Accessibility links

Breaking News

Caucasus Report

Russian Army troops intervened in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia in November 1992 but didn't protect civilians, leading to tens of thousands of Ingush fleeing their homes.

In a recent interview with the Russian daily Kommersant, Russian presidential administration deputy head Magomedsalam Magomedov cited unspecified sociological polls in which 79.7 percent of respondents assessed relations between Russia's various nationalities as "well-intentioned."

Magomedov did not, however, mention what is arguably one of the most glaring exceptions: the enmity between the Ossetians and Ingush that still persists 25 years after the violence in October-November 1992 in which according to official statistics some 600 people, predominantly Ingush, died and between 30,000 and 60,000 Ingush were forced to flee their homes in North Ossetia's disputed Prigorodny district.

Participants at a recent conference in St. Petersburg singled out several reasons why, a quarter of a century later, the mutual distrust and suspicion between the two nations still persists. Of those reasons, arguably the most important was said to be the failure to hand over to their families for burial the remains of many of the Ingush killed during the conflict who were interred in unmarked mass graves.

The roots of the conflict date back to the early days of the Soviet Union, specifically, the redrawing in the 1920s and 1930s of the borders between the various territories of the North Caucasus. In 1934, the Chechen and Ingush autonomous oblasts were merged to form the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Oblast, which was upgraded two years later to the status of an autonomous Soviet socialist republic (ASSR).

The Checheno-Ingush ASSR was formally abolished in 1944 following the deportation at the behest of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin of the entire Chechen and Ingush peoples to Central Asia. Part of its territory was renamed Grozny Oblast and the remainder divided between Georgia and the Daghestan and North Ossetian ASSRs, with the latter receiving Prigorodny Raion, a narrow strip of particularly fertile land on the right bank of the River Terek in the extreme west of the republic.

In his landmark "secret speech" to the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev condemned the Stalinist deportations of the Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Karachais, and others, and exonerated the Chechens and Ingush of the suspicion of collaboration with advancing Nazi German forces that Stalin had adduced as the rationale for them. But when the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was formally reconstituted in 1957, its borders were revised, leaving Prigorodny Raion part of North Ossetia.

The Ingush never came to terms with that decision. In early 1973, they staged a mass protest in Grozny to demand the return of Prigorodny Raion, the organizers of which were apprehended and put on trial.

In the late 1980s, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost" made possible the public discussion of the wrongs and horrors of the Stalin era. As a consequence of that broad debate, in April 1991 the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet adopted a Law on the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples that stated that Prigorodny Raion should be handed back to the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, but the Ossetians pressured Moscow to impose a five-year moratorium on implementing it.

Ethnic Cleansing

The split in July 1992 of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR into separate Chechen and Ingush republics played into the hands of the North Ossetian leadership, which according to former Russian Nationalities Minister Valery Tishkov began forging clandestine plans to provoke a clash in Prigorodny Raion between the Ossetian and Ingush communities in order to create a pretext to expel the Ingush en masse and neutralize the perceived threat posed by the Ingush demands to hand the district back.

As part of those preparations, North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov oversaw the distribution of weapons to illegal Ossetian paramilitary groups. Meanwhile, the Russian leadership demonstrated seeming indifference to the imminent crisis. Tishkov, who personally met with officials from both sides in a bid to defuse mounting tensions, suggests that one reason for that apparent lack of concern may have been the anticipation that in the event of armed hostilities between Ossetians and Ingush the Chechens would come to the aid of their Ingush ethnic cousins, thus providing the perfect pretext for ousting separatist Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, who in 1991 had refused to sign the new Federation Treaty on relations between Russia's various territorial entities.

Former North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov in 2006
Former North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov in 2006

A series of incidents in late October 1992 in which Ingush died at the hands of Ossetians spiraled within a week into fighting between Ossetian paramilitaries and bands of young armed Ingush men who Galazov told Moscow were trying to wrest military control of Prigorodny Raion. Russian officials (including then-Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu, currently Russia's defense minister) dispatched to Vladikavkaz, the North Ossetian capital, and gave the green light for the deployment of Russian Army troops, which made no effort to protect Ingush civilians. In Tishkov's words, "preventing casualties and destruction and trying to separate the conflict parties was not the primary motive behind the federal center's actions." Consequently, tens of thousands of Ingush fled for their lives to Ingushetia as marauding Ossetians systematically destroyed their homes. Both sides took hundreds of hostages, some of whom are still unaccounted for.

The Russian authorities imposed a state of emergency in Prigorodny Raion and neighboring districts of North Ossetia and Ingushetia after the fighting died down, but made no effort to determine the chain of events and decisions that precipitated it or call to account the officials responsible. As for the Ingush displaced persons, they were mostly left to fend for themselves. Two years later, their plight was eclipsed by the start of Moscow's military intervention in Chechnya in the name of "restoring constitutional order."

