direct elections for the heads of federation subjects is voted into law and implemented.

Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov has elevated the cult of personality surrounding his late father, former Chechen President Akhmed-hadji Kadyrov, to a new level by rescheduling the date on which Chechens are to commemorate the 1944 deportation of the entire Chechen and Ingush nations to Central Asia on Stalin's orders.

According to RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service, Kadyrov has issued orders that in future, the anniversary should be marked not on the actual date the deportation got under way -- February 23 -- but on May 10, in conjunction with the commemoration of the anniversary of the death of Akhmed-hadji, who was killed by a bomb attack in Grozny on May 9, 2004. May 9 is marked across Russia as Victory Day, the end of World War II.

Kadyrov's instructions have not been made public, presumably because his advisers understand, even if he does not, that this is a monstrous insult to every Chechen and will only compound the hatred many already feel for him.

Those orders are presumably the reason why there was a grandiose event in Grozny on February 23 to mark Defenders of the Fatherland Day, but no comparable ceremony to mark the anniversary.

It's not clear whether Kadyrov will try to induce Republic of Ingushetia head Yunus-Bek Yevkurov -- who this year for the first time described the deportation as "genocide" -- to follow his example. Indeed, there is no guarantee that Yevkurov will retain his job once Vladimir Putin is again elected Russian president.

The glowing endorsement of Putin earlier this week by Yevkurov's detested predecessor, Murat Zyazikov, raises the question whether Putin will bring back fellow Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Zyazikov to replace Yevkurov, who was appointed in October 2008 by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

De facto Abkhaz President Aleksandr Ankvab escaped unscathed this morning an attack on his five-car motorcade as he was driving from his home in Gudauta to Sukhumi, the breakaway republic's capital. The perpetrators exploded a remote-controlled bomb then opened fire, killing two of Ankvab's bodyguards and severely injuring a third.

It was the sixth attempt in the last seven years to assassinate Ankvab, who was elected president of the breakaway republic in August with 59 percent of the vote following the untimely death of incumbent Sergei Bagapsh.

Ankvab, 58, is a career Interior Ministry official who served as prime minister during Bagapsh's first presidential term (2005-09) then as vice president following Bagapsh's reelection in late 2009 for a second term. Dour, humorless, and sarcastic, he is nonetheless respected for his zero tolerance of crime and corruption. That single-mindedness is the most likely reason why he has been repeatedly targeted for assassination: in February and April 2005, June and July 2007, and September 2010. In the Caucasus, only Makhachkala Mayor Said Amirov has a more impressive track record as a survivor.

It is not immediately clear whether today's attempt on Ankvab's life is to be attributed to his ongoing efforts to eradicate corruption or to the acrimonious dispute with Russia over ownership of Soviet-era real estate, or whether there is a connection with the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 10, in which corruption and economic stagnation are key issues.

In December, Ankvab called for legal measures against anyone involved in the ongoing embezzlement of funds provided by Russia, which provided 9.9 billion rubles ($332 million) in subsidies in 2010-11 alone.

The news agency Kavkaz-uzel.ru quoted unnamed Abkhaz officials as excluding the possibility of any Georgian involvement in this morning's attack.

Eighteen months after the belated adoption of a new military doctrine that pinpoints the continued occupation of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian forces as a major threat, Azerbaijan has finally embarked on structural reform of its armed forces.

In recent years, Baku has doubled defense spending, from over $2 billion in 2009 to $4.4 billion for 2012. At the same time, senior officials have warned repeatedly that in the absence of a political settlement to the Karabakh conflict, a "military solution" is the only alternative. Whether massive cash injections alone can transform armed forces that were described in an International Crisis Group (ICG) report released three years ago as "fragmented, divided, accountable-to-no-one-but-the-president, un-transparent, corrupt, and internally feuding" is questionable, however.

Initial measures unveiled last week focus on modernizing conscription, one of several spheres within the armed forces where corruption is reportedly endemic. Military service is mandatory in Azerbaijan for men between the ages of 18 and 35. The ICG report noted that many conscripts' families pay bribes to military commissars in order to avoid front-line duty by being sent to serve in other units such as the Interior troops.

As a first step, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has issued a decree abolishing the district military commissariats subordinate to the Defense Ministry and establishing in their place a civil State Service for Mobilization and Induction into Military Service, which held its first session on February 15.  

Retired Colonel Ildyrym Mamedov, who now heads the civilian Center for Military Academic Research, described the military commissariats, a Soviet throwback dating to before World War II, as "a repressive and corrupt organ that is incapable of taking decisions, and poisons relations between the people and the state." He said the commissars were for the most part corrupt "daddy's boys" who had never seen active service and had no management experience; he branded them "a disgrace to the armed forces." 

Cesur Sumerinli, who heads the Doktrina Center for Journalistic Military Research, told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that "dozens" of former military commissars were currently under arrest awaiting trial on bribery and corruption charges. 

