The Kremlin-linked website Lifenews.ru on December 19 night posts wiretaps of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov's private telephone conversations, in which he made disparaging and crude remarks about environmental activist Yevgenia Chirikova and other activists.

Within hours, Nemtsov issued an apology -- on LiveJournal. Shortly thereafter, Chirikova accepted the apology -- on Twitter. And today, the two appeared together in a show of unity -- on the online television station Dozhd TV.

One of the most interesting and striking things about the Nemtsov phone-tap scandal was that it played out entirely online. And one of the most consequential things about it was how quickly the opposition was able to dominate that milieu and seize the narrative.

It took very little time for the dominant meme to change from the Kremlin's preferred story line (Nemtsov is a boor! The opposition is divided! The protests are doomed!) to one more amenable to the opposition (The scoundrels are listening to our phone conversations! We need to stick together!).

In a recent discussion on The Power Vertical Podcast, Kirill Kobrin, managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service, made a very salient observation about why the Kremlin's efforts to discredit Nemtsov failed, just as did an earlier campaign to smear anticorruption blogger Aleksei Navalny:


Kirill's remarks, which were made on December 6, succinctly foreshadowed this week's Nemtsov scandal. The authorities (if you believe the overwhelming circumstantial evidence) used the Internet as a tool and arranged for the Nemtsov wiretaps to be posted on Lifenews.ru, which according to press reports is connected to Yury Kovalchuk, a longtime Putin ally.

Job done, right? Nemtsov will be discredited. The opposition will be divided. The protests will fizzle.

Not quite. The opposition, which literally lives in the ecosystem of the Internet, quickly dominated that environment. They were able to mobilize and rapidly take over the narrative.

Suddenly, Twitter, Facebook, and LiveJournal lit up with links as people learned that the wiretaps and their subsequent circulation violated Articles 137 and 138 of the Russian Criminal Code -- and that Nemtsov's lawyers have called on law enforcement to open an investigation.

Nemtsov's rapid apology and Chirikova's gracious acceptance of it quickly laid to rest any notions of a divided opposition. And their joint TV appearance on Dozhd TV was devastatingly effective. (But don't take my word for it. Watch it here).

The opposition's dominance of the Internet ecosystem is partially a generational thing. The youth are more wired and sympathize with the opposition. But it also crosses generations (Nemtsov is 52 and Chirikova is in her mid-30s) and was born of necessity. Shut out of traditional media, the opposition had no choice but to move online -- as did citizens who wanted independent sources of information.

We saw the results of this during the protests to save Khimki forest that brought Chirikova to national prominence. We saw it in the civic activism during the bungled attempt to contain raging forest fires in the summer of 2010. And we are seeing it now, as the phenomenon comes of age, in the aftermath of the disputed December 4 parliamentary elections.    

The Kremlin has had some small online successes. Distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks by hacker brigades disrupted some opposition websites. They used bots to hijack hashtags associated with antigovernment protests on Twitter, briefly confusing would-be demonstrators. (h/t to my colleague Luke Allnutt at RFE/RL's Tangled Web blog for flagging these.) But at this point these things look like little more than nuisances.

But I wouldn''t be surprised if the Kremlin got much better at this game soon enough.

-- Brian Whitmore

Amid all the showmanship and bravado on display during Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's live call-in program yesterday, there also came a rare moment of sincerity.

This happened when Putin was asked to comment on former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, who resigned under pressure following a public spat with President Dmitry Medvedev in late September.

"Aleksei Leonidovich Kudrin has not left my team," Putin said. "We are old comrades, he's my friend. He did a lot for the country. I'm proud that this man worked in my government. Such people are needed and will be needed in current and future governments."

On one hand, Putin's comments can be viewed as a subtle dig at President Dmitry Medvedev, who demanded Kudrin's resignation after the finance minister criticized his plans to increase military spending by $65 billion over the next three years. (The rare public dust-up came just days after Putin announced that he intended to return to the Kremlin next year and planed to make Medvedev his prime minister. Kudrin was reportedly not happy about the job swap.)

But there is probably more to it than that. The prime minister's remarks also a sign that Kudrin remains influential despite his resignation three months ago.

It's not clear whether Kudrin will return to serve in the government -- a move that would certainly cheer nervous investors -- or go on to form a liberal political party.

But he remains a player -- and one who is not going to be shy about speaking his mind about Russia's current political impasse.

In comments to reporters hours after Putin spoke on Thursday, Kudrin made it clear that at the moment his sympathies lie with the tens of thousands of anti-Kremlin protestors who took to the streets on December 10 to protest electoral fraud -- and plan to do so again on December 24.

"I myself support honest elections," Kudrin told reporters. "The elections just held took place with major violations and we have not yet heard an adequate answer from those responsible, and in general from the powers that be."

He also took Putin to task for disparaging remarks he made about the mass demonstrations. "I don't agree with this attitude towards the protesters...there is no need to provoke them," Kudrin told reporters.

Kudrin is the most senior member of Putin's team thus far to come out so strongly -- and publicly -- in favor of the protestors. And he is in a prety unique position to make his voice heard.

Putin and Kudrin are indeed very close friends, dating back to their time working together in the St. Petersburg government under Mayor Anatoly Sobchak in the 1990s. (As I have noted on numerous occasions, Kudrin is widely rumored to be the only official allowed to use the familiar "ty" form with Putin in private conversations.)

In addition to personal affinity, Putin also has a great deal of professional respect for Kudrin, whom he tasked with keeping Russia's fiscal house in order while he consolidated political power and strengthened his power vertical.

Kudrin's vigilance and insistence on fiscal discipline often put him in conflict with other members of the ruling circle, most notably Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who oversees the energy sector and is the informal leader of the siloviki clan of security service veterans close to Putin.

Sechin -- who is far less enamored of fiscal discipline than Kudrin -- tried on numerous occasions to get the finance minister sacked. But each tme Kudrin came under threat, at least until the public feud with Medvedev, Putin backed him up.

For most of his public life, Kudrin steered clear of politics, preferring to play the role of the competent technocrat and economic manager. That all changed earlier this year, when he began calling for political reform, arguing that without it, true economic modernization would be impossible.

Speaking at the Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum in February, Kudrin said Russia needed open and inclusive elections, arguing that in order to make difficult and painful economic choices, the government will need a "mandate of trust" from the Russian people.

And in March, during an appearance at the forum "Russia and the World: Looking For An Investment Strategy," Kudrin made the case again:

"This country needs an institution that will make sure that we participate in formulation of these rules and their application," he said. "As matter of fact, we already have such an institution, and by that I mean elections."

Putin failed to heed Kudrin's earlier calls for political liberalization, which now look prophetic. Will he listen to the advice of his old friend and colleague now?

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE: THIS POST WAS UPDATED ON DECEMBER 17

The great post-election shuffle continues. Where it will end nobody knows.

Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Naryshkin resigned today to take a seat in the State Duma, where he is widely expected to be elected speaker. Naryshkin will likely replace outgoing speaker Boris Gryzlov, who announced on Wednesday that he will not be returning to the lower house. (Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov has also been mentioned as a possible successor to Gryzlov.)

Stepping in to replace Naryshkin -- at least temporarily -- will be Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin's deputy chief of staff, grey cardinal, and the regime's unofficial ideologist. The promotion will put Surkov in an unusual spot. He has served in the Kremlin of every post-Soviet president, albeit he always exerted his considerable influence in the shadows as a deputy chief of staff whose actual influence exceeded his official title. Now he's coming into the light, sort of.

Other than that, it's unclear what this Kremlin/Duma re-shuffle is supposed to accomplish.

After United Russia's disappointing showing in the disputed December 4 elections, Gryzlov -- the highest ranking party official after Vladimir Putin -- probably had to fall on his sword. And the loyal and competent Naryshkin is a logical replacement.

But what we essentially are seeing here is a game of musical chairs among Putin loyalists, and this actually illustrates the regime's dilemma perfectly. They clearly prefer to continue on with the status quo, which an increasingly restive society considers unacceptable.

In the post-December 4 environment, Russia's Team Putin has found itself in a bind.

They can crack down and try to shut down the growing protest movement in its infancy -- and risk greater instability, capital flight, and an even angrier public. This crew can be ruthless, but they probably don't have the stomach for that. It's also not at all clear that they have the resources or the consensus among the elite to pull it off.

Or they can take a stab at political reform. But they know very well that this can easily slip out of their control (see Gorbachev, Mikhail). Actually following through with a true political liberalization would eventually spell the end of the current regime.

So what they are left with are cosmetic changes around the margins that will satisfy nobody. This was on vivid display during Putin's televised live call-in program today.

The annual ritual took on an added significance this year and was supposed to showcase the new Putin, the one who understands he is in a new political environment. What it was, instead, was a tirade of contradictions and half-measures.

He praised the protestors, saying he was "pleased" to see "young, active people formulating their opinions" and even tried to take credit for the newfound civic activism. "If this is the result of the Putin regime, then that’s good!” he said. (Actually, as I have blogged here and here, it is -- but probably not in the way Putin meant.)

But he couldn't just leave it at that. He also couldn't resist ridiculing and mocking the demonstrators, saying the white ribbons they wear resemble condoms and suggesting they were being paid to take to the streets.

In an animated answer about alleged electoral fraud, Putin insisted the election results reflected the will of the voters and suggested placing webcams in polling places.

He also proposed a convoluted "reform" of the selecting governors that would involve the party controlling regional legislatures nominating candidates for the president's approval. The approved candidate would then face voters in a popular referendum.

And so the drama continues and next week promises to be just as interesting as the past two. Anti-corruption blogger Aleksei Navalny and Solidarity leader Ilya Yashin get out of jail on December 20 after serving their 15-day sentences. The new Duma convenes on December 21. President Dmitry Medvedev makes his state-of-the-nation speech on December 22. And mass protests are planned for Moscow and other cities December 24.

So hold onto your hats. This promises to be a wild ride.   

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE: THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED TO CORRECT DATE OF OPENING OF NEW STATE DUMA AND TO ADD DMITRY PESKOV'S COMMENTS

Former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announces plans to form a new liberal party. Billionaire mogul Mikhail Prokhorov and Irkutsk Governor Dmitry Mezentsev jump into the presidential race. Outgoing State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov says he will not return to the lower house.

The flurry of insider activity over the past several days appears to suggest that the ruling elite is trying to regain its footing in the aftermath of the December 4 election debacle and ensuing mass protests.

For the past two weeks, the opposition has had the initiative and has been setting the agenda. Now the Kremlin wants it back.

The first hints about where things may be going should come on December 15 when Prime Minister Vladimir Putin holds his annual televised live call-in program, when carefully vetted ordinary citizens get a chance to ask the national leader any previously approved question they desire.

Other dates to watch are December 21, when the new State Duma convenes and December 22, whenPresident Dmitry Medvedev is scheduled to make his last state-of-the-nation speech.

These events will follow on the heels of the scheduled December 20 release from jail of anticorruption blogger Aleksei Navalny and Solidarity leader Ilya Yashin, both of whom were given 15-day sentences after being detained during protests on December 5.

The Duma opening and Medvedev's speech also come just days before mass protests scheduled for December 24.

So, assuming they have formulated a plan, where are Team Putin likely to try to take things now? How do they plan to regain the initiative?

Some interesting speculation surfaced on Wednesday. And fair warning, this is only speculation (albeit of the reasonably informed type).

That said, check out this bombshell from a research note by Vladimir Tikhomirov and Thomas Mundy of the investment firm Otkritie Kapital (h/t to my colleague and RFE/RL's Moscow correspondent Tom Balmforth for flagging this):


Whoa! My initial reaction to this was, to say the least, skeptical. What led me to give it another look was the fact that Otkritie Kapital is a serious player (it is partially owned by the state-run VTB, Russia's second-largest lender) and Tikhomirov is its chief economist.

Tikhomirov and Mundy note that according to Russia's electoral law, Putin will need to relinquish his post as prime minister three days after he is officially registered as a candidate for president -- which should be sometime early next week.

Putin submitted his papers on December 7 to the Central Election Commission, which then has 10 days -- until December 17 -- to register him. Putin then has three days to resign as prime minister -- until December 20, the day before the new Duma convenes and two days before Mevvedev's speech.

So is this the plan? I honestly have no idea. It has received some attention in the media, prompting a curt denial from Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov. "The situation on the financial markets is a difficult one.Not all financial analysts manage to maintain mental sobriety," Peskov said. "Putin continues to work as chairman of the government. If any events have an entirely campaign-related nature, he will take a vacation," he said. "But on the whole he will carry out his day-to-day duties as prime minister. He does not have to take any vacation."

Nevertheless, if the Kremlin does decide to go down this road -- and again, it's a very big if -- an important question remains: How will this play with the tens of thousands of protesters expected to take to the streets on December 24 in Moscow and other cities?

Given the fact that the protesters have made it clear that they are fed up with all the Kremlin's insider games, it will likely do very little to calm the increasingly restive "Russian street."

-- Brian Whitmore

It began with a trickle, as change often does.

Isolated acts of dissent began popping up that eventually seemed to point to a larger trend. Street protests began attracting more than the dozen or so usual suspects. Support for reform appeared in unlikely places, including within the regime. Whistleblowers exposed wrongdoing in high places. Tech savvy youths mastered the art of getting their message out online. Artists and musicians began to speak out forcefully.

