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Central Asia often seems like a remote region. You don’t hear much about Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan playing roles in international affairs. There is an impression that the five countries are tucked away in the heart of the Eurasian landmass with only the most tenuous of ties to the world outside.

A new book, Dictators Without Borders: Power And Money In Central Asia, argues that this is far from the case, that the elites of these countries are, in fact, very well connected to the outside and are also very knowledgeable about laws and regulations in the world beyond Central Asia.

This has allowed a relatively few people in Central Asia to locate or accumulate great wealth abroad. It has also allowed the Central Asian governments to encumber political opponents who have fled their countries. At the same time, these international laws and regulations have helped some of these political opponents not only find safe havens away from Central Asia but, in some cases, retain money they brought out of their countries under unclear and, at times suspicious, circumstances.

To take a closer look, we asked the authors of Dictators Without Borders -- Alexander Cooley, the current director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University in New York, and John Heathershaw, associate professor at Exeter University in the U.K. -- to join us on the Majlis podcast.

Those of you who have been following Central Asia for any time at all will no doubt be familiar with the extensive, previous work of our guests.

Moderating the discussion was RFE/RL Media Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir, and for this one time I joined him in that role as well, as I had some questions I wanted to ask our guests.

Cooley recalled that he had already dedicated a chapter in an earlier book (Great Games, Local Rules) to the topic of transnational corruption and Heathershaw had also researched and written on such practices in Tajikistan.

Heathershaw said the two started discussing transnational corruption and found that "you spot the patterns from one Central Asian state to another...Certain kinds of practices by Central Asian elites, by company service providers that enable these flows and these networks to emerge."

Cooley mentioned that there is "this kind of constant refrain that Central Asia lacks connectivity," but the two authors' research showed it was "not the lack of connectivity, they’re the wrong kinds of connectivity. They’re systemic kleptocracy and capital flight through which these societies and countries are looted and then, with the assistance of this apparatus in the Western states, funds are taken out of the country. So there’s this myth of global isolation."

Cooley explained that far from sitting in their countries and enjoying lifestyles beyond the abilities of the average citizen in Central Asia, the region’s elites often "maintain residences overseas, they maintain bank accounts overseas, they purchase luxury real estate, they engage with international charities and international organizations, so they’re as much global players."

Heathershaw said these "global financial dimensions [are]...extremely important in telling the full story of how Tajikistan recovered from the civil war. They’re important in telling the story of the political instability in Kyrgyzstan." And, Heathershaw said, "They’re important in telling the story of how Kazakhstan’s rise as a major oil and gas power enables certain kinds of corruptions, whether Kazakhstan will fall victim to a resource curse or not."

Cooley noted that "the playbook tends to be similar," saying, "What we tend to get are elites with access to state assets, using offshore companies, shell companies that are registered overseas to parse the ownership of these assets to obscure what happens with these revenues later and these sales, and then to sort of structure deals in a way that enables future payoffs."

Heathershaw pointed out that while there are rules and regulations in Western countries to prevent such activities on their territories, in fact often these are matters of self-regulation. Heathershaw mentioned that in the United Kingdom, "real estate agents are supposed to report if they have a suspicion [about a client]...but very often, obviously, they have an interest not to report that."

And Heathershaw mentioned that the Central Asians have become acquainted with "intermediaries who facilitate these networks and exchanges."

Another sign Central Asia’s governments are connected globally is their use of international organizations to hamper the activities of political opponents who have fled Central Asia.

"One of the arguments that runs through the book is that in this quest to go after political opponents who have fled overseas, the Central Asian governments start using certain international institutions and foreign policy tools for these kinds of political purposes," Cooley said. "One of these institutions is Interpol and the Red Notice system."

Many Central Asian opposition figures have been detained, particularly in cities in Europe. Cooley said that "by tagging political opponents with accusations like they’re terrorists or that they have been involved in money laundering, this constricts the ability of political opponents to move overseas, to catch airplanes or even trains, and so their mobility is restricted and often times they are detained and then processed through the legal system of these various countries in which they find themselves."

Exeter University is compiling a database of known Central Asian political exiles to provide law-enforcement agencies, and others, outside Central Asia with a source of information about Central Asian citizens who have fled their countries and are wanted -- on frequently dubious charges -- back home.

The use of political asylum is also a topic addressed by Cooley and Heathershaw.

While most of those fleeing Central Asia have good reasons to do so, some seem to be taking advantage of asylum laws.

