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Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media

The Impact of Media Coverage

Does media coverage influence Russian political events or public opinion? Media magnates proceed from an assumption inherited from the Soviet era: if you control how the message is sent, you control how it is received by readers and viewers. However, recent history suggests that media reports are remarkably ineffective as a weapon against political opponents. Exposes are routinely dismissed as shots in a war over narrow financial interests, even though analogous scandals involving prominent figures in practically any Western country would lead to resignations or official inquiries.

Very few heads have rolled following publications of compromising information (kompromat). A rare exception was Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev, who was sacked in June 1997 after a tabloid printed alleged photos of him in a nightclub reportedly frequented by organized crime figures. In August, State Property Committee Chairman Alfred Kokh was fired during the noisy scandal surrounding controversial privatization auctions. He is now under criminal investigation for allegedly taking a bribe from Oneksimbank, the winner of those auctions. But it is notable that the media attacks have not led to policy changes or the reversal of the auctions for which Kokh was criticized.

For the most part, Yeltsin's decisions do not appear to be affected by media coverage. On the contrary, in September of this year, he summoned six top bankers to the Kremlin and urged them to stop "slinging mud" against each other and against government ministers. (There was no discernible ceasefire following the president's request.) Yeltsin's recent reprimand of Chubais and dismissal of several Chubais allies in the government cannot be attributed to media coverage alone (although steady media attacks may have gradually made his position assailable). Yeltsin has ignored numerous equally damning reports about Chubais in the past. For instance, in autumn 1996, "Moskovskii komsomolets" published a transcript of a June 1996 conversation involving Chubais, at that time a top Yeltsin campaign aide.(31) The transcript implicated Chubais in misappropriating government funds, lying about his actions to journalists, and attempting to obstruct a criminal investigation of the affair. Although the transcript was apparently genuine (at least, its authenticity was never challenged in court), the president never publicly reacted to its publication or reprimanded Chubais, who had become his chief of staff. Yeltsin appointed Chubais to the government in March 1997, and an investigation into the campaign finance scandal was quietly closed a month later.

In July 1997, "Izvestiya" published an article alleging that Chubais accepted a suspicious $3 million, interest-free loan from Stolichnyi Bank in early 1996.(32) The article accused Chubais of interfering to help Stolichnyi acquire state-owned Agroprombank in November of that year. Chubais wrote an angry letter to the editor, but otherwise there was no official reaction to the report. No investigation was launched.

Even when Yeltsin moves against a close associate, it cannot be attributed to the power of the media. He ignored many articles implicating Berezovskii in corruption before firing him from the Security Council in November 1997. For instance, in July 1997, "Moskovskii komsomolets" charged that Berezovskii has skimmed some $98 million from the airline Aeroflot to companies linked to a Swiss company he owns.(33) Other media reports have charged that Berezovskii lavishes expensive gifts to Yeltsin's two daughters and pays the salary of Aeroflot director Valerii Okulov, Yeltsin's son-in-law.

Media "bombshells" involving other high government officials have disappeared without a trace. For example, in August the weekly "Novaya gazeta" published a transcript of a telephone conversation between Boris Nemtsov and businessman Sergei Lisovskii.(34) In it, Nemtsov indicated that he was holding up the publication of a presidential decree on income declarations for personal reasons. An investigation was opened into how Nemtsov's phone was tapped and how the transcript was leaked to the press, but not into Nemtsov's actions. Nor was he reprimanded by the president. The possible impact of the transcript's publication was reduced by its appearance in a newspaper that receives funding from Gusinskii's Media Most company, which at the time was waging an open campaign to discredit Nemtsov.

Similarly, Yeltsin and other high officials ignored an October report in "Komsomolskaya pravda," which charged that Chernomyrdin violated a presidential decree by granting government loan guarantees to a satellite television project linked to Gusinskii.(35) The allegations were never followed up, and the satellite project went ahead. "Komsomolskaya pravda," partly owned by Oneksimbank, had repeatedly criticized the premier since August 1997.

Compromising media reports are becoming more frequent, but they are rarely taken seriously by the political elite, at least not at face value. When alleged corruption or official misconduct is reported, the first question that arises is the old Leninist standby: "who benefits from this?" (komu eto vygodno). The accuracy of the report is secondary. In this context, the media's ability to act as a watchdog is diminished, since investigative reports are usually assumed to be serving the hidden agendas of various financial groups.

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special reports 1997

A paper by Laura Belin, a specialist on Russian affairs at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. It was presented at the national conference of the American Association for the Advance- ment of Slavic Studies, Seattle, Washington, November 1997. The author can be contacted via email at laurabelin@mailexcite.com:

	Introduction
	Owners Attracted by Power of Media
	Media Squeezed by Market Realities
	How Financial Dependence Slants News Coverage
	The Impact of Media Coverage
	Prospects for Development
	Regional Media Even Less Free
	Conclusion
	Endnotes
	Appendix 1: Russian Media Empires
	Appendix 2: Changes in Editorial Policy and Ownership at 'Izvestiya'