It took years, but little by little, people stopped being afraid and stopped being passive. Step by step, the other Russia emerged -- the one that inspires, the one that belies the stereotypes, the one that was on full display for all the world to see during Saturday's massive and peaceful protests. The one that is now impossible for the Kremlin to ignore or belittle.

Cracks in Putin's authoritarian power vertical started appearing as far back as late 2008 when protests in Vladivostok over increased tariffs on imported cars attracted an unusually broad cross-section of society. The Kremlin was spooked and instructed local authorities to shut the growing demonstrations down but local police officials refused. In the end, Russia's rulers were forced to fly in riot police from the Moscow region to do the job.

More acts of defiance followed. A month later in January 2009, Judge Aleksei Bondarev unexpectedly released opposition protestor Roman Dobrokhotov, who had been arrested for holding a silent protest -- standing with his mouth taped shut and holding a blank sheet of paper -- in front of the Russian government headquarters in Moscow.  Dobrokhotov was charged -- despite the taped mouth -- with public cursing. In dismissing the charges, Bondarev cited the European Convention on Human Rights.

An activist in the pro-Kremlin Nashi youth movement in February 2009 exposed how the authorities were using young spies to join opposition groups and then inform on them.

Whistleblowing soon became a bit of a fad. Most famously, Aleksei Dymovsky, the original YouTube cop, posted a viral video in November 2009 alleging massive corruption in the Novorossiisk police force where he worked, including the falsification of evidence against innocent crime suspects.

Dymovsky lost his job and faced prosecution and harassment, but a trend was born. More truth-telling cops, prosecutors, and judge's aides followed suit - despite the consequences.

Soon the artistic community got into the act. When a car driven by Lukoil vice president Anatoly Barkov was involved in an accident killing two women in Moscow in March 2010, the popular rapper Noize MC posted a song and video about the incident on YouTube that quickly went viral. The rapper then followed up with another viral video and song about police brutality months later.

At a concert in Moscow's Olympic Stadium (the same place where Putin was recently booed by martial arts boxing fans) veteran rocker Yury Shevchuk lit into the authorities for corruption and impunity in a four-minute rant between songs. A video of that also went viral.

The actor Aleksei Devotchenko -- star of popular TV crime shows like "Streets Of Broken Lamps" and 'Bandit St. Petersburg" -- followed up on Shevchuk's comments posting a diary on the Internet criticizing his colleagues for cozying up to the Kremlin and making "pseudo-patriotic" propaganda films.

By the summer of 2010, dissent appeared to be reaching critical mass (I even titled a blog at the time "The August Revolution," only half in jest.)

The Blue Bucket brigades protested the widespread use of police sirens by the rich and powerful to avoid Moscow's traffic laws. A new opposition star was born when Yevgenia Chirikova, a former Moscow businesswomen and mother of two -- a classic Russian everywoman -- took up the cause of defending the Khimki forest that was slated for destruction to make room for a new Moscow-St. Petersburg highway.

When the authorities struggled to respond to raging forest fires that same summer, a startling display of Internet-powered civic activism sprung up -- exemplified by a doctor, using the online handle Dr. Liza, who organized assistance for her fellow citizens when it appeared the government was unable or unwilling to do so. (Dr. Liza captured the emerging dynamic perfectly when she dished the ruling United Russia party which had sought to co-opt her philanthropic activities for their own political purposes.)

I could go on and on, but by now you get the picture. What happened over the past week in Russia was years in the making. It took the disappointment of the Putin-Medvedev job switcheroo and the anger over the disputed December 4 election to light the spark, but the kindling was long there.

Putin famously created Russia's power vertical, the rigid top-down power structure that brought a semblance of order at the expense of the democratic process. But he also, unwittingly perhaps, created a "power horizontal" -- a highly educated, prosperous, and wired middle class that is now clamoring for its rights. This Other Russia has shown its face to the world -- and it isn't going away any time soon.

-- Brian Whitmore

Throughout his first stint in the Kremlin, from 2000 to 2008, Vladimir Putin was able to count on the rock-solid support of Russia's emerging new middle class. And why not? He was largely credited with creating this class by ushering in a degree of stability after the chaos and deprivation of the 1990s.

Sure, Russians were asked to give up a degree of political freedoms. They could no longer watch the satirical "Kukly" program on NTV -- or any independent television programming for that matter. They could also no longer elect governors or hold public demonstrations. But they were free to make money, buy cool cars and gadgets, and go on fancy vacations -- provided they steered clear of politics and criticizing the regime (see Khodorkovsky, Mikhail).

And the number of people who could afford to do these things increased markedly, fuelled by record oil prices that trickled down and fuelled prosperity that was more widespread than most Russians had ever seen. What was the exclusive prerogative of the oligarchs and their hangers on in the 90s suddenly became available, not to all, but to many.

And for awhile, that was enough -- but apparently not anymore.

In our podcast discussion earlier this week, my colleague Kirill Kobrin, the managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service, made a lot of salient observations about the rapidly changing political landscape in the aftermath of the disputed December 4 legislative elections (you can listen to the podcast here).

One of the most interesting points Kirill made was how much the socioeconomic profile of those supporting and opposing the Putin regime has changed:


This, to put it mildly, is a sea change. But it shouldn't come as a surprise. When an authoritarian society becomes more prosperous it is a natural progression for the newly minted middle class, secure in their improved living standards, to eventually begin to yearn for -- and then demand -- greater political rights and freedoms.

We saw this in Augusto Pinochet's Chile, we saw it in Taiwan, we saw it in South Korea and elsewhere. And I think we are now, finally, beginning to see it in Russia. And in this sense, Putin has largely become a victim of his own success.

The central role social-networking sites like Facebook are playing in the protests (see my colleague Tom Balmforth's excellent report on that here) and the role pricey smart phones are playing in spreading viral videos about electoral violations and the street protests are witness to the bourgeois-middle-class nature of this Decembrist uprising.

It is also striking how out of touch Putin and the ruling elite have become with the society they helped create.

Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's allegedly Internet-savvy president, belittled the videos documenting voter fraud that have been making the rounds since the elections, saying that they proved nothing. The comment is laughable for anybody who has seen these videos. (Take a look at this one of a man voting multiple times, that went viral on election day, for example.)

A report  today in "Vedomosti" citing unidentified officials said the "protests in the capital greatly upset the Kremlin, the government, and [Moscow] city fathers." The report quoted one official as saying: "They are trying to work out a policy...a
strategy."

If Putin's comments about the protests today are any indication, that strategy seems to be -- wait for it -- to blame Hillary Clinton. (I'm only half joking here.)

"I have seen  the first reaction  of our American  partners," Putin said.  "The first thing the [U.S.] Secretary of  State [Clinton] did was give an assessment  that the election was neither free nor fair, even  before she received materials from OSCE/ODIHR observers. And she set a tone for some of our actors inside the country. She gave a signal and they heard it and, with the support of the U.S. State Department, have started to work actively."

(For the record, in her comments on the Russian elections in Bonn on December 5, Clinton made numerous references to the OSCE report.)

So one part of the Kremlin strategy appears to be to play the foreigner card -- blaming the tried-and-true scapegoats in the West.

Another appears to be to curtail the Internet. The FSB called on the Russian social-networking site VKontakte to close the accounts of opposition figures. Remarkably, VKontakte rebuffed them.

The Kremlin approached the elections as if this were 2004 and not 2011. And they are approaching the aftermath in the same way.

They may yet be able to shut down these protests and get back to business as usual. But the social forces driving this uprising are not going away anytime soon.

-- Brian Whitmore

Sunday's legislative elections in Russia appear to have crystallized mounting discontent with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's rule. Moscow this week witnessed its largest demonstrations in a decade. The Kremlin, meanwhile, appears increasingly out of touch with a rapidly changing society.

In the latest edition of The Power Vertical podcast, I speak with Kirill Kobrin, managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service, about the new political reality that appears to be emerging.

In a wide-ranging conversation, we discussed Russia's newly assertive civil society, its increasingly divided elite, the prominent role the Internet and social media are now playing in opposition politics, and the rise of anticorruption crusader Aleksei Navalny.

Russia's New Politics

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Listen to or download the podcast above, or subscribe to The Power Vertical podcast on iTunes.

Enjoy...

In many ways, The December 4 election result changes nothing at all.

Sure, United Russia has lost its two-thirds supermajority in the State Duma that allows it to amend the constitution unfettered. But was this really such a big deal to begin with? In reality, the ruling elite very rarely needs a supermajority. And when they do they can always count on Vladimir Zhirinovsky -- who despite his nationalist bluster and clownish antics -- consistently supports the Kremlin on the big issues.

Moreover, Vladimir Putin will easily be elected president in March. Despite the growing and very real public disillusionment with his rule, Putin remains the most popular politician in the country. And in the time between now and March, the Kremlin will -- no doubt learning from this experience -- become more adept at using its administrative resources more effectively to make sure there are no similar embarrassments in the presidential election.

So United Russia is still top dog in the Duma and Putin will soon be back in the Kremlin. Nothing has changed, right? Well, not so fast.

In many other ways, everything has changed -- and changed decisively.

The air of omnipotence that Putin has enjoyed -- and counted on --for the past decade is gone. Watching his joint appearance with Medvedev on Sunday night, he looked shaken, vulnerable, and very very mortal.

As Moscow-based political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin told me today, Putin has suddenly found himself in uncharted waters. In the past, he has been able to control his public image, driving his Lada around the Far East, going fishing and hunting shirtless in Siberia, and scuba diving for hidden treasure in the Black Sea. But what happens when the once adoring masses start booing you at sporting events?

"He doesn't know how to act in this situation and he is beginning to get frightened," Oreshkin said. "He is backing away from public meetings. He doesn't like anything that isn't rehearsed. He wants everything to be set up so he is asked scripted questions and he gives pithy and funny answers. He is now in a situation that he cannot rehearse and he has a very big problem."

Also gone is the reservoir of nearly unconditional support most Russians had, not just for Putin, but for the authoritarian system he painstakingly built over the past decade. That system, at least in the popular mythology, brought stability and prosperity after the chaos and poverty of the 1990s. But for many Russians, the bad old days -- the modern Time of Troubles -- are a fading memory and the economy is looking less and less robust. And for the Russian elite, the prosperity Putin presided over is a double-edged sword. As any political scientist will tell you, rising living standards in authoritarian countries usually lead to demands for political rights. This is happening in Russia as we speak, as a young generation with no memory of the Soviet period or the deprivation that followed it comes of age.

As I blogged last week, the ruling elite is suffering from a legitimacy crisis that is not going away anytime soon. Russian civil society is engaged and active in ways I have not seen since the Perestroika period -- and this time around, activists have the ability to spread viral videos on YouTube. This was on full display during the Duma vote as electoral observers, opposition figures, and ordinary citizens documented abuses like carrousel voting for all the world to see.

Was this election more fraudulent that previous ones on Putin's watch? Probably not. But this time it was filmed, documented, and posted online.

The unity of the broader elite, so vital for the smooth functioning of Putin's power vertical, is also gone. This became clear following the United Russia congress on September 24, when President Dmitry Medvedev's supporters could barely hide their disappointment and dismay at his "decision" to stand aside and let Putin return to the Kremlin. It was evident when Aleksei Kudrin went rogue, publicly criticizing the government's spending plans and then being forced to resign as finance minister. And it was evident with the remarkable political death and resurrection of Sergei Mironov, whose A Just Russia party has fared far better as an opposition force than it ever did as a pro-Kremlin satellite.

This is new for the Putin period. The last time I saw the elite this divided was in the late 1990s, just before Putin's rise to power.

I'll no doubt have more to add in the coming days. But for now, this is my initial takeaway from the December 4 election. Nothing has changed. Everything has changed.

-- Brian Whitmore

So the coronation has begun in earnest.

Amid deafening chants and thunderous applause, United Russia this weekend formally -- and unanimously -- nominated Vladimir Putin for a third term as president. The once-and-future national leader was, of course, in rare form, taunting the opposition, warning the West against trying to influence the elections, and announcing some populist initiatives.

But as several commentators have pointed out, this time the bluster carried a whiff of desperation. The ruling party's numbers are clearly falling precipitously, as are the tandem's -- albeit less so. Civil society is waking up from its long slumber and the opposition is getting increasingly surly.

That said, the Kremlin has more than sufficient resources -- administrative and otherwise -- to assure a victory for United Russia in the December 4 State Duma elections and for Putin in the presidential vote in March. (For anybody interested, "Vedomosti" had a fascinating piece recently about the mechanics of fixing elections in Russia.)

But then what? True, the authorities will have secured the formal legal basis to keep Putin and the current elite in power at least through 2018 -- if not 2024. But will they truly have a mandate?

An recent editorial in Gazeta.ru says no:  


Moreover, in the coming year, Russia's rulers will need to make some very unpopular moves -- most notably, reforming the country's social services, pension fund, and health-care system. Money will need to be found to upgrade Russia's creaking infrastructure. A way to diversify the economy away from its perilous dependence on commodities will need to be found.

Tough decisions will need to be made, but, as Gazeta.ru points out, there is thus far no indication that Putin or anybody else is ready to talk to the electorate about these things:
The one person who was willing to talk about the difficult choices facing Russia's rulers, former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, is now out of government.

