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The return of Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Rashid Dostum (center right) has brought a modicum of stability to parts of northwest Afghanistan. (file photo)

Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov made a rare and little publicized visit to three northwestern Afghan provinces at the end of June. Meredov’s trip was the latest evidence that Turkmen authorities are having to adjust their policies toward their southern neighbor in light of the breakdown in security in northwestern Afghanistan.

We’ve been discussing events in northern Afghanistan in the Majlis podcast and in Qishloq Ovozi for many months. But Meredov’s visit to Jowzjan, Faryab, and Balkh provinces was something unseen previously.

The trip, and what it means to Turkmenistan’s posturing toward Afghanistan, bears a closer look. So RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, known locally as Azatlyk, assembled a Majlis panel to consider recent events in northwest Afghanistan and review how Turkmenistan has reacted and how Ashgabat might react in the future.

Moderating the discussion was Azatlyk Director Muhammad Tahir. Gennady Rudkevich, assistant professor of political science at Georgia University and a specialist in Central Asian affairs, joined the talk. And in the studio in Prague, Amin Mudaqiq, the director of RFE/RL’s Pakistani service, known as Radio Mashaal, participated. And I tossed in a few tidbits here and there, as well.

Mudaqiq started the discussion by recounting the recent fighting in northwest Afghanistan. Mudaqiq said the return of Afghanistan’s vice president, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, to the region has once again brought a modicum of stability to parts of northwest Afghanistan.

“Two months ago, the Taliban had almost encircled the provincial capitals of Faryab and Jowzjan and Sari Pul,” Mudaqiq explained. “I have relatives, I’ve been talking with them, they evacuated their families...because it was expected that the Taliban will overrun [their city] in hours.”

Mudaqiq said the situation changed after Dostum came back to northwest Afghanistan in the spring, the fourth time in less than a year that Dostum had returned to lead security operations against the militants.

The Taliban has been driven from some districts. But Rudkevich pointed out that a pattern has emerged where we see “Dostum coming in, Dostum clearing out the militants, Dostum leaving, the Taliban coming in.”

For Turkmenistan, one of the more alarming developments in northwest Afghanistan is the rise of a new group of Taliban, as Mudaqiq explained.

“To my surprise, [it is] the Turkmen commanders, Turkmen Taliban, who are the most resistant, the toughest fighters in this area,” Mudaqiq said. “These are the local Turkmen commanders, but they studied in Pakistan, they came [back] from Pakistan.” And he added that these Turkmen fighters are a departure from previous Turkmen groups.

“Traditionally, the young Turkmen would obey their elders, but right now they don’t obey their elders,” Mudaqiq said. “The elders are also not pushing so hard because they have their own grievances against Dostum.”

Mudaqiq also mentioned “local Taliban, local militants who are not ideological Taliban but [who] joined the Taliban either for their own security or [because of] their economic problems.”

Mudaqiq described these people as essentially hired guns and said they are often accepted back onto the government side after making vague oaths of allegiance. During Dostum’s offensives in the northwest, there have been several instances of Taliban commanders making peace with Dostum and joining the government side.

Rudkevich said this tactic might not pay off for long.

“If these local actors change sides so quickly and without punishment, apparently, then one day, whether it’s a month from now or a year from now or five years from now, we could have a situation where they decide that being on Dostum’s side, or being on the government’s side, is not in their interest," he said. "And in that case, the fighting will end up in a very different direction than what it is right now.”

Part of the reason for Foreign Minister Meredov’s trip to northwest Afghanistan was probably to get a first-hand look at these events so the Turkmen government can better assess the situation south of the border. His planned visit to a border town where Turkmenistan is building a retaining wall along the Amu-Darya River was abruptly canceled when “unfortunately there was a mine blast, which hit his convoy, and he returned,” Mudaqiq said.