No Attempt At Resolution

In August 1997, in response to renewed interethnic clashes in Prigorodny Raion, Russian President Boris Yeltsin summoned Galazov and his Ingush counterpart, army General Ruslan Aushev, and offered 200 billion rubles (then worth $34.5 million) annually for the next two years to finance reconstruction in Prigorodny Raion and thus enable Ingush families to return. At the same time, Yeltsin also called for a 15-20-year moratorium on Ingush territorial claims, which Aushev deplored as tantamount to "burying one's head in the sand."

A program unveiled in May 2005 for expediting the return of the Ingush displaced persons to their abandoned homes in Prigorodny Raion by the end of 2006 was only partially implemented. Consequently, as of October 2016, just 23,430 Ingush had succeeded in returning, with a similar number still in Ingushetia, according to Magomed Mutsolgov, head of the NGO Mashr. Those who have returned experience problems finding work; Ingush and Ossetian children attend separate schools.

Neither has the Russian leadership undertaken any serious effort to promote reconciliation. As a result, as Tishkov points out, deep-rooted stereotyped perceptions of "the adversary," often based on a distorted or mythologized perception of past events, continue to poison relations between the two ethnic groups.

Those negative perceptions surfaced late last year when Rustem Kelekhsayev, the head of the North Ossetian presidential administration, called for a more concerted effort to integrate into North Ossetian society young Ingush from Prigorodny Raion. Kelekhsayev was denounced on social media as a traitor, and in the region's parliament by lawmaker Dzhambolat Tedeyev, the trainer of Russia's free-style wrestling team.

Meanwhile, the Ingush collective hostility toward Ossetians has been compounded by the periodic abduction and subsequent disappearance of Ingush in North Ossetia. The human rights watchdog Memorial chronicled 18 such cases between mid-2005 and mid-2007.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Raul Khajimba takes the oath of office in Sukhumi on September 25, 2014.

In July 2013, nine opposition parties and groups in Georgia's breakaway republic of Abkhazia aligned in a Coordinating Council that succeeded the following year in ousting de facto President Aleksandr Ankvab in what was portrayed as a bloodless coup. Earlier this month, Abkhazia's main opposition parties similarly established a Union of Political Parties and Public Organizations with the stated aim of using all available legal means to force the resignation of Raul Khajimba, who was elected Ankvab's successor in an early presidential poll in August 2014.

In one key respect, however, the political landscape has changed over the past five years: The parliament elected in March 2017 has begun to play a more active role, challenging perceived failings on the part of the executive branch, rather than simply endorsing legislation drafted by the presidential administration.

For most of the past three years, Abkhaz domestic politics has been dominated by the mutual antagonism between Khajimba and the opposition. Initially, the most active and outspoken opposition force was the Amtsakhara (Keep the Home Fires Burning) union of veterans of the 1992-93 war that culminated in the loss of Georgia's control over the region. In early 2015, Amtsakhara began accusing Khajimba of failing to deliver on his election campaign pledges to expedite economic growth, raise living standards, and seek reconciliation with the Ankvab camp. In October of that year, it convened an emergency congress to demand his resignation, but without success.

In December 2016, the Bloc of Opposition Forces (BOS) established the previous year by Amtsakhara; the APRA Fund for Socio-Economic and Political Research headed by Aslan Bzhania, whom Khajimba had defeated in the August 2014 early presidential ballot by just 559 votes; and two other small political groups launched a new push to force Khajimba to step down. A violent confrontation in the region's capital, Sukhumi, between supporters and critics of the president was averted at the last minute by talks between the two camps that led to the signing of an agreement on social and political stability under which the BOS would stop demanding Khajimba's resignation.

In return, they received the right to nominate a first deputy prime minister, several deputy ministers, the prosecutor-general, four members of the new Central Election Commission, and two members of the newly established Constitutional Court. In addition, the parliament was to set about drafting constitutional amendments that would redistribute power between the legislature and the executive, including the president.

The truce between the two camps lasted barely six months, however, primarily because Khajimba failed to comply with the provisions of the agreement. Following yet another emergency congress in late June 2017, Amtsakhara and the BOS issued separate statements announcing their withdrawal from the agreement on the grounds that the Abkhaz leadership had not fulfilled its obligations.

Amtsakhara and the BOS did not, however, immediately renew their efforts to force Khajimba to step down. On the contrary, the focus of opposition discourse began to shift from relentless criticism of Khajimba and the government to a more nuanced debate that prioritized the need for systemic reform over criticism of the region's leadership.

That comparative lull came to an abrupt end in late December when it transpired that Khajimba had pardoned and handed over to the Georgian authorities Georgy Lukava, an ethnic Georgian from Abkhazia serving a 20-year prison term for the kidnapping and murder of Abkhaz officials. Amtsakhara and two smaller opposition groups, Ainar and Kyarazaa, accused Khajimba of betraying the memory of those who fought and died in the 1992-93 war that culminated in Abkhazia's de facto separation from Georgia.

