THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT
A Special Report by RFE/RL's Regional Analysis
19 November 2002

Headlines:

RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH NATO: IN SEARCH OF A NEW DIMENSION

THE BALTIC STATES: A LITMUS TEST FOR NATO

NATO AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN

END NOTE: ADAPTING NATO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

EXPANDING NATO: THE PRAGUE SUMMIT. The leaders of the 19 NATO member states will meet on 21-22 November in Prague to chart the Atlantic alliance's future course. NATO is expected to continue its enlargement process by inviting as many as seven countries to join the organization. The agenda will also include improving the alliance's defense against terrorism, developing new military capabilities, and strengthening relationships with Russia and among NATO members.

Ten countries are currently pursuing NATO membership by participating in the alliance's Membership Action Plan (MAP): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that established the alliance and to contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic region is eligible to join the alliance. Countries desiring NATO membership must also meet certain military, political, and economic goals. The MAP is designed to assist countries aspiring to NATO membership by providing advice, assistance, and practical support. However, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, and invitations to join the organization are made on a case-by-case basis. Recent developments in Central and Southwest Asia and the Middle East have boosted the membership prospects of Romania and Bulgaria due to the their geographic proximity to these new regions of concern to the alliance.

The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council at the Rome summit on 28 May 2002 opened a new chapter in NATO-Russia relations and enabled both sides to pursue new opportunities for joint action, such as the fight against terrorism, crisis management, arms control, missile defense, search-and-rescue at sea, bilateral military cooperation, and civil emergencies. A previous accord providing for regular consultations, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, foundered due to disagreements over NATO military action in the former Yugoslavia and other issues, and the Rome agreement has yet to be tested.

To meet the new security challenges facing the alliance, NATO must ensure that its forces have the equipment, personnel, and training to carry out its mission. Proposed measures to increase the alliance's operational capabilities will be submitted for approval during the summit. Increased mobility, survivability, and improved command and control are key military concerns of the alliance. These issues have been complicated by NATO's peacekeeping commitments in Kosova, other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and the prospect of the Atlantic alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. Other unsettled military issues remain from the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. (Don Jensen)

RUSSIA

COOPERATION WITH NATO: IN SEARCH OF A NEW DIMENSION. On 1 November, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that President Vladimir Putin had instructed him to attend the 21-22 November NATO summit in Prague, a historic event that is expected to bless the entrance into the alliance of seven new Eastern and Central European members, including the former Soviet republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Ivanov said that he also expects to participate in a foreign-minister-level session of the Russia-NATO Council to be held on the sidelines of the summit, at which the main topic of discussion will be improving cooperation in combating international terrorism.

Ivanov's announcement, emphasizing cooperation in the face of an expansion that Moscow continues to oppose, is typical of the evolution of the Kremlin's attitude toward NATO expansion that began a little more than one year ago, an evolution characterized by a sharp shift from loud protestation to reluctant acceptance and an active search for new forms of cohabitation with the enlarging alliance.

This evolution got under way in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, when Putin signed up with the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition. Most notably, Putin consented to the presence of U.S. forces in Central Asia in preparation for a strike against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Evidently, the tangible threat of terrorism from Russia's south compelled Putin to overcome Moscow's traditional suspicion of U.S. and Western intentions in this region. As a popular Russian comedian said at the time, "Better the Americans in Uzbekistan than the Taliban in Tatarstan."

Obviously, another element in this change of heart was Moscow's awareness of its own weakness. In an interview on 14 May with the RosBalt new agency, Kremlin-connected political consultant Gleb Pavlovskii explained that Russia has only two options when it comes to defending its territory and national security from the threat of international terrorism. It could try to build up its own military response in partnership with the very weak states along its southern perimeter in competition -- or even confrontation -- with the United States and the West. In this case, the Kremlin would have to count on "incompetent regimes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which at best would be unreliable allies and, at worst, outright foes." If these countries tried to abandon Russia's orbit, the West would most likely back them and not Russia, Pavlovskii pointed out.

Russia's other choice, in Pavlovskii's analysis, would be to boost its defenses by adopting policies aimed at reducing outside threats and increasing cooperation with the United States and other powerful Western countries. This option appeared more practical because of repeated U.S. and NATO overtures for cooperation and an existing NATO cooperation mechanism, the Partnership for Peace program. Pavlovskii argued that this strategy would not only enable Russia to address possible threats to its southern perimeter but also to enhance its security in the West through expanding contacts with the United States, NATO, and the European Union, contacts that would take the form of "mutual agreements and obligations."

"We chose the second course, and that was the right choice," Pavlovskii concluded.

Russia's evolving attitude toward NATO expansion was given new impetus by the signing of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in May and the creation the same month of the NATO-Russia Council during the alliance's Rome summit.

In the early stages of this evolution of attitude, Putin frequently faced and faced down strong anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments from within Russia's political and military elites. Now, however, as the Prague summit nears, a significant shift in these sentiments can be observed. Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the influential Defense and Foreign Relations Council, typifies this shift. Speaking to journalists during an international conference titled "NATO-EU-Russia: Together Against New Threats to International Security" in Prague on 14-15 November, Karaganov declared that every Russian nationalist today -- and he considers himself a nationalist -- "must be a Westerner and must do everything possible to promote Russian integration with NATO and the EU." He argued that military-strategic cooperation with the West has increased Russia's role in the international arena far beyond any that its diminished economic power would justify. This is especially true for South Asia and the Middle East, where Russia's alliance with the United States has unexpectedly revived Russia's tangible levers of political influence.

For Russia, Karaganov continued, this alliance with the West -- in the broad political sense that includes Israel, Japan, and even China -- means standing together with the world's richest and most progressive countries rather than with the poor and miserable. This status is important for Moscow not only in terms of its international status, but because two major conflict faults run right through Russia: the "clash-of-civilizations" fault line between the West and those parts of the Islamic world that are using religious fanaticism to resist modernization and the conflict fault line between the rich and the poor.