The new civil state service is headed by Arzu Ragimov, a former general who previously served as chairman of the State Migration Service. According to Colonel Mamedov, it is primarily thanks to Ragimov's professionalism that the State Migration Service is one of the country's most professional agencies. Sumerinli for his part noted that Ragimov has never been implicated in corruption.

Sumerinli also told Kavkaz-uzel.ru that creation of a civilian agency to oversee conscription was one of the requirements enshrined in the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) agreed with NATO in 2005. The law on mobilization was duly amended to replace regional call-up centers with a single one subordinate directly to the head of state, zerkalo.az reported on March 11, 2006, but that amendment apparently remained on paper.

The ICG report noted that those selective reforms that have been implemented within the Azerbaijani military have been undertaken in order to meets the demands of successive IPAPs. The most recent IPAP was finalized in December 2011.  

Revamping conscription may, as Sumerinli noted, reduce the potential leeway for corruption in that sector. But many other areas have long been affected, including procurement and supply. The online daily "Ayna-Zerkalo" has reported fearlessly since the mid-to-late 1990s on such abuses as the falsification of documentation pertaining to the purchase of food supplies, some of which (canned pet food past its sell-by date) was not fit for human consumption.

In March 2006, zerkalo.az reported that President Aliyev planned to issue "soon" orders to create a special commission that was to review the spending by the Defense Ministry of budget funds. But three years later, the ICG concluded that corruption in procurement and supply was still a problem. "A lack of transparency and parliamentary oversight of tenders for military construction and food and other purchases for the army allows inflated prices and proxy companies to receive preferential treatment," the report reads. "Lethal accidents in the armed forces due to technical malfunctions have led to speculation that due to corruption in procurement, outdated hardware is being purchased as new."

As long as Azerbaijan's top brass refuse to take effective measures to eradicate not only corruption in its various manifestations, but also brutal hazing, reform of the call-up system alone will not yield armed forces that conform to NATO standards. According to Mamedov, that can be achieved only by switching to a professional army serving on a contract basis, backed by a pool of reservists who undergo annual training.

Over a period of five days last week, militants in Chechnya inflicted serious casualties on pro-Moscow Chechen forces in a series of coordinated attacks in adverse weather conditions.

On February 18, the Chechen Interior Ministry admitted to having lost a total of 17 officers killed, and a further 24 wounded.

It was the second such major battle so far this year.

As such, it demonstrates the enhanced combat effectiveness of the Chechnya-based insurgents, and may also herald a sustained long-term intensification of hostilities.

Ever since the Chechen insurgents retreated from Grozny during the night of January 31, 2000, accurately assessing the intensity of sporadic low-level fighting between the insurgency and pro-Moscow Chechen and federal forces has been bedeviled by a dearth of reliable information.

Russian and Western media tend to promulgate unquestioningly Chechen officials' claims of the losses inflicted on the insurgency, claims that are frequently inconsistent and/or seemingly exaggerated.
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The insurgents are not always able to promptly provide their own version of what happened, but their estimates of enemy casualties, whether posted on the main insurgency website Kavkazcenter or relayed in phone calls or SMS messages to RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service, are almost always higher than those admitted to by Chechen and Moscow officials.

Reports of the most recent fighting in Chechnya's south-eastern Nozhai-Yurt district, on the border with Daghestan, conform to that pattern.

Piecing together and comparing reports from the Chechen authorities, Kavkazcenter, and Chechen officials who spoke to the Caucasus Knot news agency on condition of anonymity, the following chronology emerges.

Differing Death Tolls

Late on February 13, some 30-40 insurgents lured police from Chechnya's neighboring Vedeno district into an ambush and attacked them from two sides, killing five and wounding at least six of them.

The insurgents retreated without incurring casualties despite the deployment on February 14 of heavy artillery and military helicopters.

Kavkaz-Uzel quoted unnamed Chechen sources as saying on February 15 that the search for the fighters had ended unsuccessfully the previous day.

But fighting resumed on the morning of February 15 after the insurgents opened fire on Chechen Special Purpose Interior Ministry forces (spetsnaz). An insurgent who succeeded after numerous failed attempts in calling RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service reported against a background of deafening artillery fire that the insurgents had killed four police officers and wounded at least 13.

A Chechen law enforcement official confirmed the killing of four police to Kavkaz-Uzel.

On February 16, Chechen officials said the fighting had shifted to the neighboring Kazbekov district of Daghestan, where Daghestani, Chechen and federal forces backed by military helicopters reportedly engaged in two successive fierce gun battles with three separate groups of insurgents totaling "several dozen" in all.

They said two of those groups were led by Daghestani amirs Ruslan Temirkaev and Arslan Mamedov (aka Amir Muaz), and the third by a Chechen, Makharbi Timiraliyev, 47. (Intercepts of walkie-talkie communications presumably facilitated the identification of the three commanders.)