So while the Kremlin tends to use elections as a legitimizing ritual, this time around elections -- regardless of the results -- are unlikely to provide the authorities with the legitimacy to govern effectively in the current economic and political climate.

In an insightful piece in Gazeta.ru last week, Grigory Golosov, a professor at the European University in St. Petersburg, asks a useful question. Where Russia's current rulers derive their legitimacy to govern?


So, if it's not elections, what then is the source of Putin's legitimacy?


And the only alternative people have to compare the current elite is the erratic presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the chaotic 1990s. And as Golosov points out, the regime has made the narrative that Putin and his team rescued Russia from this modern "time of troubles" -- when the Kremlin was the plaything of scheming oligarchs who pillaged Russia's wealth -- part of its legitimizing myth:


But what will happen to this veneer of "unique effectiveness" when the Kremlin is faced with the budget crunch Kudrin says will come next year and lacks the popular mandate to address it? Running against the bad old '90s, the oligarchs, and the chaos worked fine for the past decade. But for many Russians, particularly the younger generation, the wild Yeltsin years are a distant -- and fading -- memory.

-- Brian Whitmore

In a rare instance of truth telling, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev appeared to reveal on Monday the real reason Moscow went to war with Georgia in August 2008.

Speaking to officers of the Southern Military District in Vladikavkaz, Medvedev seemed to suggest that the goal was preventing Georgia from joining NATO (h/t to Civil Georgia for flagging this story):


And just in case anybody didn't get the message, Medvedev repeated it later in the day, in remarks to reporters in Rostov-na-Donu:


This is a remarkable admission. In the past, Kremlin officials have said they reluctantly went to war with Georgia to stop Tbilisi's "aggression" and "genocide" in the breakaway region of South Ossetia. But here, Medvedev suggests that the campaign was -- at least in part -- an effort to stifle Georgia's NATO bid (which looked a lot more realistic in the summer of 2008 than it does today).

It also fits with the circumstances surrounding the August 2008 war, which came just months after Georgia was denied a formal Membership Action Plan --  but was promised eventual membership in NATO -- at the alliances summit in Bucharest in April 2008.

In an article in August 2008, I outlined a series of steps Russia took with regard to Georgia in the months following the summit -- and preceding the war:


Then, in July 2008, Russia began massive military exercises near the Georgian border:

 
Would Georgia be in NATO today if the war had not happen? I doubt it. I covered the Bucharest summit in the spring of 2008 and the opposition from France, Germany, and Italy was fierce indeed. Moreover, Georgia's recent backsliding on democracy is giving even its strongest supporters in the alliance pause.

But nevertheless, Medvedev's bout of truth telling on Monday was revealing indeed.

-- Brian Whitmore

It is not entirely clear whether the fans at Moscow's Olympic Stadium were booing Vladimir Putin when he stepped into the ring to address the crowd following a martial arts match on Saturday, or whether -- as the events organizers claim -- their ire was directed at the defeated American fighter.

YOU CAN WATCH THE VIDEO HERE AND DECIDE FOR YOURSELF:



But what is abundantly clear is that the incident has fed a narrative that has been building in Russia over the past couple months that Putin is wearing out his welcome.

As I blogged here recently, Putin's poll numbers, as well as those of President Dmitry Medvedev and the ruling United Russia party, have been in steady decline for months.

The trend seemed to accelerate with the Leonid Brezhnev comparisons that followed the United Russia congress in September, when Putin's plan to return to the Kremlin was announced.

But as "Kommersant" reported last week, a roundtable at Moscow State University's Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics illustrates that the public's changing attitude toward the long-serving leader go even deeper.

On participant in the roundtable, Yelena Shestopal, noted that Putin is now facing a new generation that is less amenable to his political charms than their parents were:


Another participant, Victor Titov, noted that the public is growing increasingly weary of Putin's macho PR stunts like driving a Lada through the Far East, scuba diving for buried treasure -- or making an impromptu appearance at a martial arts bout:


Titov noted that Medvedev's image has also suffered since the United Russia congress in September, when Putin's return to the presidency was unveiled.

Russians had viewed Medvedev "as a nice person but not as a politician or leader. That's what attracted Russians," he said. "The castling move proclaimed at United Russia congress in late September, however, changed everything. Unconsciously, the Russians began perceiving Medvedev as first and foremost a weak politician."

Titov added that "Medvedev and Putin are seen as people who are in the position to accomplish something but who never even try."

Another participant in the symposium, Vladimir Lapkin of the Institute of Global Economy and International Relations, noted that the public was also souring on the staged Potemkin political theater that substitutes for real debate in Russia:


In a recent commentary published in "Vedomosti," Mikhail Dmitriyev and Sergei Belanovsky of the Center for Strategic Research came to similar conclusions as the Moscow State University roundtable.

The authors called the creation of the Putin-Medvedev tandem a masterstroke that consolidated two opposing poles in Russian society:


But the decision to have the two switch jobs after the 2012 election essentially emasculated Medvedev as a politician and severely damaged Putin's image as well:


This will all probably not mean much for the 2011-12 election cycle. The Kremlin's command of administrative resources is more than sufficient to achieve the results they want.

But where it will matter -- and matter big time -- will be when the elections are over and Putin needs to preside over what are certain to be very unpopular reforms in Russia's creaking social service infrastructure without the reservoir of support he has historically enjoyed.

UPDATE (November 23, 2011): The video of the booing incident has now gone viral, with 1,599,107 views on YouTube as I am writing this -- making it today's most viewed video. The video also boasts 13,437 "likes" and just 926 "dislikes."

Moreover, the Facebook page of Jeff "Snowman" Monson, the defeated American fighter the Kremlin claims the fans were booing, is now filled with supportive comments from Russians who assured him they were booing Putin and not him.

Here are just a few examples (click the link above for the whole shebang):


This must be very disturbing for the Kremlin. Those who attend martial arts fights like the one in Moscow's Olympic Stadium Saturday should constitute a key part of Putin's base -- and once did. If he is losing them, that is an ominous sign indeed.

UPDATE 2 (November 23, 2011): This video, shot from another angle, shows many in the crowd clearly booing Putin. Also audible are shouts of "ykhodi!" (go away!).

WATCH IT HERE:



The original video, meanwhile, now has over 2 million views on YouTube.

-- Brian Whitmore

Russia's latest YouTube political sensation is a Siberian teenager.

Matvei Tsivinyuk, a 15-year-old student at Krasnoyarsk's Gymnasium No. 3, captured the imaginations of oppositionists when he defaced United Russia campaign placards in his high school's lobby -- and then posted a secretly recorded video of his confrontation with the headmaster.

According to press reports, Tsivinyuk tore some of the posters and wrote the inscription: "The party of thieves and scoundrels."

He was promptly summoned to the principal's office where the clandestinely recorded argument with headmaster Aleksandra Pronina took place. The video is jumpy and poorly centered --  for obvious reasons -- but the dialogue is crystal clear.

WATCH THE VIDEO HERE:


Aleksandra Pronina: If there is something you disagree with then go to a demonstration. But not in school.

Matvei Tsivinyuk: According to Article 9, Point 5 of the law of the Russian Federation....

Aleksandra Pronina: Enough, Matvei! I don't care about any article. Article 9, Article 10, or whatever.... Does your family have a lot of money? Your parents may have to pay a fine for your hooliganism.

Matvei Tsivinyuk: A fine over a piece of paper?

Aleksandra Pronina: For hooliganism! Do you understand!? It's not just paper! It's a political placard!

Matvei Tsivinyuk: It should not be in the school because political parties are forbidden from agitating in educational institutions, including spreading propaganda.

Aleksandra Pronina: It's not propaganda.

Matvei Tsivinyuk: What is it, then?

Aleksandra Pronina: It's not propaganda. It is there so you can read the biographies of these people. I am telling you now, categorically, that if you deface any more placards I will turn you over to the police.

Matvei Tsivinyuk: And what will they do?

Aleksandra Pronina: I don't know. It's another sphere. My sphere is education. But I have warned you. If you read the biography of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin....

Matvei Tsivinyuk: I don't respect him....

Aleksandra Pronina: I'm just telling you that he was expelled from gymnasium and he was expelled from Kazan University when he studied there. I don't know if you want the same fate.

Tsivinyuk, who is an excellent student according to press reports, now joins the ranks of police officer Aleksei Dymovsky, courtroom whistle-blower Natalya Vasilyeva, and other Russians who have taken their grievances online. It's still not clear what will happen to Tsivinyuk, who, as a minor, may not face the harassment other YouTube whistle-blowers have faced.

Tsivinyuk does have his supporters and his actions have been getting some positive press coverage and supportive comments in online forums.

"I believe that if we had more such high-school students, then the political system would be more free and democratic. In general, this situation is standard for an election, when you just use the administrative resources in favor of the party in power, limiting political competition," Andrei Seleznyov, a city council deputy in Krasnoyarsk, told RFE/RL's Russian Service.

Other officials have been less supportive. Krasnoyarsk Krai's deputy governor, Sergei Ponomarenko, accused him of "militant ignorance and meanness."

United Russia officials deny that placing election placards in schools violates the law, as long as the director consents. (One has to wonder whether Pronina would have approved Yabloko placards in the school.)

Nevertheless, the incident comes as United Russia is coming under increased scrutiny in the media over the use of administrative resources in advance of the December elections to the State Duma.

-- Brian Whitmore

Amidst rapidly declining poll numbers, the ruling United Russia party has released a steamy online video designed to win the support of younger voters.

The spot, titled "Let's Do It Together," shows an attractive woman entering a polling station where a young man attempts to flirt with her. After the man holds open the curtain to the voting booth for her, the woman pulls him into the booth. Seconds later, the two emerge disheveled and smiling as they cast their ballots together.

WATCH THE VIDEO HERE:


The video was released as a poll by the independent Levada Center showed United Russia's rating drop nine points in just one week -- from 60 percent to 51 percent.

The same poll, conducted from October 28-November 1, shows President Dmitry Medvedev's approval rating falling to 57 percent from 62 percent the previous week. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's rating also fell 5 percent in a week, to 61 percent.

As this blog has taken pains to point out in the past, public opinion polls in Russia should usually be taken with a grain of salt. But sometimes it makes sense to pay attention and I think this is one of those times.

While the Levada Center poll got the most media attention this week, the survey that really got my attention was an internal one conducted for the Kremlin, which was leaked to Gazeta.ru.

That poll, according to the Gazeta.ru report, showed a startling number of regional leaders -- many of whom will be leading United Russia's regional party lists in the December State Duma elections -- with approval ratings below 20 percent.

Here is a list of some of Russia's least popular regional leaders:

Andrei Nelidov (Karelia) -- 11 percent
Pavel Ipatov (Saratov) -- 14 percent
Oleg Bogomolov (Kurgan) -- 15 percent
Anatoly Brovko (Volgograd) -- 15 percent
Ilya Mikhalchuk (Arkhangelsk) -- 16 percent
Aleksandr Mikhailov (Kursk) -- 17 percent

That poll follows another internal Kremlin poll, also leaked to Gazeta.ru, that showed United Russia's numbers dangerously under water in several key regions, including Moscow (29 percent), St. Petersburg (31 percent) and Kaliningrad Oblast (27 percent).

Will all this matter in the end? Probably not. The governors may be unpopular, but they have massive administrative and bureaucratic resources at their disposal to get out the vote for United Russia.

In a commentary in Gazeta.ru, Gleb Cherkasov writes that while the ruling party may not match the massive victory it won in the 2007 elections this December, it will still hold a clear majority in the Duma. And Putin, he adds, is virtually assured election in March, despite his falling numbers.

But, Cherkasov adds, during his second stint in the Kremlin, Putin will be hard pressed to return to the lofty heights of popularity he once enjoyed:


-- Brian Whitmore

As Russia marked National Unity Day today and thousands marched in Moscow and other cities chanting nationalistic, xenophobic, and sometimes outright racist slogans, Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin traveled to Kazan to send a very different message.

"We wish to emphasize that Russia is a multiethnic country, where traditionally people lived in peace and friendship for centuries. The Russian people, the Tatar people, the Bashkir people, the Udmurt people, and the Caucasian people -- Avars, Chechens, and so on," Mitrokhin said in a meeting with voters in the Tatar capital. "For us, this issue is crucial. We see a tremendous threat to those values. This can have very dangerous consequences."

And to underscore this point, Mitrokhin presented Yabloko's party platform in the Tatar and Bashkir languages as well as in Russian.

Appearing together with Aleksei Yablokov, leader of Green Russia (who is third on the Yabloko electoral list) and Andrei Babushkin, leader of Yabloko's Tatarstan branch, Mitrokhin added that the party has made the platform available in other minority languages as well. (On Yabloko's website, the program, "Russia Needs Change," is already available in 15 languages)

They are the only major political party in Russia to make such a gesture.

Mitrokhin also said that no one in Russia would suffer if the Tatar language became Russia's second state language.

"This was our response to today's Russian marches," Mitrokhin wrote in his blog on Yabloko's website, adding that the sentiments behind the nationalist rallies "carves a demarcation line between the peoples."

Driving home the point, Mitrokhin raised the specter of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. "Twenty years ago, [Slobodan] Milosevic led Yugoslavia down this path," he wrote. "He raised Serbian nationalism to the level of a state ideology and ended up not only with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but also of Serbia itself."

