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Protesters demonstrate in support of wearing the hijab in Bishkek in 2011. The issue of Islam's role in society in still a matter of some debate in Kyrgyzstan.
Protesters demonstrate in support of wearing the hijab in Bishkek in 2011. The issue of Islam's role in society in still a matter of some debate in Kyrgyzstan.

Once again, Qishloq Ovozi is pleased to feature the work of another up-and-coming authority in the field of Central Asian studies. This article sees the return of Matt Kupfer to the Qishloq. Kupfer authored an earlier article on ethnic violence in Osh. This time the topic is the necessary, and unavoidable, role of Islam in society and education in Kyrgyzstan, and the need for understanding and tolerance.

In 2011, my friend Zulfiya graduated from high school in her hometown not far from Osh, Kyrgyzstan. It would have been an ordinary, if important, milestone for most young Kyrgyz people. But, for Zulfiya, it was a major victory. Why?

Zulfiya, who asked to hide her identity with a pseudonym, is a religious Muslim who wears the hijab, something that went against the dress code of her high school. As a result, the school administrators told her she would have to remove her headscarf to continue attending school. And, when she refused, they sent her home.

Zulfiya was not alone in her predicament. She estimates that fifteen of her classmates removed their headscarves and around twenty stopped attending school entirely.

But not Zulfiya. She persisted. The next day she came back to school in her hijab. And when they kicked her out again, she came back the next day, and the day after that. And she kept coming until the exasperated school administrators gave up and let her continue her studies.

"I think Allah himself supported me and gave me strength and hope," she recently told me. "I never gave up. I wanted with all my heart just to study and study."

One day, after being ejected from school, Zulfiya stood out in the schoolyard looking through the window at the students in class and thought about how lucky they were. At that moment, she promised herself that, God willing, she would become someone who would make all those who had opposed her recognize how wrong they were. Today, she is well on her way: Zulfiya was the only student in hijab to graduate from her high school. She now studies at a university in the north of Kyrgyzstan and hopes to become a diplomat.

Zulfiya's story fits into a wider narrative of tension surrounding the growth of Islam in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, one that continues to this day. The recent mobilization of protestors shouting: "This is a Muslim country" to prevent a concert by a gender-bending Ukrainian male dance troupe in Bishkek, the passage by the Kyrgyz parliament of a Russian-style "gay propaganda" law, and the rise of Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East and IS alarmism in Eurasia all raise an old, highly polarizing question: is Kyrgyzstan at risk of "Islamization?"

'Mixed' Identity

Unfortunately, if the recent history of this debate is any indicator, Muslims will advocate Islam and secularists will advocate secularism. Competing identities will be presented as exclusive, "Islamization" as the antithesis of democracy, and extremism as the potential end result of increased religiosity. Supporters of both sides will come away from the debate more convinced that they are correct and that there is little chance to find common ground with their opponents.

But, as Zulfiya's story shows, identities are hardly so black and white. Zulfiya is a religious Muslim woman who wears hijab, wants to have a secular career in government, and sees no conflict in this supposedly "mixed" identity. The biggest threat to her is neither Islam nor secularism, but the failure of the government to integrate all members of society and resolve the issue of hijab in public institutions.

At fault here is the government, but a government is made up of people, and the people are often equally polarized. Blogosphere responses to a 2007 decision by a government commission to allow women to wear hijab in passport photos often read like a list of young, educated progressives worried by the impending "Islamization."

And it got worse: in the wake of the 2010 interethnic rioting in Kyrgyzstan's diverse south, many ethnic Kyrgyz claimed (incorrectly) that the traditionally more religious ethnic Uzbeks were working with Islamic extremist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Visitors to Kyrgyzstan often encounter the religion issue in conversations with locals. In 2010, a Kyrgyz acquaintance in Bishkek pointed out two women in headscarves walking down the street and announced, "This is not our culture." In 2013, an Uzbek friend in Osh lamented the amount of private local and foreign funding going into building mosques in the city, when the state could hardly afford to build new schools and hospitals. "I'm a Muslim, too," he sighed, "but I'm a normal Muslim."