Five more police officers were reported killed and six wounded in that fighting.
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As of  the morning of February 17, the death toll among the pro-Moscow Chechen forces was given as 11, with a further 17 wounded, compared with the 14 killed claimed by Kavkazcenter.

No further details were given of fighting on February 17-18, so it remains unclear when and in what circumstances the death toll among the pro-Moscow Chechen forces rose from 11 (or 14) to 17.

Also on February 17, Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Timiraliyev's entire detachment of seven men had been killed in Nozhai-Yurt.

But Kavkaz-Uzel on February 18 quoted law enforcement officials as saying the hunt for the last remaining members of Timiraliyev's group was continuing.

The insurgency website Kavkazcenter confirmed the death of Timiraliyev and four of his men. Five bodies said to be those of the slain fighters were shown on Chechen state TV.

Fighting Spills Over?

Meanwhile, a senior Daghestani official denied on February 17 that the fighting had spilled over from Chechnya to Daghestan.

Security Council secretary Magomed Baachilov told Interfax that military operations were confined to Chechen territory, and no fighters had penetrated Daghestan from Chechnya.

Nonetheless, RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service was informed that fighting did indeed take place in Daghestan's Kazbekov district on February 17.

The insurgency's tactics in Nozhai-Yurt were the same as those used in fighting in Vedeno in early January.

On that earlier occasion, one group of insurgents had also lured Chechen police into an ambush; two other groups attacked along a radius of 15-20 kilometers.

The pro-Moscow Chechen losses over a period of several days were officially given as four dead and 14 wounded.

Kavkazcenter cited a higher figure of at least 14 dead and 36 wounded.

The Chechen authorities subsequently produced three bodies they identified as insurgents killed in the fighting.

Chechen human rights activists, however, claimed the men had been taken from Kadyrov's private prison, dressed in winter camouflage, and shot dead.

Just days into the new year, a group numbering around 10 insurgents had opened fire on Chechen police in Yandy, south-west of Grozny, then retreated.

Despite the deployment of artillery and combat helicopters, the hunt for them ended in failure four days later.

If the insurgency indeed succeeded in killing up to 30 Chechen and Russian police in Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt with a loss of only five of its own fighters, that ratio testifies to their increasing tactical superiority.

Moreover, as Kavkazcenter pointed out, the fighting took place in rugged mountainous terrain in heavy snow.

That latter circumstance raises the question: are such attacks the start of a training program to hone insurgents' skills in winter warfare with the ultimate intention of disrupting the Winter Olympics in Sochi in two years' time?

Or do they herald a switch in tactics from occasional high-profile suicide attacks, such as those on Kadyrov's home village of Khosi-Yurt in August 2010 and the targeting of Chechen police in Grozny one year later, to more frequent coordinated attacks on Chechen police in the mountain districts where the insurgents maintain their network of bases?

Alla Dzhioyeva, the opposition candidate whose victory in a runoff ballot in November for de facto president of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia was swiftly annulled by the republic's Supreme Court, was taken to a hospital after a raid by some 200 masked security personnel on her headquarters in Tskhinvali.

Accounts of what happened, and of her condition, are contradictory. Dzhioyeva had planned to hold her inauguration on February 10, despite warnings from acting de facto President Vadim Brovtsev that doing so would constitute an attempt to seize power illegally.  

The security personnel forced their way into Dzhioyeva's headquarters on February 9. Some eyewitnesses say they hit Dzhioyeva on the head with a rifle butt and she lost consciousness. The South Ossetian Interior Ministry has issued a statement denying this. Deputy prosecutor Georgy Kabulov said Dzhioyeva passed out when she realized the security personnel planned to take her to the prosecutor's office for questioning.

Shortly before the security personnel forced their way into the building, Dzhioyeva reportedly had an argument by telephone with one of her former backers, Russian wrestling team trainer Dzhambolat Tedeyev, who tried unsuccessfully to persuade her to call off her planned inauguration. 

Medical personnel at the hospital in Tskhinvali said Dzhioyeva, who is 62, suffered a minor stroke, but had regained consciousness. She has reportedly rejected an offer to transport her to a hospital in Vladikavkaz, the capital of neighboring North Ossetia.

Dzhioyeva told the Russian daily "Kommersant" on February 9 that nothing would stop her going ahead with her planned inauguration. Asked why she had not tried to register for the March 25 repeat presidential ballot, she said she would not be permitted to do so.

In fact, the agreement she signed in December with outgoing President Eduard Kokoity explicitly gives her the right to participate. Nineteen candidates have applied to register for that election. But according to a recent poll cited by "Kommersant," only 48 percent of the electorate intend to cast ballots, which implies that those who voted for Dzhioyeva in last November's runoff intend to stay at home, having "already made their choice."