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Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media

Endnotes

1. After the private network NTV repeatedly showed footage that contradicted official statements by the Russian Defense Ministry, state-owned Russian Television changed the tone and content of its newscasts. See report on media coverage of the Chechen war, "Zhurnalistika i voina," published by the Russian-American Press and Information Center, Moscow, 1995; Ellen Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

2. Private conversations with numerous journalists in Moscow, June-July 1997. A few journalists warned that serving the Yeltsin campaign would have disastrous long-term consequences for media freedom and credibility with readers. For instance, Aleksandr Minkin quit "Moskovskii komsomolets" after the paper's editor refused to publish an article by Minkin urging readers to vote against both Yeltsin and Zyuganov. See Minkin, "Sumerki svobody," "Novaya gazeta," no. 22, 17 June 1996, pp. 1, 5. See also author's interview with Minkin, "The Press Has Lost the Trust of Readers," "Transition," vol. 2, no. 18, 6 September 1996, pp. 40-41, 64.

3. See editorial in "Segodnya," 5 July 1997, p.1. Criticism of certain policies, especially the continued fighting in Chechnya, reappeared before criticism of Yeltsin himself. The Russian media did not begin to devote widespread coverage to the president's obvious health problems until early September 1996. Laura Belin, "Private Media Comes Full Circle," "Transition," 2:21, 18 October 1996, pp. 62-65.

4. Ekspress-khronika news agency, 13 February 1996.

5. Eduard Sagalaev left the private network TV-6 to replace Oleg Poptsov as chairman of Russian Television. According to his own account, Sagalaev was first approached by presidential bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov about the job. He was then hired after a private meeting with Yeltsin, during which he assured the president that he was "on the team." See interview with Sagalaev, "Izvestiya," 18 July 1996, p.6.

6. In July 1995, criminal cases were opened against producers of the satirical puppet show "Kukly" and against the network's celebrated journalist Yelena Maslyuk. She had interviewed Chechen field commander Shamil Basaev and had not revealed his whereabouts to authorities. Following a public outcry, both criminal cases were quietly closed in September 1995. See Laura Belin, "Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," "Transition," 1:18, 6 October 1995, pp. 59-63, 88.

7. Quoted in "Obshchaya gazeta," no. 6, 15-21 February 1996, p.1.

8. Interview with Igor Malashenko in "Izvestiya," 19 April 1996, p.6.

9. The media bias was so pervasive that the European Institute for the Media concluded that the election was free, but not fair. See Final Report on the Presidential Election, European Institution for the Media, 1996. Numerous specific examples of media bias can be found in OMRI Special Reports on the presidential election, May-July 1997, http://www.omri.cz/Publications/RPE/Index.html.

10. That ten-minute video featured State Duma Culture Committee Chairman Stanislav Govorukhin. On 1 July, the last night campaigning was allowed, Russian Public Television executives said Zyuganov was only entitled to five minutes of free air time and had not paid for the extra five minutes. They then rebuffed Govorukhin's offer to speak live to the camera for just five minutes. Instead, the network showed a previously broadcast videotape featuring Zyuganov. The executives presumably feared that a testimonial by Govorukhin, a well-known film-maker and cultural figure, would carry more weight with viewers than an appeal from the uncharismatic Zyuganov. A transcript of the never-aired Govorukhin video was published in OMRI Special Report: Presidential Election Survey, 10 July 1997. See also interview with Govorukhin, "Zavtra," no. 30, July 1996, pp.1,3.

11. Some observers, including the journalist Aleksandr Minkin and the media commentator Alexei Pankin, believe that the incessant "either Yeltsin or Zyuganov" message actually gave Zyuganov more votes than he otherwise would have received. See, for example, interview with Minkin in "Transition." Nevertheless, the "red card" was Yeltsin's most promising campaign strategy, since opinion polls consistently showed that a majority of Russians did not want to return to the Soviet system.

12. See European Institute for the Media report on the presidential election; OMRI Special Report: Presidential Election Survey, 5 and 14 June, 1996.

13. For example, when interviewing Lebed on the NTV program "Itogi" on 2 June 1996, Yevgenii Kiselev asked several questions about the suppression by Soviet authorities of a 1962 trade union demonstration in Novocherkassk, Lebed's home town.

14. Private conversations with numerous journalists in Moscow, June and July 1996.

15. This conviction explains why Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, a leading contender in the next presidential election, sought to have the Moscow city government found its own television network. TV-Center began broadcasting in June 1997.

16. After Tretyakov agreed to accept financing from Berezovskii, some commentators lamented that "Nezavisimaya gazeta" (the name means Independent newspaper) had lost its independence for good. See "Obshchaya gazeta," (no. 36 and no. 37), September 1995. Tretyakov acknowledged in an interview with Radio Rossii on 21 December 1995 that "Nezavisimaya gazeta" could not survive without help from the Obedinennyi Bank, part of the LogoVAZ empire.

17. Although Kommersant-Daily's news coverage is generally more professional than that of other leading Russian dailies, the influence of its "sponsor" can still be detected. For instance, it devoted favorable coverage to a controversial May 1997 auction for a stake in the oil company Sibneft, which was won by a company linked to SBS-Agro.

18. The first edition of the new "Obshchaya gazeta," 21-27 August 1997, contained an unsigned editorial attacking Gusinskii's main enemies: First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais and Oneksimbank President Vladimir Potanin.

19. "Kommersant-Daily," 8 June 1996, pp. 1, 10.

20. Interview with Ekho Moskvy's news director Aleksei Venediktov, "Kommersant-Daily," 16 September 1997.

21. Berezovskii controls an 8 percent stake through the Obedinennyi Bank, part of his LogoVAZ empire. See Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty special report, "Russian Media Empires," 26 September 1997. The report can be found on the World Wide Web at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia/index.html (in English), and http://www.rferl.org/bd/ru/russian/rumedia/index.html (in Russian).