This second fault is particularly worrisome for Russia, in Karaganov's view. He said that many Islamic extremists tolerated for about 20 years a growing gap between the rich and the poor before taking action. The younger generation in Russia has already been watching this process for 12 years, Karaganov warned, and might not wait much longer. Therefore, the government must work quickly to create economic conditions that will counter despair and give young people hope for their futures. In any case, however, the government will not be able to provide such hope for all young people, so the state must also take extraordinary measures to prevent Russian extremists from allying with international terrorists, as well as to safeguard the country's nuclear-power plants and chemical- and biological-weapons installations.

Karaganov views cooperation between Russia and NATO as a fact of life that must be faced. However, he believes that NATO needs a new mission, as the justifications of containing the Soviet Union and protecting Western Europe from Communist expansion have vanished. He noted that in recent years NATO has adopted some new inter-European functions such as containing "nationalism" and bolstering the military-political link between the United States and Europe. Both of these functions, especially the second, are beneficial to Russian national interests. Even more important for the future of Russian-NATO ties, however, are the development of strategies and doctrines addressing joint peacekeeping operations and shared international security concerns such as combating international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and drug trafficking, Karaganov said. (Victor Yasmann)

TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

'THEY ALSO SERVE WHO ONLY STAND AND WAIT.' The attitudes of the three South Caucasus states toward NATO membership differ greatly. Georgia has made clear its intention to make a formal application at the 21-22 NATO summit in Prague for membership in the alliance. Armenia, by contrast, plans to continue the closest-possible mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO but not to seek formal membership, either now or at some future date. Pronouncements on the part of Azerbaijani officials over the past two years have been more ambiguous, acknowledging that the country is not ready for membership and will not be for the foreseeable future.

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze first raised the possibility of NATO membership for Georgia in the spring of 1999, shortly after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were accepted as the alliance's newest members. And in the fall of that year, Shevardnadze first suggested a time frame, telling the "Financial Times" that he will "knock vigorously at NATO's door" in 2005. (Shevardnadze's second and final presidential term expires in that year.) On 13 September 2002, the Georgian parliament voted to task the executive with embarking on the formal process of applying for NATO membership.

Shevardnadze has since stated that he will present a formal request in Prague that Georgia be considered for membership in the alliance. NATO officials, including Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, have welcomed that statement of intent but have avoided any prediction of how long it might take before Georgia becomes a full-fledged NATO member. Shevardnadze, for his part, has admitted that membership is not anticipated in the near future. The Prague summit is expected to clarify at least the approximate time frame for a prospective "third wave" of NATO expansion.

At present, there are at least two major obstacles to Georgia's joining NATO. First, repeated complaints by Georgian defense officials of chronic underfunding suggest that, despite numerous generous grants from the United States and Turkey, including the U.S.-funded "train-and-equip" program launched earlier this year, the Georgian armed forces are unlikely to attain NATO standards in the near future. In 2003, defense spending is planned at 57 million laris ($26.5 million), less than half the 129 million laris that the Defense Ministry considers necessary. Incidentally, Georgia currently owes more than 11 million euros ($11.09 million) in unpaid membership fees for NATO's Partnership for Peace program for the past five years.

One Russian observer has suggested, however, that the United States at least might consider Georgia's geopolitical situation so vital that the requirements that pertain to other applicants may be waived in Georgia's case. Colonel General Yurii Baluevskii, who is the deputy chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, told Interfax in September: "When the alliance decided on admitting the so-called first wave of new members, priority was given to their military and technological capabilities. [But] today this issue has been sidelined." Baluevskii continued: "I think the Georgian Army is unlikely to be able to meet NATO military and technological requirements for the next few decades. However, I do not rule out that the political element will be given priority when reviewing Georgia's application." Decisions on accepting new members into NATO are, however, made by consensus, and while the United States may well push for admitting Georgia on political grounds, other members could raise objections to doing so.

Second, NATO does not look kindly on member states hosting military bases belonging to non-NATO members (although its founding charter does not explicitly forbid them from doing so). Georgia currently has two Russian military bases on its territory, and Moscow insists that it needs between 11 and 13 years to close them.

Paradoxically, the Armenian military is probably far better qualified for NATO membership than its Georgian counterpart. Armenia's defense spending is already more than double what Georgia allocates and is slated to be increased by 20 percent in the 2003 draft budget to 46 billion drams ($80 million). And this author was astounded by the professionalism of the Independence Day military parade she witnessed in Yerevan in September 1996. (Georgia has canceled Independence Day military parades for the past two years due to financial constraints.)

Whereas Georgia is eager to place all its eggs in the NATO security basket, Armenia remains committed to a security policy that parallels its multipolar, complementary foreign policy. That security policy combines close military cooperation with Russia (which has a military base in Armenia close to the frontier with Turkey), multilateral cooperation within the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, and increasingly close cooperation with NATO. In June 2001, Armenian troops participated for the first time in Partnership for Peace military exercises, and Armenia will host further such maneuvers next year in which troops from 17 NATO member states, including Turkey, and from Russia will participate.

Over the past three years, Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly affirmed their intention to broaden and intensify cooperation with NATO within the parameters of the Partnership for Peace program. Unofficially, they have also raised the possibility that Azerbaijan could host a NATO base. But at the same time, they have avoided a direct answer to the question of whether they envisage Azerbaijan as a future NATO member. President Heidar Aliyev, for example, while not ruling out NATO membership, has warned that the process of meeting NATO standards "is not easy," while Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliev was quoted by "Nezavisimaya gazeta" in December as saying that any talks of NATO membership for Azerbaijan at present are "premature."

It is not clear, however, why Baku has not unambiguously expressed its long-term intentions vis-a-vis NATO the way Georgia has. One possible explanation for that reticence may be the desire not to jeopardize Azerbaijan's gradual rapprochement with Moscow. (One notable milestone in that process was the signing in January of an agreement extending Russia's lease of a strategic radar facility in central Azerbaijan.) Nor is it clear whether at some point in recent years Azerbaijan made an explicit request to NATO either for direct involvement in mediating a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or for a NATO force to guard the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil-export pipeline and took offense when those requests were politely rejected.

