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Uzbek President Islam Karimov
Uzbek President Islam Karimov

This was the headline from a report the Fergananews.com website carried at the end of December about the March 29 Uzbek presidential election.

“Incumbent President Islam Karimov’s Reelection Scheduled For March 2015"

It is a reliable prediction since, barring an act of God, Karimov is certain to be elected for the fourth time, or put another way, for his second unconstitutional term in office (see Article 90 of Uzbekistan’s constitution).

Karimov has been the poster boy for “Central Asia’s strongmen” for more than two decades and during that time earned a reputation as a rights abuser, an enemy of the press, and a neighborhood bully.

But he recently turned 77. He has been the subject of health rumors for some time now -- and lately those rumors have gathered more steam. Well-publicized family problems, which include his eldest daughter currently being under house arrest, have caused Karimov some embarrassment and raised questions about his control over his inner circle.

His country seems headed for some tough economic times, as migrant laborers in Russia return to unemployment in Uzbekistan and a large part of the remittances they’ve been sending home ($6.6 billion in 2013) evaporate. There are also fresh security concerns now that Afghan troops are fully responsible for security in their country, including the area bordering Uzbekistan.

And there is the huge matter of leadership succession in Central Asia’s most populous country.

RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, known locally as Azatlyk, organized a roundtable on the challenges during Karimov’s upcoming five-year term.

Azatlyk Director Muhammad Tahir moderated the discussion with Sanjar Umarov, leader-in-exile of Uzbekistan’s opposition Sunshine Coalition; Joanna Lillis from EurasiaNet and author of many articles about Uzbekistan; Alisher Sidikov, the director of RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik; and myself.

Figures from international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank show Uzbekistan weathered the recent global economic crisis fairly well with GDP growth of more than 8 percent or more annually for several straight years. But Russia’s sharp economic decline is likely to hit Uzbekistan’s economy hard.

Sidikov said the economy would be a major challenge for Karimov during his next term as work becomes harder to find in Russia, remittances dry up, and hundreds of thousands of Uzbek citizens return home.Finding jobs for them will be difficult and if they remain unemployed there could be social unrest.

Uzbekistan can still count on Chinese investment but Russia is currently not in a position to sink money into Uzbekistan, a fact underscored by Moscow’s recent decision to greatly reduce imports of Central Asian gas. Until very recently, most of Uzbekistan’s exported gas went to Russia. China is building four gas pipelines to Central Asia but it is still several years until all those pipelines are finished.

Lillis pointed out “Western investors shun the country, not really so much because of political uncertainty although that is a factor, but mainly because many Western investors have had terrible experiences in Uzbekistan [some] had their businesses appropriated.”

Karimov is unlikely to have the luxury of devoting his full attention to looming economic problems.

The panelists agreed the biggest question hanging over Karimov’s next term in office is whether he’ll live through all five years and that opened the door for a discussion on succession.

Sidikov said that while deciding the succession question should be one Karimov’s priorities during the next term, the Uzbek president might spend more time ensuring an exit strategy for some of his family members after his death. Sidikov said the process has already started. “They [the Karimov family] don’t invest in their future in Uzbekistan, they don’t see themselves in Uzbekistan long term…they don’t have a long-term perspective for their stay.”

There is no member of the Karimov family who is a legitimate contender to take over once President Karimov dies. That leaves someone from the inner circle.

There has been a struggle for positioning at the top levels of the Uzbek government for years now. But it’s become more intense in the last year, since the downfall of Gulnara Karimova, the would-be socialite, musician, politician, and presidential daughter. This spectacular fall from grace of not just Gulnara but many of her associates was clearly orchestrated by someone within the Uzbek government.

Lillis said during Karimov’s next presidential term “the question of political stability is going to come to the fore much more…there's going to be a lot of questions about the unresolved succession and I think that we're going to see a lot of behind the scenes, or possibly public infighting.”

The head of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service (SNB), Rustam Inoyatov, is suspected of masterminding Gulnara’s downfall. He is also mentioned as one of the likely successors to Karimov. The fact that Inoyatov, 70, has been the SNB chief for 20 years speaks volumes about the power he must have.

Umarov said he did not believe Inoyatov would succeed Karimov, pointing out that in the wake of the Andijon massacre in May 2005, Inoyatov was one of the Uzbek officials hit by the European Union with a travel ban. President Karimov was not put on that list. So Inoyatov’s odious reputation for violating rights complicates his chances for assuming Uzbekistan’s top post.

But it was noted that the SNB will have a large say in who is chosen to be Uzbekistan’s second president.

The panelists covered much more ground during the discussion, which can be heard in its entirety at:

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-- Bruce Pannier

Tajik men pray in a Dushanbe mosque. Women have been forbidden from attending prayers since 2004.
Tajik men pray in a Dushanbe mosque. Women have been forbidden from attending prayers since 2004.

