Opposition leaders Levan Gachechiladze (left) and Nino Burjanadze
November 06, 2009
November 6 is the second anniversary of a brutal police crackdown in Tbilisi on demonstrators who had for days picketed the parliament building to demand early parliamentary elections and the release of persons they considered political prisoners.
Over the past several weeks, Georgian media have discussed the possibility that the opposition will launch a new wave of protests on November 7 to demand the resignation of President Mikheil Saakashvili. But with opposition parties divided over tactics and strategy, the likely impact remains unclear.
In early April, virtually all influential opposition parties joined forces to convene repeated protest demonstrations in Tbilisi and other cities to demand that Saakashvili step down and schedule early elections.
But that campaign gradually lost momentum, partly due to internal disagreements which Saakashvili sought to exploit. Having repeatedly stated that he intends to serve out his entire second term, which ends in January 2013, he met on May 11 with four moderate opposition leaders and offered concessions on other political issues.
Then one month later, on June 9, Saakashvili met with Levan Gachechiladze, his closest defeated rival in the January 2008 presidential ballot, and offered opposition figures several deputy ministerial posts. Days later, police clashed outside the Interior Ministry with protesters: 39 people were arrested and several protesters injured. On July 9, only some 1,500 people turned up for a demonstration to mark three months since the campaign to force Saakashvili's resignation got under way.
Will opposition protesters occupy downtown Tbilisi again, as they did in April? On October 14, opposition leaders met in Tbilisi to discuss tactics, but reached agreement only on not working at cross-purposes, but not on a coordinated course of action. The more radical wing, which comprises former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze's Democratic Movement-United Georgia and former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili's Movement for a United Georgia, continues to advocate street protests to demand that Saakashvili resign and schedule an early presidential ballot.
The more moderate faction, including the Alliance for Georgia, the Republican Party and the Conservative Party, intends instead to focus on the municipal elections due in May 2010. Alliance for Georgia head Irakli Alasania has already announced that he plans to
run for the post of Tbilisi mayor. Alasania
reasoned on October 14 that "if we win in the capital, it will be an indication that change is possible and that a transition of power is under way."
The third major player within the opposition, the National Forum, for its part sees no point in participating in local elections, and will continue trying to mobilize support outside Tbilisi. The party has also floated the idea of forming a parallel government.
The forum already has considerable support in Tbilisi and among the younger generation, not least because its leaders, Zhiuli Shartava and Gubaz Sanikidze, are not perceived as compromised by any past association with the present Georgian leadership. Shartava and Sanikidze were elected to parliament in May 2008, but rejected their mandates to protest the perceived rigging of the outcome of that election.
Despite confusion over which and how many parties would participate, Eka Beselia of the Movement for a United Georgia formally
informed the Tbilisi authorities on October 30 that a protest is planned on November 7. On October 29, she had said "almost all" party leaders had signaled that they would participate, and predicted that the entire opposition would demonstrate unanimity, regardless of party divisions. She said the November 7 demonstration would be followed by further protest actions, but not on a daily basis.
But Republican Party political secretary Levan Berdzenishvili was
quoted on October 29 as saying it is not clear whether a mass meeting, as opposed to a commemoration of the crackdown two years ago, will indeed take place on November 7, and if it does, which parties will participate.
Greens party leader Gachechiladze (no relation to Levan) similarly
said on October 31 that his party still has not decided whether or not to join the anticipated new wave of protests.
Political commentator Emil Adelkhanov expressed skepticism in mid-October with regard to the planned renewed protests, saying he doubts whether they will have any effect on the country's leadership. One month earlier,
kavkaz-uzel.ru posted a detailed analysis of the political situation that revealed how Saakashvili's United National Movement has already established offices in provincial towns and is lobbying intensively to win the hearts and minds of the population in the run-up to the municipal elections next May.
On November 6, the organizers of the November 7 protest addressed an
appeal to U.S. Ambassador John Bass, pointing out that more than three months after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's July visit to Tbilisi, the Georgian authorities have still not made any progress towards fulfilling the democratization requirements of the strategic partnership agreement signed in January. They warn that the Georgian leadership's "authoritarian" approach is inexorably bringing the country closer to mass destabilization, which poses a "real threat" to the Georgian people's collective aspiration to build a society based on western democratic values.
Chechen parliament speaker Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov (right) called Akhmed Zakayev (left) a traitor who has brought untold suffering on his own people.
November 03, 2009
Over the past year, Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov has repeatedly said he would welcome the return to Chechnya from London of Akhmed Zakayev, who heads the Chechen Republic Ichkeria (CHRI) leadership in exile. But last week, Kadyrov abruptly changed tack, branding Zakayev a liar and a hypocrite and accusing him of misrepresenting the present situation in Chechnya.
Two days later, on October 30, parliament speaker Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, a close Kadyrov ally who has met several times in recent months with Zakayev to discuss ways to promote political stabilization in Chechnya, issued a decree formally dissolving the ChRI parliament and government in exile and also the North Caucasus emirate proclaimed two years ago by Chechen resistance commander Doku Umarov. Abdurakhmanov was quoted as saying that move was primarily moral and psychological, insofar as the ChRI agencies abroad are virtual, not real. (He did not make the same claim for Umarov's emirate.)