Today's National Unity Day holiday, which was celebrated in the Russian Empire and was re-established by Vladimir Putin in 2005, marks the popular uprising which expelled Polish-Lithuanian forces from Moscow in November 1612, leading to the end of the Time of Troubles.

The holiday was originally designed to shore up support for the regime. But in Kazan, Mitrokhin said it has turned into little more than a platform for ultra-nationalists.

Yabloko's position stands out in a election season in which most major political parties are playing the nationalist card in one form or another. It also comes at a time when Tatar and other minority languages are coming under threat amid a drive to Russify the educational system in the ethnic republics.

Will it pay electoral dividends? Perhaps. Most analysts expect Yabloko to struggle to clear the seven-percent barrier to win seats in the State Duma in the December 4 parliamentary elections. And while a vocal anti-nationalist stand will most likely not harm the party with its urbane and liberal supporters, it may win them some votes among Tatars and other ethnic minorities.

But that all might be moot given how these elections are expected to go down -- no party is getting into the Duma unless the Kremlin, with its media dominance and vast administrative resources, wants them in.  

Regardless, Mitrokhin's efforts to raise the level of public discourse today was, to say the least, refreshing.

-- Brian Whitmore

It was a preemptive measure. It was a message. And it was, in many ways, an act of desperation.

Police in Moscow today detained nationalist leader Dmitry Dyomushkin shortly before he was to attend a meeting with municipal officials to finalize plans for Friday's Russian March. Dyomushkin, who is under investigation for inciting ethnic hatred and violence, was released after being questioned. But, in what appeared to be an attempt to keep him away from the march, police warned him that he would be re-arrested if he committed even the slightest infraction.

Between 10,000 and 20,000 nationalists are expected to attend the Russian March, which coincides with National Unity Day. The holiday, instituted in 2005 to buttress support for Vladimir Putin's regime, has since been appropriated by nationalist elements that are quickly slipping out of the Kremlin's control.

Dyomushkin's detention, and the jitters the authorities are currently experiencing about the march, illustrate the degree to which the ruling elite is becoming increasingly spooked by the nationalist monster they helped nurture.

As Gazeta.ru pointed out in a recent editorial, in the past the authorities were able to harness nationalist groups for their own purposes -- stirring up patriotic sentiment, deflecting criticism of the regime, harnessing and controlling xenophobic elements in society, harassing the opposition. But these elements are increasingly demonstrating that they have their own agenda:


Nevertheless, as a recent story by Aleksandra Samarina in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" points out, nationalist themes are becoming increasingly prominent in the State Duma election campaign.

The Communists have called for a return of the so-called "fifth paragraph" in the Russian internal passport, which identifies an individual's ethnicity.

A brochure by LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky -- which has a print run of 10 million -- complains that Russians "are prevented from becoming aware of ourselves" and that "all the nationalities have become hostile to the Russians. They insult us, rob us."

Even figures usually associated with the liberal opposition like Vladimir Milov and anti-corruption crusader Aleksei Navalny are increasingly carrying the nationalist banner.

The story notes that "the topic of nationalism is being exploited in an extremely selective manner" in the Duma elections with the authorities "reacting calmly to the constant exaggeration of this topic in the speeches and publications of the leaders of the parliamentary parties" while "taking a hard line with leaders of the non-systemic opposition."

"It is obvious that the Kremlin is very afraid, and it is right to be afraid of nationalism, which is getting out of control," the report quoted Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center as saying.

Zhirinovsky and others "have a license" to use nationalist slogans, Petrov added, because the regime believes that "it is a kind of vaccination against nationalism, when the process is being tightly controlled."

But the vaccination appears to be quickly merging with the disease itself.

Will this be the year that the Kremlin loses control of the nationalist monster it helped create -- both at the ballot box and in the streets? Friday's Russian March should give us the first hint.

-- Brian Whitmore

Despite KGB veteran Vladimir Putin's imminent return to the Kremlin, there is a lot of angst in siloviki-land.

As I blogged earlier in the week, the GRU has just undergone a painful downsizing and downgrade. In the wake of the recent German spy scandal, which bears a striking resemblance to last summer's Anna Chapman debacle in the United States, the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, has again found itself under unwelcome scrutiny. And as intelligence expert Andrei Soldatov recently wrote, the FSB -- the crown jewel of Russia's security apparatus, has found itself in its "most serious internal crisis in years."

I recently spoke with Russia expert Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University and author of the excellent siloviki-watching blog "In Moscow's Shadows" about the situation in the security services (sorry, no link as the interview is yet unpublished). Galeotti says Putin is moving quickly to bring the situation under control before next year's presidential election:


That said, each of the main security services has its own set of problems. Let's take these one at a time.

As far as the GRU goes, Galeotti says a combination of insubordination and bad performance led Putin to make an example of it:


In addition to losing more than 1,000 officers and 80 generals, the GRU is about to lose its privileged access to the president and will report instead to the General Chief of Staff instead. (For a more detailed discussion of the changes at the GRU, see my post "Resetting the Siloviki.")

For its part, the SVR doesn't appear to have the GRU's insubordination problem, but it is suffering from a competence deficit in the eyes of many intelligence watchers.

Following last summer's embarrassing (and admittedly titillating)  spy scandal in the United States involving 10 deep cover agents including the racy Chapman, the SVR came under intense scrutiny and fierce criticism. There were persistent rumors in the media that the service's director, Mikhail Fradkov, might lose his job and the SVR would be swallowed up by the FSB.

Fradkov and the Foreign Intelligence Service managed to weather that storm. But now, with the recent arrest of two deep cover agents in Germany, the SVR is again under the microscope.

Galeotti told me that he doesn't believe that the SVR would end up being be swallowed by the FSB, but -- depending on how the German scandal shakes out -- Fradkov could again find himself in jeopardy:


And what about the jewel of the crown, the FSB? With the GRU and the SVR under fire, they should be sitting pretty, right? Well, not so much according to Soldatov.

In a recent article, Soldatov explained that the FSB is currently plagued by a conflict between its senior officer and a rising younger generation eager to receive the perks their superiors enjoy.

Among the gripes, Soldatov writes, is that the senior officers are snapping up all the prime real estate along Moscow's prestigious Rublyovsky Shosse (an exclusive area favored by the Russian elite) as well as the most lucrative moonlighting jobs in state companies:


It may seem banal and petty, but the issue is reportedly causing serious friction. The FSB, according to Soldatov, is also faced with a potential leadership problem because many of its senior officers are approaching retirement age:


For his part, Galeotti expects the FSB to face some form of shakeup in the near future:


-- Brian Whitmore

In anticipation of his return to the Kremlin, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appears to be preparing -- or at least considering -- an overhaul of the country's security services.

The official government daily "Rossiiskaya gazeta" reported on September 28 that General Aleksandr Shlyakhturov, head of the GRU, would be stepping down in the near future. The official confirmation followed anonymously sourced reports in "Izvestiya" and elsewhere that the 65-year old Shlyakhturov was on his way out.

"Rossiiskaya gazeta" made a point of stressing that Shlyakhturov was retiring and his departure was routine. "It would be correct to say that Shlyahturova has served the military for a very long time and is leaving because he has reached the maximum age of service. This was inevitable. There is no intrigue connected to this," the daily wrote.

There was nothing routine, however, about Shlyakhturov's brief tenure as head of Russia's super-secret military intelligence agency. Shlyakhturov took over as GRU head in 2009 when his predecessor, Valentin Korabelnikov, was fired for resisting Kremlin efforts to reform and streamline the military.

A close ally of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, Shlyakhturov was clearly appointed to carry out the changes Korabelnikov was resisting.

In his "Spooks And Scoundrels" column in "The Moscow News," Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University and author of the blog "In Moscow's Shadows," sketched out the extent that the GRU has been downsized under Shlyakhturov (h/t to Moscow News editor Tim Wall for tweeting this):


He adds that more changes could be on the way:
Galeotti writes that the overhaul of the GRU "reflects a stocktaking of the intelligence agencies as Putin prepares to return to power" next year. And while it might seem counterintuitive that Putin would target his main power base -- the siloviki -- the move actually makes sense:


They may, in fact, already be learning it. As I have blogged here and here, in the wake of the Anna Chapman spy scandal last summer, stories began appearing in the Russian media suggesting that Putin was going to use that fiasco as an excuse to overhaul the SVR with the goal of ultimately merging it into the FSB -- essentially re-creating the monolithic KGB of old.

Here's an excerpt from a report by Argumenti.ru at the time that cited anonymous intelligence sources as saying an FSB-SVR merger was imminent:
I haven't seen much more on this since (if any siloviki watchers out there have, I'd love to hear about it), but the changes at the GRU suggest that a siloviki-wide reorganization could be in the cards.

-- Brian Whitmore

Vladimir Putin insists it was all decided back in 2007.

In a joint interview Monday with Russia's three national television networks, the prime minister said he and President Dmitry Medvedev had agreed to their 2012 job switch four years ago when he tapped his longtime protégé to replace him in the Kremlin.

Medvedev made a similar claim at the United Russia congress last month. But in a speech on Saturday, he offered a somewhat different account.

Speaking at a town hall meeting at the former Red October chocolate factory that has been converted to host digital startups, Medvedev said he and Putin reached their decision to switch jobs after a “sufficiently long analysis" and that it was not arrived at lightly.

"You know, people say they met somewhere in the woods, on a fishing trip, and changed everything, worked out this configuration and then came out with it at the convention -- it’s not that way at all," Medvedev said.

Maybe this "long analysis" happened back in 2007, but somehow I doubt it.

Since the United Russia congress on September 24, I've been trolling through the Russian media looking for clues about how and why the tandem reached their decision.  Was Putin's return always the plan? Was Medvedev serving a second term ever a serious consideration? Who was involved in the final decision and what was their reasoning?

And although I am nowhere near being able to draw up a reconstruction, some clues are emerging.

"The simplest thing that can be assumed is that the influence groups that I was talking about turned out to be stronger than those who displayed open or hidden support of President Medvedev," Igor Yurgnes, head of the Institute of Contemporary Development told Gazeta.ru in a recent interview.

That much seems obvious enough? As I blogged recently, there clearly was a battle within the ruling elite and one side won and the other lost. But what tipped the scales?

In a piece in Politkom.ru, Tatyana Stanovaya, director of the Center for Political Technology suggests some plausible answers:


That would mean the trouble started back in early 2010, according to Stanovaya.

This was a time when Medvedev became increasingly assertive.

It was, for example, when his campaign to purge long-serving regional governors began to gather steam. (This process would climax with Medvedev firing Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov in September of that year -- a move made despite Putin's deep reservations according to some reports.)

There were also stirrings of dissent in the elite at this time. Yurgens' Kremlin-connected Institute for Contemporary Development released a much-discussed report in February 2010 calling for political reform and democratization.

Also in February, Sergei Mironov, then speaker of the Federation Council, publicly criticized Putin's budget, drawing a fierce response from United Russia. Mironov and his A Just Russia party, originally established as a Kremlin-friendly "pocket opposition" force, became increasingly feisty in the months ahead, culminating in his removal from the Federation Council (and by extension the speakership) in May of this year.

And on March 14, 2010, United Russia suffered embarrassing losses in regional elections, which spooked Putin and much of the elite.  

Rumblings of discontent in society also became more visible in 2010, beginning with mass protests in Kaliningrad in January that led to the sacking of Governor Georgy Boos in August.

By late summer of 2010, it appeared that change could be in the air as the authorities badly mishandled raging forest fires, civic groups protested issues like police abuse and the authorities' plans to build a highway through the Khimki Forest outside Moscow.

Meanwhile , musicians like Yury Shevchuk and Noize MC and actors like Aleksei Devotchenko began openly criticizing the authorities.


Medvedev seemed ascendant at this time and Putin, uncharacteristically, appeared defensive and out of touch with the emerging mood.

As 2010 turned into 2011, the trend appeared to accelerate and Medvedev became more confident in pushing his agenda, Stanovaya argued in her Politkom.ru article:


In March 2011, Medvedev ordered government officials to resign their seats on the boards of state corporations, a move widely interpreted as an attack on Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin.

That same month, Putin and Medvedev openly disagreed over the West's military campaign in Libya. Medvedev even publicly rebuked his mentor for comparing the NATO bombing campaign to a "medieval crusade."

In the end, according to Stanovaya, Putin and his inner circle just considered it too much of a risk to keep Medvedev in the Kremlin for another six years:


Is Stanovaya correct? She is a solid political analyst, I imagine she has good sources, and her account appears to make sense. The one thing that surprised me was the extent that she sees personal conflict between Putin and Medvedev (rather than just between their respective teams, which I always assumed was the case).

Moreover, the reaction of the elite after September 24 suggests a fair amount of discontent, suggesting there was a fierce argument over the 2012 question.

-- Brian Whitmore

One thing United Russia's congress on September 24 was supposed to do was to provide the elite with some measure of certainty about the country's future. With the question of the tandem settled and Vladimir Putin's return to the Kremlin a virtual certainty, everybody can finally just settle down and stop the intrigue and infighting, right?

Well, not so fast according to a story by politics editor Aleksandra Samarina in today's "Nezavisimaya gazeta."