"The main reason behind the participation of young Tajik people in the Syrian conflict is both lack of proper knowledge and bad living conditions," says the chairman of Tajikistan's Committee on Religious Affairs.

Abdurahim Holiqzoda made his comment in Dushanbe last month, and explained it by saying that "a young man who has got a good religious awareness will never take part in such a conflict. Those who recruit young people to go to fight in the Syrian war, above all, take advantage of their unawareness of Islam."

Holiqzoda did not specify where young people in Tajikistan should go to increase their "awareness" of Islam. Presumably in Tajikistan, since the government has been working since 2010 to bring all its nationals studying Islam at madrasahs abroad back home.

So what can they learn about Islam in Tajikistan?

Before continuing I wish to make clear that there are many deeply pious and knowledgeable Islamic clerics in Tajikistan and I have great respect for them.

One person who does not fit in that category is the "Prophet" Shaikh Temur, who is the subject of a recent report by RFE/RL's Tajik Service, known locally as Radio Ozodi, or simply Ozodi.

Shaikh Temur convinced people in Tajikistan's Hissar district that he was a new prophet. They married their daughters to him and gave him money after Temur claimed he could bring damnation down upon them.

A short video on Ozodi's website shows people lining the road to touch his car and kiss the "Prophet's" hands as he slowly drives past. In one scene a small group of followers leaves the room where Shaikh Temur is standing and they are mindful not to turn their backs on this "holy" man as they withdraw.

WATCH: Tajik 'Prophet' Shaikh Temur

Tajik 'Prophet' Shaikh Temur
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This is an ancient practice in Central Asia but it has usually been reserved for khans and emirs.

To many, Shaikh Temur is clearly a charlatan, the kind that haunts all religions, and he is currently under house arrest.

But he is not to blame for the "lack of proper knowledge" of Islam in Tajikistan. That dubious distinction more rightly belongs to the government and its policies, some would say meddling, in the practice of Islam.

Regime-Friendly Religion

The Tajik government wants a specific form of Islam that does not threaten, and indeed actually supports, the regime. To be fair, for hundreds of years rulers in Central Asia have attempted to shape Islam so that the religion served them, so President Emomali Rahmon and his government are simply the latest chapter in an ancient tale.

For more than a decade now Tajik authorities have been seeking out and closing mosques that were allegedly operating illegally. This concerns hundreds of mosques. Considering the rugged terrain of Tajikistan, the poor road network and remoteness of some communities, these closures have sometimes left the faithful without a place of worship.

In late 2013, five of the nine madrasahs in Tajikistan's northern Sughd region had their activities suspended, making it more difficult for young men to find a place to study Islam. For the record, about 40 percent of Tajikistan's population lives in the Sughd region.

Provincial madrasahs in other areas of Tajikistan were closed that same year leaving the Islamic University and the Islamic Gymnasium (school) in the capital Dushanbe as the only places to formally study the religion. By the start of this year, there were 1,548 students left attending the Islamic Gymnasium after some 400 other students left the school and 348 were expelled.

Under a 2011 law, most children under the age of 18 are prohibited from attending Friday prayers. For those men (women were forbidden from attending Friday prayers in 2004) who do attend Friday prayers, the sermons they hear are not only preapproved by the government, they are from a list of topics sanctions by the authorities.

There has also been a recent tendency for Tajikistan's imams to throw in some words of praise for the government, especially for President Emomali Rahmon.

In October 2013, this so enraged Vokhidkhon Kosiddinov from the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the only legally registered Islamic party in Central Asia, that police in northern Tajikistan detained him for interrupting the imam during Namaz (daily prayers). Kosiddinov objected to the imam's praise for the president and the government during the sermon.

And one of the most common complaints from the young people of Tajikistan is that the imams do not have a contemporary message. The imams speak of events in the history of Islam but the connection to the world's modern challenges and problems is not always clear.

So when Holiqzoda speaks of "good religious awareness" and "unawareness of Islam" he neglects to note that the state policies he articulates are a very big part of the problem.

As for bad living conditions, more state intervention would probably be welcome there.

-- Bruce Pannier, with contributions by Salimjon Aioubov from RFE/RL's Tajik Service

Authors Note: For those interested in the impact that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is having on Central Asia, or the reach of Russian media that region, the Harriman Institute of Columbia University and Eurasia Net hosted a panel discussion on these topics in December. Some recognized authorities participated in the event, including Erica Marat, Edward Schatz, Sebastien Peyrouse, David Trilling, Nabi Abdullaev, and Andrei Soldatov.

You can watch a video of proceedings here

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.​

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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