As for the five Central Asian states, all have signaled their intent to send delegations to the NATO Prague summit in their capacity as members of the Partnership for Peace program. But as with the states of the South Caucasus, the five Central Asian countries differ widely in the degree and intensity of their cooperation with NATO. Tajikistan, which was wracked by civil war from 1992-97, joined the Partnership for Peace program only this year (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 21 February 2002). Kyrgyzstan, which suffered two incursions by Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000, has since expanded bilateral military cooperation with Russia and China, but its contribution to the Partnership for Peace program remains modest. Turkmenistan, whose armed forces divide their time between growing their own food and studying President Saparmurat Niyazov's "Rukhname," is formally a Partnership for Peace member but as a neutral state has not participated in Partnership for Peace maneuvers. By contrast, Kazakhstan has enthusiastically pursued cooperation with NATO, hosting peacekeeping exercises within the parameters of the Partnership for Peace program in October 2000 and becoming the first Central Asian state to join NATO's Planning and Review Process program. Kazakhstan also offered to make its peacekeeping battalion KazBat available for service in the Balkans. Uzbekistan, too, has pursued cooperation, both military and scientific, with the alliance.

As members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, however, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (like Armenia) are unlikely to aspire to NATO membership for fear of jeopardizing their respective complex relations with (and in the case of the latter two, their economic dependence on) Russia. Russia would inevitably fiercely oppose the prospect of NATO's expansion further eastward (assuming that ultimately it drops its objections to Georgia's membership), and for that reason the alliance may well be reluctant even to entertain that possibility. As for Uzbekistan, it is possible that it originally envisaged GUUAM as a potential alternative military alliance but now views its expanding security ties and military cooperation with the United States as a surrogate.

Given their diverse security priorities and the wide variation in the level of professionalism of their armed forces, what can the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia expect from the Prague summit? NATO's Robertson offered a clue in his February address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in which he pointed out that NATO needs a robust mechanism to strengthen the links between its European and Atlantic members and the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Expanding on that statement in a subsequent interview with the independent Armenian news agency Mediamax, Robertson said: "We need more and better opportunities for open and frank political dialogue. NATO needs to pay more attention to the individual, specific needs and circumstances of its partners in the Caucasus.... We need to improve liaison arrangements between Brussels and the capitals of the region." The Prague summit, Robertson said, "will provide us with guidelines" for achieving those objectives. (Liz Fuller)

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

BELARUS AND UKRAINE: PRESIDENTS THAT FALL SHORT OF EURO-ATLANTIC STANDARDS. Two scandalous political developments have burst onto the international agenda prior to the NATO summit in Prague on 21-22 November. The first concerns the Czech Republic's denial of a visa to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, effectively preventing him from coming to the country to participate in a sitting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The second is NATO's decision to hold a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the summit at the foreign-minister level in an apparent attempt to prevent Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma from coming to Prague. While Lukashenka will definitely not appear in Prague, Kuchma has preferred to keep NATO in suspense until the very last moment. According to what appear to be deliberately unconfirmed media reports from Ukraine, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko will come to Prague at the head a Ukrainian delegation to the NATO-Ukraine Commission talks, while Kuchma is considering leading another delegation to a session of the 46-member EAPC.

It is no wonder that media always seek sensational and spicy aspects of any event, irrespective of how serious or historically momentous that event might be. Therefore, their focus on the turmoil caused by Lukashenka and Kuchma in the context of the Prague summit is understandable. But it is also true that, in general perception, the NATO summit in Prague -- which is expected to extend NATO membership invitations to as many as seven postcommunist states and has been labeled in advance a historic event -- lacks the momentousness it would have had if NATO membership had been offered to those seven Central and Eastern European states 10 years ago. The past decade has greatly blurred the Cold War division line in Europe, while the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have radically redefined the North Atlantic alliance's military goals and priorities. In fact, the upcoming expansion of NATO seems to be a political move rather than a military one, while the military consequences of this step might more greatly affect other parts of the globe than Europe itself.

As in the case of the three Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) that were admitted to NATO in March 1999, it will take years before the new members -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria -- are able to make a palpable contribution to NATO's "firepower." This aspect of NATO enlargement is obviously understood by NATO planners and strategists, and it has also spawned a great deal of ironic commentary in Russia as well as in the United States, which now seems to uphold NATO's military reliability completely with its own efforts. However, the political significance of the current NATO expansion should not be underestimated. In actual fact, the inclusion of these seven new countries into NATO is in reward for the progress they made toward shaking off their "Eurasian" political legacy and acquiring new, "Euro-Atlantic" identities. It is also a clear sign of how greatly the realm of democracy and political stability in Europe has expanded since the breakdown of communism in Europe in 1989, including headway into what was formerly known as the Soviet Union. For the countries that were admitted to NATO in 1999 or are to be admitted in the second wave following the Prague summit, NATO membership is firm evidence that they belong to the West. Their future membership in the EU will only confirm and seal this eventuality.

"We are convinced that fundamental human rights and freedoms are not being protected and respected in Belarus, and that is one of the basic values upon which the Euro-Atlantic alliance was founded," Czech Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda said in justifying the visa denial to Lukashenka. Few would deny that human rights in Belarus are abused, freedom of speech is suppressed, and political choices are limited. Similar accusations, however, can justly be made with regard to some regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia that will be represented by their leaders at the Prague summit. Does this mean Lukashenka is correct in claiming the West resorts to "double standards" in assessing the level of democracy in Belarus in comparison with post-Soviet Central Asian countries? To a certain degree, yes. But it also should be taken into account that none of NATO's "partners for peace" in Central Asia has been suspected, as has Belarus, of rendering military assistance to Saddam Hussein's regime and training Iraqi antiaircraft gunners who could conceivably be asked to down NATO aircraft.