Aleksei Kudrin's resignation as finance minister and an ongoing low-intensity clan war between the Prosecutor General's Office and the Investigative Committee illustrate that the ruling elite is as jittery as ever.

Here's Andrei Ryabov of the Moscow Carnegie Center as cited by "Nezavisimaya gazeta":


Boris Makarenko of the Institute of Contemporary Development has a similar take:


A weakened lame-duck president, a dispirited technocratic faction in the elite that opposed Putin's return, and fears that the pro-Putin siloviki clan will be eager to move on its bureaucratic enemies are also no doubt fraying nerves.

This could be temporary as the 2012 decision was announced barely three weeks ago. Moreover, some degree of factionalism and clan struggles are, after all, regular features of Russian politics. But if Putin (and to an extent Medvedev) can't find a way to calm down and unify the ruling elite, then out-of-control factionalism could also turn into a big problem.

-- Brian Whitmore

I caught up with Yabloko founder Grigory Yavlinsky, who was in Prague this week to participate in the Forum 2000 conference, for a brief on-the-record chat.

We discussed a range of issues including Vladimir Putin's decision to return to the presidency, the possibility of change in Russia today, and how his strategy of working within the system differs from Boris Nemtsov and other members of the so-called "non-systemic opposition."

The Power Vertical: When you announced your return to politics you said you said that this was one of those moments when change was truly possible. That was before United Russia held its congress on September 24 and Vladimir Putin announced his intention to return to the presidency. Do you still see a opportunity for change?

Grigory Yavlinsky: I see an even greater opportunity. People now see that if there isn't a change things will be just like they are now for another 25 years. People want the situation to change. I think Putin's return and Putin's [United Russia] congress showed people the necessity of change even more than before. The reaction in society and in the elite shows this. For example, after the congress the number of people who want to work with me and with Yabloko rose sharply. Even those who were more moderate or indifferent are now in a different mood. They have been under pressure from these conditions for such a long time. What does [Putin's return] mean? It means the preservation of the previous style and the previous agenda. It means the same faces on television. It means everything will remain the same. People can't take this anymore.

The Power Vertical: Do you agree with the assessment of many observers that there is a risk that Russian politics and society could enter into another so-called era of stagnation as in the late 1970s and early 1980s?

Yavlinsky: There is already stagnation. It isn't a risk. It's a reality. There is no dynamic in society. There is no engine of development. Fatigue is rising in society. Dissent is rising. Alienation is rising. Not only due to corruption, the lack of human rights, the lack of property rights, but also because everything has been the same for a long time and this has caused alienation. Change is only possible if there is an alternative. And right now is a moment when this can happen.

The Power Vertical: And you believe that Yabloko can be that alternative?

Yavlinsky: There is nobody else. Some like me and some don't. But it is a fact of life that other than Yabloko there is nobody else. Those who don't like what is happening in Russia today are far greater in numbers than my [traditional] electorate. But who else is there for them [to voter for]? The Communists? [LDPR leader Vladimir] Zhirinovsky? There's nobody else. [A Just Cause leader Sergei] Mironov? Right Cause has already died.

The Power Vertical: You recently appeared on the talk show Mnenie (Opinion) on Vesti-24. Things like that don't happen by accident in Russia. There has been a fair bit of speculation in the media that if you get into the State Duma you are being set up to play the role that Sergei Mironov once played or that Mikhail Prokhorov was meant to play -- that of a nominal opposition figure who is loyal and obedient to the regime. Is there any truth to this speculation?

Yavlinsky: I will be myself. I will be the same as I have been for the past 20 years. Moreover, in order to do something serious you need to appear not on Vesti-24, but on Channel One or RTR for an interview. Vesti-24 isn't a political channel. Sure, that was some kind of sign. They're playing some kind of game. And as for those who are writing in the press that I will play the role of Mironov, it is in their interest to destroy the idea of some kind of alternative [to the current authorities].

The Power Vertical: So you don't see yourself becoming part of the so-called "systemic opposition"?

Yavlinsky: The real non-systemic opposition is in the mountains of the Caucasus. [Opposition figures Vladimir] Ryzhkov, [Mikhail] Kasyanov, [Boris] Nemtsov, [Garry] Kasparov, [Eduard] Limonov, and all the others are the systemic opposition as well. They pay their taxes they fulfill their civic obligations participate in Russian politics in their own way. This suits the authorities. Anybody who the authorities don't want to tolerate is already not in Russia.

The Power Vertical: But these people, Nemtsov, Ryzhkov, Kasparov, etc, they are very different from those traditionally seen as the systemic opposition like Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Sergei Mironov.

Yavlinsky: Sure, they are different in that they speak differently. But they pay their taxes and this finances the state, they finance Mr. Putin. So if they believe in their strategy, let them follow their strategy. I don't know whose strategy is more correct, mine or theirs. I only know that there is a moment right now. And there is Yabloko's strategy and there is Nemtsov's strategy.

The Power Vertical: But Nermtsov and the others differ from you in that you are permitted to participate in the elections while they are not. Their strategy, as you called it, is born of necessity. They would participate if they could, but the authorities would not register the Party of People's Freedom (PARNAC).

Yavlinsky: If they want to participate, then why are they criticizing me? If they were allowed to participate then they would. This means they would like to be part of the systemic opposition.

The Power Vertical: Do you see them as allies?

Yavlinsky: I see anybody who is fighting for democracy in Russia as an ally.

-- Brian Whitmore

A lot has already been written about the interview Vladimir Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov gave to the independent television network "Dozhd," in which he praised Leonid Brezhnev's rule.


WATCH THE VIDEO:



Peskov is correct, but only to a point. By Soviet standards, as I have blogged here and here, the early part of Brezhnev's rule was seen as a success. His "stability of cadres" policy gave the elite job security (and personal security) that they lacked in during the Stalin and Khrushchev periods. He brought the Soviet Union to rough military parity with the United States. Living standards, again by Soviet standards, rose -- mostly thanks to rising oil prices.

And then came the late 1970s and early 1980s. Stability of cadres kept an ossified and moribund elite in power. Oil prices dropped, crippling the Soviet economy leading to shortages of consumer goods. Militarily, the Soviet Union began to fall behind the West.

On the Brezhnev timeline, Putin (who has been in power for 12 years) is now in the late 1970s -- 1976 to be exact, just before things started to fall apart.

Interestingly enough, 1976-77 was also when Brezhnev was widely rumored to be considering resigning. Accounts vary, with some claiming that Brezhnev decided against this himself and others suggesting that he was talked out of it by the Soviet leadership.

The 2008 Russian documentary film, "Leonid Brezhnev: Burnt By Power," cites members of the ruling elite as saying that Brezhnev wanted to resign in 1976 but was urged to stay by his inner circle because nobody else was capable of balancing the interests of the various clans in the ruling elite. Sound familiar?

One thing that jumps out at you about the documentary is that in the early part of his rule, Brezhnev looks healthy, athletic, and positively Putin-esque -- before degenerating into the doddering stumbling Brezhnev we all remember.

WATCH THE DOCUMENTARY HERE:


Putin was also widely rumored to be looking for a way to step down back in 2007 and, according to some reports, was not thrilled about the prospect of returning to the presidency in 2012.

But like Brezhnev, he is the only one seen as capable of balancing the interests of the competing clans in his ruling circle.

The more things change...

-- Brian Whitmore

We've known for nearly two weeks that Vladimir Putin will return to the Kremlin for at least one, and most likely two, six-year terms starting in 2012. And we've known for two weeks that Dmitry Medvedev is most likely destined to become an interesting historical footnote - a curiosity who occupied the Kremlin in the short interlude between Putin and Putin 2.0.  

But what happens next?

I have a piece out today that spells out possible four trajectories for Putin's second act: top-down reform: top-down reform (the Stolypin scenario); authoritarian modernization (the Andropov scenario), stagnation and survival (the Brezhnev scenario), and crisis and revolt (the colored revolution scenario). You can read the whole story here, so I'll spare you the rest of the details in this post.

These has also been a fair amount of speculation in the Russian media over the past couple weeks about where things may be headed.

In a recent commentary, Aleksandra Samarina, head of "Nezavisimaya gazeta's" politics desk, wrote that given the painful economic moves the government is going to need to make in the near future mean that extremists on both the left and the right will enjoy a resurgence in the coming years:


Political analyst Tatyana Stanovaya also offers a pessimistic prognosis. Writing in Politkom.ru, opines that Aleksei Kudrin's resignation as finance minister is a harbinger of more shocks and conflicts within the ruling elite:


Political analyst Pavel Danilin sees a more optimistic future.  In a commentary in "Nezavisimaya gazeta," he writes that "the tandem is being preserved and is renewing its legitimacy by means of taking the policy it has been pursuing out to a universal vote."

Far from being sidelined, Danilin writes that Medvedev  "has received extra powers to run the [United Russia] party as the person who is taking it into the elections."


In a highly entertaining piece in "Gazeta.ru," Nataliya Gevorkyan writes off the past four years as an illusion that abruptly came to an end on September 24 at the United Russia congress:


Gevorkyan also scoffs at the idea that Putin's second stint in the Kremlin will be any different than his first:


-- Brian Whitmore

It took less than two weeks for the long-standing debate in Russia's ruling elite to come to a screeching halt.

On September 15, Mikhail Prokhorov abruptly resigned as chairman of Right Cause, casting a cloud over plans for a regime-friendly center-right party to enter the State Duma.

Ten days later, on September 24, United Russia nominated Vladimir Putin as its candidate for president in 2012, dashing the hopes of those who hoped to see Dmitry Medvedev remain in the Kremlin for a second term.

And two days later, on September 26, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin resigned following a public dustup ostensibly over military spending, removing one of the most strident advocates of fiscal probity and political reform from the government.

The managed-democracy project, if not dead, appears to be on life support at best (Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko may still yet get into the State Duma as a token liberal party). And with Putin set to occupy the Kremlin until 2024, any hopes for economic modernization and a gradual transition to more democratic governance have been buried.

But was this really preordained? In his speech at the United Russia congress, Medvedev provoked cries of betrayal from his supporters when he suggested as much, saying the decision for Putin to return was made "years ago."

The past four years could conceivably have been a big ruse, with only Putin and Medvedev in on the con -- but color me skeptical on that score. The evidence overwhelmingly points to a debate over how to proceed post-2012 among the inner core of the ruling elite. And one side won and one side lost -- decisively.

The result was the mirror image of the decision back in 2007-08, when Putin resisted the appeals of Igor Sechin, Viktor Ivanov, and others urging him to change the constitution and serve a third consecutive term.

This time, those seeking Putin's return to the Kremlin won the argument. And there was an argument, not just about the Putin-Medvedev question, but also the composition of the State Duma and whether United Russia would be allowed a continued constitutional majority.

The lines were often blurred and it wasn't always easy to determine who was on which side (with the exception of obvious advocates of a Putin return like Sechin and supporters of political reform like Kudrin). Some, like Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the regime's unofficial ideologist, appeared to be playing both sides of the fence.

Back in June 2009, for example, Surkov appeared to telegraph the doomed Right Cause project when he argued that United Russia needed to share power in the Duma with other parties.

"We believe that once a system has settled, there should be more degrees of freedom inside it. One should be flexible, one should learn to enter into coalitions. Democracy is a compromise. Democracy is a procedure. It's a tedious one, but it's a procedure," Surkov said at the time.

Surkov's comments drew a harsh response from Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, who said: "Our parliament of the majority based on one party is a necessity for Russia.... The parliamentary majority allows us to adopt laws that determine political and economic stability."

Looks like Gryzlov won that argument. Or Surkov had second thoughts.

Another sign of conflict inside the elite was the abrupt departure from the Kremlin in April of onetime uber-spinmeister Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the key architects of Putin's first presidential campaign in 2000.

Pavlovsky was a vocal proponent of a second term for Medvedev, with Putin keeping a dominant role in Russian politics and was becoming increasingly critical of United Russia. And it was for these sins that he was reportedly pushed out into the wilderness.

In interviews after his firing, Pavlovsky said the elite was close to endorsing a second term for Medvedev but was getting cold feet.

"I think that, of course, that first and foremost, this debate is painful for Putin. Not easy for him to step aside. Also, he rightly fears that there could be instability in the bureaucracy after the nomination of a candidate," he told Gazeta.ru.

Moreover, on several occasions, Kudrin spoke out in favor of greater democracy -- at the Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum in February, in an interview with "The Wall Street Journal" in April, and in an interview with "The New York Times" in June.

Kudrin's basic argument was that effective economic reform was not possible without political reform because the authorities will need a "mandate of trust" from the people.

So the argument came down to this: one side argued that modernizing Russia's economy requires at least limited reforms of the political system while another argued that loosening things up politically could lead to instability and chaos.

Putin was going to be the key player in either scenario -- he could be the formal leader as president or an informal national leader and head of the deep state. Putin is indispensible because he is the power broker among the Kremlin clans and without him, open warfare among them would likely break out.

I expected, wrongly, Putin to choose the informal leader route. In a recent interview, longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, the international editor of "The Economist" and author of "The New Cold War," offered interesting insight into why Putin and a critical mass of the elite decided he had to return to the Kremlin:


-- Brian Whitmore

Some things require very little commentary.