In a subsequent lengthy interview, Abdurakhmanov called Zakayev a traitor who has brought untold suffering on his own people, and made it clear that the present pro-Moscow Chechen leadership wants no further dealings with him.
The catalyst for the wave of vilification of Zakayev was an interview published on October 26 in "Kommersant-Vlast" by Musa Muradov, a Chechen journalist who travelled to London to talk to Zakayev. In that interview, Zakayev said he has spoken briefly by telephone on two occasions with Kadyrov, but they did not discuss his possible return to Grozny.
He also said that during their successive meetings this summer, he discussed with Abdurakhmanov the possibility of the Russian authorities handing over to their families the bodies of prominent Chechen resistance figures, including ChRI President Aslan Maskhadov, and also of declaring an amnesty for an estimated 20,000 Chechens serving prison terms in Russia. Zakayev also reaffirmed his conviction that Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) orchestrated Umarov's decision to declare the North Caucasus an Islamic state.
Victory Of The Hawks
In an October 29 interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service, Zakayev attributed Kadyrov's criticism of him to a split within the Russian leadership between one faction that realizes that the North Caucasus cannot be stabilized by using military force, and an opposing faction that considers a military victory not only possible, but the sole acceptable outcome. He said that latter faction at present has the upper hand, and that Kadyrov's reaction was dictated by Moscow, as Kadyrov is not an independent player.
If Zakayev's hypothesis that the "hawks" in Moscow were behind Kadyrov's criticism of him last week is indeed correct, then Abdurakhmanov's November 2 interview leaves no doubt that, for whatever reason, they are out to destroy Zakayev's reputation and influence both within the diaspora community and in Chechnya.
Abdurakhmanov's blanket criticism of Zakayev ranges from his role as a minister within Maskhadov's government to his imputed violation of the gentlemen's agreement between them not to comment publicly on the issues discussed during their talks this summer.
Abdurakhmanov further implicitly denied Zakayev's affirmation that the Russian leadership had given the green light for those talks, saying that he coordinated his meetings with Zakayev only with Kadyrov. Following a meeting with Zakayev in Oslo on July 24, Abdurakhmanov had read out an official statement saying that meeting took place with the approval of both Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Abdurakhmanov further lumped Zakayev together with Umarov and Umarov's adviser, Movladi Udugov (whom Zakayev considers the mastermind behind the North Caucasus emirate), as "enemies of the [Chechen] republic." He stressed that "we are the legitimate government," and that following the adoption in a referendum in March 2003 of a new constitution designating the Chechen Republic a subject of the Russian Federation "all political questions are closed."
Exile Squabbles
Abdurakhmanov said that the envisaged world congress of Chechens will take place as planned, that Grozny will be the venue, and that it will focus on encouraging Chechens in exile to return home. During their most recent meeting, in London in mid-August, Zakayev and Abdurakhmanov agreed that such a forum would be convened before the end of the year. It was subsequently scheduled for February 23, 2010.
Abdurakhmanov said Zakayev has discredited himself to the point that he cannot attend that gathering, and "we shall not conduct any further talks with him." But he did not exclude inviting other Chechen political figures in exile. In that context he mentioned Akhyad Idigov and Zhaloudi Saralyapov, who head rival factions of the divided ChRI parliament.
In late August, days after Zakayev's most recent meeting with Abdurakhmanov in London, Saralyapov issued a decree dismissing the ChRI cabinet in exile and Zakayev as its head, and taking upon himself the duties of cabinet head. Saralyapov's stated rationale for doing so was that Zakayev violated the ChRI Constitution by recognizing the legitimacy of the pro-Moscow Chechen Republic leadership.
Saralyapov said the parliament and government in exile authorized Zakayev to discuss with pro-Moscow Chechen officials only a proposal advanced by the latter that the Russian Federation should recognize the Chechen Republic as an independent state just as it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia one year ago.
The ChRI prosecutor's office loyal to Zakayev retaliated by issuing a statement accusing Saralyapov and two other persons of treason, conspiring with a hostile state, and seeking to overthrow the legitimate ChRI leadership and seize power.
Which of Zakayev's statements to "Kommersant-Vlast" occasioned Abdurakhmanov's diatribe can only be guessed at. Abdurakhmanov may himself have incurred Moscow's displeasure if he and Zakayev indeed discussed the possibility of handing over Maskhadov's body to his family for reburial. Any such proposal would be anathema to the Kremlin, given that under Russian legislation, the bodies of slain "terrorists" are to be buried in unmarked graves.
Meanwhile, the plight of "Kommersant" journalist Muradov gives serious grounds for concern in light of the still unresolved murder three years ago of Anna Politkovskaya, whose fearless coverage of events in Chechnya cost her her life. Abdurakhmanov denounced Muradov as "a scoundrel and a traitor to the Chechen people" who "has committed a crime against Chechen history."