It seems that NATO applied a similar rationale in not inviting the Ukrainian president to Prague. The record of human rights abuses and suppression of media under the rule of Leonid Kuchma actually puts Kuchma on a par with Lukashenka. But here, too, the decisive reason for snubbing the Ukrainian leader appeared to be the U.S. allegation that Kuchma approved the sale of an early-warning radar system to Iraq -- potentially putting the lives of NATO pilots at risk through the work of another NATO "partner for peace."

On the other hand, if Kuchma chooses to come to Prague in defiance of NATO hints that he is not welcome, it seems unlikely that he will be denied a Czech visa the way that Lukashenka was. Like it or not, it was under Kuchma's rule that Ukraine has asked for and been granted a place in the waiting room of Europe. This fact alone arguably grants Kuchma the right to somewhat different treatment by European leaders than that afforded Lukashenka. Ukraine has essentially found the path it must pursue, with or without Kuchma. Under Lukashenka, Belarus has failed to find a place within any alignment, defying through its actions both political expediency and common sense. Most likely, the West has come to the conclusion that life will be much simpler if it ignores Belarus's current leader. (Jan Maksymiuk)

THE BALTIC STATES: A LITMUS TEST FOR NATO. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania this week in Prague are expected to become the only former Soviet republics to receive an invitation to join NATO. The distinction is perhaps unsurprising, since they were the only former Soviet republics that successfully established and retained their independence between the two world wars. The United States and many other Western countries, moreover, have never officially recognized their annexation to the USSR in 1940.

Through their efforts to regain their independence, the Baltic states played an important role in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since receiving recognition of their independence, they have sought to ensure that it is not lost again and have made NATO membership one of their major foreign-policy goals. This was clearly impossible when some 130,000 Soviet (whose jurisdiction Russia officially assumed in January 1992) troops remained on their territories.

The importance that Lithuania placed on those troops was demonstrated by the results of a referendum on the question in June 1992. Of the 78.5 percent of eligible voters who participated in the plebiscite, 91 percent agreed that the Russian troops should depart unconditionally by the end of 1992 and pay suitable compensation for damages inflicted since 1940. Backed by this vote, as well as by Western pressure, Russia fulfilled an agreement to withdraw its troops from Lithuania by the end of August 1993.

Russian officials were more reluctant to leave Estonia and Latvia for two reasons. First, Moscow wanted better conditions for the much larger Russian minorities remaining in those countries. And second, it sought to maintain what Russia considered to be two strategic military objects: a submarine training base in Paldiski, Estonia, and a large radar complex in Skrunda, Latvia. Russia finally agreed to remove its troops by 31 August 1994. Latvia, however, agreed to allow the Skrunda site to function for four more years, with an additional 18 months for its dismantling, while Estonia permitted Russia to use the Paldiski base for another 14 months.

Although Russian troops were no longer stationed in Lithuania, Moscow's military presence remained, since Lithuania was in no position to refuse Russian requests in 1993 to allow the transit of military personnel and equipment being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. A transit agreement requiring 12 days' advance notice for shipments and numerous other regulations were signed in November 1993. In January 1995, Lithuania and Russia signed another agreement whereby these regulations were applied for future military transit to and from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast.

Realizing that they would never be able to build up sufficient military forces or ensure security against Russia, the Baltic states considered membership in NATO the best guarantee of independence. At the same time, they did not place great hopes in early membership, since their military capabilities were weak and opposition to the Baltic states' NATO membership was firm in Russia. The United States and European countries made no promises, since they had to take Moscow's position into consideration -- and Russia did not even want to consider the possibility of any Western military presence in what it called its "near abroad." The Baltic states, however, believed that they should become an integral part of Europe again and made membership in NATO and the European Union a long-term foreign-policy priority.

Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas sent a formal request on 4 January 1994 to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner for NATO membership. This was supplemented on 27 January 1994, when Lithuania became the second country (after Romania) to file an application to join the NATO Partnership for Peace program. Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania's example later that year. Even before those applications were submitted, there had been cooperation between NATO and the Baltic states, for instance, the participation of two Lithuanian frigates in NATO's Baltic exercise BALTOPS '93 in June 1993. Estonia and Latvia began to participate in these annual exercises two years later.

To demonstrate their ability and willingness to cooperate among themselves and with the armed forces of other European countries, the commanders of the Baltic armed forces agreed in Tallinn in November 1993 to establish the Baltic peacekeeping battalion. With substantial Scandinavian and U.S. assistance, BALTBAT was thus formed, with its main training base located at Adazi, Latvia. Moreover, units of all three countries have served in UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova). This participation also provided NATO with a rationale for supplying them with arms and training. To prepare for the missions, Lithuanian troops were sent to peacekeeping exercises in Poland in 1994 and to the Cooperative Spirit '94 exercises in the Netherlands. In August 1995, in the first military exercise held jointly by the U.S. military and a former Soviet republic, 10 U.S. officers trained 150 Lithuanian soldiers in peacekeeping duties at the Rukla base. Soldiers from the three Baltic states also participated in the Cooperative Nugget '95 exercises in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Numerous Baltic officers have also attended courses and received further military training in various European countries, and those countries boast students at major U.S. military academies. Other successful efforts of Baltic military cooperation include the creation of the naval squadron BALTRON, the regional airspace-surveillance-control center BALTNET, and the Baltic Defense College in Tartu.

Buoyed by the tacit Russian acceptance of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech membership in NATO in 1999, prospects grew for the Baltic states also to become members of the alliance. In May 2000, the foreign ministers of nine Eastern European countries -- Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia -- met in Vilnius and adopted a joint resolution calling on NATO to invite all of them for membership, including a pledge to cooperate to achieve this goal. Those countries became known as the "Vilnius Nine," later becoming the "Vilnius 10" when Croatia was added to the list.

Another favorable signal for Baltic membership in NATO was the convention of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Vilnius on 27-29 May 2001, with 300 delegates from the 19 NATO member states and 16 of the 17 partner countries participating. (Russia did not attend, saying the action could be misinterpreted as Moscow's approval of NATO expansion.) The assembly passed a declaration that called on NATO "to issue no later than during its summit meeting in 2002 invitations to NATO accession negotiations to any European democracy that seeks membership in the alliance and that has met the criteria for NATO membership as established in the alliance's 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement." The Baltic states fulfill these criteria and have also met a requirement to raise their defense expenditures to 2 percent of gross domestic product.