Anybody who watched the United Russia congress last weekend, probably saw the impassioned speech by the actor Vladimir Mashkov, star of the 2001 film Behind Enemy Lines, at the nationally televised plenary session on September 24, where he explained why he joined the ruling party:


WATCH THE VIDEO:



But fewer people saw a very different speech by Fyodor Bondarchuk, director of the film The 9th Company (a film about the Afghan war that is rumored to be one of Vladimir Putin's favorites) at a session a day earlier on civil society:


At that point, Andrei Makarov, a television personality and United Russia official who was chairing the meeting, interrupted.

"Well, that was interesting. You know I am taking notes and will need to report this," he said.

"I understand," Bondarchuk answered. "Tomorrow I already won't be here."

WATCH THE VIDEO:


Newsru.com reported however, that Bondarchuk did in fact attend the plenary session the next day -- and the video of his rant went viral on YouTube.

I guess the moral of the story is that there is dissent even inside United Russia, and if you are the director of Putin's favorite film, you can even get away with expressing it publicly.

Oh, and another moral of the story: in the age of YouTube, even controlling all of a country's television stations does not guarantee control over information.

-- Brian Whitmore

Well, so much for the hopes that an answer to the 2012 question would put an end to political uncertainty in Russia.

Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin resigned today, just hours after a testy public exchange with President Dmitry Medvedev.

Apparently the switcheroo announced at the United Russia congress on Saturday -- with Vladimir Putin becoming president in 2012 and Medvedev becoming prime minister -- doesn't suit Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin.

Speaking to reporters in Washington on Sunday, Kudrin, a key member of Putin's inner circle who is widely credited with orchestrating Russia's macroeconomic stability, says he would not serve in a Cabinet led by Medvedev.

Kudrin's stated reason was that he opposed Medvedev's plans to increase military spending by $65 billion over the next three years. But there appears to be more to it than that. Many Kremlin-watchers, in fact, had expected that Kudrin would be named prime minister in the event that Putin returned as president. Instead, Medvedev got the nod.

Back in Russia today, Medvedev told Kudrin at a meeting of his modernization commission that Kudrin should just resign now.

Here's the exchange:


WATCH THE VIDEO:


There are various rumors swirling about what happens next. Kudrin could end up as Central Bank chairman according to one scenario. In another, Medvedev will carry out deeply unpopular social reforms after the presidential elections, take the heat, become the fall guy, and resign to become chairman of the Constitutional Court. Kudrin would then step in as prime minister.

Whatever happens, I don't expect Kudrin to be too far from the circles of power anytime soon. He is very close to Putin (he is rumored to be the only official allowed to use the familiar "ty" with Putin in private conversations) and he is widely considered to be a top flight professional and one of the most valuable members of the ruling elite.

He has weathered several attempts to remove him, most recently following the 2008 financial crisis when Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin tried to force him out but was thwarted by Putin's intervention.

Putin has not spoken publicly on Kudrin's conflict with Medvedev as of the time I am writing this.

What the events of the past couple days seems to illustrate is that the ruling elite was thrown off kilter by the Putin-Medvedev 2012 decision. Some were disillusioned by Putin's plan to return to the presidency. Others by the fact that Medvedev -- and not Kudrin -- would be prime minister. Some by both.

It's not clear where this is going, but we'll keep a close eye on it in the days and weeks ahead.

-- Brian Whitmore

The fallout from Vladimir Putin's announcement this weekend that he will return to the presidency in 2012 with Dmitry Medvedev becoming his prime minister has already begun. Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announced his resignation today, a day after he told reporters he would not serve in a government led by Medvedev and just hours after a testy public exchange with the president.

In the latest edition of The Power Vertical podcast, I discussed the Kudrin scandal and what we can expect from Putin 2.0 with Kirill Kobrin, managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service.

Enjoy...

Power Vertical Podcast -- Putin Special

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• Download

Who stands to benefit from the reshuffling of political forces in the wake of Right Cause's embarrassing public meltdown and Mikhail Prokhorov's abrupt exit from the scene?

As improbable as this might seem, an increasing number of commentators seem to think it might be Yabloko, which has been pretty much a non-factor in Russian politics since the party failed to get into the State Duma in the 2003 elections.

This might just be wishful thinking. Like many Western Russia-watchers, I had high hopes for Yabloko in the 1990s -- hopes that were ultimately never realized.

Nevertheless, given the amount of media attention it has received, a potential Yabloko renaissance is worth examining.

Yabloko founder Grigory Yavlinsky, who stepped down as party chairman in 2008 and pretty much disappeared from public life ever since, made a high-profile return to the political stage this month.

He will lead Yabloko's party list in the December 4 Duma elections. He has been getting a surprising amount of media oxygen lately. And with two Kremlin-friendly projects, the pro-business Right Cause and the ostensibly center-left A Just Russia, on the skids, there might just be an opening for him to lead his party into the Duma.

"Indisputably there is one beneficiary that will gain from the [Right Cause] scandal. It is the Yabloko party, the constituency of which may be joined by part of the Right Cause consistency," political analyst Dmitry Orlov told Interfax. "My forecast is that the scandal will result in a certain increase in voter support for Yabloko party which in the future may come very close to clearing the barrier."

In a video posted on his blog, Yavlinsky explained to supporters his reasons for returning to the political arena, saying that there was a real chance for change. "I don't have the right to stand aside," he said. "I don't know if I will be able to change anything. But I don't have the right not to try to do this with all my strength."

WATCH THE VIDEO:


But as anybody who follows Russian politics knows, it is not enough for Yavlinsky to run a strong campaign and capture the constituencies that would have otherwise voted for Right Cause or A Just Russia. And it also won't be enough for him use the Internet to bring new voters to the polls who would have otherwise stayed home (which he has indicated he plans to do).

In Russia, nobody gets into the Duma unless the ruling elite wants them to get into the Duma -- that is the reality.

But another reality is that a significant part of the ruling elite wants a more pluralistic Duma to reflect the aspirations of an emerging middle class and to deflect growing dissent among the liberal intelligentsia and professional classes.

So are the Kremlin's political managers who dreamed up and then abandoned the Right Cause project (and the A Just Russia project before it) ready to dance with Yavlinsky? And just as importantly, is the famously prickly and independent Yavlinsky ready to dance with them?

Some of the traditional tea leaves one needs to read to assess such things suggest this might be the case.

For example, just today (as I was writing this blog!) Yavlinsky was featured in an extensive 35-minute interview on the state-run Vesti-24 channel's flagship interview program "Mnenye" (Opinion), something that would have been unthinkable just months ago. Things like that don't happen by accident in Russia.

WATCH THE VIDEO:



A recent story in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" analyzing the causes and consequences of the Right Cause debacle suggested that Yavlinsky could conceivably play the role in the Duma that was intended for Prokhorov:


I'll be watching this with interest in the coming weeks, but for the time being color me skeptical. As a reporter in Russia in the 1990s, I watched Yavlinsky at close range and interacted with him often. I have a hard time seeing him playing the obedient role of a Kremlin-sanctioned "opposition" figure. Moreover, Vladislav Surkov's team of Kremlin spin doctors knows this much better than I do and will probably balk at taking a risk on such a defiant figure.

And finally, one has to wonder: Would a housebroken Yavlinsky still be Yavlinsky?

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE: THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED TO INCLUDE THE VESTI-24 VIDEO

It is hard to look at Right Cause's public meltdown last week as anything other than an unmitigated disaster for the Kremlin's political managers.

Not only has a high-profile project to create a regime-friendly pro-business party to draw the votes of the disgruntled liberal intelligentsia and professional classes spectacularly fallen apart just months before parliamentary elections -- but it has done so in a way that airs the ruling elite's dirty laundry for all to see.

In an interview with Ekho Moskvy following Mikhail Prokhorov's September 15 resignation from Right Cause, political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin declared that the "era of simulated democracy in Russia is over." Oreshkin added that the episode illustrates that "within the elite, real conflicts are maturing and coming to a head that will, one way or another, spill out into public view.”

Prokhorov himself suggested as much, assailing First Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the regime's informal ideologist, as "a puppet master who long ago privatized the political system."

In a blog post on September 16, Prokhorov softened his criticism of Surkov, writing: "There was no personal conflict with anyone. … In the end it was a conflict of ideologies. At this stage the conservatives won. I wanted change, but the system was not ready."

Ideology certainly explains some of what just happened. The ruling elite is currently divided among those who want to open up the political system, albeit in a tightly managed way, and those who want to maintain the vertically integrated authoritarian state Vladimir Putin built over the past decade. Both sides seek to maintain the dominance of the current ruling circle, but differ on the means.

But as Joera Mulders at Russia Watchers points out in a well researched post (h/t to James Kimer at Robertamsterdam.com for flagging this) personal ambition and turf defense by United Russia also played a big role in undermining the Right Cause project:


Mulders adds that Surkov's team in the Kremlin, which oversees domestic politics and political parties, failed to rein in these parochial interests:


In other words, Surkov and his team were so captured by the ruling party they were supposed to be managing that they apparently lost sight of the bigger picture.

This dance between Surkov and United Russia is nothing new. Back in June 2009, the Kremlin ideologist said the ruling party needed to "be flexible" and "learn to enter into coalitions." The proposal was firmly rejected by State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, who was just fine with United Russia's two-thirds constitutional majority. (You can read my post on the Surkov-Gryzlov exchange here)

It is unclear what happens next. Is the whole managed pluralism project dead? If so, Mulders notes that this could have negative consequences for the ruling elite:
In a recent editorial, "Kommersant" noted that the collapse of the Right Cause project comes on the heels of the failure of another pocket opposition project, the ostensibly center-left A Just Russia -- and calls into question the competence of the Kremlin's political operation:  
-- Brian Whitmore

How should Russia's so-called non-systemic opposition approach the December State Duma elections, which they will not have the opportunity to contest?

Should they encourage their supporters to just boycott it? Or spoil their ballot papers in symbolic protest?

In a commentary earlier this week in "Vedomosti," Vladimir Milov, leader of the Russia's Democratic Choice movement, took a stab at this question. Unlike many in the opposition, Milov believes that "despite the widespread opinion that 'the result is predetermined,' this is by no means the case. For the first time in a long while there is a chance of exerting a real influence on changing the situation in the country through elections."

The reason for Milov's surprising optimism is the unprecedented weakness of the ruling United Russia party's standing with the electorate, which has dropped so low that even falsification will not save the two-thirds majority that allows it to act unilaterally:
And should United Russia lose its constitutional majority, even if -- as is highly likely -- it maintains its simple majority, Milov argues that this would be a cataclysmic event that would send tremors through the body politic:  


And Milov's suggestion about how opposition minded voters should approach the election?


If Milov is correct that United Russia's true poll numbers are in a ditch(which I suspect that he is) and that falsification can't pull them out (which I'm less sure about), then such a strategy, if the opposition is disciplined enough to follow it, could produce interesting results indeed.

And the wider implications of a weak United Russia? They are already evident from the rise of Mikhail Prokhorov's Right Cause to the formation of Vladimir Putin's Popular Front.

And as I blogged yesterday, "Kommersant" cited a Kremlin official as saying that having Medvedev as the ruling elite's presidential candidate could boost United Russia's vote total by as much as 10 percent because it could give the party both his and Putin's natural electorate. (I'm not sure if this is actually true, but what is significant is that at least some members of the elite seem to believe it.)

Medvedev of course will address the United Russia congress on September 23-24 and is widely expected to make an announcement about his 2012 plans. The headline for a story today in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" about a possible second term for Medvedev reads: Apparently They Have Begun To Reach An Agreement."

The hot autumn everybody has been forecasting has apparently begun.

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE TO READERS: I will be taking a much needed vacation for the next two weeks and will be posting very lightly. The Power Vertical will return in earnest on September 19, just as things heat up. Have a nice weekend everybody!

There is a lot of buzz in the Russian media today about September 23-24.

Those, of course, are the dates when United Russia is scheduled to hold its national congress, the last one before the election season begins. But what has the Moscow punditocracy all wound up is the announcement yesterday by President Dmitry Medvedev that he will attend -- and will address the congress.

And almost everybody is expecting him to announce, well, you know what. Here's political analyst Mikhail Zakharov of Polit.ru:


Likewise, "Kommersant" cited unidentified United Russia officials as saying that Medvedev "will announce his political future" when he speaks on the second day of the congress, September 24. The daily also cited an unidentified Kremlin official as saying that if Medvedev is the announced presidential candidate for the March ballot, it could add 10 percent to United Russia's vote total in the December 4 State Duma elections.

Uber-pundit Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Politics Foundation, notes that the clock is ticking and the United Russia congress is the logical time and place for a decision to finally be reached:


This, of course, is debatable. It wasn't until December 17, 2007 when Medvedev's candidacy for the March 2008 presidential election was made public.

Prior to Medvedev's announcement, many Kremlin-watchers were focusing their attention on the World Policy Forum in Yaroslavl next week, on September 7-8, as a venue for Medvedev's announcement.

The expectations for an announcement on September 23-24 are not universal. "Kommersant" cited one unidentified Kremlin official as saying that it could wait until the end of the year, just like in 2007. "It is in the interests of both members of a tandem to keep up the suspense as long as possible," the official said.

Another unidentified source told the daily that "the announcement [of who will run] is news itself. It does not need to fasten itself to any occasion. In general, our tradition is to continue the political intrigue until the end. In the case of the presidential election, I think, [this could continue] until December."

