December 31, 2004
Central Asia: A Year In Review
by Daniel Kimmage
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If any single mood was common to all of Central Asia in 2004, it was one of gradually rising unease. No cataclysms darkened the skies; but where stability endured, it did so at a price.
President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov ruled Turkmenistan with apparent disregard for all but himself even as his country's isolation deepened and the outside world nervously eyed reports of a society in perpetual crisis and potential collapse.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov found himself in a familiar standoff with critics of his iron-fisted approach to ensuring stability, as terrorist attacks and outbursts of civil unrest suggested that the seemingly still waters of Uzbekistan may run dangerously deep.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev oversaw a petroleum-fueled economic upturn and shepherded a comfortably pro-presidential majority into parliament, yet his very domination of the political arena and the looming uncertainty of succession conspired to cast a pall over the future.
Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev stressed his resolve to become the first regional leader to leave power voluntarily, but spoke darkly of election-related storm clouds gathering on the horizon in 2005.
And Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov shored up his hold on power as Tajikistan soldiered on with a halting recovery from the dual blows of post-Soviet transition and a devastating 1992-1997 civil war.
Unease marked the region's economic fortunes and geopolitical alignments. Kazakhstan stood out as the economic leader, with plentiful oil to sell amid high world prices and a rapidly developing financial system to move the money around, but the hydrocarbon-heavy mix promises the country an uphill battle if it is to avoid the fate of an oil-dependent rentier state and arrive at a more diversified economy. Gas-rich Turkmenistan, already a rentier state by some assessments, moved in an economic fog, with official statistics trumpeting triumphs and international financial institutions insinuating otherwise. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan experienced varieties of the post-Soviet doldrums, with pervasive corruption, lingering socialist-era inefficiencies, and lagging foreign investment hampering growth and allowing poverty to keep a vise-grip on swaths of the population.
Relations Abroad
Kazakh President Nazarbaev, who pioneered the "multivector" approach to foreign policy in the region, no doubt relished the sight of his broadening legacy, as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan attempted to replicate Kazakhstan's feat of maintaining cordial relations with such regional and global heavyweights as Russia, the United States, and China while getting something for themselves in the bargain. The basic rules of the "multivector" game, as played in the southeastern arc of Central Asia, have now emerged: cooperation with Russia and China premised on a common acceptance of authoritarian political practice and driven by economic interests, often in the energy sector; cooperation with the West, primarily the United States, premised on the primacy of security concerns and driven by common opposition to Islamic extremism; and just enough tension between the big outside players to let the smaller Central Asian players extract concessions with the occasional move to and fro.
Security threats continued to provide the prism through which much of the outside world viewed Central Asia. Here too, unease abounded. Uzbekistan's government pointed to terrorist attacks as proof of a dire threat, but critics saw the violence as evidence of repression begetting resistance, and the government's warnings as a convenient pretext to crack down on domestic dissent. The debate seems poised to encompass Uzbekistan's neighbors, as officials in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Kazakhstan warned of increasing activity by such extremist groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which officially eschews violence yet pursues the radical goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the region.