The greater cooperation with Russia in the wake of the international terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 appears to have reduced Moscow's opposition to Baltic membership in NATO. Baltic leaders are thus converging on Prague with the expectation of receiving NATO invitations. (Saulius Girnius)

BULGARIA'S ROAD TO NATO. NATO is all but certain to invite Bulgaria to become a new member of the military alliance at its Prague summit this week. While other former communist countries like Poland and Hungary resolved to join the alliance soon after the fall of communism, the question of Bulgaria's possible NATO aspirations remained open for many years. Only in 1997 did the conservative government of Stefan Sofiyanski officially announce that Bulgaria should pursue NATO membership. With some delay, the former communists gave up their official anti-NATO position as well. Today, there is a broad consensus in the country that Bulgaria should join the alliance.

It is the result of an astonishing process.

Until 1989, Sofia was one of Moscow's closest allies. It did not pursue its own foreign policy but rather followed the Soviet line. In return for its loyalty, Moscow granted Bulgaria some freedom in domestic and economic policies.

After the fall of communism in 1989, members of the conservative opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) proposed that Bulgaria leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO instead. In 1990, this proposal was regarded as unrealistic, almost scandalous. But despite considerable resistance, especially from the postcommunist Socialist Party (BSP), SDS members continued to promote the goal of NATO accession. The pro-NATO lobby was headed by Solomon Pasi, an SDS legislator at the time.

During the first years of democratization, NATO accession was not high on the agenda. Bulgaria's governments had to transform the political system, address ongoing economic crisis, and combat emergent organized crime. Lobbying for NATO accession was not easy, given that Bulgaria's economy suffered as a result of the international trade embargo against Yugoslavia from 1993-96: This made it easy for NATO critics to blame the alliance for the country's economic crisis as well as for the rise of organized-crime structures that profited from breaking the embargo.

Despite difficult political circumstances, Bulgaria cooperated with the Western military powers in a number of respects. It contributed noncombat troops to the international coalition in the Gulf War in 1990-91, and it participated in a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions, including in Cambodia and later Bosnia. Bulgaria joined the Partnership for Peace program in 1994. In 1996, after discussions with NATO concerning prospective desires to joint the alliance, Socialist Prime Minister Zhan Videnov decided that the country should not pursue membership. As a result, many of the reforms within the army and the huge Defense Ministry were delayed.

But then, in February 1997, the conservative interim government under Videnov's successor, Sofiyanski, officially proclaimed Bulgaria's desire to become a NATO member. Sofiyanski used a historic opportunity. His predecessor had largely failed in conducting a consequent foreign policy, attempting to reestablish links with Moscow while being prevented from doing so by rivals within the Socialist Party; at the same time, Videnov was continuing talks with NATO. Videnov also failed to stabilize the economy and was ousted from government by street protests against skyrocketing inflation. Thus, Sofiyanski had the chance to announce a complete about-face in internal, economic, and foreign policies.

But the Socialists also drew a line under Videnov's policy. Immediately after Videnov's resignation, the Socialists elected Georgi Parvanov to be their new chairman. Parvanov, a historian, had headed a party think tank and remained outside the internal strife among the various factions within the Socialist Party. Perhaps it was his position as an "outsider" and intellectual that made him a credible reformer. It was Parvanov who decided that the Bulgarian Socialists should no longer oppose NATO membership.

While Parvanov's pro-NATO orientation contributed to his political success, another politician was less fortunate with his policy. Ivan Kostov, leader of the SDS, became prime minister in May 1997. Kostov initiated long-delayed economic reforms and pursued a Western-oriented foreign policy. With the support of President Petar Stoyanov, Kostov continued the tack of Sofiyanski's pro-NATO policy. But Kostov's popularity soon began to crumble as the population felt the impact of his economic reforms. Another major blow to the public support for Kostov's government came in 1999, when he decided to allow NATO aircraft to use Bulgarian airspace for operations against the Yugoslav Army in Kosova. As in other Balkan countries such as neighboring Greece, NATO critics organized anti-U.S. protests.

In 2001, another political change took place: The SDS lost parliamentary elections in June in large part due to Kostov's lack of popularity. The new government was formed by Simeon Saxecoburggotski, Bulgaria's former king. And in November, Socialist leader Parvanov won the presidential elections, primarily because the SDS was paralyzed by the election defeat it had suffered in the parliamentary elections.

As a result of these political changes, two outstanding actors in Bulgaria's bid for NATO accession are now in charge of Bulgaria's foreign policy. Today, Solomon Pasi, the man who first proposed that Bulgaria become a NATO member, is foreign minister. Together with President Parvanov, who convinced the postcommunist Socialist Party membership of the necessity of NATO accession, Pasi will represent Bulgaria at this week's Prague summit.

What will happen after the Prague summit on the Bulgarian political scene remains a question. So far, the opposition has respected the nonaggression pact it concluded with the government in the run-up to the summit. But the major opposition parties, the Socialists and the SDS, have already announced that it will be open season immediately after the summit concludes. Many observers believe that either the Socialists, the SDS, or both, will seek to move a vote of no confidence against Saxecoburggotski's government. (Ulrich Buechsenschuetz)

THE WESTERN BALKANS

DIFFICULT TIMES FOR AN IMPORTANT ALLIANCE. The German-American partnership has long been a cornerstone of stability in European security affairs, including the Balkans. It will require much care and attention if it is to return to its former strength.

Unidentified NATO officials told Reuters in Brussels on 31 October that the Atlantic alliance is making plans to extend the mandate of its peacekeeping mission in Macedonia -- known as Amber Fox -- when the current mandate runs out on 15 December. The officials stressed that NATO does not want a vacuum to emerge if the European Union is unable to carry out its plans to take over the mission from NATO.