Officially, Meredov was there to discuss bilateral projects. He participated in a groundbreaking ceremony for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway in the town of Akina in Faryab Province and he discussed plans for Turkmenistan to export electricity to areas in northwest Afghanistan. Such discussions could just as easily, and more usually, have been held in Ashgabat or Kabul. Mudaqiq mentioned that Meredov’s meetings with local officials were all conducted behind closed doors.

Azatlyk already reported that the commander of the paramilitary “Arbaky” units and some local police officials were just in Ashgabat. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu also made the first-ever visit by a Russian defense minister to Turkmenistan at the start of June.

So it could be that Turkmenistan, which for some 20 years has prided itself on being a neutral country, is choosing a side in the Afghan conflict.

But Mudaqiq drew attention to Turkmenistan’s projects in northwest Afghanistan and suggested that Turkmenistan does have a policy toward this region.

“This electricity, this railway project, these road projects do not benefit only the government. [They] benefit the whole population, which includes the Taliban,” Mudaqiq said. “Turkmenistan electricity in Faryab is distributed in villages, which are under the Taliban, so when the Taliban starts a disturbance against Turkmenistan, they will lose electricity as well.”

Mudaqiq said Turkmenistan might be seeking to make the Afghan provinces across the border dependent on Turkmenistan so that no matter who is in control in northwest Afghanistan that party will need to have friendly relations with Turkmenistan.

It would be a better policy than simply trying to stay out of Afghan politics altogether, which has already proven to be impossible.

Rudkevich said, “[The Turkmen government} wants to have stable borders with Afghanistan, and it looks like they’ve seen the situation degenerate to such an extent that they’re willing to make some sacrifices in the neutrality policy.” But Rudkevich cautioned, “I can’t see them going much further without really jeopardizing the whole neutrality policy, which, again, has been what their whole identity is based on for the last 20 years.”

The panel agreed we are likely to see a very flexible policy from the Turkmen government toward neighboring areas in Afghanistan, but not a coherent strategy, as Ashgabat is in the position of having to react to Afghan events without being able to do much to influence the situation.

The panel discussed these issues in greater detail and looked at other topics that are shaping the situation in northwest Afghanistan and forcing policymakers in Ashgabat to regularly make adjustments to Turkmenistan’s ties with its southern neighbor.

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Tajik children watch a supporter of the Islamic Renaissance Party paste a campaign poster on a wall in the capital, Dushanbe, in February 2015. Within a few months it would be disbanded.

June 27, 1997, remains one of the greatest days in Tajikistan's nearly 25-year history as an independent country.

On that day in Moscow, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (then Rakhmonov) and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Abdullo Nuri, signed a national peace accord. It ended five years of civil war in Tajikistan that estimates now say left some 100,000 people dead.

The core of the UTO was the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (HNIT) and the era of peace in Tajikistan seemed to get off to a good start when President Rahmon, three days after signing the peace deal, arrived in Saudi Arabia to make the "umrah," the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca.

This year only those who sided with the government during the civil war are celebrating National Reconciliation Day. Their partners in peace, the HNIT, are once again outlawed.

On June 23, RFE/RL's Tajik Service, known locally as Ozodi, reported that a 35-year-old man was sentenced to five years in prison for propagating the ideas of the HNIT, a party that was legally registered less than one year ago.

Something To Brag About

For nearly 18 of the 19 years of peace in Tajikistan, the HNIT was part of the country's government. One of the provisions of the peace accord was that the UTO receive 30 percent of the places in government, from ministerial posts down to the village level. Most places went to the HNIT, which was the largest part of the UTO and had done most of the fighting. The percentage eroded away over the years until, in March 2015, the HNIT lost its last two seats in parliament.

During the roughly 18 years the HNIT was part of the government, the party demonstrated its dedication to the peace deal many times. The war might have ended but outbreaks of fighting continued. Sometimes it was former opposition members, sometimes it was former government allies who were responsible. The HNIT always sided with the government.