In February of this year, President Almazbek Atambaev lambasted the growing role of Islam in politics and suggested that hijabs on young women represent a foreign import that erases traditional Kyrgyz culture. This month, he made similar statements about "radical Islamization," warning of the growth of Islam that is not in harmony with the Kyrgyz people's values. These comments likely scored points with many Kyrgyz citizens who remain suspicious of growing religiosity, but they also feed these same religious tensions the country has long faced.

In fact, if Kyrgyzstan is truly concerned about Islamic extremism, it should fear religious polarization more than Islam. Polarization alienates religious Muslims and creates conditions conducive to discrimination, which can lead Muslims to turn toward more extreme forms of Islam. But efforts to better integrate religious Muslim citizens and respect their views will give them a bigger stake in the future of Kyrgyzstan.

Bridging The Gap

When I first learned about Zulfiya's story last year, I tweeted about it and commented, "It always surprises me when people consider bans on religious clothing to be democratic. Democracy is when you defend the rights of those with whom you disagree." Kyrgyz parliamentarian Tursunbai Bakir uulu quickly retweeted it and commented in support, "A reasonable remark!"

Bakir uulu and I make strange bedfellows. I'm a secular Jew from America and a liberal. He's a religious Muslim conservative known for his harsh rhetoric against Western influence, the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) community, and Israel. We probably agree on virtually nothing, but found common ground on a woman's right to wear hijab in school.

Religion will likely remain a tense topic in Kyrgyzstan, as it can be in many countries. But, to improve the situation, more of Kyrgyzstan's own local "strange bedfellows" need to come forward. That means secularists willing to reach across the aisle to support the basic rights of religious Muslims to practice their faith and express their identity as they choose and religious Muslims who recognize the need for open discourse with secularists.

Many may fear "Islamization," but interest in Islam is already growing and won't likely stop any time soon. Would nearly twenty of Zulfiya's classmates who dropped out of school because of their hijabs truly be more "dangerous" to Kyrgyzstan with a secular education and the social and economic opportunities it provides?

In fact, it's probably the opposite: breaking free from the polarized discourse over Islam and better integrating religious Muslims would also help protect the rights of Kyrgyzstan's more secular citizens. A Muslim community that feels its rights are supported by the secular majority and wants to preserve that support will be more willing to compromise and respect the views of secular citizens.

But, first, both secular and religious citizens of Kyrgyzstan concerned about the future of their country will have to come forward, ready and willing to bridge the gap and forge a better discourse.

-- Matt Kupfer

Matthew Kupfer is a writer focusing on Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine, and the former Soviet Union. His work has been published in EurasiaNet.org, the Moscow Times, Eurasia Outlook, and Registan.net. Previously a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he is currently pursuing an M.A. in Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia regional studies at Harvard University. The views expressed in this blog are his own.

You can follow Matthew on Twitter (@Matthew_Kupfer)
A screengrab from a 2013 YouTube video purportedly showing Kazakh jihadists in Syria
A screengrab from a 2013 YouTube video purportedly showing Kazakh jihadists in Syria

Citizens of Central Asia seem to be present wherever a Sunni Muslim group has declared jihad.

Uzbeks, in particular, but also Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Turkmen have joined groups in nearby Afghanistan and Pakistan and also further away, in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

Jihadist groups highly value these Central Asian recruits, and there is incentive for Central Asians to join.

RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service organized a panel discussion to examine Central Asia’s militants -- what makes them desirable to various jihadist groups and what stirs the desire of some Central Asians to leave home and wage jihad.

Turkmen Service Director Muhammad Tahir moderated the talk.

Participating were Edward Lemon, a doctoral candidate from Exeter University in England who has conducted in-depth research on Islamic radicalization in Tajikistan; Jozef Lang, a Central Asian analyst at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw and author of a number of articles on Central Asian militants, including “The Radical Militants of Central Asia”; and Joanna Paraszczuk, the author of RFE/RL’s new blog “Under the Black Flag,” which has been chronicling issues surrounding the Islamic State militant group. And I said a few things, naturally.