The EU's project has been held up for months by bickering between Greece and Turkey over what is known as Berlin Plus, which is a plan to guarantee the EU access to NATO planning, intelligence, and logistics (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 and 16 October 2002, and "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 15 February, 8 March, 3 May, and 16 August 2002).

France wants to press ahead with the EU project even without Berlin Plus, the "Financial Times" reported on 30 October. Britain, however, wants the EU to undertake the mission only with that agreement. Paris sees the future of the EU's incipient European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as distant from, or even independent of, NATO. London wants the ESDP linked to the Atlantic alliance in order to improve European military capabilities.

This situation calls attention to the role of Germany, which has always been crucial in the European and Balkan stability equations. The government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder seeks to support both the ESDP and NATO, including its planned rapid-reaction force, but has little or no money to take on new commitments.

Nonetheless, Berlin's budget problems and its well-publicized policy differences with Washington over Iraq are but the most visible parts of a more fundamental political problem that threatens to erode the alliance that has been vital for Euro-Atlantic security in the postwar era (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 15 June 2001 and 13 September 2002).

The current imbroglio began in the run-up to the 22 September German parliamentary elections. For the first time in postwar history, a sitting chancellor's party, the Social Democrats (SPD), aggressively used anti-American themes to win votes. An atmosphere conducive to such an approach had long been prepared by much of the media, particularly where insulting treatment of President George W. Bush was concerned.

In the end, Schroeder's strategy brought him victory, due in part to the support of many former East Germans. As the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" pointed out, East Germans had "never known the Americans as friends or helpers" because the East Germans had gone directly from Nazism to communism without an interlude of democracy. Years of anti-American propaganda by both totalitarian regimes seem to have had a lasting impact on some voters.

Another factor in the equation was the failure of the Christian Democratic-Christian Social (CDU-CSU) opposition candidate, Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, to articulate a clear alternative position to that of Schroeder. The CDU-CSU seemed to have lost completely the strong foreign-policy profile it had under some former leaders, such as Chancellor Helmut Kohl or Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss.

But one thing that had not changed was the presence of anti-American currents in the SPD. For anyone who cared to look, such views have long been present at beer-table gatherings of the party faithful, such as the group before which Justice Minister Herta Daeubler-Gmelin compared Bush to Adolf Hitler and slammed the U.S. judicial system. Views mistrustful of, or disparaging toward, the United States could also be found in the public remarks of many party leaders over the years, as well as in recent books by some of its elder statesmen. These include Egon Bahr's "Deutsche Interessen" (German Interests) (Munich, Karl Blessing, 1998) and Helmut Schmidt's "Die Selbstbehauptung Europas" (The Self-Affirmation of Europe) (Munich, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2000).

But the party leaders prior to 2002 were generally very careful to ensure that anti-American views within the SPD, which were not shared by all members, did not interfere with the pragmatic exercise of power when in office. Many within the U.S. policy elite knew of this dichotomy. They chose to ignore it so long as pragmatism held sway when the SPD was in office and policy differences could be worked out behind closed doors.

Schroeder's campaign put an end to that -- the old cat of SPD anti-Americanism was out of the bag for all to see. Not only were President Bush and many top administration officials reportedly quite angry, but many people in the broader U.S. policy community felt that the German leadership had repaid decades of political, economic, diplomatic, and military support with crass ingratitude.

There are several theories as to what the change in German behavior means. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in "The Scotsman" of 20 October that "self-righteous isolation beckons for Germany and a return to pre-First World War conditions for Europe." Victor Davis Hanson argued in "National Review" of 11 November that Schroeder's rhetoric about a "German way" and about policy "made in Berlin -- and only in Berlin" is ominous. Hanson suggested that "a Mel Brooks movie could not have offered a better caricature of repressed nostalgia for the 1930s."

On a less apocalyptic note, Kohl argued that the problem is that Schroeder does not understand the difference between making foreign policy and making domestic policy. Consequently, Kohl argued, Schroeder launched his anti-American campaign thinking that damage could quickly be repaired after the election, as in the rough-and-tumble of domestic politics.

For its part, the Bush administration has let it be known that the damage is serious. U.S. officials have not responded quickly or warmly to calls from Berlin to go back to business as usual and write off the problem as one of "irritations." In Washington's eyes, trust has been violated and confidence thrown into doubt. "Normal" relations may be restored in the coming months, but that would be a pale shadow of the close German-American partnership of the past.

The question remains as to where things will go from here. Will the United States be tempted to keep relations with Germany on the back burner until a friendlier government appears there? Might the U.S. administration be inclined at some point to pull U.S. forces out of Germany and move them to another country -- perhaps one in Eastern Europe -- that is likely to prove more supportive than Schroeder in a time of crisis in the Middle East? Might the German chancellor and the SPD conclude that anti-Americanism is a proven vote getter and be tempted to behave like the French or Greek Socialists in future election campaigns?

The answers to these and other questions will affect the security situation not only in the Balkans and in Europe but possibly well beyond. (Patrick Moore)

PARTNERS FOR PEACE? The growing scandal regarding Serbian arms sales to Iraq and other unsavory clients has raised more questions than answers. But one thing seems clear: Belgrade is a long way from achieving or deserving its return to full membership in the international community.

Scarcely a day goes by without a new revelation or other development in the scandal over illegal Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb arms sales (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 25 October 2002). For several reasons, the Council of Europe has made it clear it is unwilling to talk about Belgrade's membership in that body until May 2003 at the earliest. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic noted that his country's international standing is lower than it was one year ago and that worse things might be yet to come.

Others are more blunt. London's "The Times" wrote on 2 November, "The revelations have enraged London and Washington,... [which] consider Yugoslavia's breaches [of sanctions] so serious that [Belgrade] risks regaining the pariah status that it endured before" the fall of President Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. In Bosnia, UN High Representative Paddy Ashdown warned the Bosnian Serbs that they must choose between "Brussels and Baghdad."

There are, of course, reasons for giving the Serbs the benefit of the doubt. Serbia and the Republika Srpska are geographically located at the center of the Balkans, and any attempt at creating regional stability and integration is bound to fail without bringing the Serbs on board at some point.