22. Special report by Anna Kachkaeva, "Ot Ostankino do ORT," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russian Service, 5 August 1997.

23. "Kommersant-Daily," 11 September 1997, p.1.

24. See appeal signed by 20 editors-in-chief of Moscow-based newspapers, published in "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 18 October 1997, pp.1-2.

25. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russian Service on 27 April 1997, Golembiovskii admitted that the appeal to Yeltsin was "senseless," since the president had no legal basis for intervening in a conflict between a newspaper and its shareholder. For a thoughtful analysis of the early stage of the conflict between "Izvestiya" and LUKoil, see Yevgeniya Albats, "O prave na vybor," "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 22 April 1997, p.4.

26. For example, Russian Public Television, "Vremya," 26 July 1997; NTV, "Itogi," 28 September 1997; "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 29 July, 30 July, 13 September, 26 September, 27 September 1997; "Segodnya," 28 July, 30 July, 7 August, 12 August, 13 August, 27 September 1997.

27. "Izvestiya", 31 July, 11 September 1997; "Komsomolskaya pravda," 30 July, 1 August, 9 August, 20 August, 4 September, 2 October 1997.

28. For instance, on 1 November 1997 the Russian Public Television program "Vremya" charged that the government in effect gave Oneksimbank the funds it used to acquire a controlling stake in the metals giant Norilsk Nickel, for far below the market price.

29. "RFE/RL Newsline," 6 and 11 November 1997.

30. For instance, an article in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" argued on 12 August 1997 that the ruble redenomination will help neither the public nor the economy and will serve only the interests of the government's "young reformers," code words for Chubais and Nemtsov. The paper claimed the government embarked on currency reform because it had "exhausted its reserves for supporting the appearance of stability in the economy." "Rabochaya tribuna," also seen as close to Chernomyrdin, on 9 August 1997 published a commentary charging that the redenomination will hurt ordinary people.

31. The transcript appeared on 15 November 1996, p.1. "Moskovskii komsomolets" is considered very close to the Moscow city government; it is informally known as "Luzhkovskii komsomolets," after Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov. The newspaper's editor in chief, Pavel Gusev, was the city's minister of information from January 1992 to October 1997. Luzhkov is an outspoken critic of both Anatolii Chubais and Boris Berezovskii.

32. "Izvestiya," 1 July 1997, p.4.

33. "Moskovskii komsomolets," 30 July 1997, pp. 1, 3.

34. "Novaya gazeta," 4 August 1997, p.1. Lisovskii coordinates advertising for Russian Public Television.

35. "Komsomoskaya pravda," 2 October 1997, p.2.

36. Andrei Fadin, "In Russia, Private Doesn't Mean Independent," "Transitions," Vol. 4, no. 5, October 1997, pp. 90-92.

37. Vsevolod Bogdanov, chairman of the Union of Journalists of Russia, announced in August that subscriptions to all Russian newspapers and magazines for the second half of 1997 totaled some 7 million, down 20 percent on the same period in 1996. Moscow-based newspapers suffered the largest drop in circulation. ITAR-TASS, 27 August 1997; "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 28 August 1997, p.2.

38. Author's interviews with Pankin in Moscow, June and July 1996. Pankin coordinated the European Institute for the Media's monitoring effort and interviewed dozens of journalists during the presidential campaign.

39. Krutakov was interviewed in "Komsomolskaya pravda," 29 October 1997, p.2.

40. Yakovlev made these remarks during a public appearance in Prague in January 1997.

41. See interview with Globe Press Syndicate head Victor Davidoff, "Regional Press Fights Political Control," "Transition," vol. 1, no. 18, 6 October 1995, pp. 64-67.

42. Journalist Valentin Razboinikov published an account of his tragi-comic court case in "Izvestiya," 21 October 1997, p.5. One million rubles is more than the average monthly wage in Russia. For background on media restrictions in Ulyanovsk Oblast, see Elizabeth Tucker, "The Russian Media's Time of Troubles," "Demokratizatsiya," no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 422-438.

43. According to Oleg Panfilov of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, the media in Kabardino-Balkaria are "under the most severe pressure from the authorities" and hardly ever publicize any criticism of the republic's leaders. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russian Service, "Kavkazskie khronniki," 24 September 1997. Reporting from Vladikavkaz for the same program, RFE/RL correspondent Oleg Kusov commented that the Republic of North Ossetia has some opposition newspapers, but they are all mouthpieces for local political or financial groups. Electronic media in North Ossetia consistently support the local authorities, as do all television and radio stations in Kabardino-Balkaria.

44. "Izvestiya," 23 October 1997.

45. Report by Mikhail Sokolov from Orel, for "Vybory-97," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russian Service, 23 October 1997. See also "RFE/RL Newsline," 23 October 1997.

46. Laura Belin, "Russia's 1996 Gubernatorial Elections and the Implications for Yeltsin," "Demokratizatsiya," Vol. 5, no. 2, Spring 1997, pp. 165-182.

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special reports 1997

A paper by Laura Belin, a specialist on Russian affairs at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. It was presented at the national conference of the American Association for the Advance- ment of Slavic Studies, Seattle, Washington, November 1997. The author can be contacted via email at laurabelin@mailexcite.com:

	Introduction
	Owners Attracted by Power of Media
	Media Squeezed by Market Realities
	How Financial Dependence Slants News Coverage
	The Impact of Media Coverage
	Prospects for Development
	Regional Media Even Less Free
	Conclusion
	Endnotes
	Appendix 1: Russian Media Empires
	Appendix 2: Changes in Editorial Policy and Ownership at 'Izvestiya'