RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBERTY

Advanced Search

I I I I

I I I I I I I

RFE/RL Specials

E-mail this page to a friend

Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media

Regional Media Even Less Free

The media in the Russian regions are as a rule more restricted than Moscow-based media outlets. Although no formal monopoly on media ownership exists, there is a dearth of small and medium-sized businesses to support independent media outlets through advertising. Political elites keep journalists largely subservient through "carrots" (offering loyal journalists subsidies and access to high officials) or "sticks" (such as libel lawsuits or sending tax inspectors to investigate the owners of "inconvenient" media outlets).(41) In October 1997, a court in Ulyanovsk Oblast fined a journalist 1 million rubles ($170) for libelling Governor Yurii Goryachev. His misdeed was to publish an article in "Izvestiya" that included the following question: "Where have several hundred billion rubles in agriculture credits gone?"(42) Journalists have faced physical intimidation from the authorities in some regions, including the Republic of Tatarstan and Primorskii Krai. The media environment in some areas, such as Kabardino-Balkaria in the North Caucasus, has been compared to that found in the extremely restrictive Central Asian regimes.(43)

There are exceptional regions that have a vibrant media landscape. Several major cities in the Urals and Siberia boast a variety of private television stations, some of which produce their own news broadcasts. However, most private television networks and radio stations focus on entertainment programming, not news.

The servility of journalists in most Russian regions is especially pronounced during political campaigns, as illustrated in the October 1997 gubernatorial election in Orel Oblast. Supporters of the incumbent governor, Yegor Stroev, who is also speaker of the Russian Federation Council, in effect staged a sham election. Stroev's only competitor, the obscure head of a collective farm, was barely visible on the campaign trail and told journalists that she hoped Stroev would win the election.(44) Two potential candidates were excluded from the race by the regional electoral commission. Local media neither publicized their cause nor reported on foot-dragging by the Orel Oblast Court, which deprived the would-be candidates of enough time to appeal to the Russian Supreme Court. Instead, local media printed and broadcast innumerable appeals to vote for Stroev, while there was little media discussion of economic problems facing the oblast.(45)

In the end, Stroev was re-elected with more than 95 percent of the vote. Media coverage alone did not swing the election in his favor; similar scenarios have been played out in numerous regional elections, and many governors lost their jobs despite domination of the local media.(46) But by offering almost exclusively favorable coverage of a campaign that offered voters no real alternative, the Orel media demonstrated that they place the interests of the authorities above those of their consumers.

Conclusion

Although the Russian media's independence from state control has not been reversed, editorial freedom remains limited. Most Russian journalists engaged in self-censorship to assist Yeltsin's re-election effort in 1996, fearing that they would lose their freedom if the Communists returned to power. Following Yeltsin's victory, business interests accelerated their media acquisitions in the hope of gaining political influence. Cash-strapped media outlets were not in a position to refuse help from "sponsors," since the Russian economy cannot support most print and electronic media. Financial dependence on banking and industrial groups has led to biased coverage in many Russian media outlets, in a way that few expected after the collapse of Communism in 1991.

top

homepage

special reports 1997

A paper by Laura Belin, a specialist on Russian affairs at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. It was presented at the national conference of the American Association for the Advance- ment of Slavic Studies, Seattle, Washington, November 1997. The author can be contacted via email at laurabelin@mailexcite.com:

	Introduction
	Owners Attracted by Power of Media
	Media Squeezed by Market Realities
	How Financial Dependence Slants News Coverage
	The Impact of Media Coverage
	Prospects for Development
	Regional Media Even Less Free
	Conclusion
	Endnotes
	Appendix 1: Russian Media Empires
	Appendix 2: Changes in Editorial Policy and Ownership at 'Izvestiya'