Some observers accordingly argue that it is better to start integrating the Serbs into Euro-Atlantic structures sooner rather than later so that Western governments can engage Belgrade and Banja Luka and open their dealings to greater transparency. In short, advocates of this view stress that it is better to have the Serbs inside than outside.

There are, however, some problems with this. Two years of Western engagement with the current Belgrade leadership has yielded few concrete results except for the extradition of former President Milosevic -- by the decision of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and over the objections of Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica -- and an end to open warfare. Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, has stressed repeatedly that she receives little or no cooperation from Belgrade and that General Ratko Mladic enjoys official protection from the Yugoslav military.

Even well-intentioned attempts to placate both Serbia and the Kosovar Serbs by giving Belgrade a limited role in Kosova's affairs seem to have backfired (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 23 August 2002). Serbian nationalists on both sides of the border remain stubborn, as was indicated by the boycott of the 26 October local elections by the Serbs of northern Mitrovica, despite some encouragement from Belgrade for them to take part. Michael Steiner, who heads the UN's civilian administration in Kosova (UNMIK), said the Serbs who boycotted the vote "shot themselves in the foot" politically.

But the arms-sales scandal has raised questions going beyond the wisdom and efficacy of engaging Belgrade in Kosova. Should one believe the official Belgrade line that the arms sales were made out of ignorance of sanctions or by rogue companies? Even if one accepts that October 2000 led to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, is it too much for the international community to ask that the civilian authorities have their military-industrial complex under control? And regarding the arms sales, what did the civilian authorities know and when did they know it?

Several prominent Western commentators have argued that the scandal is just beginning and that many surprises are in store. "Jane's Defence Weekly" pointed out on 6 November that it was efforts from within the "anti-terror coalition" that led to the Croatian seizure of the Montenegrin-owned, former Yugoslav Navy ammunition supply ship, the "Boka Star." It carried more than 200 tons of what appears to be solid rocket fuel, probably destined for Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles.

It seems clear that Serbian arms merchants have been dealing with Libya, Burma, and Liberia, as well as with Iraq, and that a variety of services and equipment have been provided. Yugoslavia has been "helping Baghdad upgrade aircraft, supplying rocket fuel for Iraqi Scud missiles, and transferring technology for guidance systems," "The Times" reported on 2 November. Belgrade might also have helped Iraq improve its air-defense systems and provided the skills of specialists.

The motives underlying this risky business are certainly money and probably anti-NATO solidarity. If this is the case, might not Serbian arms merchants have found some additional customers willing to pay good money and seeking to harm Western interests other than those clients already publicly identified?

If the Belgrade and Banja Luka political leaderships wish to distance themselves from the illegal arms trading in a convincing manner, they will need to get their military-industrial complex under control and make sure its international dealings meet European standards of legality and transparency. If the political leaders fail to do so, they can expect some much tougher questions from the international community. (Patrick Moore)

SOUTHWESTERN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

NATO AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was much discussion on the role and even the relevancy of NATO in the newly emerging security environment in Europe. It was not until March 1999 that NATO as a united force was called upon to act in Kosova -- not in defense of one of its members, but in a relatively new role of safeguarding larger European security issues and human rights. Just prior to the Kosova military campaign, the alliance accepted three new members -- all former members of its former rival the Warsaw Pact -- and further moved away from its original mission. At the 21-22 November NATO summit in Prague, up to seven new members are expected to be accepted into the alliance, three of which were part of the former Soviet Union. One item on the summit's agenda that is not receiving much media coverage but is of equal importance to NATO expansion is the proposal for direct NATO involvement in Afghanistan, which would indeed change the nature of the alliance altogether.

A day after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO for the first time invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more NATO member states is considered an attack against all. While the gesture was historic, what followed in Afghanistan was not an alliance-wide involvement in the U.S.-declared war on terrorism but help from individual NATO members in the military campaign in Afghanistan. Whether the alliance would have actually invoked Article 5 and participated in the Afghan campaign as one force is open to debate. But for several reasons, the United States did not invite NATO to take part as a whole. First, the United States considered its experience in Kosova, where the majority of the air sorties were carried out by U.S. forces and coordination of military efforts was hampered by the bureaucratic procedures of one or another member state. The United States also sought independence of movement and direct command of the operations. Second, when on 20 September 2001 U.S. President George W. Bush announced that the war on terrorism would not be limited to law-enforcement measures alone but would include a military response, not all NATO member states voiced their readiness to act militarily in a U.S.-led operation. A third reason for U.S. reluctance to call on NATO was the fact that the war on terrorism required the support of states that were not members of the alliance and had no experience operating within a NATO environment. By October 2001, the military campaign against international terrorism, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom, began in Afghanistan. Not all NATO members were ready -- either politically, logistically, or both -- to participate. As part of the contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, the alliance did provide Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, and elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean. To date, 14 NATO members have forces directly involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, but the operation remains a U.S.-led campaign.

Addressing the alliance's contribution to the war on terrorism, an unidentified U.S. diplomat quoted by the "Financial Times" of 12 November said that in "retrospect, NATO as an alliance was marginalized. It did little for its morale.... That may now change in the coming weeks." What the U.S. diplomat may have been referring to is NATO's expected future role in the war on terrorism -- initially in Afghanistan through the provision of communications and logistical support to the international peacekeeping force operating there.

The UN Security Council on 20 December 2001 passed Resolution 1386, which authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF's mission is to assist the new Afghan administration that came to power after the defeat of the Taliban regime and to maintain security in its area of operations, which is currently limited to the Afghan capital city of Kabul and its surrounding areas.

The ISAF currently numbers some 5,000 troops representing 21 states, with troops from NATO states making up the bulk of the force. As of December this year, Germany and the Netherlands are expected to assume joint command of the ISAF after Turkey's command expires. It is expected that Germany and the Netherlands, backed by the United States and some other NATO members, will request at the Prague summit that NATO become officially involved with the ISAF. Seeking NATO's official involvement in the ISAF is not a new issue: The United Kingdom, which led the force from its inception until June 2002, reportedly explored a peacekeeping role for NATO following the end of the ISAF's initial six-month mandate. However, Turkey agreed to lead the force for its second six-month mandate. A European diplomat was quoted by the "Financial Times" of 13 March as saying that NATO "would not be visible on the ground" but would "be looking at the planning end of things -- strategy, resources, force structures."