So there you have it. September 23-24 may be when the question that has been obsessing Russia's political class may -- or may not -- finally be answered.

And while I have long thought that Plan A was for Medvedev to remain in the Kremlin for a second term with Putin remaining in charge, I have also maintained that the more interesting -- and consequential -- question is not who will be president after 2012 but what direction will the elite take the country.

Mikhail Zakharov at Polit.ru asks the same question about a Medvedev announcement later this month: "This will calm the elite, but it does not answer the question - Does the tandem to carry out reforms?"

-- Brian Whitmore

Maybe it was the fiasco surrounding getting Valentina Matviyenko into the Federation Council. Maybe it is just pre-election posturing. Or maybe it is some kind of opaque power play. But suddenly, for some reason, reforming the upper house of Russia's parliament seems to be all the rage.

Speaking to journalists in Sochi on Wednesday, President Dmitry Medvedev suggested that it might be a good idea to bring back the direct election of senators, as members of the Federation Council are commonly called:
Under the current system, each of Russia's 83 federal subjects gets two senators, which are appointed respectively by regional executive and legislative branches. Only those who are local or regional legislators are eligible (which is what made former St. Petersburg Governor Matviyenko's accession to the upper chamber so hilariously problematic).

Medvedev's unexpected proposal to change this came on the heels of another -- less radical -- plan to reform the upper house, which was made public last week.

The daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported that legislation is currently in the works that would  make former or current State Duma deputies also eligible for delegation to the Federation Council.

The report notes that since the majority of these would be from United Russia, the legislation would significantly increase the ruling party's clout in the upper chamber -- as well as that of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. It would also provide a dignified "golden parachute" for United Russia lawmakers who fail to make it into the next Duma.

The first Federation Council, which sat from 1993-95, was actually directly elected. But in 1995, President Boris Yeltsin changed the system so that regional governors and legislative speakers doubled as senators.

When Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000, he sought to curb the powers of regional leaders, who had become a powerful force in Russian politics -- and a thorn in the side of the Kremlin -- by the late 1990s. Part of this campaign involved removing them from the federal parliament in favor of the current system of regional executives and legislatures delegating their senators.

The governors and legislative speaker initially resisted Putin's plan, but when the president threatened criminal investigations against them, they relented. BY 2002, the new system was fully in place.

Analysts are skeptical that Medvedev's proposal will gain any traction.

Evgeny Minchenko, director of the International Institute of Political Expertise, told Gazeta.ru that Medvedev has proposed reforms aimed at democratizing the political system in the past, but they only resulted in cosmetic changes.

Likewise, Mikhail Vinogradov, director of the Petersburg Politics Foundation, notes that the trend in recent years has been to keep "non-system" candidates out of the legislative branch. And since an elected Federation Council would increase the upper house's status, such a move would be opposed by a majority in the State Duma, which would need to approve any changes. "This is unlikely to please either the State Duma or the political parties," Vinogradov told Gazeta.ru.

I would add a caveat to Vinogradov's assessment. Regardless of what the State Duma or political parties want, what will ultimately happen will be what the 30 or so people who run Russia -- what I call the "deep state" -- decide is in their interests.

Just like letting more parties into the Duma, elections to the Federation Council could provide a useful pressure valve for an increasingly restive society.

If the inner sanctum of the elite reaches a consensus that the benefits of such a move outweigh the costs and risks, and help them maintain their power, wealth, and privilege, then they will make the change. If not, they won't.

That said, I don't expect Medvedev's proposal to go anywhere in the near term as the elite is likely to se it as too risky.

The less risky proposal of allowing former Duma deputies to be appointed to the Federation Council -- for which a draft bill is already prepared -- is, on the other hand, quite useful to the elite and is likely to be enacted.

-- Brian Whitmore

So Russia's second city has its new governor, and nobody is quite sure what to expect of him.

Behind closed doors, and as expected, the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly today confirmed Georgy Poltavchenko as the city's fourth post-Soviet leader without much fanfare. (And as Gazeta.ru reports, without much emotion from the victor.)

After formally taking office, Poltavchenko then named the outgoing governor, Valentina Matviyenko, as the city government's representative to the Federation Council, where she will ultimately replace Sergei Mironov as speaker.

So now that all that is over with, the question remains: Why Poltavchenko?

In a commentary in "The Moscow Times," Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center -- one of the most astute observers of Russian regional politics out there -- took a stab at answering the question:


Petrov notes that the decision could have been driven by a number of factors.

The Kremlin may have been reluctant to put one of its rising stars -- like say, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, whose appointment was widely expected -- in a position where he would be forced to waste political capital instituting unpopular social reforms after the 2012 elections.

He also notes that Poltavchenko "does not disrupt the equilibrium that has formed between the major St. Petersburg clans."

I must admit that I was puzzled by the choice of Poltavchenko. Like most other observers, I really expected Kozak to get the nod.

But as I wrote last week, at least according to the Kremlin's logic Poltavchenko does sort of make sense. He checks all the boxes of what they seem want in a regional leader: He's a KGB veteran; a Putin loyalist (he's the only prefect to serve continuously in the same post since Putin created the system in 2000); and he has the reputation of a low-key problem solver, similar to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin.

Petrov likewise notes the similarities between the Moscow and St. Petersburg appointments -- and thinks it marks a trend:
In a recent article, "Kommersant-Vlast" also noted that Putin's fingerprints were all over the appointment.

"The decision was made in the White House, and the role of Dmitry Medvedev in the operation, apparently, has been reduced to just to sign the decree on the dotted line," the weekly wrote.

Poltavchenko's first job of course will be political -- making sure the ruling United Russia party, whose popularity is sagging badly in St. Petersburg, gets a good result in the December parliamentary elections. As a former KGB man, he will certainly be adept at using administrative resources to push the results in the direction the Kremlin wants.

And just to be sure, United Russia's regional party list will be headed by three popular figures: Kozak, Hermitage Museum director Mikhail Piotrovsky; and Mariinsky Theater director Valery Gergiyev.

-- Brian Whitmore

It's been a busy week here at RFE and I haven't had as much time to blog as I would like. And as luck would have it, there was plenty of action in Russia that was blogable, from the mini-scandals that erupted over the Popular Front's "primaries," to pending legislation overhauling the Federation Council, to a new acting governor in St. Petersburg, just to name a few.

And since any of these stories could get interesting in the coming weeks, I decided to get them all out there today in short form. So below, for your perusal, are five things I wish I had blogged this past week -- written up as mini-blogs.

The August lull is just about over and the fall political season is upon us.

Enjoy...

Primary Colors

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggested that the Popular Front's "primaries" were so successful that all political parties should be required to hold them.

But by the end of the week, he backtracked, citing "requests from the opposition." And we all know how anxious Putin has always been to please the opposition.

So what happened between Tuesday and Friday? Could it be a mushrooming scandal about widespread falsifications in the Popular Front primaries in Pyatigorsk and Vladivostok?

Overhaul In The Upper House?

A report in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" notes that legislation is pending that would significantly change who can be elected to the Federation Council.

Under the current system, candidates for the upper house must be either municipal or regional legislators. Under a new bill that is expected to easily pass in the fall, former State Duma deputies would also be eligible.

The report notes that this would significantly increase the ruling United Russia party's clout in the Federation Council -- as well as that of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. It would also provide a dignified "golden parachute" for United Russia lawmakers who fail to make it into the next Duma.

Perhaps the changes were inspired by the fiasco in St. Petersburg that accompanied the Kremlin's ultimately successful attempt to get Valentina Matviyenko elected to a local council so she could eventually become Federation Council speaker.

Meet The New Boss

And speaking of St. Petersburg, I had fully expected Deputy Prime Minister -- and Putin loyalist -- Dmitry Kozak to become Matviyenko's successor as governor. So I was as blindsided as anybody when Georgi Poltavchenko, the Kremlin's prefect to the Central Federal District, got the nod instead.

But Poltavchenko is just as logical a choice -- at least from the Kremlin's logic. He's a KGB veteran, a Putin loyalist (he's the only prefect to serve continuously in the same post since Putin created the system in 2000); and he has the reputation of a low-key problem solver, similar to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin.

Reds To The Left Of Me, Liberals To The Right

Ever since Sergei Mironov's fall from the Kremlin's grace -- and the Federation Council speakership -- A Just Russia has been casting about for a place at the table.


Early this week, there were reports that the party was seeking to form some kind of alliance with Gennady Zyuganov's Communists -- an "alliance of left forces."

But by Friday, reports were appearing in the Russian media suggesting the party was also looking for friends to its right. Apparently the party is trying to conclude a "non-aggression pact" with Mikhail Prokhorov's Right Cause so as to better compete with their common enemy -- United Russia.

Changing The Subject

And finally, speaking of Prokhorov and Right Cause, the party has just endured a string of negative publicity, most notably regarding its alleged drift toward nationalism, after the high-profile rollout of its campaign. But now the party hopes to change the conversation to its platform, which it released today. (You can read "Vedomosti's" write-up here or, if your in the mood for some light weekend reading, the full platform here)

The platform calls for a "new industrialization," including infrastructure projects like a renovated Trans-Siberian railroad and a North-South transport corridor. It also envisions Russia becoming part of a "greater Europe" and strive for "maximum economic integration" without joining the EU or NATO. The platform also calls for greater controls on state companies. Politically, it advocates a prohibition of a political monopoly by one party -- a clear swipe at United Russia.

We'll soon see if this will be enough for Prokhorov to get his mojo back.

President Dmitry Medvedev is scheduled to sign a decree officially opening the State Duma election campaign on Monday, so the political season is about to begin in earnest. And as the Russians are fond of saying, it promises to he a very hot autumn.

Have a nice weekend everybody!

-- Brian Whitmore

Well, that was fast.

It's just been a couple months since Mikhail Prokhorov burst onto the political scene to take over a revived Right Cause party. The Kremlin-sponsored project was supposed to give liberally inclined Russian voters who are disillusioned with the ruling United Russia party a voice (or at least the imitation of one) in the next State Duma in a way that was not threatening to the current elite.

I called the phenomenon "managed pluralism" and assumed that it had the blessing of those at the very top -- or at least a critical mass of the ruling circle. Prokhorov was even being touted as a potential prime minister.

But now, suddenly, political obituaries for Right Cause and Prokhorov are already appearing in the Russian media.

A story in yesterday's edition of "Nezavisimaya gazeta" quotes political analysts as saying that Prokhorov "is leading Right Cause to disaster" due to the party's embrace of nationalists:


Such an assessment from "Nezavisimaya gazeta," which caters to the liberal intelligentsia and the technocratic wing of the political elite, is an ominous sign.

And they are not the only media who have taken note of "Right Cause's" hard right turn. Here's an excerpt from an editorial in Polit.ru from August 19:


In a thoroughly reported story, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" political reporter Aleksandra Samarina  recalls the controversy that erupted when Boris Nadezhdin, a senior member of Right Cause, told "Izvestia" that the party was actively recruiting nationalists (see my post on the scandal here).

Prokhorov publicly rebuked Nadezhdin, but that did little to quiet the scandal, as Samarina wrote in "Nezavisimaya gazeta":


The story also noted that the party's billboards used a "combination of colors identified with the flag of the Russian Empire, better remembered in association with Russian Marches." And the party's flag, the daily wrote, used colors "identical to the ones used on the flag of Eduard Limonov's outlawed National Bolshevik Party."

"Nezavisimaya gazeta" suggested that Prokhorov was trying to repeat the success Dmitry Rogozin enjoyed with his nationalist party Rodina (Motherland), which polled 15 percent in the 2003 State Duma election.

If that is indeed the case, Prokhorov may find the far right side of the political spectrum a little bit crowded. In addition to Vladimir Zhirinovsky's pseudo-nationalist LDPR, the Justice Ministry has recently approved the registration of Rogozin's Rodina party, which plans to join Vladimir Putin's Popular Front and compete in the December elections.

 Why would nationalist-inclined voters choose to back an imitation of Rodina when they can choose the real thing? And who was behind this apparently flawed strategy?

Samarina's story in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" quotes Igor Bunin, director of the Center for Political Technologies, who blames the strategy on Prokhorov's political consultants, who hail from the same team that ran Arseny Yatsenyuk's very expensive -- and very disappointing -- campaign for president of Ukraine in 2010.

Prior to that election, Yatsenyuk, a former foreign minister, was widely seen as a young liberal who could potentially be a dark horse in the race. But his presidential campaign, which cost an estimated $60 million-$70 million, presented him as a tough military-style nationalist.

"Prokhorov's political scientists and advisors are at fault here," Bunin told the daily.  "These are the guys who used to work for Arseny Yatsenyuk. It is to these guys that Yatsenyuk owes his disastrous performance in the presidential race.... That's whose services Prokhorov enlisted."

It is unclear whether Prokhorov and the retooled Right Cause are just not quite ready for prime time; whether they are being actively undermined by forces in the elite who would prefer not to upset the current balance of forces in the Duma and the government; or whether there is some other -- unseen -- strategy afoot.

Since the Right Cause project got off the ground earlier in the summer, I have viewed it as a central component of a move toward managed pluralism by the elite that would allow them to maintain control of the system and at the same time open a badly needed pressure valve.

Perhaps it is time to begin rethinking those assumptions.