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One of the greatest attributes of Central Asian fighters first became evident some 15 years ago when they appeared in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas: They are literate.

A benefit of decades of Soviet rule was a literacy rate of some 97 percent. That is certainly one of the highest rates among Muslim countries. In neighboring Afghanistan, for example, the literacy rate is about 30 percent.

The Uzbeks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) gained a reputation as the chief bomb makers in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. They were able to read manuals on mixing explosives and building bombs.

As Lang said, these Uzbeks “teach…how to construct IEDs and other explosive devices, which is the technical knowledge needed by the Taliban.”

Lang noted that the original IMU leader, Juma Namangani, was a soldier in the Red Army during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Namangani became an Islamic militant and used his Soviet military training to great effect in Tajikistan’s civil war, brief insurgencies in Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley, and in the service of the Taliban.

Lang said some of the new Central Asians recruits fighting abroad have some military background. There are also those who have been fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan for years and now have ample tactical battlefield experience.

The IMU took part in the well-coordinated June attack on the Karachi airport that left 36 people dead, including the 10 attackers.

Paraszczuk also noted the Central Asians are good with social media and that that experience is now working in support of the Islamic State militant group.

“The major Uzbek group in Syria has a website and a video channel and a Twitter account, for example,” Paraszczuk said.

The IMU has been running a website for a decade now and has been regularly posting videos from Pakistan’s tribal area.

Lemon said the Central Asians now supporting IS militants are helping send IS propaganda back to the former Soviet Union.

“They're using VKontakte, they're using Odnoklassniki -- the main Russian-language social networks. They're using videos and the social media very effectively,” Lemon said.

Certainly, any militant group would be looking to recruit more members, but all the panelists agreed there seems to be a preference for bringing in Central Asians.

But why are the Central Asians interested in joining militant groups?

The obvious answer is a sense of religious duty, helping out fellow Muslims.

But it is unclear how strongly that call resonates among the Muslims in Central Asia. Those who left Central Asia and went to Afghanistan and Pakistan were certainly aware that an austere lifestyle awaited them.

For those joining IS, the picture is more complicated.

Various figures have been given for how many have gone to Syria, with the most alarmist estimates, mainly from Russian sources, putting the number as high as 5,000. The roundtable panelists believe the number of Central Asians fighting in Syria and Iraq is closer to about 1,000.

Even then, it remains unclear how many actually packed their bags in Central Asia and left for Syria. Lemon pointed out that of the militants from Tajikistan he profiled, “the vast majority were recruited in Russia, so most of them…went to Russia in search of work, were radicalized in Russia, and then moved to Syria.”

There are millions of Central Asians in Russia working as migrant laborers. Lemon said that in the cases of the Tajik militants he researched, “Most of these young men, before going to Russia, were not religious. They were not particularly pious…”

Many of the Central Asians now in Syria and Iraq were first in Russian cities, part of the army of migrant laborers sweeping Russia’s streets, shoveling snow, and breaking ice off rooftops, then likely spending their nights in crowded quarters occupied by dozens of other migrant laborers.

Paraszczuk said the living conditions for migrant laborers contrast strongly with the propaganda the IS offers.

“What I'm seeing is -- not just with Central Asians but also with other militants from the former Soviet Union -- is that people are being given a sense of mission," she said. "If before they were a nobody in Moscow with a menial job, they're now someone who's leading a brigade, they're taking part in an operation to liberate a town…”

And Lemon added that for some Central Asians there is a certain romance about fighting in the Middle East, an area from which Central Asia was entirely cut off during its time as part of the Soviet Union.

Plus, there’s the money.

The chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security, Taalai Japarov, said in September that he had heard Islamic State militants were offering $1,000 a day to fighters.

That figure is unlikely, but based on what some of these Central Asian militants are saying, IS pays significantly more than the average migrant laborer makes in Russia. And, of course, in Syria and Iraq they are given their own rooms, they believe themselves to be heroes -- mujahedin -- as opposed to being looked down upon and worrying about being beaten, or worse, by nationalists in Russia.

-- Bruce Pannier

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.​

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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