* Stanislau Shushkevich, whose signature adorns the dissolution act of the Soviet Union, was the chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet in which Lukashenka started his political career.
* Lyavon Barshcheuski, from the Belarusian Popular Front, was a people's deputy in 1991-95, along with his then-comrades-in-arms Zyanon Paznyak and Yuras Belenki.
* Anatol Lyabedzka, from the United Civic Party, was a people's deputy in the same legislature.
* Social democrat Alyaksandr Kazulin was a deputy education minister in Prime Minister Vyachaslau Kebich's cabinet.
* Social democrat Mikola Statkevich was the founder of the Belarusian Association of Servicemen.
* Alyaksandr Milinkevich, who served as a provincial university professor and deputy head of the city administration in Hrodna, is perhaps the only leading oppositionist who kept a low profile in the pre-Lukashenka era.
Fourteen years later, after a series of disappointing political failures, virtually the same people can be found in the top ranks of the Belarusian opposition. But while these politicians could once mobilize 50,000 people in Minsk for a street protest against the ruling regime, today 2,000 people at an opposition rally is deemed a huge success.
Without a doubt, an objective generation gap between the veteran leaders of the opposition and younger Belarusians is responsible to a significant degree for the dramatically weakened public appeal of opposition parties in Belarus. But it can also be argued that the lack of an adequate political strategy on the part of the opposition and the regime's ability to respond to some essential needs and expectations of the younger generation are no less important in marginalizing the opposition movement or even reducing it to a replica of the Soviet-era dissent.
Belief In Showdown
During a recent online news conference with RFE/RL, Mikola Statkevich spoke for many Belarusian opposition leaders when he asserted that change in today's Belarus is possible only through a political showdown during presidential elections.
"Decisive action by some 1,500 demonstrators under circumstances in which the authorities keep everything under tight control is impossible," Statkevich said. "But there is one night in five years when the authorities' control, so to say, wavers. This is the night of political miracles. This is the night of presidential elections."
Past tactical moves of the Belarusian opposition -- as well as those of its Western sponsors -- followed this strategic guideline. Targeted financial, organizational, and propaganda resources were spent by the Belarusian opposition on three major campaigns of the Lukashenka-era: the presidential ballots in 2001 and 2006 and the constitutional referendum in 2004, when Lukashenka lifted the two-term limit on the presidency. The parliamentary-election campaigns in Belarus in 2000 and 2004 were of significantly less importance to the opposition and its sponsors. Indeed, nobody seems even to remember that Belarus also held local elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007.
It is unsurprising that during the above-mentioned presidential campaigns the role of younger opposition activists was confined to collecting signatures, distributing campaign materials, and, primarily, participating in street protests. Their older colleagues made decisions about the allocation of campaign resources and represented the Belarusian opposition abroad. There was hardly any space for young oppositionists to develop or test their own political ambitions.
Parliamentary and local elections presented much better opportunities for young activists, who could run for seats as people's deputies and local councilors, to demonstrate their political initiative and gain political experience.
Meanwhile their older colleagues, believing that participation in parliamentary elections -- let alone local ones -- was a waste of time and energy, busied themselves with symbolic electoral activities in major cities.
Combined with a questionable political strategy that favored political change from the top over a grassroots approach, the generational gap within the Belarusian opposition grew wider and wider.
Carrots And Sticks
When speaking about the repressive nature of Lukashenka's regime, one must understand that its control apparatus is aimed almost exclusively at containing potentially effective antigovernment activities during major political campaigns, as well as at those citizens who try to infect the wider social strata with the "opposition virus." Otherwise, Belarus is relatively free with respect to cultural and intellectual life. Or more accurately, state control over "apolitical" cultural and intellectual activities in the nonstate sector is lax. In other words, life in today's Belarus is a far cry from the stale and depressing atmosphere of the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union.
Previously banned Belarusian rockers are being offered clemency in exchange for a refusal to perform at opposition events (RFE/RL)