"If you were a former regime insider, you had access to a ministry or an insider privatization deal and you have now fallen out with the current regime, persona non grata, and you leave, part of the paradox of fleeing an authoritarian regime is you have a pretty strong case for political asylum," Cooley said.

Heathershaw said that despite the best of intentions "global governance just hasn’t kept up with these business practices and these political practices."

Heathershaw said it really should not be so surprising that Central Asian governments and elites have figured out how to use international systems and organizations to advance their own aims.

"The [Central Asian] states became independent in an era of globalization and therefore the states reflect that reality," he said.

Cooley concluded, saying, "The take-home message [of Dictators Without Borders] is as much a mirror on how we [in the West] facilitate these extraterritorial spaces for these financial transfers and for these extraterritorial authoritarian types of attacks."

Majlis Podcast: Dictators Without Borders
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Turkmenistan is hosting the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games in September, but it is not an event Turkmenistan's people are likely to remember fondly.

With the government reportedly scrambling to cover the expense of hosting an international sporting event and really nowhere else to turn for funds, the authorities are said to be putting the squeeze on citizens.

In the latest development, correspondents from RFE/RL's Turkmen Service, known locally as Azatlyk, report rising prices for basic foods, particularly dairy products.

There is no shortage of food at the moment in Turkmenistan, as was true at the end of 2016.

But Azatlyk correspondents report that the increases are affecting virtually all stores -- state and private -- domestic products and imports, and owners -- local or foreign. The price of a 200-gram container of sour cream, for example, went from 5 manats (3.5 manat = $1 at official rate) to 6 manats, and cheese products rose from 7-8 manats to 9-10 manats for about 200 grams.

In the capital, Ashgabat, prices for some essential foods have risen by as much as 50 percent since the start of the year.

One Ashgabat merchant, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that an "order came from above" to raise prices on certain goods by up to 20 percent. The same merchant said that state officials now visit his shop to check his sales records and extract that 20 percent markup as the state's share. Officially, the source said, the money hands over to officials is labeled a "voluntary donation." The merchant said he was told the funds were to be used in connection with the games.

Many workers in Turkmenistan, including state employees, are already familiar with "voluntary donations." For months now, the state has been taking money out of their monthly paychecks, declaring it also to be a "voluntary donation." In some cases, according to Azatlyk correspondents, up to 50 percent of teachers' and medical workers' monthly wages were being withheld.

A Turkmen opposition website recently alleged that some 15 to 20 percent of the salaries of workers in the gas and oil sector will be taken by the state from April until September to pay for the games.

The estimated cost of constructing the facilities and other infrastructure for the games -- including a monorail -- is some $5.5 billion. That does not include the cost of services or remuneration for employees and staff working at the events (though they might end up being conscripted, the way things are going). Add to that the expense of hiring a yet-to-be-announced special entertainer to perform at the opening ceremonies.

And there is also security. Turkmenistan's security service is active all the time. But this international sports event will bring the largest influx of foreigners the country has ever seen, and the Turkmen government is highly suspicious of foreigners. One expects that every member of every law enforcement and security agency will be on duty during the games, most of them in Ashgabat. That should be an extra expense.

Let's put this in perspective. Turkmenistan's leading trade partner is China, and China's ambassador to Turkmenistan, Sun Weidong, just said in an interview in January that bilateral trade for the first 11 months of 2016 was $5.4 billion.

In 2010, when Turkmenistan was named as host for these 2017 Games, the country's economic future looked very promising. Turkmenistan had just been exporting more than 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Russia in 2008; and despite pricing and other disputes with Gazprom in 2010, Ashgabat had good reason to believe those exports, at those volumes, would resume eventually. Turkmenistan exported somewhere between 6 and 8 bcm to Iran annually. And the first of four planned gas pipelines to China had just been launched at the end of 2009.

The situation is very different in 2017. Russia and Iran, at least for the moment, are no longer buying Turkmenistan's gas. It looks like China will buy only half the amount of gas planned a few years ago. And the price of gas is far less than Turkmen authorities predicted not so long ago.

The people of Turkmenistan never played a role in the decision to host the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games; the government campaigned for it as a prestige project.

If the economic situation were more favorable, the games would probably have very little influence on the lives of Turkmenistan's people. As it turns out, it is impossible for Turkmenistan's people to ignore the upcoming sporting event; they're helping pay for it.

And it isn't over yet for the Turkmen public. The official website for the games says there are 600,000 tickets on sale for the events, and authorities will no doubt wish for all those seats to be filled.

Azatlyk Director Farruh Yusupov contributed to this report. The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.​

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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