The HNIT had the credentials to speak authoritatively on matters of Islam, something that proved extremely valuable in countering the views of Islamic extremist groups. The HNIT was once the armed Islamic opposition, but it had reached an agreement with the government.

The HNIT's participation in governing the country was an example that cooperation between a secular government and an Islamic opposition was possible. The HNIT's presence in the government was a reminder to Tajikistan's people of a "happy ending" to a horrible time. The ability of the HNIT and President Rahmon's government to work together reinforced the idea that Tajikistan's civil war had truly been an incredible waste.

Harassment, Attacks

But after a few years, the harassment of HNIT members started; some were beaten, a few were killed. State media started reporting on alleged misdeeds by HNIT members, especially the party's leaders. HNIT leader Muhiddin Kabiri eventually fled the country as it became clear he would soon be charged with some crime.

The HNIT's attempts to hold public meetings or press conferences were sometimes broken up by the sudden appearance of groups of supposedly irate citizens who spontaneously banded together to vent at the HNIT. This, despite strict prohibitions on unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations.

Not long after the HNIT lost its last two seats in parliament in 2015, the Tajik authorities started to claim the HNIT, the second-largest party in the country, did not actually enjoy widespread popularity and that many of its branches around the country had effectively ceased activities.

On this basis, the authorities initiated procedures that in late August resulted in the Justice Ministry ordering the HNIT to cease all activities. At the end of September, the Supreme Court ruled that the HNIT was an extremist group and outlawed the party.

At the start of June this year, 14 leading members of the HNIT were convicted on dubious charges. Some were given lengthy prison sentences.

HNIT deputy leaders Mahmadali Hayit and Saidumar Husaini were sentenced to life in prison for their alleged, and unlikely, involvement in the supposed coup attempt Tajikistan's deputy defense minister led in September, just before the deadline the Justice Ministry ordered the HNIT to cease all activities.

Hayit and Husaini had been targeted before.

On April 19, 2013, two unknown assailants attacked the then-56-year-old Hayit outside his Dushanbe home after he helped plan a public event the HNIT was about to hold to mark the anniversary of the party's founding. He was taken to the hospital with "severe wounds to the head, face, eyes, ribs, back, and stomach."

On April 28, 2014, Husaini, his son, and another HNIT member were attacked in Tajikistan's eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. Husaini said some 15 people were involved in the attack. He told Ozodi at the time he didn't intend to ask local authorities for help in apprehending the attackers because he believed some of the assailants were actually policemen.

End Of Reconciliation

Tajikistan is a poor country, the poorest in Central Asia. At least 25 percent of the country's eligible labor force is working abroad, mainly in Russia. There is little to distinguish Tajikistan today.

For 18 years Tajik authorities could say the country had the only registered Islamic party in Central Asia. Not anymore.

So this year Tajik authorities for the first time mark National Reconciliation Day without their partner in the reconciliation.

President Rahmon is marking the holiday in Gorno-Badakhshan, the poorest region of Tajikistan. He is not popular in Gorno-Badakhshan. The local Lal'i Badakhshan group established by the Pamiri population there was part of the UTO during the civil war.

Rahmon was in the regional capital, Khorog, on June 26 to present the government's gift to the people of Gorno-Badakhshan -- a 30-meter flagpole for an 8-meter-by-4-meter Tajik flag.

According to the president's press service, the project cost some 300,000 somonis (a bit more than $38,000); money that could have been better used in so many ways in this region.

This year's National Reconciliation Day celebration really marks the government's victory in a war it could not win 19 years ago. However, if the Tajik authorities continue on their present course, they could spark unrest and this might be one of the last Reconciliation Days the country marks.

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect some of the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.

Bruce Pannier
Bruce Pannier

Content draws on the extensive knowledge and contacts of RFE/RL's Central Asian services but also allow scholars in the West, particularly younger scholars who will be tomorrow’s experts on the region, opportunities to share their views on the evolving situation at this Eurasian crossroad.

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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