-- Brian Whitmore

Vladimir Putin isn’t going anywhere.

All other analysis of where Russia is headed post-2012 must proceed from this basic assumption.

Putin may very well end up returning to the Kremlin, as much of the Moscow punditocracy seems to expect at this point, in which case Medvedev would become an interesting historical footnote.

Or, he could continue to rule as Russia’s informal national leader essentially extending the tandem's shelf life -- and Medvedev's presidency -- for another six years. In this case, the only question remaining would be which official post he occupies.

Regardless, at the end of the day, this is Putin’s show.

I recently spoke to Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center about the source of Putin's indispensability to the current system (sorry, no link since the interview is still unpublished):
Kremlin-watchers say this system of interlocking and competing clans that is managed by Putin comprises the core of Russia's ruling elite. The key players, the people with decision making power, number about thirty. The inner circle, most agree, comprises about twelve people.

Petrov describes them as "shareholders" and "managers":


Some analysts, like Yevgeny Minchenko and Vladimir Pribylovsky, call the core ruling elite "Putin's Politburo." Others playfully refer to it as "the Collective Putin." In a recent report for Chatham House, Andrew Monaghan of the NATO Defense College called it "The Team."

I prefer to call it Russia's emerging "Deep State" (and am working on a longer feature-length piece on the subject, so if you're interested, stay tuned).

In addition to Putin and Medvedev, the core group, according to Minchenko and others, comprises Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Naryshkin, Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff (and informal ideologist) Vladislav Surkov, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin,  and businessmen Yury Kovalchuk (widely seen as "Putin's personal banker"), Gennady Timchenko, Roman Abramovich, and Alisher Usmanov.

And since this Politburo, Collective Putin, or Deep State comprises "shareholders," they are above all concerned with preserving their status, power, and by extension, their wealth.

If they believe -- and ultimately decide -- that they can do that by loosening up the system by moving to a system of managed pluralism, that is what they will do. This is the option preferred by Kudrin and his allies in the technocratic wing of the elite.

If they conclude that the only way to maintain control is by maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, the vertically integrated authoritarian state Putin established, then they will go down that road. This is the option favored by Sechin and many of his siloviki allies.

Both choices have implicit risks, as I have blogged in the past. As the late 1980s and early 1990s show, the managed pluralism route can easily spin out of control and lead to -- ghasp! - real pluralism (which many in the elite see as chaos). And as the Soviet 1970s show, failure to open up and modernize the system can result in ossification and stagnation.

Which negative set of lessons will prevail -- those of Mikhail Gorbachev and perestroika or those of Leonid Brezhnev and the period of "zastoi" -- is still up in the air.

And this is the main question to watch, rather than all the hand wringing and navel gazing over whether Putin or Medvedev will occupy the Kremlin post-2012.

-- Brian Whitmore

Lost amid all the drama about Valentina Matviyenko's convoluted bid to become Federation Council speaker has been a more interesting -- and consequential -- question: Who will be the new governor of St. Petersburg?

Citing unidentified sources, the daily "Kommersant" reported today that Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak is emerging as a top contender.

According to the report, Kozak has already been tasked with overseeing United Russia's State Duma campaign in St. Petersburg, will likely lead the ruling party's regional list in the December elections, and is emerging as "a prime candidate" to replace Matvyenko as governor:


If Kozak does return to St. Petersburg, it would be the latest of many Mr. Fix-It missions he has taken on for the Kremlin -- some of which have been more successful than others.

As deputy Kremlin chief of staff from 2000-2004 he was among the architects of Putin's drive to centralize power by establishing the current system of regional prefects.

In September 2004, he became part of that system when Putin named him presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District, which includes the restive North Caucasus, in order to oversee the reconstruction of the war-torn region. In that job, he argued that the Kremlin needed to battle corruption, rights abuses, ethnic tension, poverty, and crime in order to quiet the volatile region. (His advise was largely ignored when Putin was president, but got a more sympathetic hearing from Medvedev.)

And in October 2008, he was named Deputy Prime Minister in charge of overseeing and rooting out the corruption and inefficiencies in the often troubled preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.

If Kozak is appointed St. Petersburg governor it would certainly make sense based on the logic of the ruling elite. He is a loyal -- and largely apolitical -- apparatchik in the mold of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. A legendary workaholic, he is also widely seen as a smart and competent manager.  

Kozak is not going to go off the reservation and act counter to the Kremlin's priorities (a la Yury Luzhkov) or commit any major gaffes or make a mess of running the city's affairs (a la Matviyenko).

Additionally, he doesn't rub the opposition the wrong way.

Speaking to "Kommersant" (which ran two stories on the subject today), Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin called his appointment as governor "likely," adding that "it is hard to find a more successful figure. I know him personally, he is head and shoulders above Matviyenko."

Likewise, Sergei Mironov, whose recent sacking as Federation Council speaker set this whole process in motion, called Kozak's candidacy "optimal" and "fully working." Mironov added that "Dmitri Nikolayevich has high professional qualities."

Working as a journalist in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, I interacted with Kozak fairly regularly and found him intelligent, funny, pleasant, and sometimes even helpful -- a functionary without the usual arrogance of that species. He was fairly popular among reporters for this reason (and could often be found sharing a smoke, and the occasional scoop, with the press in the Legislative Assembly stairwell).

With an unpopular and ineffective governor, creaking infrastructure and housing, and an increasingly restive electorate,  St. Petersburg -- the hometown of both sides of the tandem -- has become a bit of an embarrassment for the Kremlin. Time to call in Mr. Fix-It.

-- Brian Whitmore

Is a critical mass of Russia's ruling elite having second thoughts about managed pluralism? There are some signs that this might be the case.

Suddenly, for example, Mikhail Prokhorov's Right Cause party is running into all sorts of problems.

On August 9, the entire political council of the party's Kamchatka branch -- as well as heads of local offices in Milkovo district and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky -- resigned en masse and joined Vladimir Putin's Popular Front, saying they disagreed with Prokhorov's personnel policies.

The Kamchatka exodus came after Prokhorov made waves by replacing the leadership of the party's St. Petersburg branch last week.

Also on August 9, Prokhorov accused the ruling United Russia party of orchestrating the removal of more than 200 of its billboards in Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and Moscow.

All of this followed a conflict last week between him and Boris Nadezhdin, a senior member of the party, over whether nationalists should be included among its ranks. That mini-scandal broke out after an article appeared in the pro-Putin daily "Izvestia," prominently quoting Nadezhdin as saying the party was actively recruiting nationalist figures.

The article drew a quick denial from Right Cause officials. It also led to Prokhorov sharply -- and publicly -- rebuking Nadezhdin. "If he shares any of their views, there is no place in the party for him," he wrote on his blog on August 3, according to "The Moscow Times."

In Russia, a string of bad luck like this doesn't usually happen by accident. And one can't help but wonder if somebody very powerful is trying to undermine the whole "Right Cause project."

The idea of propping up a Kremlin-friendly center-right party has been in the works for a long time, had the support of the technocratic wing of the elite, much of which also favors President Dmitry Medvedev serving a second term, but was hotly opposed by the likes of Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and other siloviki.

Right Cause's troubles coincide with an apparent shift in the conventional wisdom about who will run as the establishment's anointed presidential candidate in March 2012. In recent weeks, the punditocracy appears to sense that the a return to the Kremlin for Putin is increasingly likely. Some are also suggesting that Putin and Medvedev may even run against each other (a scenario I still find hardly likely, but not out of the question).

Here's Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Politics Foundation and a Medvedev supporter, speaking to "Nezavisimaya gazeta":


This all may be a temporary blip, it may be a diversion, or it could very well be a decisive shift away from where I have been assuming Russia is moving. As regular readers of this blog must know by now, I have long thought that Plan A was for Medvedev to serve a second term as president and for Putin to remain in charge as "national leader" and the senior member of the tandem.

I have also long thought that another part of Plan A was to rejuvenate the State Duma with fresh parties that gave the appearance of a pluralistic system, albeit one that is in fact tightly managed.

But Plan A can always be scrapped for Plan B, which may or may not be what is happening now.

-- Brian Whitmore

OK, this is getting ridiculous (albeit amusing).

The latest bit of Russian electoral erotica just hit the web courtesy of Eduard Limonov and the Other Russia opposition group.

The video features three young women decked out in tight black minidresses, high heels, and sunglasses stepping out of a late-model Mercedes and entering an apparently abandoned house. As they climb the staircase, they each pull out pistols.

"The level of corruption and theft has exceeded all conceivable limits. If this continues, Russia will soon disappear from the world arena," the female narrator says. "We believe that Vladimir Putin has discredited himself as a politician and national leader. He must go."

The girls then enter a room and take aim at a row of wooden figurine bears with the inscription: "The party of crooks and thieves."

The narrator then asks: "What are you prepared to do so we have a normal president?" The women then tear open their dresses to reveal tank tops embroidered with hand grenades -- the symbol of Limonov's banned National Bolshevik Party. (See video above.)

The recent video craze was kicked off last month by a group of scantily clad young women who described themselves as "Putin's Army." That video starred an iPhone-sporting schoolgirl protagonist calling herself Diana, who called on Russian women to show their support for Putin by ripping off their clothes. The winner, Diana informed viewers, would get a new iPad.

WATCH:



Weeks later, a rival video by young female supporters of President Dmitry Medvedev hit the web. In the video, Veronica and Anna describe themselves as "Medvedev's Girls" and say they are "prepared to do anything for Dmitry Anatolyevich."

Walking through a park, the young women, dressed in short-shorts and high heels, then express support for the president's drive to get Russians to drink less alcohol. At the end of that video, they tell viewers, "So it's beer, or us." They then -- wait for it -- pull off their shirts.

WATCH:



I'm not even going to try to put an analytical spin on all of this. (All I will say at this point is that the "Putin's Army" and "Medvedev's Girls" videos were obviously sanctioned by the authorities, while Limonov's clearly was not.)

If anybody else wants to have a go at interpreting all this, have at it in the comments (or on our Facebook page). I usually refrain from posting curiosities like this on "Power Vertical." But, hey, it's Friday and I decided to have a little fun.

Have a nice weekend everybody.

-- Brian Whitmore

St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko's path to the Federation Council speakership looks more and more ridiculous by the day.

You see, before Matviyenko can take a seat in the upper chamber, let alone become its speaker, she needs to be elected to a legislature -- any legislature.

Once she has secured a seat in some local council where she will probably never show her face and surely never cast a vote, then either the St. Petersburg government or legislature can "elect" her to be one of the city representatives to the Federation Council. Then, and only then, can the full upper house elect her speaker.

But first she must actually face real live voters, albeit in a tiny municipal district.

Theoretically this should pose no problem. St. Petersburg is the hometown of both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, after all. The ruling United Russia party has a powerful political machine. And of course there are all those administrative resources at her disposal.

But the problem is that Matviyenko, who has served as governor since 2003, is extremely unpopular. Moreover, allies of ousted speaker Sergei Mironov from his A Just Russia party are determined to make her bid as difficult as possible by fielding strong candidates to oppose her. And the opposition in St. Petersburg is feeling particularly frisky at the moment, and appears prepared to stage all sorts of mischief to embarrass her.

And this is where things start to get silly.

For days, Matviyenko and her allies have been playing a game of cat-and-mouse with the opposition. Initial reports indicated that she was planning on running for a council seat in St. Petersburg's Aleksandrovskaya district or the Leningrad Oblast town of Lomonosov.

But the opposition got wind of her intentions when lawmakers from United Russia unexpectedly resigned their seats in those councils and candidates began registering to oppose her in the September 4 byelections.

Matviyenko then pulled a bait-and-switch, registering her candidacy in two separate St. Petersburg districts, Petrovsky and Krasnenkaya Rechka.

But her candidacy for the August 21 elections in those districts -- and indeed the very fact that elections were to take place in those districts -- was only made public after the registration deadline, meaning opposition parties were denied the possibility to run strong challengers.

Dmitry Krasnyansky, deputy head of the St. Petersburg Election Commission, said the reason her candidacy was not announced before the deadline was because the head of the district election commission was "on vacation."

On August 2, Matviyenko was officially registered as a candidate and today the St. Petersburg Election Commission gave her the green light to start campaigning. Matviyenko said she had not intention of actually campaigning since residents of the district have had ample time to evaluate her work as governor.

Denied the ability to challenge her, the St. Petersburg branch of A Just Russia says it plans to hold demonstrations on election day.

This whole comic opera illustrates how much has changed in Russia over the past few years. There was a time, not so long ago, when if the Kremlin wanted somebody to become speaker of the Federation Council, it would happen. No complications. No questions asked.

But we are now witnessing now more turbulence in the ruling elite's personnel policy than has been customary for some time.

First, Sergei Mironov goes off the reservation and loses his Federation Council speakership. Then the Kremlin realizes that Matviyenko's unpopularity in St. Petersburg could drag down United Russia in December's State Duma elections.

But when President Medvedev sought to solve two problems as once -- finding Matviyenko a new job and filling Mironov's vacant seat with a pliant successor -- she dithered for days before finally accepting (now it's not hard to see why).

And now, her election is turning into a farce.

I have little doubt that Matviyenko will eventually take over the speaker's chair. And then the real fun will begin when the Kremlin tries to appoint her successor as St. Petersburg governor.

-- Brian Whitmore

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