Some members of the Abkhaz leadership expressed reservations, too. Even Khajimba's vice president, Vitaly Gabnia, was quoted by the news portal Caucasian Knot as saying that if the Abkhaz side “handed over a man sentenced for such serious crimes and we were not aware of it, then it has to be said that a mistake was made, and those responsible must be [identified]."

More than 1,000 people, including some Khajimba supporters, congregated in Sukhumi on January 3 to protest Lukava's release. Meeting in emergency session the same day, the parliament set up a commission headed by former Interior Minister Raul Lolua to determine whether Khajimba had, indeed, violated the law and the constitution by single-handedly deciding to release Lukava without securing the approval of the pardons commission. After Khajimba personally argued his case to lawmakers, however, the parliament commission decided to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court -- even though, as a result of Khajimba's rejection of opposition nominees, that body is still not at full strength.

That initiative reflects the albeit limited power of the new parliament to serve as a curb on and counterbalance to perceived infringements or inefficiency on the part of the president and government. Of the 35 lawmakers, some 20 are Khajimba supporters, even though only three are members of his Forum of National Unity of Abkhazia. In fact, few parliamentarians represent a specific political party. Neither Amtsakhara nor the former ruling United Abkhazia won representation, and only one of seven Ainar candidates was elected.

Former Abkhaz leader Aleksandr Ankvab
Former Abkhaz leader Aleksandr Ankvab

Instead, the remaining 15 lawmakers are loosely divided into three groups. Former President Ankvab and former CEC Chairman Batal Tabagua each head a group of five or six deputies, while the others are affiliated with Ainar or another opposition grouping, the news portal Caucasian Knot reported on March 28.

That model of informal loyalties is, however, proving increasingly tenuous and fluid. In late December, two nominally pro-Khajimba lawmakers, Ilya Gunia and Dmitry Ardzinba, called for a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Beslan Bartsits on the grounds that the 2018 draft budget submitted by the government to parliament prioritized financing the government bureaucracy over subsidizing agriculture or a comprehensive program of economic development. Twelve pro-government parliamentarians walked out of the parliament chamber before the actual no-confidence vote, which failed by just two votes. (Of the 21 remaining deputies, 16 voted in favor, two against, one abstained, and two votes were ruled invalid.)

Predictably, Khajimba reacted to the protests over Lukava's release by convening a series of public meetings in a bid to convince the population at large that he had acted within the framework of the law in pardoning Lukava, and that the opposition had organized those protests in order to score political points. Former Interior Minister Lolua categorically denies this. In a lengthy interview he gave to AbkhazInform, he said that “there was no political undercurrent to [the protesters'] actions; citizens were simply demanding that the authorities make public the motives for and details of the release of a terrorist and murderer."

Khajimba subsequently dismissed the call by the new Union of Political Parties and Public Organizations for his resignation as “a destructive position, a call for chaos."

In an apparent effort to underscore the key difference between the union's push for Khajimba's resignation and the storming in May 2014 of the presidential administration that triggered Ankvab's ouster, APRA Fund chairman Bzhania stressed at the union's first press conference on January 23 that the opposition was committed to acting within the framework of the law to create a situation in which Khajimba would voluntarily step down.

But even allowing for Khajimba's clear determination to remain in his post, the new union's chances of success are slight, for at least two reasons. First, it may prove difficult to reach a consensus on tactics and time frame, given the diverging priorities of its various members. Amtsakhara and Bzhania may argue that it is imperative to force Khajimba's resignation as soon as possible, given what Bzhania describes as the catastrophic state of the Abkhaz economy. Abkhazia Is Our Home leader Lolua, by contrast, insists that new legislation on both presidential and parliamentary elections must be passed before an early presidential election can be held.

Secondly, Ankvab and Tabagua have not acceded to the union and were conspicuous by their absence from its first press conference. Addressing Amtsakhara's June 2017 congress, Ankvab stressed the need to preserve political stability until the presidential election due in August 2019, rather than expose a population wearied by repeated political crises to new upheavals that could, in his words, undermine the foundations of the state. Instead, he continued, “responsible people, meaning us, should concentrate on preparing for the upcoming presidential election in order to offer society an alternative, to convince citizens that we are right." Ankvab himself is not eligible to participate in that ballot, having reached the maximum age of 65 in December.

But even if Ankvab and Tabagua do not openly align with the new union, they could still play a key role in parliament by systematically thwarting any legal initiative for which Khajimba's supporters require a constitutional majority, with the possible exception of the long-awaited draft constitutional amendments on the distribution of powers between the legislative and executive branches.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

Load more

About This Blog

This blog presents analyst Liz Fuller's personal take on events in the region, following on from her work in the "RFE/RL Caucasus Report." It also aims, to borrow a metaphor from Tom de Waal, to act as a smoke detector, focusing attention on potential conflict situations and crises throughout the region. The views are the author's own and do not represent those of RFE/RL.


Latest Posts