June 30, 2004
Iraq: Handover -- Baghdad Can't Expect Much Outside Help Until Security Is Under Control (Part 4)
by Breffni O'Rourke
Iraq's economy is based largely on oil exports
![]()
Iraq has been granted its sovereignty from the United States; but will the world be rushing to help Baghdad? Probably not, while the security situation remains so grave. The likelihood of new foreign-troop commitments is slim, and reconstruction and economic activity cannot progress meaningfully without a secure environment. In the fourth piece in a five-part series on the handover of power, RFE/RL correspondent Breffni O'Rourke reports that it is now up to the new interim government in Baghdad to convince the Iraqi people that it is legitimate and that further violence is pointless.
Prague, 30 June 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The state of security in Iraq is the essential element that will decide how the country fares in the immediate future.
Iraq's potential for economic development is great. But a continuation of the bombings, kidnappings, and sabotage will hinder reconstruction and discourage private investment.
The first question to ask, therefore, is how much extra support can Iraq expect from the international community in terms of military assistance to control insurgents? The second question is, what further nonmilitary assistance from foreign governments is possible in the prevailing security conditions?
This week's NATO summit in Istanbul proved unable to make a significant contribution to helping Iraq out if its dilemma. Despite the hopes of U.S. President George W. Bush, the best the summit could do was agree to train Iraqi security forces and border guards.
Several NATO members who opposed the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq say there can be no direct military role for NATO, even in a sovereign Iraq. And such is the delicacy of the situation that most of the training will take place off Iraqi soil.
Mark Joyce, a senior analyst at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said: "It has become increasingly clear over recent days and weeks that the prospects of NATO contributing large numbers of additional troops to Iraq in the short and medium term was a very unlikely one. This is what the Bush administration was pushing for initially, but it quickly became clear that [such commitments] were not going to materialize. So they decided instead to settle for NATO playing a very limited role in terms of training Iraqi security forces."
Beyond the ideological rejection lies a compelling practical reason. Namely, that the members of the NATO alliance are already feeling stretched by their engagements in Afghanistan.