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, commenting on possible NATO-ISAF cooperation, said in a U.S. Defense Department report of 23 September that while discussions are taking place on this issue, it "has a lot of moving parts, and so until we pin various aspects down, we can't start narrowing the list of options."

The fact that Germany and the Netherlands are seeking NATO's assistance when they take over command of the ISAF may be related to expectations that, as the United States shifts its military role in Afghanistan to more reconstruction projects, the ISAF's mandate will expand to an area of operations beyond Kabul. "If we [, with the ISAF,] went outside Kabul, then we would need many, many more troops," a NATO diplomat told the "Financial Times" of 12 November, and in this event the alliance could even have the leading role, the diplomat added. If NATO were to take the lead, the ISAF mandate would likely be amended so the ISAF's command would not be changed every six months as it is now, but countries wishing to contribute more or less could choose to do so within an established structure.

The idea of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is not without political and technical hurdles. Within the alliance, opposition is expected to emerge from France, which left the NATO commands in 1966 and may view a NATO role as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in an area where Paris has no direct influence. Beyond this, there are technical problems as to how to coordinate a peacekeeping force that includes non-NATO countries under the alliance's command and the coordination of possible military activities between NATO and Afghanistan's neighbors in the event of cross-border incursions. Beyond these issues, if NATO begins playing a leading role in the war on terrorism, some members of the alliance could find themselves fighting a war they are currently not directly participating in. Moreover, the presence of NATO in the heart of Central Asia would undoubtedly be used by Islamist extremists and terrorists in the region to claim that the West, led by NATO, has officially launched a war against them.

With all of these difficulties, the stated role of NATO "is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries. Its first task is to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any of them," according to the organization. Today, the freedom and security of some -- if not all -- members of the alliance is being challenged by international terrorism. As such, if NATO were to assume a role in Afghanistan, despite the difficulties involved, it would be a natural progression of the organization's changing mandate. (Amin Tarzi)

IRAN'S TAKE ON NATO EXPANSION. The Iranian government is likely to watch the 21-22 November NATO summit in Prague very closely because of its concerns over the organization's enlargement. Tehran believes that its archenemy, the United States, dominates NATO, and it is reluctant to see any increase in U.S. power and influence. Moreover, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and, possibly, in Iraq contributes to Iran's growing sense of isolation and apprehension.

One of the individuals seemingly most concerned about NATO expansion is General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the commander of Iran's elite Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. In several speeches in September, he warned that the United States would like to extend NATO into the Middle East and the Caucasus by changing some regional governments.

"Over the next 20 years, the Americans intend to extend NATO from Turkey to Iraq, the Persian Gulf littoral, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and, finally, Central Asia," Rahim-Safavi told one gathering, according to an Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) report on 27 September. He added that the United States aims to consolidate its "military and political foothold in three sensitive regions -- namely, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus" -- in order to control most of the world's energy resources. In an interview with state radio on 26 September, Rahim-Safavi described another U.S. objective: "They want to help the Zionist regime by providing security for the Zionist regime."

Tehran is also worried about NATO expansion in the context of the Caspian Sea. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said in a 29 August interview with the newspaper "Al-Watan" that, although Tehran believes the Caspian should be free of any military activities, it would conduct naval maneuvers there because, "If we do not carry out the necessary measures, one can imagine a situation in which the NATO countries will conduct such maneuvers in the near future."

Within this context, Russia's improving relationship with NATO is a matter of some concern to Tehran. Elaheh Kulyai, who serves on the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, said in the 4 July issue of the "Hayat-i No" daily that Russian-led multinational naval exercises then being conducted on the Caspian are worrisome. "At a time when Russia has established a close relationship with NATO, as a member of that collective body, it is natural that staging a military exercise in the Caspian Sea could in a way become protracted thanks to that country's dominant role," Kulyai said.

Not all members of the Iranian legislature share this concern, however. Parliamentarian Ali Tajernia, who also serves on the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, said Tehran should not react negatively to a Russia-U.S. relationship as long as it does not threaten Iran, ISNA reported. He stated Russia's weakness relative to the United States leaves it little choice but to acquiesce in NATO's eastward expansion. However, in light of Iran's regional importance, "Russia attaches great importance to relations with Iran," Tajernia said.

Other comments from Tehran over the last few years also indicate concern about NATO expansion and the Western military presence in the region. Tehran promoted a South Caucasus security system in May 2000 that would include only regional states, and the previous month Iranian Deputy Oil Minister Mehdi Husseini accused the United States of promoting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline with the ultimate objective of "taking control of all countries in the region."

Chief of the Joint Staff General Hassan Firuzabadi warned in January 1999 that "the Israelis and the Americans are approaching us from the north," and he made veiled threats about "Shiite Azeris with Iranian blood in their veins." Army commander Major General Mohammad Salimi told a Tehran military seminar in November 2000 that the armed forces must be on the lookout for an attack by NATO or Israel near the Caspian Sea. "Iran's powerful army is the messenger of peace and security in the region, and with the blessings of God, Iran and other regional states will foil all threats posed by the trans-regional troops," he said.

NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 on behalf of Kosovar Muslims also greatly disturbed Tehran, although Iran chaired the Organization of the Islamic Conference at the time. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in September 1999 that NATO's actions were meant to "legitimize a new mode of crisis-handling behavior that would merely set a precedent as a rule for future contingencies." Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani said during his Friday-prayer sermon on 2 April 1999 that "if the Islamic world was coordinated and had stopped these atrocities, NATO would not have had a pretext to go there." He admitted that helping the Kosovars is a good thing, but "the problem is that this is being done by an organization like NATO, led by America." (Bill Samii)

END NOTE: ADAPTING NATO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY