And here we go again.

In a commentary in "Vedomosti" on Wednesday, Igor Yurgens of the Institute of Contemporary Development and Yevgeny Gontmakher of the Institute of Global Economy and International Relations appealed to President Dmitry Medvedev to openly declare his intention to run for a second term.

The two Medvedev allies also argued that Russia would face a massive economic crisis and social tensions if Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin.

Literally hours after the Yurgens and Gontmakher commentary appeared, Reuters moved a story, citing anonymous officials, claiming that Putin had already decided to run for president in 2012.

Reuters cited one of the officials as saying that Putin was "troubled by the perception that his protege, whom he has known for more than two decades, did not have sufficient support among the political and business elite or the electorate to ensure stability if he pushed ahead with plans for political reform." Another official claimed that "an attempt by Medvedev to assert his authority in recent months had unsettled Putin, but the two leaders communicated well on a regular basis."

This, of course, was more than enough to set off another round of the-tandem-is-feuding-oh-my-oh-my! hand wringing.

In a piece today, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" spoke to the usual stable of Moscow pundits to get a handle on what is really going on.

Gleb Pavlovsky of the Effective Politics Foundation told the daily that the tension that has always existed among Putin and Medvedev's respective teams is now spilling over to the principles -- and that society was getting increasingly impatient with the drawn-out drama:
Aleksei Malashenko of the Carnegie Moscow Center, meanwhile, downplayed the whole affair. "It was announced on countless occasions already that Medvedev must run for president. It was also denounced more than once that he should remain president," Malashenko told "Nezavisimaya gazeta." "In any event, there is no way to say what will happen. All of this is guesswork."

Meanwhile, as I blogged earlier in the week, Putin's Popular Front is drafting a platform for State Duma elections in December that appears to be moving in the direction of (mild and tightly controlled) political reform that Medvedev has long been calling for.

In an article in today's edition of "Novaya gazeta," political analyst Andrey Kolesnikov sarcastically noted the convergence:


The conventional wisdom in the Moscow punditocracy appears to be moving in the direction of Putin returning. For now, I am sticking to my assumption that Plan A is still for Medvedev to remain president and for Putin to remain in charge as National Leader (recognizing, of course, that Plan A can easily be abandoned for Plan B).

What I suspect happened yesterday was that the Medvedev and Putin teams, which (as Pavlovsky suggested) are becoming increasingly jittery, engaged in a bit of shadow boxing via the media.

In any event, I suspect we will soon see photographs of the smiling tandem hanging out together and enjoying some kind of fun outdoor activity.

-- Brian Whitmore

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This just in from the department of things that caused me to say "Huh?!?"

It appears that Gazeta.ru got a peek at a draft of the Popular Front's electoral program -- and it is surprisingly "liberal," calling for preserving the popular election of mayors, instituting the election of top judges, a simplification of the rules governing the registration of political parties, and a return to single mandate districts in State Duma elections.

Moreover, it calls for the federal government and bureaucracy to be moved outside of Moscow.

It's just a draft and it will no doubt go through revisions. But it is nevertheless a bit eye-popping.

The 100-page program, drafted by the Institute of Social, Economic and Political Studies, argues that the authoritarian measures of the past decade were necessary given Russia's dire circumstances when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000:


The draft program goes on to say that these efforts have "largely paid off" and that it was now "possible to maintain political unity and territorial integrity."

The next step, the authors argue, is to increase political competition and assure that the authorities are more accountable to citizens:


In addition to calling for the preservation of mayoral elections -- one of the last vestiges of democracy in Russia, which has come under threat of late -- the document also calls for revamping the system of electing the State Duma, going back to the mixed system of the 1990s that combined single mandate districts and party lists.

Additionally, the draft program harshly criticizes "the ever-growing appetite for officials of different ranks to outdo each other in acquiring prestigious offices and cars, and arrange comfort and opulence for themselves at the expense of public funds." It calls for "reducing the cost of maintaining the government at all levels."

Finally, the document calls for moving most of the federal bureaucracy outside of Moscow:


Now if this how the Popular Front's platform emerges in its final form, I'll eat my hat. In fact, expect this to be watered down considerably (and the proposals as they are, while progressive by the standards of today's ruling elite, are pretty modest by any international standards of democracy).

But nevertheless, the fact that a proposal like this came out of Putin's Popular Front at all is quite telling. It shows that the push for some form of "managed pluralism" post-2012 is quite strong indeed. What surprised me here is that I expected Mikhail Prokhorov and Right Cause to be holding down the (Kremlin-approved) "liberal" flank this political season.

Apparently they won't be alone.

And it also shows that Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev are actually more on the same page than much of the recent conventional wisdom suggests -- which should come as no surprise to regular readers of this blog.

-- Brian Whitmore

If Dmitry Medvedev remains president for a second term, as I suspect he will, what will Vladimir Putin's role be?

In my last post, I blogged what I thought was an excellent analysis of the current political dynamic by Lauren Goodrich at Stratfor.com. Goodrich argued that Russia was moving toward a political system characterized by "managed pluralism underneath not a president or premier, but under a person more like the leader of the nation, not just the leader of the state." And that leader is, of course, Vladimir Putin.

The post also quoted Igor Yurgens, chairman of the Kremlin-connected Institute of Modern Development, as saying that he expects Medvedev to remain president, but that Putin would remain Russia's most powerful figure as "father of the nation."

Regular readers of this blog will not be surprised that I agree with Goodrich and Yurgens that this is where Russia is heading.

But if that is the case -- and this is all speculation and tea leave reading at this point -- will Putin occupy an official state post? And if so, which one?

In the past, I have blogged that it doesn't really matter. Putin has the loyalty of -- and de facto control over -- the siloviki, and that should be enough for him to maintain decisive influence and act as "national leader."

But is that really the case? In recent weeks, I have begun giving the assumption a re-think.

It is true that informal authority is very important in Russia and Putin has plenty of it. But anybody who has spent any time in Russia and observed its politics at close range also knows that it is an extremely bureaucratic country where one's position in the state apparatus is directly proportional to one's power and influence.

Would Putin be able to hang onto that influence over the long haul without an official post? Perhaps, but it would be risky for him.

So what will Putin do?

He, of course, could remain prime minister, keeping the tandem together in its current form. But press reports and pundit buzz suggests he doesn't really like that job. A National Leader, after all isn't someone who gets bogged down getting his hands -- and image -- dirty with the details of day-to-day governance. Moreover, I expect that after the elections a more "liberal" or "technocratic" figure will become premier. Right Cause leader Mikhail Prokhorov is one candidate, should his party do well in the December elections to the State Duma. Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin is another name that has been floated.

In the past I have suggested that Putin could rule as General Secretary of United Russia, taking a page out of the old Soviet playbook. He could also become Speaker of a United Russia dominated State Duma. But given United Russia's declining popularity, and the Duma's weakness to influence policy in a meaningful way, these could prove flimsy foundations on which to base his long-term authority.

The role that I think would best preserve Putin's control over the system was established in a little-noticed presidential decree that Medvedev signed back in May.

And here, I'll turn the floor over to defense and security analyst Aleksandr Golts, writing in "Yezhednevny zhurnal" (you can read the English version here):


 Sounds like a job description for the National Leader.

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE TO READERS: The Power Vertical has just started a Facebook page that I hope will beocme a forum for regular readers of the blog and for Russia watchers in general.

Is there an overarching strategy to the dizzying machinations of the Russian elite as election season approaches? Or are we just seeing the usual jockeying of Kremlin clans positioning themselves for the post-2012 situation?

Lauren Goodrich at Stratfor.com has written a well-reasoned piece that argues the former. I have been meaning to blog it for a couple weeks now (it came out on July 5 and is well worth a read), not least of all because it largely mirrors my understanding of the current political dynamic.

"Interesting shifts are under way this election season," Goodrich writes. "While on the surface they may resemble political squabbles and instability, they actually represent the next step in the Russian leadership's consolidation of the state."

Goodrich argues that upon coming to power, Putin's first priority was to restore the authority of the Russian state which had deteriorated during Boris Yeltsin's presidency.

Putin largely achieved this goal using authoritarian means during his eight years in the Kremlin, which gave him the confidence to turn the presidency over to Dmitry Medvedev -- while remaining in firm control of the country as prime minister.

Putin's next priority, which he is undertaking in tandem with Medvedev, is to modernize the country's economy and infrastructure. But this, Goodrich writes, requires some adjustments in policy:


In order to achieve these goals, Putin and Medvedev not only need to improve Russia's investment climate and ease up the state's role in the economy (which explains Medvedev's moves to move siloviki like Igor Sechin out of the chairmanship of state corporations), they also need to create what Goodrich calls "the appearance of democracy."

Enter Mikhail Prokhorov and Right Cause:


But the tandem (and the larger ruling elite) also wants to make sure the appearance of democracy doesn't turn into the real thing.

Enter the Popular Front:


And as I have been blogging for months, the mechanism to keep the current elite firmly in control with the appearance of a more democratic system is "managed pluralism":


Igor Yurgens , chairman of the Kremlin-connected Institute of Modern Development, recently said he expected Medvedev to remain president for a second term, adding that Putin would remain the country's most powerful figure.

"Vladimir Putin is a more powerful player. He will probably become a kind of father of the nation, allowing the president to promote the thoughts and ideas he regards as priorities," Yurgens told Interfax.

My only quibble with Goodrich's conclusions is that I don't think this is just about Putin. It is about keeping the inner sanctum of the current ruling elite, what Andrew Monaghan of the NATO Defense College calls "The Team" (and what I would call the Deep State -- but that is a subject for a future piece I am working on), in power as well.

-- Brian Whitmore

Well, it was just a matter of time before somebody decided to play the fear card.
 
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev darkly warned last week that "extremist" groups may be planning to disrupt elections to the State Duma in December:
   
At an emergency meeting, Nurgaliyev said the Interior Ministry was creating a special working group to deal with the problem.
 
Central Election Commission Chairman Vladimir Churov, meanwhile, reassured the public that the December 4 election would not be disrupted and that voters should not be dissuaded from going to the polls.
 
Speaking to "Nezavisimaya gazeta," political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Politics Foundation, casts doubt on the damage extremist groups can do to the elections:  
But where Pavlovsky does see a danger is that elements in the security services could attempt to use a manufactured situation involving "extremists" acting on their behalf to destabilize the political situation ahead of the elections:

 
"Nezavisimaya gazeta" also quotes an unidentified official as saying that extremist groups and the security services are often closely intertwined and that the whole network connecting the authorities and these groups needs to be addressed:
   
So what is going on here. Possibly nothing. Right-wing extremist violence is clearly a problem in Russia (although rarely in elections). And it never hurts in Russia to play up the threat of extremism in an effort make the authorities look like defenders of public order.
 
But the fear card -- whether its fear of a communist restoration (1996), Chechen separatists (2000), or something else -- usually gets played when the authorities want to change the political dynamic and conversation going into an election season.
 
As I have been blogging for months, this season seems to be defined by a move toward managed pluralism, with housebroken "liberal" parties like Mikhail Prokhorov's Right Cause getting a seat at the table.
 
Perhaps somebody in the ruling elite is trying to change the conversation.
 
-- Brian Whitmore

Did President Dmitry Medvedev really tell Russia's top business leaders that the time had come for them to choose between him and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin?

The daily "Vedomosti" reported today that in a meeting on Monday with the heads of 27 major companies, both state-owned and private, Medvedev said that he and Putin "had different ideas concerning the future of the country" and they needed to pick sides. According to the report, Medvedev said he laid out his ideas for Russia's future in his speech last month at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, and appealed for their support.

"Vedomosti" based its report on interviews with participants in the closed-door meeting after the fact. Neither those interviewed nor the companies represented were identified.

Here are the money grafs from the story:


That got Moscow pundits and journalists pretty excited. Discord in the tandem makes for great copy, after all.

But, as "Vedomosti" (responsibly) points out later in the story, not everyone at the meeting interpreted Medvedev's comments in the same way. One participant was quoted as saying that Medvedev's comments were "quite vague" and over interpreted by others present.

"Sure, I can imagine some people thinking that they were asked to choose their side. I believe, however, that they kind of got carries away. Personally I do not think that this is what the meeting was about," said a company owner, according to "Vedomosti." "That's wishful thinking."

Another participant told "Vedomosti" that all Medvedev was doing was indicating his desire to run, but that the issue was far from decided. "What he was saying was essentially this. Sure, I want [to run for a second term] but I do not know yet if I'm going to run for president... So, how are businesses supposed to decide when the president himself is not certain yet?" the participant said.

So what really happened? Beats me. But my instincts, and my understanding of the current political dynamics, tend to favor the latter -- less dramatic -- interpretation of Medvedev's comments.

In a recent post I cited an interview Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin gave to "The New York Times" in which he said that although there are nuances in the positions of Medvedev and Putin on issues of economic reform, both were essentially on the same page.

"They understand it a little bit differently," Kudrin said. "As a whole, yes, they understand it. Probably they are ready -- I think they are ready for this work. I know this from our discussions. This is why, in principle, Russia will improve its investment climate and carry out reforms under either leader."

In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service today, Oleg Kiselyev, deputy chairman of the Russian Nanotechnologies Corporation, or Rosnano, made a similar point:


As I have blogged before, my working assumption is that Medvedev and Putin are the leading members of a core "team" of elite officials and business leaders who are now deciding how Russia's political and economic development should proceed into 2012 and beyond.

These are disagreements and bitter rivalries within the team, most notably between Kudrin and the economic technocrats on one hand (who favor deeper reforms) and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and the siloviki (who want to preserve as much of the status quo as possible) on the other.

The trend at this point is in the direction of tightly managed pluralism in the political system and a tightly controlled liberalization of the economy. Most realize that changes must be made, but they are absolutely terrified of losing control of the process.

They have learned the lessons of the Brezhnev period -- that a top-heavy economy can become stagnant and bring down a superpower. But they have also learned the lessons of Perestroika and the 1990s -- that uncontrolled reform can spin out of control and bring down the whole house of cards.

-- Brian Whitmore

One would think that being asked to move from being the leader of Russia's second-largest city to a post that puts one second in line for the presidency would be seen as a promotion.

But outgoing St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko didn't exactly see it that way.

When President Dmitry Medvedev offered Matviyenko the job of Federation Council speaker, replacing fellow Petersburger Sergei Mironov, she didn't exactly jump at the opportunity.

Medvedev made the offer last Friday and Matviyenko thought about it over the weekend. She then requested a meeting with Medvedev on Monday.

Ultimately she agreed, albeit reluctantly.

"On the one hand, I certainly feel a responsibility toward the city and before the citizens who have placed their trust in me. On the other hand, I understand that this is a huge responsibility - to work in the Federation Council," Matviyenko said in her Kremlin meeting with Medvedev.

Why the hesitancy? Well, as "Vedomosti" points out in an editorial today, being Federation Council speaker, despite the fact that it is formally the third most prestigious job in Russia (it is second in the line of presidential succession behind the prime minister), is largely an ornamental post.


"Vedomosti" goes on to point out that the Federation Council has become nothing more than a rubber-stamp.


This, of course, should not surprise seasoned (or even passive) Russia watchers. Under Putin's rule, everything institution -- the State Duma, the courts, the governors, the regional legislatures -- has become a rubber stamp for the ruling team, the 20-30 officials who make most of Russia's consequential decisions. That is how Putin's vaunted Power Vertical is supposed to work.

But Matviyenko's Hamlet on the Neva routine just illustrated in especially stark fashion.

Why this is also interesting now is that an increasing number of top officials, including members of the ruling team like Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and Medvedev himself, are acknowledging in public that the vertical has outlived its usefulness.  

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE TO READERS: THE POWER VERTICAL WILL BE POSTING LIGHT FOR THE NEXT WEEK DUE THE THE LONG HOLIDAY WEEKEND.

The editorial in Monday's "Nezavisimaya gazeta" left little room for ambiguity.


Over the past several days there have been ample signs that changes in how Russia is governed are indeed in the works. Whether these will be meaningful and lasting, or simply cosmetic, is still an open question. What is not in question, as "Nezavisimaya gazeta" noted, is that any changes will be done "manually" -- meaning that the process will be stage managed by upper echelons of the ruling elite, which has no intention of losing control of the thaw it has initiated.

Right Cause, the Kremlin's attempt to create a housebroken center-right party, held its congress in Moscow on Saturday and elected Mikhail Prokhorov as its leader. He called for the direct election of governors, mayors, judges, and police chiefs. He called for a return of single-mandate districts in elections to the State Duma. He called for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev to be freed.

And he directly challenged the ruling United Russia party's chokehold on power:


The congress was broadcast on state television. Two days later, President Dmitry Medvedev invited Prokhorov for a chat at his residence in the Moscow suburb of Gorki.

Here is what Medvedev had to say to Prokhorov, according to the Kremlin's official website:


If this all seems a bit orchestrated, well that's because it is. It is the opening sequence in a stage-managed -- manually-controlled -- move by the Russian elite toward managed pluralism.

And the motivation? In an interview with "The New York Times" published today, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin spelled it all out pretty clearly.

Speaking to the Times' (Pulitzer Prize winning) Moscow bureau chief Ellen Barry, Kudrin explained that oil production will not increase in Russia over the next 10 years as old wells will run dry and newly developed ones are yet to go online:


Kudrin is a fairly reliable barometer of Russia's political winds. Ideologically close to Medvedev's technocratic approach, but personally close to Putin (he is rumored to be the only official allowed to use the familiar "ty" with Putin in private), he is in a unique position to understand both men's thinking.

Asked if there was consensus between Medvedev and Putin on reform, Kudrin's response was telling.

"They understand it a little bit differently," Kudrin said. "As a whole, yes, they understand it. Probably they are ready -- I think they are ready for this work. I know this from our discussions. This is why, in principle, Russia will improve its investment climate and carry out reforms under either leader."

Kudrin, who has outlasted five prime ministers over his eleven year stint as finance minister, has long been locked in a struggle for influence with Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who opposes diversifying the economy away from energy and opening up the political system.

Both have Putin's ear and both have sought to influence his thinking. Kudrin's comments and the events of the past few weeks suggest that he is winning -- at least for now.

-- Brian Whitmore

President Dmitry Medvedev said he wants more parties represented in parliament. Not so fast, replied State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov.

As I noted in my last post, in his recent interview with "The Financial Times," Medvedev came out in favor of lowering the barrier for parties to win seats in the Duma from the current seven percent of the party list vote to 5 -- or even 3 -- percent.

Today, Russian news agencies quoted Gryzlov as saying that he discussed the issue with Medvedev and the leadership of the ruling United Russia party. "The president stressed that this issue is important for small parties," Gryzlov said, but added that the Duma will not have time to consider the changes before the end of the year. "This is a question for the next State Duma to consider."

Which means, of course, that there will not be any changes before the December elections -- which kind of defeats the whole purpose of the idea of lowering the barrier.

Speaking to "Novye izvestia," Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin noted that the speaker had essentially challenged the president:


This is actually a long-standing battle that has been going on long before Medvedev decided to weigh in.

Back in the summer of 2009, Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov raised eyebrows when he suggested that United Russia -- which enjoys a two-thirds "constitutional majority in the Duma -- needed to learn to cooperate with other parties:


Gryzlov quickly made it clear that he wasn't interested. "Our parliament of the majority based on one party is a necessity for Russia...The parliamentary majority allows us to adopt laws that determine political and economic stability," he said.

Of course, Surkov's two-year-old idea, which Medvedev appears to support, isn't about letting real opposition parties like Yabloko into the Duma. The Justice Ministry's refusal to register the opposition Party of People's Freedom (known by its Russian acronym PARNAC), made that abundantly clear.

What Medvedev's proposal is really about is assuring that the Kremlin's latest housebroken "opposition" party, Right Cause, does enter the next Duma. But Right Cause leaders don't appear concerned about lowering the barrier, at least publicly.

"We will surely poll more than 7 percent, so that this barrier is nothing to lose any sleep over," Boris Nadezhdin, a member of Right Cause's Federal Political Council, told "Novye izvestia."

Nadezhdin is probably right, as long as the party enjoys Kremlin support, according to Stanislav Belkovsky, director to the Institute of National Strategy. "Whomever the Kremlin wants in the Duma will be there in any event. As for all others, I do not think that they will be permitted to poll even percent," he told "Novye izvestia."

So what is behind the public disagreement between Medvedev and Gryzlov (and the public disagreement between Surkov and Gryzlov that preceded it)?

Apparently an argument in the ruling elite about moving toward a system of managed pluralism that would allow more players into the system -- which would cut into United Russia's dominance -- or maintaining the status quo.

Medvedev's position (and that of Surkov) represents that of the technocratic side of the elite, while Gryzlov's is closer to that of the siloviki.

Medvedev's decision to weigh in on this in such a public way suggests that the managed pluralism advocates are in ascendancy. Gryzlov's response suggests that the status quo advocates haven't given up yet.

-- Brian Whitmore

WARNING! THIS IS A LONG AND VERY WONKY POST!

Russia appears to be moving toward some form of managed pluralism.  But the stress will clearly be more on the managed and less on the pluralism.

The limits of how far the ruling elite is prepared go in opening up the political system became clear today when the Justice Ministry denied registration to the opposition People's Freedom Party (known in Russian by the acronym PARNAS), led by Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Vladimir Milov, and Mikhail Kasyanov. The decision most likely means that the newly formed party will not be able to run in elections to the State Duma in December.

The ruling came just days after Medvedev, in a widely discussed interview with Britain's "Financial Times," said it was time to open up the State Duma to more parties. (You can watch the video of the interview here or read the transcript here.)

Medvedev indicated that it was time to lower the threshold to win seats in the Duma in order to bring more parties into the parliament, which could cut into United Russia's dominance:


What Medvedev's comments suggest is that the newly rebooted Right Cause party, led by the Kremlin-connected oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, will probably be headed for the Duma. Right Cause is scheduled to hold its congress on June 25, when they will formally elect Prokhorov as leader and adopt a platform.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, is tightening his grip on United Russia as the ruling party goes through an overhaul ahead of the December elections.

Last week, Putin addressed the Federal Coordinating Council of the nascent All-Russian Popular Front, which is laying the groundwork for its participation in the Duma elections.

Putin called on the Popular Front to hold competitive "primaries" among its members to choose candidates to run for the Duma on the ruling United Russia's party list:  


"Kommersant" reported on June 20 that the "joint United Russia and Popular Front primaries" will be held throughout the country from July 21 to August 10 in preparation for the ruling party's annual congress on September 3-4.

But just as managed pluralism has its limits, the "real competition" Putin called for inside the ruling party will only go so far.

"Putin, the leader of United Russia and the All-Russia Popular Front, will be able to include and exclude candidates from the list that the party congress will approve for submission to the State Duma as he sees fit.  So victory in the primaries does not guarantee inclusion on the party list," according to "Kommersant."

Several analysts, including Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center, have pointed out that the Popular Front is being used as a vehicle to purge United Russia of its less effective members and bring in fresh blood.

Deputy Prime Minsiter Vyacheslav Volodin appeared to confirm this last week when he said the party would go through a "soft upgrade" by bringing in new members from the Popular Front. If this is the case, Putin clearly does not want to lose control of that process.

The composition of the Duma, and how much United Russia will dominate it, will be a key component of Russia's post-2012 political landscape.

Deputy Kremlin chief of staff Vladislav Surkov had been pushing a plan to create a tightly managed multiparty system that resembled that in communist-era Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. The plan was staunchly opposed by the current speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, who feared seeing United Russia lose its constitutional majority.

Gryzlov has said the party intends to hold on to -- and even augment -- its two-thirds majority, although I suspect this is still an open question and will remain so until very late in the game.

The first signals about what post-2012 Russia will look like will come in the (highly stage-managed) December elections.

With United Russia undergoing a rebranding, with Right Cause appearing as a plausible parliamentary party under Prokhorov, and with the recent meltdown of A Just Russia, the signals are still mixed at this point.

-- Brian Whitmore

So it appears we won't be hearing about how "the tandem is feuding, oh my oh my" in the wake of President Dmitry Medvedev's widely discussed speech in St. Petersburg on Friday.

Speaking at a press conference in Paris after meeting his French counterpart, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stressed that he completely agreed with Medvedev's call to rapidly modernize the economy and decentralize political decision-making:


In his speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Medvedev won praise from investors when he called for moving away from the heavily centralized state capitalist model that has dominated the Russian economy since Putin's rise to power over a decade ago.

Medvedev also said it was "not viable" to continue to centralize power in the Kremlin. "One cannot govern a country today from one spot," he said. "If everything begins to work or moves according to a signal  from the Kremlin -- and we've seen that before -- then this system  is not viable," Medvedev said. "This is bad, this means the system should be changed."

This reinforces the point I have been making for awhile now, that Medvedev and Putin are on the same page, even if their respective teams are often at each other's throats.

What is interesting this time around is that after Medvedev's speech -- which at the time was interpreted by some observers (but not by this blog) as an attack on Putin -- both the president and prime minister moved quickly to put to rest any talk of conflict.

In an interview with the "Financial Times," Medvedev ruled out that he and Putin would run against each other in the 2012 presidential elections (see the video here and the print transcript here). And then came Putin's comments in Paris today.

In the past, they would have let the speculation of conflict percolate for awhile and then make a big show of camaraderie by playing badminton or going skiing together.

As the election season approaches, the tandem apparently wants to keep the elite unified. Fake displays of tension appear to have outlived their usefulness for the time being.

-- Brian Whitmore

Get ready for another round of frenzied -- and flawed -- speculation about discord in Russia's ruling tandem.

Speaking at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum today, President Dmitry Medvedev said Russia risks stagnation if it does not move quickly to reform and modernize its economy and decentralize political power from the Kremlin:

"We should not delay bidding farewell to many harmful habits. It  would be a mistake for us to aim for only calm and steady growth," Medvedev said. "It is in our power to dramatically change the situation over  the next few years. Another stagnation may be hiding behind stability."

Reiterating comments he made in a widely discussed interview with China's CCTV in April, Medvedev said it was time to move beyond the state capitalist model that has been prevalent in Russia for the past decade and open up the economy:
And just as state capitalism has outlived its usefulness in Russia, so has its highly centralized and Kremlin-dominated political system.  

"One cannot govern a country today from one spot. If everything begins to work or moves according to a signal  from the Kremlin -- and we've seen that before -- then this system  is not viable," Medvedev said. "This is bad, this means the system should be changed."

It is easy to read Medvedev's speech as a not-so-veiled attack on Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. It was Putin, after all, who centralized Russia's economy and political system after coming to power in 2000 -- Russia Inc. and the Power Vertical were, after all, his creations.

But this assumes two things: that Putin and Medvedev are in competition with each other (I do not believe that they are); and that Putin thinks the political and economic system are just fine as they are (I do not believe that he does).

As I have blogged before on numerous occasions, Putin has learned the lessons of perestroika well: that unmanaged economic and political reform can easily spin out of the Kremlin's control. But he also understands the lessons of the Brezhnev period -- that a stagnant economy and moribund political system can sink a superpower.

My assumption as Russia enters what should prove to be a very interesting -- and very consequential -- political season is that he and Medvedev are working together to try to square a complicated circle: reforming the economy and slowly opening up the political system without losing control over the process.

Medvedev's role is to be out front pushing for reform. Putin's is to call for caution and to keep the process from spinning out of control. But despite appearances to the contrary, they are working in tandem.

-- Brian Whitmore

The latest edition of the Power Vertical podcast I spoke with Kirill Kobrin, managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service about a topic that has been in the news for much of the past month and has been covered extensively by the Power Vertical blog: the return of oligarchs to Russian politics and what it means for the future of the political system.

For nearly a decade, since the October 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, there has been an implicit understanding that Russia's top business leaders must steer clear of politics -- or face very unpleasant consequences.

That all changed rather abruptly last month when Mikhail Prokhorov, chairman of the Onexim Group, agreed to head up the center-right party Right Cause -- apparently with the Kremlin's blessing. Prokhorov is expected to be formally elected head of Right Cause at a party congress on June 25.

Prokhorov is already recruiting more businessmen to join the party; he says he wants to re-brand it and change its name; and has been extremely confident in his public statements about its prospects in the December 2011 State Duma elections. He even predicts that Right Cause will have the second largest faction in the next Duma, after the ruling United Russia.

Listen to or download the latest episode of the podcast below or subscribe to "The Power Vertical Podcast" on iTunes.

Enjoy.

-- Brian Whitmore

The Power Vertical Podcast -- 6/16/11 (Episode 4)

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In one of the oldest moves in Russia's political playbook, it appears that the good Tsars Dmitry and Vladimir are blaming the country's problems on the bad boyars -- or, in this case, on the bad bureaucrats.

At a Cabinet meeting on Thursday, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin lit into the country's civil servants, ordering them to cut bureaucratic red tape or else:

"There are still refusals, formal write-offs, requests to bring in unnecessary paperwork," Putin said according to Moscow News. "Officials still keep sending citizens around in circles. There will be administrative responsibility for the violations. We need to break the vicious circle."

According to legislation introduced by the government, bureaucrats demanding superfluous paperwork will face fines of up to 5,000 rubles ($180) and those who do not respond to citizens' complaints within a 10-day time period could pay as much as 30,000 rubles ($1,075).

Earlier in the week, Medvedev surprised much of Moscow's political class when he complained that Russia's  top-down administrative command-and-control system was not working and needed to be revised or replaced:


What Putin and Medvedev seemed to be saying -- without actually saying it -- was that the vaunted power vertical that was painstakingly constructed over the past decade and which was supposed to bring order to post-Soviet Russia's administrative chaos is not working.

Interestingly enough, this is the same conclusion reached in a report issued by Chatham House that I cited in my last post.

Here's how the report's author, Andrew Moneghan of the NATO Defense College, described the situation:


Moneghan writes that Medvedev has become "‘particularly annoyed’ by the length of time it takes to prepare the paperwork for one or other activity."

And the reasons for the logjam?
"Nezavisimaya gazeta" spoke to several political analysts about the situation and the consensus was that the system needed to be opened up and made less top heavy.

"When control is executed from one agency only, its neutralization becomes very easy," Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center said. "I believe that was what the president was talking about. Bureaucrats at all levels care for nothing except retaining their positions. Whenever there is no accountability, there is no motivation to send accurate information upstairs. Why bother?"

Likewise, Olga Kryshtanovskaya of the Russian Academy of Sciences Center for Elite Studies -- and a State Duma deputy from United Russia -- called for the establishment of a meaningful separation of powers.

"You cannot just up and break the vertical because it will result in chaos and anarchy," Kryshtanovskaya said.  There ought to be several management pyramids. We live in an authoritarian state within which democracy is growing. These two are incompatible."

Indeed they are. And therein lies the paradox facing Russia's ruling elite. To make the system more effective and rational, it needs to be opened up. But opening up the system would threaten the positions of those at the top.

-- Brian Whitmore

Who is truly calling the shots in Russia?

Vladimir Putin? Dmitry Medvedev? Putin and Medvedev, together in tandem? Some grey cardinal in the shadows, like Igor Sechin or Vladislav Surkov?

Actually, an increasing number of analysts are pointing out that Russia is -- as it has been throughout the Putin era -- run by a collective leadership. Putin and Medvedev are the front men and leaders to be sure, but decisions are arrived at largely by consensus among a group that includes at least 10 and as many as 30 people.

Chatham House has recently issued a report, authored by Andrew Monaghan of the NATO Defense College, that makes several salient points about the nature of Russia's ruling elite and where it appears to be headed.

In the report, titled "The Russian Vertikal: The Tandem, Power, and Elections," Monaghan argues at the outset that "there are no major gaps between the political agendas of Medvedev and Putin" and that regardless of which one of them is president after 2012 "there is unlikely to be major change in Russian domestic or foreign policy in the short to medium term."

He also argues that the terms we have been using to describe Russian politics -- terms like tandem and vertical -- are quickly becoming obsolete:

"Both ‘The Tandem’ and ‘The Vertical’ have lost their original meanings. The tandem has become outdated – not because of a split between the two men, but because of the emergence and emphasis on a unified team, albeit one with some internal rivalries."

And who is on this unified team?


So what explains the apparent rifts that appear between Medvedev and Putin periodically?


Both myself and Sean Guillory have made similar arguments in the past.

Monaghan's report dovetails with another widely discussed paper by Kremlin-connected political analyst Dmitry Orlov, director general of Agency for Political and Economic Communications. In that report, published in May, Orlov argued that decision about who will be president in 2012 is being decided by "the most influential 25-30 Russian politicians and businessmen" behind closed doors.

Orlov argues that the alliance between Putin and Medvedev will endure beyond the election and "grow into a lasting political alliance." The tandem's main task as Russia gears up for elections to the State Duma in December and for the presidency in March 2012 "is to ensure the unity of the ruling elite."

-- Brian Whitmore

Apparently Mikhail Prokhorov isn't wasting any time revamping Right Cause.

The billionaire oligarch -- the president of the Onexim Group and owner of the New Jersey Nets -- says he wants to rebrand the pro-Kremlin center-right party, change its name, and bring in fresh faces.

"Vedomosti" reported on Monday that Prokhorov has invited another billionaire, Federation Council Deputy Suleiman Kerimov, to join. The daily also reported that Prokhorov is planning to recruit two more top businessmen, Arkady Volozh, the co-founder of Yandex, and Yevgeny Kaspersky of Kaspersky Lab.

The changes going on at Right Cause, which are clearly sanctioned by the Kremlin, come as another leading entrepreneur, Aleksandr Lebedev, announced plans to join Putin's fledgling All-Russian Popular Front.

So what's going on here? Are we returning to a 1990s-style Age of the Oligarchs, when leading tycoons played a leading role in politics -- an era that ended decisively with the October 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky?

The short answer, according to many Kremlin-watchers, is: Yes, but... (and it's a very big but).

Here's Andrew Roth writing in "Moscow News":


The age when uber-oligarchs like Boris Berezovsky controlled vast swaths of the economy and could act as independent political players, bringing down governments, swaying elections, and manipulating the Kremlin is clearly not coming back.

What does appear to be happening is that the Kremlin is allowing select business moguls into the political arena to help retool the political system for the 2011-12 election season.

As I have blogged before, Prokhorov is no Khodorkovsky -- and he's certainly no Berezovsky. He knows the rules of the game and he can be expected to be pliant.

Prokhorov's role is clearly to turn Right Cause into a viable center-right party that would attract the support of the disaffected liberal intelligentsia, business class, and technocratic elite -- but to remain obedient to the Kremlin.

This has been made necessary by the precipitous decline in the ruling United Russia's popularity in recent years and by the failure of the ostensibly center-left A Just Cause to gain any real traction. "Reformatting is necessary, because everyone has egg on their faces, and not just United Russia," Aleksei Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center told "Nezavisimaya gazeta."

So Prokhorov is playing his role, dutifully building up a pro-Kremlin party on United Russia's right flank.

"Prokhorov is maneuvering through the situation. The Kremlin needs a rightist party, and he understands that he can accept an offer to head it and hopefully increase his own effect on public politics," Olga Mefodyeva of the Center for Political Technologies told "Moscow News."

-- Brian Whitmore

There has been a lot of ink spilled lately about what Vladimir Putin's decision to form the All-Russian Popular Front means for the country's political future.

Speaking to "Nezavisimaya gazeta" earlier this week, Igor Bunin, the president of the Center for Political Technologies, argues that it is a sure-fire sign that Putin intends to return to the presidency:


According to Bunin, if United Russia manages in December to win the same two-thirds "constitutional" majority it won in the 2007 State Duma elections, Putin's return to the Kremlin is all but a sure thing:


I agree with Bunin that the results of this December's elections will be a key indicator about who will occupy the Kremlin after 2012. But I draw the opposite conclusion.

If Putin controls the Popular Front (and is there any doubt that he will?) and is crowned "national leader" (again!) and United Russia maintains a "constitutional majority" in the Duma, then this makes it all the more likely that Putin will feel comfortable allowing Medvedev to stay in the Kremlin.

In a two consecutive columns in "The Moscow Times," political analyst Vladimir Frolov, president of the LEFF Group, makes the case.

In a May 10 column, Frolov argues that a supermajority in the Duma is one of the keys to Putin maintaining control of the country while surrendering the presidency:
Another key, Frolov wrote in a May 23 column, is to find a post that Putin can occupy that affords him sufficient prestige -- and control:
Secretary of the Security Council could conceivably be the perch from which Putin continues to run the country, especially since Medvedev's decree giving it control over the military and security services. This would formalize the informal control Putin already exercises over these bodies.

As I have blogged before, it actually doesn't matter that much which post Putin occupies -- Prime Minister, speaker of the Duma, general secretary of United Russia (or the Popular Front). The point is, as long as Putin controls Russia's "deep state" -- ie, the key figures in the military, law enforcement, and security services -- he will have more power and influence than Medvedev  or whoever is the formal head of state.

-- Brian Whitmore

It's not just about the presidency.

What the upper echelons of the Russian political elite are deciding now is not only whether it will be Dmitry Medvedev or Vladimir Putin who will occupy the Kremlin after 2012 -- but what the contours of the entire political system will be.

In a compelling piece published last week in "Vedomosti," political analyst Dmitry Badovsky argues that Russia is moving away from the highly personalized system of authority that dominated the past decade and toward some form of tightly controlled two-party system.

Badovsky writes that consensus is building in the ruling elite for the continuation of the Putin-Medvedev tandem for the time being and for the institutionalization of shared power in the long term:


He adds that "the continued retention of power and maintenance of the general outlines of the political regime will require more complex structures than the tandem, the personal approval ratings of leaders, and the dominant party."

Badovsky then goes on to suggest that the Russian system is moving in the direction of some form of managed pluralism:


I agree with Badovsky that Russia is moving in the direction of a more pluralistic system -- albeit a tightly controlled one -- at least on the surface. As I have blogged on numerous occasions, I still believe that Plan A is for some form of the tandem to endure beyond 2012 -- with Medvedev as president and Putin in the role of "national leader." And there are ample signs that the party configuration following December's parliamentary elections will look different and more diverse that it does today.

But I think Putin's role in that system will be larger than a co-equal partner to Medvedev in a Tandem 2.0 arrangement. I expect Putin's role in the future political arrangements to resemble something similar to Iran's supreme leader, Turkey's so-called deep state, or China's Deng Xiaoping after he formally stepped down as China's leader but maintained decisive influence over the political process.

The lessons the Russian elite drew from the chaotic 1990s, I believe, will prevent them from a move to a more pluralistic system --even a tightly controlled one -- without a guarantor, or a "krysha."  

And with his control over the security services, Putin is the only krysha in town.

-- Brian Whitmore

It wasn't until December 10, 2007 that Russia and the world learned that Dmitry Medvedev had been anointed to follow Vladimir Putin into the Kremlin. A week later, on December 17, Putin said he would agree to serve as Medvedev's prime minister -- and the tandem was born.

Significantly, none of this happened until more than a week after elections to the State Duma, in which United Russia won 315 out of 450 seats -- with a huge assist from the Kremlin's media machine and administrative resources.

We should expect a similar timetable this time around and anybody who came away disappointed or surprised that Medvedev did not reveal his 2012 plans at his press conference Wednesday is missing the point.

In an interview with "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology's Center of Elite Studies, explains why:


In 2007, a United Russia-dominated Duma made the Putin-Medvedev tandem possible in 2008. Likewise, the contours of the post-2012 political arrangements won't be clear until the composition of the legislative branch is settled.

And what the Duma will look like after the December 4 elections will, of course, be decided not by the voters but by the elite -- an elite that appears sharply divided over the issue.

Will United Russia be allowed to maintain such a massive majority? What role will the nascent Popular Front play? Will more parties, like the Prokhorov-powered Right Cause, be allowed in? What will be the fate of A Just Russia after Sergei Mironov's sacking as Federation Council speaker?

United Russia clearly wants to hang on to its overwhelmingly dominant position. But there are clearly those in the elite who think this is a recipe for stagnation. And while we shouldn't hold out breath in anticipation of genuine pluralism in the Duma, some powerful voices have argued for some form of managed pluralism.

One of Medvedev's more telling remarks came when he was asked whether he thought the president could be a member of a political party -- which would be a break from post-Soviet Russian tradition:


In her remarks to "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Kryshtanovskaya seemed to attach a lot of significance to this comment:


I think this is correct, but Medvedev's comment also suggests to me that Russia's political party landscape could be in for a bit of an overhaul that will set the table for the post-2012 system.

And with just over six months before the Duma elections, just what kind of changes are coming should come into focus soon.

-- Brian Whitmore

Sergei Mironov lost his job as speaker of the Federation Council today when the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly voted 42-5 to remove him as one of the city's representatives to the upper chamber.

His sacking was sparked by a series of critical public comments he made about the ruling United Russia party. He also drew fire for saying that his party, A Just Russia, would not support Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 if he is nominated by United Russia.

So this means that Mironov is finished and will just fade away into the political wilderness, right? Well, not exactly.

After the vote, Mironov said he would take a seat in the State Duma, which he is entitled to do because he led the party list of A Just Russia in the December 2007 parliamentary elections:


The Mironov case is one of the stranger twists in what is shaping up to be another lively election season.

A longtime loyal ally of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Mironov held his speakership for the past 10 years. He founded A Just Russia in 2007 with the Putin's blessing as a pro-Kremlin center-left party, a move widely seen as part of a strategy to co-opt discontent on the left and establish an obedient domesticated opposition.

But in then, he started acting -- and the operative word here is "acting" -- sort of like an actual opposition figure. In October 2009, A Just Russia joined the Communists and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats, two other "opposition" parties tolerated by the Kremlin, in a walkout from the State Duma to protest falsification in local elections that month (in which United Russia won an overwhelming majority of seats).

Throughout 2010 and into this year, MIronov became increasingly critical of United Russia. He even criticized the government's 2010 budget, sparking the first calls for him to step down.

Mironov says he and his party are gearing up for the December 2011 State Duma elections.

"If somebody assumed that I am leaving the [A Just Russia] party - they are wrong - it is a simple reshuffling of forces ahead of the decisive battle that we are facing in December," he said in remarks reported by RIA-Novosti.

In his press conference today, Medvedev curiously interrupted the proceedings to announce Mironov's sacking (which he reportedly read on his iPad). Asked later by journalists to comment, Medvedev said it would benefit both United Russia and A Just Russia.

"Many countries take decades to develop their parliaments and this is what we are doing," Medvedev said.

The remark appears curious devoid of context. But in context, it makes perfect sense.

Back in 2009, Mironov supported a plan, floated by Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov and hotly opposed by United Russia, to establish a tightly controlled multi-party system similar to the ones that existed in some Soviet satellites like Communist-era Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, a leading member of United Russia, vocally fought the idea -- which would reduce the party's clout -- and it seemed to lose traction.

But given the events of the past week or so, it might just be poised to make a comeback.

Billionaire oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov's decision to head up the Kremlin-friendly center-right "opposition" party Right Cause could -- possibly -- turn them into a player and get them into the next Duma.

Mironov's expulsion could -- conceivably -- boost his stature as an outsider fighting the system (as contrived as that is) among disaffected voters on the left. This would boost A Just Russia's chances to make it back into the Duma in December without the taint of being a Kremlin lackey.

If both A Just Russia and Right Cause make it into parliament they will provide a convenient left and right flank to a still-dominant United Russia (with the Communists and the Liberal Democrats occupying the left and right extremes). And then -- voila! -- Surkov's tightly controlled fake multiparty system is a reality.

And then everybody joins Putin's new All-Russian National Front and lives happily ever after!

-- Brian Whitmore

Does anybody seriously think that a politically connected oligarch of Mikhail Prokhorov's stature would agree to lead a liberal political party -- even a highly domesticated one like Right Cause -- without official sanction?

Prokhorov's surprise announcement on Monday that he would take the reigns of Right Cause ended that party's months-long search for an influential leader who would lead them into the State Duma and political relevance. The party had previously tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, Kremlin advisor Arkady Dvorkovich, and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov.

Prokhorov is Russia's third richest citizen with an estimated fortune of $22.7 billion and his deep pockets could conceivably turn Right Cause into a player overnight.

He is also be the first top business mogul to enter politics in such a high-profile way since Mikhail Khodorkovsky's ill-fated attempt to finance opposition parties in the 2003 Duma election.

But 2011 is not 2003, when Vladimir Putin was just getting started in consolidating his vice grip on Russia's political system and would tolerate no serious dissent. Today, the political landscape is markedly different, with a sharply divided elite and a widespread belief that Putin's top heavy power vertical is stifling economic development and growth.

And Prokhorov is not Khodorkovsky, who was challenging the Kremlin's priorities consistently prior to his October 2003 arrest. In contrast, Prokhorov has kept his nose clean in Putin's Russia, amassing his fortune and abiding by the unwritten rule forbidding business leaders from engaging in unsanctioned political advocacy.

No, I don't think Prokhorov is going rogue here. So what is going on?

Prokhorov's move came on the heels of Putin's announcement that he was forming a new political grouping called the All-Russian Popular Front, which many analysts see as a vehicle for Putin to return to the Kremlin following the 2012 elections. Putin made his announcement at a conference of United Russia in Volgograd and the details of how the ruling party and the new group will work together are not entirely clear yet.

Right Cause, meanwhile, has endorsed President Dmitry Medvedev's reelection.

So one theory out there is that the groundwork is being laid for some form of managed competition between Putin and Medvedev in 2012. The assumption here is that Putin would return to the presidency, but the election would have a veneer of respectability and legitimacy.

This could be what's going on, but I am far from convinced.

The more likely scenario is that a decision about 2012 has not been reached yet and the elite is setting up the political infrastructure to keep all their options open. The rest is political theater.

In a widely discussed report published online today, Kremlin-connected political analyst Dmitry Orlov, director general of Agency for Political and Economic Communications, argues that decision about who will be president in 2012 is being decided by "the most influential 25-30 Russian politicians and businessmen" behind closed doors:

But whatever this select group decides, Orlov says the alliance between Putin and Medvedev will endure beyond the election:


The formation of the Popular Front, which will purportedly bring together various Kremlin-friendly political parties and social organizations, is one vehicle to consolidate the elite. Beefing up Right Cause, which will give disgruntled liberals in the elite a (limited) voice, is another.

In all likelihood, a final decision on 2012 will not be made before the elections to the State Duma in December of this year.

Meanwhile, a new set of tea leaves will be available for reading following Medvedev's much-anticipated press conference on Wednesday.

-- Brian Whitmore

In the third edition of "The Power Vertical Podcast," I speak with David Kakabadze, the director of our Georgian Service, and Samuel Charap of the Center for American Progress, about the stormy relationship between Russia and Georgia. And, of course, how the United States fits into that.

Enjoy.

Listen to or download the latest episode of the podcast below or subscribe to "The Power Vertical Podcast" on iTunes.

The Power Vertical Podcast -- Episode 3

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What to make of Gleb Pavlovsky's departure from the Kremlin as an advisor to the presidential administration?

According to a report in "Vedomosti" on Wednesday, Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the ruling elite's informal ideologist, personally made the decision to sever ties with Pavlovsky, the head of the Foundation for Effective Politics, a Moscow-based think tank that advised the Kremlin in an unofficial capacity for more than a decade. Pavlovsky's open support for President Dmitry Medvedev's reelection in 2012, the officials say, was the reason for the decision.

"Vedomosti" also quoted Yuri Shuvalov, Assistant Secretary of the Presidium of United
Russia's General Council, as saying that Pavlovsky's recent criticism of the ruling party also played a role.

Mikhail Vinogradov, a political analyst told the daily that positioning oneself on "one side of the fence" between Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Medvedev "is risky at this point."

Pavlovsky has been a fixture in the cloistered universe of Russia's elite political strategists since the mid-1990s. After establishing the Foundation for Effective Politics in 1995, he worked on Boris Yeltsin's 1996 reelection campaign and has been a key player with close Kremlin ties ever since.

He was a key strategist for Putin's 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns, as well as Medvedev's in 2008. He was also the driving force behind an Internet media empire that includes "Russky zhurnal," Lenta.ru, Kreml.org, and the Public Opinion Foundation polling organization.

Since the news broke, Pavlovsky has been making the media rounds giving his side of the story.

In interviews with RFE/RL's Russian Service, Gazeta.ru, and "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Pavlovsky stressed that he was not fired and the decision for him to leave the Kremlin administration was mutual.

Here he is, speaking to "Nezavisimaya gazeta":


In various interviews, Pavlovsky strongly implied that the tandem and key members of the elite were very close to deciding that Medvedev would stand for reelection.

But as he told Gazeta.ru, many in the elite -- including Putin himself -- are getting cold feet:
Pavlovsky added that "The tandem will remain a political alliance, but its design will change," implying that if Medvedev stays for a second term Putin will not going be anywhere and will continue to play a large role in Russian politics.

In his interview with Gazeta.ru, Pavlovsky also insisted that his relationship with Surkov -- who has also been a Kremlin fixture since the 1990s -- was on solid footing, despite reports that it was the regime's chief ideologist who showed him the door:


Speaking to Vladimir Kara-Murza of RFE/RL's Russian Service, Pavlovsky said that with March 2012 approaching rapidly, it was high time the elite got over its jitters (you can listen to the whole broadcast in Russian here):


Pavlovsky is the third official to suffer for expressing public support for one member of the tandem over the other. Konstantin Zatulin was replaced as Senior Assistant Chairman of the State Duma's Committee for CIS Affairs and Aleksei Chadayev was removed from United Russia's Central Executive Committee. Both criticized Medvedev over his failure to oppose the international military campaign in Libya.

At this point, I have more questions than answers about what all this means. Can we take Pavlovsky at his word? Or, despite his protestations to the contrary, did he lose a power struggle with Surkov (who has long been seen as a close Putin ally)? Can we surmise anything about 2012 from this incident?

I have long thought that Plan A was for Medvedev to serve a second term as president while Putin remained on the scene as the real power behind the throne. And I must admit that this assessment was in no small part (although not exclusively) influenced by Pavlovsky's public stance on the issue.

There will no doubt be many more twists and turns before this is all finally decided. Medvedev has scheduled a press conference for May 18, an event that will no doubt be scrutinized closely for any fresh signals.

Meanwhile, as Pavlovsky was departing the Kremlin this week, Putin baffled journalists in Stockholm with a typically cryptic response when asked about 2012. “You will like the decision, you will be pleased,” he said.

-- Brian Whitmore

A Russian leader gives a four-hour speech filled with empty platitudes about imaginary accomplishments, promises of a bright future, and dire warnings about dangerous foreign influences. The speech was interrupted 53 times by applause.

Sound familiar?

Several months back, I blogged about the striking similarities between Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Each replaced a reformist predecessor who was ultimately seen as bumbling, erratic, and ineffective -- Nikita Krushchev in Brezhnev's case, Boris Yeltsin in Putin's. Both ushered in an era of stability and relative prosperity thanks to high oil prices. And both perceived a "golden age" that lasted roughly a decade.

But by the late 1970s, the luster began to wear off Brezhnev's rule as the Soviet economy stagnated, life expectancy plummeted, and social problems like rampant alcoholism, worker absenteeism, and widespread cynicism became endemic.

Vladimir Putin has been in power in one form or another for roughly 12 years now. On the Brezhnev timeline, that places us roughly in 1976 -- just before things started to go south. It was also in that year when Brezhnev, who was then 70 years old, reportedly considered resigning.

Instead he stuck around, collected his third Hero of the Soviet Union medal, took the military rank of marshal, and passed a new constitution. Oh, and as living standards sank and the general social malaise increased, he gave a lot of long and meandering speeches.

In a commentary in "The Moscow Times" today (titled "Vladimir Ilyich Putin") former State Duma Deputy and current opposition figure Vladimir Ryzhkov wrote about how much the prime minister's speech to parliament last week reminded him of Brezhnev:


Ryzhkov noted that in Brezhnev's time "Russians were fed rosy promises of an imminent solution to the food deficits, guaranteed housing for everyone and sustained economic growth, even while it was clear to everyone that their standards of living were only deteriorating with each passing year."

He adds that "we are seeing the same Brezhnev-like stagnation today, including the official silence regarding the country's deep economic and political problems, the manipulation of statistics and rampant alcoholism and drug abuse."

And just like in the late 1970s, there are empty platitudes and outlandish promises:


And just like in speeches past, Putin pledged to "increase life expectancy, modernize infrastructure, make the ruble a world reserve currency, turn Moscow into an international financial center."

Is Putin aware of the Brezhnev parallels? I suspect that he is.

As I have blogged before, Putin understands the lessons of the late 1970s all too well: a stagnant economy and moribund political system can sink a superpower. But he is also very well schooled in the lessons of the late 1980s and early 1990s: that unmanaged economic and political reform can quickly spin out of the Kremlin's control.

And the drama we will witness in the coming year will largely involve how he manages to square this circle.

-- Brian Whitmore

There was a time, not so long ago, when a major speech by Vladimir Putin would elicit nothing but starry-eyed praise from the establishment punditocracy.

Apparently, that time has passed.

In a combative address to parliament on Wednesday, Putin warned against Western economic and military influence, soothed farmers, blue-collar workers, and retirees with promises of generous social benefits, boasted that Russia has weathered its financial crisis, and mocked the United States for its budget deficit. Pundits said the speech looked like the start of a presidential campaign.

But one of the key architects of Putin's rise to power over a decade ago, was not impressed.

Here's political strategist Gleb Pavlovsky, president of the Effective Politics Foundation, speaking to "Nezavisimaya gazeta":


There was a time, not so long ago, when policy differences among top Russia officials were not aired in public.

Apparently, that time has passed as well.

At a meeting of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs at the government's headquarters, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shantalov sparred openly with Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (who recently stepped down as Rosneft's CEO to comply with a new policy initiated by President Dmitry Medvedev) over whether a major oil filed will be stripped of tax breaks it had been receiving.

Shantov said yes. Sechin said no.

Here's how Reuters reported the exchange:


There was a time, not so long ago, when top government officials wouldn't dare contradict Putin following a major speech.

But after Putin warned lawmakers of Western influences on Wednesday, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin spoke out on Thursday in favor of greater democracy and a freer flow of ideas:

"Political competition is a necessary element for properly structuring any economy," Kudrin said in remarks at the RSPP meeting, as reported by the Wall Street Journal's William Mauldin. "We would like to see more ideas and more political competition in the development of these ideas."

Whatever will happen with the tandem, whatever will happen in the 2011-12 election season, whoever will be president-elect a year from now, one thing is certain: the Russian elite is more divided than it has been since the advent of Putin over a decade ago.

And that makes for a very fluid, and very unpredictable, situation.

-- Brian Whitmore

So the cycle repeats itself again. President Dmitry Medvedev gets assertive. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin slaps him down.

But this time it feels a bit different, a bit more urgent. This time, presidential elections are less than a year away and everybody senses that the answer to the great riddle of Russian politics is coming very soon.

Medvedev set off the latest frenzy with his interview with China's CCTV, where he gave the strongest indication yet that he plans to seek reelection in 2012. For good measure, he also said it was time to move beyond the authoritarian "state capitalism" model that has been a hallmark of Putin's rule.

Putin then weighed in, saying elections were still nearly a year off and that either he or Medvedev (or perhaps both) could run. Putin also seemed to take a swipe at Medvedev by saying that all the "fuss" over the election is disrupting the work of the government.

And on April 14, some top figures in the ruling United Russia party indicated their preference for Putin to return to the Kremlin.

Here's Yury Shuvalov, deputy secretary of United Russia's presidium, speaking to Gazeta.ru:


Another United Russia member, Andrei Isayev, said Shuvalov accurately reflected the views of the party.

Gazeta.ru noted, however, that Shuvalov and Isayev hail from United Russia's conservative wing and it was unclear whether their views reflect that of the party as a whole.

By all appearances this looks like a coordinated counteroffensive by Putin.

But in an interview with the St. Petersburg-based newspaper "Delovoy Peterburg," the uber political strategist Gleb Pavlovsky offered some context to what might be going on.
But Pavlovsky adds that Medvedev is proceeding very carefully:


As for the tandem, Pavlovsky suggests that it will remain intact after 2012. He dismisses talk that Putin will take a job like head of the International Olympic Committee, as some press reports have suggested. The trick, he argues, is to find a role for Putin in Russian politics:


With his Kremlin connections and history of working for both Putin and Medvedev, Pavlovsky is about as good a barometer as there is for Russian elite opinion. My take away from his comments is that that he expects Medvedev to be president after 2012 (although he doesn't say this directly) and he expects Putin to continue to play a key role in the system (I would argue that he will play the key role.)

As I've written before, the longevity of the tandem beyond 2012 is likely because Putin and Medvedev appeal to different wings of the elite -- the siloviki and the technocratic -- and both are essential to preserving unity.

Moreover, a critical mass of the elite appears to want Putin to continue playing a role. Some want this to make sure that any reforms Medvedev pursues don't endanger the primacy of the existing elite. Others want to make sure the siloviki and the bureaucracy don't undermine and emasculate Medvedev. (The "Putin as Medvedev's Krysha" model.)

The trick, as Pavlovsky notes, is finding a place for Putin in the system where he could plausibly play the role of "national leader."

But as I have noted in the past, as long as Putin continues to enjoy the loyalty of the security services, it doesn't really matter. He could continue as prime minister. If he heads United Russia's party list in December, he could be speaker of the State Duma of  general secretary of United Russia.

Whichever it is, the details need to be worked out this year.

-- Brian Whitmore

THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED

It took less than two weeks and it happened so quietly you could easily miss it.

In a dry press release late Monday, the oil giant Rosneft announced that Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin was stepping down as its CEO.

Sechin -- a close ally of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the informal leader of the "siloviki" clan of security service veterans who have dominated Russian politics for the past decade -- became the first official to fulfill President Dmitry Medvedev's March 31 order that government ministers give up their seats on corporate boards.

Merging the state, the security services, and industry, particularly the energy industry, was one of the central tenets of "Putinism" -- and Sechin was its poster child.

Medvedev's order, announced in a speech in Magnitigorsk, was seen by some analysts as the first step in dismantling -- or at least weakening -- this practice. It was also interpreted as an attack on Sechin, who is widely viewed as a rival to the president.

It is probably no accident that Medvedev chose today, just a day after Sechin left Rosneft, to give the strongest hint to date that he intends to seek a second term.

"I do not rule out that I will run for a new term as president. A decision will be made, moreover, in the fairly near future because there is less than a year remaining," Medvedev said.

Medvedev made his comments in an interview with China's CCTV ahead of a visit to that country for a meeting of the BRICS group of emerging market economies.

In the same interview, Medvedev said it was time to move beyond the model of state capitalism that Putin initiated after taking power in 2000.

"It is time for changes. Those who do not change remain in the past," he said. "What was good 10 years ago isn't good today. At some point we needed to gather together the foundations of our state and the destroyed economy. But we are not going to build state capitalism. This is not our choice."

One way to interpret all this is that Medvedev has really gone out on a limb here and decided to take on Putin and hope for the best. (You can read Yevgeny Albats' argument that this is the case here and my posts on the same subject here and here.)

I suspect, however, as I have blogged in the past, that Putin is actually on board with all this. And a closer look at Sechin's departure gives some hints about where things may be headed.

According to Russian press reports, Sechin's most likely successor at Rosneft is VTB senior vice president Sergei Shishin -- a Sechin ally with a KGB background, according to analysts.

"The state can conduct its policies without Sechin in charge of the company," said Artyom Konchin, an oil and gas analyst at Unicredit told Moscow News. “We saw today that one possible successor, Sergei Sishin, has KGB ties too. He is rumoured to be well connected in Sechin’s clique."

So while Sechin is leaving Rosneft, the Kremlin is hardly divesting itself from the company's operations. Russia Inc. will remain Russia Inc. -- it will just be a little less in-your-face about it. Call it Putinism Lite. Call it Putinism With A Human Face.

Moreover, as Reuters reports, Sechin has not stepped down from his seats on the boards of InterRAO, the state utility company, or from Rosneftegaz, which controls large shares in both Rosneft and the state natural gas monopoly Gazprom.

As deputy prime minister, he also retains his portfolio of overseeing the energy sector.

So Sechin isn't going anyplace just yet.

What appears to be unfolding here is consistent with my longstanding belief that Plan A is for Medvedev to remain president after 2012 but for Putin to remain the dominant figure in Russian politics -- exercising power and influence as the leader of the "deep state" with de facto control over the security services.

He could do this as prime minister, as a beefed up general secretary of United Russia, or from some other yet-to-be-established perch. It doesn't really matter, as long as he has the loyalty of the siloviki.

Medvedev's modernization program can then proceed, albeit under Putin's watchful eye to make sure any reforms implemented don't endanger the dominance of the current elite.

UPDATE:

Putin said on Wednesday that neither he nor Medvedev have ruled out running for president in 2012.  Putin also complained that speculation over the issue was disrupting the work of the government and the Kremlin. 

"The election still nearly a year off and all this fuss right now is not conducive to the normal organization of our work, " Putin said. "If we give any wrong signals, half of the administration and more than half the government will no longer work in anticipation of some changes."

-- Brian Whitmore

The latest tensions between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- or appearance thereof -- have sparked a lively debate in the Russian press about what is actually going on inside the tandem.

Recent articles by Yevgenia Albats and Yulia Latynina encapsulate the polemic.

Writing in "Novoye vremya" (New Times), Albats argues that with his assault on government ministers sitting on corporate boards Medvedev has made his move against his former mentor and the battle is finally on. "No more feeble excuses that it's all about the institutional rivalry within the state bureaucracy between the Kremlin and the government. It all comes down to the president and the premier now," she writes.

Albats also stresses Medvedev's criticism of the procurement practices at Transneft, Gazprom, and  Russian Railways, which he described as "banal corruption." Each of these, she notes, is run by a Putin crony:


Writing in "Yezhednevnyy zhurnal," Latynina sees an entirely different reality. Instead of Medvedev making his move, she sees a lot of empty words with little action to back them up:


Dismissing Medvedev as "the Twitter president," Latynina goes on to chide him for making promises -- to get to the bottom of things like Sergei Magnitsky's death in prison, the automobile accident involving Lukoil vice president Anatoly Barkov that killed two women, and the attack on journalist Oleg Kashin -- and not delivering:


She goes on to suggest that Medvedev is not all that different from Putin at the end of the day, citing his saber rattling with Japan over the Kurile Islands and his support for a police "reform" that many rights activists argue gives law-enforcement even more arbitrary power. "Medvedev is a part of the Putin power machine in the most direct, corrupt, sense of this word," Latynina writes.

She concludes by comparing Medvedev to...Putin's shoelace:


I have always considered Albats and Latynina to be two of the more astute Kremlin watchers on the scene. And the fact that they have looked at the same information and came to diametrically opposed conclusions is testament to just how opaque and fluid the current dynamic is.

Despite the apparent turbulence, for the time being I am sticking to my working hypothesis that Medvedev and Putin are stuck with each other and that the tandem will endure beyond 2012 -- with Medvedev as president and Putin as the dominant force in Russian politics.

What we have been seeing as of late (and as I blogged earlier in the week, this is not exactly a new phenomenon) is Medvedev becoming, if not a coequal partner in the ruling tandem, at least a less unequivocally subordinate co-ruler.

Putin still has the siloviki and will continue to have them. But Medvedev has won the loyalty of much of the technocratic part of the elite that will be a necessary player in any modernization of the country's economy. He has also won the trust of the West to a degree -- no small matter as Russia seeks investment to fuel its modernization.

But whoever is right about the politics, there is still the not-so-minor matter of what kind of policy Russia is going to pursue after 2012, regardless of who (either individually or collectively) is running the show after 2012. 

Here is political analyst Mikhail Vinogradov writing in "RBC Daily":


Have a nice weekend, everybody!

-- Brian Whitmore

What has gotten into Dmitry Medvedev?

In just over two weeks he has slapped down Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for comments critical of the international military campaign in Libya, ordered government officials to give up their posts on corporate boards and fired dozens of senior police generals.

In openly rebuking Putin on foreign affairs, instituting a corporate policy that will harm the prime minister's key allies like Deputy Prime Minister and Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, and purging the ranks of the Interior Ministry elites, Medvedev has sparked endless chatter that he has finally become his own man.

In an article in "Vedomosti" this week, Maksim Glikin writes that Medvedev "is clearly proclaiming a policy polar to the one promoted since 2000," when Putin came to power:


Glikin goes on to write that Medvedev is "trying to punch holes in the fence" that the elite has constructed "to isolate itself from society."

The question remains, why?


It's a clever argument, but I'm not sure I buy it.

Rather than suddenly appearing out of the blue, Medvedev's current hyperactive assertiveness has actually been building for months.

In November 2009 he fired his senior media adviser Mikhail Lesin, a former Putin aide who remained in the Kremlin after Medvedev took office.

In September 2010, he dismissed Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, one or Russia's most powerful politicians and a close Putin ally.

The Luzhkov firing capped off a rather remarkable run on the country's provincial barons in which Medvedev replaced a startling 34 regional leaders since taking office in May 2008 -- including some serious heavyweights who had been in office since Soviet times.

In March 2009 Medvedev replaced Oryol Governor Yegor Stroyev and Murmansk leader Yury Yevdokimov. Longtime Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Eduard Rossel was eased into retirement in November 2009. Volgograd Governor Nikolai Maksyutka and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev stepped down -- with more than a slight nudge from the Kremlin in January 2010. Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov saw the writing on the wall and announced his retirement in July 2010.

In February of this year, Medvedev raised eyebrows by calling for panel of legal experts to review the case of jailed former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Days after that, he rebuked Putin for saying that the January 24 terrorist attack on Moscow's Domodedovo Airport had been solved.

I was as intrigued as any Russia watcher by Medvedev's frantic moves over the past two weeks, but, as this little trip back in time should show, it was actually nothing new.

Medvedev has recalibrated Russian foreign policy toward greater pragmatism and away from the instinctive anti-Western tilt it took during Putin's presidency. He has overhauled the regional leadership. And is in the process of radically altering the nation's corporate policy.

But what does it mean for the future of the ruling tandem? Writing in today's "Moskovsky komsomolets," Mikhail Rostovsky suggests that the jury is still out:


I think this is largely correct. But as I have blogged before, Plan A seems to be to somehow keep the tandem intact (which means Medvedev remaining president and Putin maintaining his dominant position in Russian politics).

Putin and Medvedev need each other because each appeals to a different wing of the elite. Without Putin's protection, Russia's various bureaucratic and siloviki clans would quickly emasculate Medvedev and render his presidency powerless. And a return to the authoritarian Putinism of 2004-07 would be very difficult -- if not impossible -- in the current political climate.

Moreover, Putin clearly understands that reforms are necessary but seems to prefer that Medvedev carry them out (under his watchful eye, of course).

As Sean Guillory wrote in a thoughtful recent post on his blog, Putin and Medvedev's contrasting styles "can indeed be reconciled into a Hegelian whole."

We're just waiting to see what form that "Hegelian whole" will take.

-- Brian Whitmore

It appears that President Dmitry Medvedev was serious when he proposed on Wednesday that government officials be removed from the board of directors of state companies.

Medvedev made the proposal, that could potentially roll back one of the key mechanisms of state's stranglehold over the economy, at a meeting of a presidential commission on modernizing the economy in Magnitogorsk:


Following up on Medvedev's speech, presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich today named names.

According to a report in "Vedomosti," the following officials could be told to give up their corporate posts:

• Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, who chairs the supervisory committee of the bank VTB;

• Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, chairman of oil giant Rosneft's board of directors;

• Transportation Minister Igor Levitin, an advisor to Aeroflot;

• First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, chairman of the board of directors at Rosselkhozbank

Dvorkovich said the reform will only affect those who work in the competitive sector and are not monopolies. Gazeta.ru reported that "the Kremlin hopes that the decision to exclude from the boards of directors of large companies government officials will be taken at the next shareholders' meetings."

If Medvedev's plan is actually carried out it would roll back one of the key components of Putinism -- the establishment of a system interlocking directorates between government and business that allowed the state (in the form of officials close to Putin) to hold the economy in a vice grip.

It would also undercut Sechin -- the informal leader of the siloviki clan of security service veterans who have dominated Russian politics for the past decade -- who has emerged as one of Medvedev's most powerful nemeses.

Coming on the heels of Medvedev's high-profile rebuttal of Putin over Russian policy in the Libya crisis, the proposed reforms are also being interpreted as another battle within the ruling tandem as elite gears up for the 2011-12 election season.

But while I tended to see the spat over Libya as a case of real disagreement between Medvedev and Putin, I think something else is going on here. And like with Medvedev's campaign against Russia's mammoth state corporations in the summer of 2009, I think Putin is probably on board -- at least for the time being.
 
Putin is no fool, far from it, and he clearly sees the need to make the economy less top heavy. Despite rising oil prices, investors, who tend to see the game as largely rigged, are not betting on Russia. In the aftermath of Medvedev's announcement, however, the "New York Times" reported that stocks in the pipeline company Transneft rose 3.5 percent, the largest increase in months.

The fly in the ointment, I believe, will be Sechin and his siloviki allies, who will lose a considerable degree of power should Medvedev's plan go forward.

Is Putin prepared to let this happen? So far, his silence on the matter has been deafening.

-- Brian Whitmore

When Russia recognized breakaway Abkhazia's independence from Georgia in August 2008, very few countries followed suit. But there was nonetheless jubilation and gratitude in Sukhumi.

Today, many Abkhaz are wondering whether the cost of Moscow's support may have turned out to be a bit too high.

As a joint Abkhaz-Russian commission on border demarcation met in Moscow this week, residents of the territory became increasingly alarmed about reports that Russia was seeking to annex 160 square kilometers of Abkhaz territory.

The opposition Abkhaz newspaper "Novy den" reported earlier this month that Russia has sent a proposal to Abkhazia's de facto authorities asking them to cede a sliver of land in the territory's Gagra region.

The land in question is in a mountainous area near the Psou River, which forms Abkhazia's natural boundary with Russia. It is also close to Russia's Krasnaya Polyana ski resort, a key venue for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Echo of the Caucasus -- which broadcasts to Abkhazia and Georgia's other breakaway region, South Ossetia -- the prominent Sukhumi-based journalist Inal Khashig said Moscow's proposal appeared to be an opening gambit from which they would ultimately back down from in exchange for a smaller chunk of land --  the Abkhaz village of Aibga, which straddles the Psou River.

But Khashig said any territorial concessions, no matter how small, were staunchly opposed by an overwhelming majority of the population and by the territory's political elite:
Speaking later with RFE/RL's Russian Service, Khashig said the controversy put Abkhazia's de facto president, Sergei Bagapsh, in an impossible position:


If this came to pass, it would be an ironic twist. In the 2004 election, Abkhaz voters rejected Moscow's handpicked candidate, former KGB officer Raul Khajimba, who was soundly defeated by Bagapsh.

In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service, Ivlian Khaindrava, director of South Caucasus programs at the Tbilisi-based Center of Development and Cooperation, said attempted land grabs like this could lead to a rise in anti-Russian sentiment among the Abkhaz:


Russian officials have yet to comment publicly on the controversy.

The current fears of Russian domination are, in fact, not new. When I visited Abkhazia in the June 2009, the signs of accelerating Russification were everywhere.

More than 90 percent of Abkhaz residents, for example, carry Russian passports. The Russian ruble is the territory's official currency. The Russian language is dominant. Russian flags are everywhere. Russian television rule the airwaves and Russian newspapers are ubiquitous.

Moscow was building a naval base in the port of Ochamchire. Russian businesses were snapping up prime real estate along Sukhumi's seaside promenade. Russia's state-run oil giant Rosneft won the right to explore and develop Abkhazia's maritime oil fields.

And a controversial provision to give Russian soldiers serving in Abkhazia the right to purchase property sparked howls of opposition.

"After recognizing Abkhazia, Russia is now swallowing us," Khashig told me at the time. "This is happening economically, politically, militarily, and socially. Every day we are becoming more and more dependent."

But at the same time, many Abkhaz also proudly pointed out that their ancestors fought a series of bloody rebellions against the Russian Empire in the 19th century. The largest of these, in 1866 and 1877, resulted in hundreds of thousands of Abkhaz being deported -- ironically, they were deported mainly from the very same Gagra region where the land Russia now covets is located.

-- Brian Whitmore

The struggle over Russian policy toward the upheaval in Libya is far from over.

Former ambassador Vladimir Chamov, who was sacked last week, has returned to Moscow -- and he doesn't appear ready to go quietly into the sunset. 

In an interview published today in the daily "Moskovsky komsomolets," Chamov denied that he sent a telegram to President Dmitry Medvedev calling him a "traitor" over Russia's failure to veto the UN Security Council resolution authorizing a no-fly zone in Libya.

But he did say that he told Medvedev that Russia was betraying its interests in Libya by abandoning Muammar Qaddafi:
Russia has said it will lose $4 billion in weapons deals in Libya as a result of an arms embargo on the country. Moreover, Reuters reports that Russian companies have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in oil and gas exploration in Libya. Russian Railways has also signed a 2.2 billion euro contract to build a railway in the country.

According to Russian press reports, Chamov, who told "Moskovsky komsomolets" that he "talked quite often" with Qaddafi, was instrumental in setting up many of the deals.

President Dmitry Medvedev sharply rebuked Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Monday for comparing the international military actions in Libya to the crusades. Medvedev called those comments "unacceptable" and Putin later walked them back, saying he was simply expressing his personal opinion -- not Russian policy.

Asked what he thought of Putin's crusades reference, Chamov went out of his way to praise the prime minister, who is widely seen as Russia's true ruler. "What I particularly like about Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] is that he very clearly and briefly states his position. And in this case, I think he is not far from the truth," Chamov said according to "Moskovsky komsomolets."

Despite Chamov's dismissal as ambassador, and his outspokenness upon returning to Moscow, he has remarkably not been fired from the Foreign Ministry, where he serves as a career diplomat. Prior to his posting in Libya he served as a Russian ambassador to Iraq from 2004-8.

"Moskovsky komsomolets" reported that Chamov gave them the interview shortly after his arrival at Moscow's Sherametavo-2 airport late Wednesday night.

In his on-camera remarks to journalists upon landing, he was much more guarded.

WATCH THE VIDEO HERE (IN RUSSIAN COURTESY OF RIA-NOVOSTI):



As I blogged here yesterday, the discord over Moscow's policy toward the Libya crisis appears to reflect a broader debate going on among the Russian elite.

Medvedev and his allies, analysts say, are aiming to dial back Moscow's tendency to oppose and confront the United States on every issue in favor of broader cooperation with Washington. Putin and the security service veterans close to the prime minister remain deeply skeptical of such a change.

This debate has been going on for some time, particularly since U.S. President Barack Obama initiated Washington's "reset" in relations with Moscow. What is somewhat surprising is that it has become so public, with Medvedev and Putin so personally involved.

-- Brian Whitmore

OK. This time, I think, something real might actually be going on.

Speaking to journalists in Votkinsk yesterday, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin sharply criticized the multinational bombing campaign against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and the United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized it.

"It actually resembles medieval calls for crusades when someone called on others to go to a certain place and liberate it," Putin said.

Almost immediately, President Dmitry Medvedev slapped him down, stressing that he fully supported Russia's decision not to veto Resolution 1973. (Russia ended up abstaining -- which was good enough for the United States, France, and Britain -- but some media reports suggested that he was actually considering going even farther and backing the resolution.)

"These were my instructions to the Foreign Ministry [to abstain] and they were carried out," Medvedev, looking very much the tough guy in a leather bomber jacket, said in televised comments.

"Under no circumstances is it acceptable to use expressions that essentially lead to a clash of civilizations, such as 'crusades' and so on. It is unacceptable. Otherwise, everything may end up much worse than what is going on now. Everyone should remember that."

Ouch! And while it's easy to dismiss this little exchange as just the latest installment of the ruling tandem's good cop/bad cop pokazukha show, this one feels a bit more like a genuine conflict.

The context, of course, is crucial.

Just hours before the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, Medvedev fired Vladimir Chamov, Moscow's visibly pro-Qaddafi ambassador to Tripoli. The reason for the sacking, according to press reports, was that Chamov "inadequately represented Russia's interests in the Libyan conflict." Chamov had been a vocal opponent of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya.

How the exchange between Putin and Medvedev played out on television is also telling. According to Lenta.ru, "Putin's remarks about the crusades miraculously disappeared" from the national television networks and were replaced by Medvedev's rebuttal. Rather than giving Putin and Medvedev equal billing, as has been customary, the main channels "gave preference to the president."

Moreover, speaking to "Vedomosti," Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, appeared to walk back Putin's comments, saying the prime minister was just expressing his personal opinion.

[UPDATE: Putin sought to defuse the situation further during a visit to Ljubljana, saying that he and Medvedev had "very close views and we understand each other" on Libya. He went on to say: "As for agreement or disagreement among the Russian leadership on what is going on in Libya, it is the Russian president who is in charge of foreign policy and there can be no divergence."]

The apparent conflict between Putin and Medvedev followed what can only be described as a bizarre series of stories in the media prior to Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Moscow last week. According to the reports, the real reason for Biden's visit was to assure that Medvedev remain president after 2012 by enticing Putin to step aside by offering him -- the chairmanship of the International Olympic Committee. (?!?)

Analysts say a debate is indeed emerging in the Russian elite over foreign policy. Medvedev and his allies, they say, are aiming to dial back Moscow's tendency to oppose and confront the United States on every issue in favor of broader cooperation with Washington.

"Russia is going through a psychological transformation from a power with global ambitions to a strong but limited regional power that doesn't want to involve itself in every conflict," Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs," told RFE/RL's Russian Service.

The decision not to block Resolution 1973, Lukyuanov added, "was a pragmatic decision. Russia is actively developing its relations with the United States and they weren't prepared to risk that for the sake of Colonel Qaddafi...That Russia did not block this was a big step toward the West."

Such a reorientation of Russian policy recalls a Foreign Ministry report that was leaked last spring calling for Moscow to establish closer relations with the United States and the European Union in order to secure the investments necessary for a sucessful modernization drive.

Putin and the siloviki apparently oppose such a change.

During a meeting on Tuesday with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov -- a close Putin ally -- appeared to pick up where his patron left off in criticizing the Libya air strikes.

Libya "is experiencing real hostilities which result in damage to civilian facilities. Civilians have died. This should not have been allowed to happen and we informed our U.S. counterparts of our opposition," Serdyukov said, calling for an immediate cease-fire.

In remarks to reporters later, Gates appeared to chastise his Russian counterpart, suggesting that he was naively believing the Libyan leader's propaganda.

"We've been very careful about this and it's almost as though some people here are taking at face value Qaddafi's claims about the number of civilian casualties, which as far as I am concerned are just outright lies," Gates said.

"I must say that I'm a little curious, frankly, about the tone. It's perfectly evident that the vast majority, if not nearly all, civilian casualties have been inflicted by Qaddafi."

Gates is due to meet Medvedev during his visit to Moscow, but will not be meeting Putin.

The prime minister, meanwhile, is due to visit Belgrade on Wednesday, where he will no doubt draw comparisons between the current air campaign in Libya and the 1999 NATO war against Serbia.

As is always the case in Russia, this could all be a big smokescreen. But this time, I don't think so. And if there is something real going on here, it's far from over.

Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin has long been one of Russia's quietly influential figures.

This is partially due to positioning. He is personally close to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, yet ideologically more in line with the technocratic elite and "civiliki" associated with President Dmitry Medvedev.

The influential siliviki clan of security service veterans close to Putin are largely hostile to Kudrin, to be sure. This is most notable in the case of Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. But Kudrin's closeness to Putin has largely inoculated him from past attempts by the siloviki to have him removed.

Another source of Kudrin's influence has been his economic expertise and his insistence on some semblance of sound fiscal management.

But over his two decades as a public servant-- first in the St. Petersburg local administration and later in the national government -- Kudrin has largely shied away from public politics.

This, however, appears to be changing of late.

Speaking at the Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum in February, Kudrin made the case for more open and inclusive elections, arguing that in order to make difficult and painful economic choices, the government will need a "mandate of trust" from the Russian people. The comments did not sit well with some in the ruling United Russia party, which has made a habit of holding on to power in elections that are anything but free and fair.

And now, Kudrin is at it again.

Addressing the forum "Russia and The World: Looking for an Investment Strategy" on Wednesday, Kudrin said the following:


Kudrin's point is simple -- business needs predictable and stable rules of the game to thrive and those rules must be made transparently by representatives who have won the trust of the electorate.

Simple, perhaps. But in a country where ruthless property redistribution is always a risk -- and often the norm -- when power changes hands (see Khodorkovsky, Mikhail), his point is also radical.

Fears of property redistribution is one of the driving forces behind the Russian elite's allergy to change at the top (better the devil you know). And this, in turn, is why political authority in Russia tends to ossify and ultimately stagnate (see Brezhnev, Leonid).

It is perhaps for this reason that Igor Yurgens, chairman of the Institute of Contemporary Development, argued that should he secure a second term, Medvedev would pursue his modernization plans for the Russian economy -- albeit without upsetting the apple cart:


A close Medvedev ally, Yurgens appears to be arguing for a continuation of the tandem in something approximating its current form. But I digress.

Kudrin's recent outspokenness on political matters has attracted the attention of the opposition, but more-or-less Kremlin friendly, Right Cause party.

Here's an excerpt from a report in the daily "Vedomosti":


"Vedomosti" reported that Dvorkovich said he has not been approached, but would be open to the idea. Shuvalov was evasive.

"As for Kudrin, he admitted that he has been receiving such signals for years, but added that he did not think that it was something he could comment on," "Vedomosti" wrote.

This could be a trial balloon. It could be a smokescreen. But if it is real, it could be very interesting indeed.

-- Brian Whitmore

Were the March 13 regional elections a victory or an embarrassment for the ruling United Russia party?

In the second edition of "The Power Vertical Podcast," I spoke with Kiril Kobrin, managing editor of RFE/RL's Russian Service, and Gregory Feifer, a senior correspondent at RFE/RL and author of the book "The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan."

We discussed the results of the March 13 vote, which kicked off the upcoming political season, and debated what they portend for upcoming State Duma and presidential elections.

Enjoy.

Listen to or download the latest episode of the podcast below or subscribe to "The Power Vertical Podcast" on iTunes.

Power Vertical Podcast, No. 2

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As they assessed the results of Sunday's elections, the authorities did their best to put on a brave face. 

Even though voters "are tired and feel pressure," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said they ”continue to positively assess the government's actions and express hope by this vote that the situation will change."

State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov said the ""voters have supported United Russia. This is an assessment of the party's activities. It is support for the authorities, support for the president and for the leader of our party, [Vladimir] Putin."

"We won a fiercely competitive struggle," Andrei Vorobyov, the head of United Russia's executive committee told "Kommersant" in an interview. "This means that our programs are working. We are moving forward."

Upbeat words, to be sure. But few are convinced.

On the surface, Putin, Gryzlov, and Vorobyov's buoyant assessments seems justified. United Russia, after all, hung onto its majorities in all 12 regional legislatures where elections were held.

But take a peek under the hood and the situation looks less rosy for the longtime ruling party. And according to "Vedomosti," they knew it even before the polls closed.

"By yesterday afternoon (March 13), it had become clear that United Russia would hardly be satisfied with the election results," the daily wrote. "The party leadership did not release the results of exit polls and they cancelled their election night press conference."

As Gazeta.ru reported today, United Russia failed to clear 40 percent in the Tver and Kirov oblasts, where they won 39.7 percent and 36.5 percent, respectively.

In the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast they won just 43 percent, in Kursk 44.8 percent, and in Khanty-Mansiysk 44.5. In Kaliningrad, electoral officials say the ruling party won just under 50 percent. They won an outright majority in just two regions, Dagestan (66.8 percent) and Chukotka (71.2 percent) -- where allegations of fraud were especially pronounced.

This is quite a fall from the bigwins the party boasted in the October 2009 regional elections, to say nothing of their crushing 64 percent victory in the December 2007 State Duma vote.

And if you assume, as you must in Russian elections, that United Russia's totals are wildly inflated by the extensive use of administrative resources and fraud, then the authorities have very little to smile about today.

"The elections, of course, were rigged, but they could not be faked all the way to the very core.  Somewhere, under a thick layer of chocolate, there is always the truth," Moscow-based political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin told "Gazeta.ru," adding that if people get the idea that they can change things through the ballot box, then "no amount of resources in the hands of the authorities" can thwart them.

Sunday's vote was the unofficial kick-off of the coming political season, with elections to the State Duma and the presidency scheduled for December 2011 and March 2012 respectively.

The question now is what lessons the authorities will take away from the results. Will they crank the administrative resources and voter fraud "up to eleven" to try to prevent losses in the Duma in December?

I suspect they will try for one simple reason. The Duma elections in December come just months before the presidential election. And whatever the ruling tandem decides it wants to do in that poll -- whether Putin or President Dmitry Medvedev will stand for president -- the Kremlin wants it to be a highly choreographed affair.

Moreover, Putin is clearly trying to turn the ruling party into a vehicle for his continued dominance of Russian politics, regardless of which official state post he occupies.

An embarrassment for United Russia at the polls in December would severely hinder both of these goals. 

-- Brian Whitmore

Sunday marks the formal kickoff of the election season with Russians going to the polls in more than 3,000 regional elections across the country. The poll marks the last time Russians will go to the polls before elections to the State Duma in December and for the presidency in March 2012.

In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service, Andrei Buzin, head of the independent monitoring agency "Golos," says the authorities are pulling out all the stops to assure that United Russia maintain their majorities in what has become an unfavorable electoral climate (you can listen to the whole interview in Russian here):


The daily "Novye Izvestia" gives this rundown of which parties have been able to register in the twelve regions holding votes:


Got that. The ruling United Russia and the housebroken parliamentary "opposition" managed to register everywhere. The nationalist Russian Patriots were allowed in the door in six of twelve regions. While the more liberal -- and actually oppositionist -- Yabloko and Right Cause were given the green light in two and one regions respectively.

All this is happening as United Russia's approval ratings are falling precipitously. Recent polling by the independent Levada Center, showed that just 35 percent of the electorate was prepared to vote for United Russia, 10 percent less than in the last set of regional elections in October.

Political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky told "Novye Izvestia" that despite the declining poll numbers, United Russia will manage to squeak by and hang onto its majorities. "The ruling party will probably poll fewer votes than it did in the previous election [but it will win]. It won't win because it is popular. It will owe its triumph to the administrative resources," Belkovsky said.

But win at what cost? Leonid Gozman, chairman of the party Right Cause, notes that with dissatisfaction rising in society, and no legitimate outlet to express it, the situation could become explosive.

"This maniacal policy of winning at all costs foments discontent and tension. Either people will stop going to polling stations or they will meet outdoors to make their voice heard... the way it happened in Egypt and Tunisia," Gozman told "Novye Izvestia."

Aleksei Navalny, the activist and blogger who has made a name for himself exposing corruption in high places, recently held a contest on his blog for the best anti-United Russia campaign poster. The winner pictured the party's trademark bear logo carrying a bag of money across Russia. The slogan: United Russia - Party of Thieves and Swindlers.

-- Brian Whitmore

A leading member of United Russia says its time to bring back the Politburo.

Yevgeny Fyodorov, the head of the State Duma's Committee for Economic Policy, says Russia's constitution should be changed to establish a "political bureau of the nation" -- a new governing body that would stand above the president and take responsibility for the country's strategic direction.

Fyodorov explained his reasoning in a recent interview with Gazeta.ru:


Fyodorov says the idea has long been discussed in political circles, but had not yet been officially proposed at any official level. He said he plans to formally introduce his idea "after the election cycle, following State Duma and presidential elections, in the second half of next year."

The proposal has been met with an icy reception -- at least publicly -- by the United Russia leadership.

"Any specific proposal to establish any governing body that is above the head of state should be viewed not as a serious idea but as ravings of a madman,” said Aleksei Chesnakov, head of the Presidium of United Russia's Public Council.
 
"The authors of such a proposal should be tested for professional and psychological competence."

Likewise, Vladimir Pligin, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building said "changes to the constitution are currently not welcome." And Aleksandr Moskalets, another Duma deputy from United Russia, said he was surprised by Fyodorov's statement.

"Frankly, I can't imagine how he could say this," he said. "I know Yevgeny as a balanced and careful person. Such a proposal is not quite his style."

So what's going on here? Was Fyodorov just running his mouth?  I don't think so. One would expect such a high-ranking member of the ruling party

Was he talking out of school? Maybe.  It is possible that the idea is indeed being considered, but wasn't meant to be made public just yet.

Or was this a carefully orchestrated trial balloon floated by one faction of the elite? I think this is the most likely option.

With all the certainty in the air about what will happen after 2012, various factions and clans are going to be testing the waters and pushing their agendas -- just like the last time a transition at the top was looming.

Remember how Putin was sure to change the constitution and run for a third term in 208? And how about how Sergei Ivanov was a sure bet to follow Putin into the Kremlin? Remember Viktor Zubkov's brief stint as prime minister and potential president-in-waiting?

But the thing about Fyodorov's proposal that grabbed my attention most was how well it fits with where I think things are going. As I have blogged here, I think Plan A at this point is for Medvedev to remain president after 2012, but for Putin to remain in charge.

And for that to happen, Putin needs some kind of formal post that coincides with his "national leader" status. I have suggested in the past that this might be as a sort of General Secretary of United Russia. But head of a new "Political Bureau of the Nation" would also fit the bill nicely.

It would allow Medvedev to be the public face of a tightly controlled modernization campaign under Putin's -- and the Politburo's -- watchful eye. It would solve Russia's perennial succession crises. And keeping the tandem intact keeps a leadership in power that appeals to both the siloviki and civiliki factions of the elite.

Fyodorov was coy when asked who might lead a newly minted Politburo.

"This is not about specific people, but about the country's development," he said. "It could be the president or it could be another person. This is an issue we would need to work out later. We still don't know how the presidential election will turn out."

This is probably just one of the many trial balloons that we can expect the elite to float as 2012 approaches. Most will go nowhere. But they all merit watching.

-- Brian Whitmore

In the first edition of the newly minted "Power Vertical Podcast," I spoke with longtime Russia-watcher David Satter, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and author of the book "Darkness At Dawn: The Rise Of The Russian Criminal State" and the forthcoming "It Was A Long Time Ago And It Never Happened Anyway: Russia And The Communist Past."

David boasts decades of experience following Russian affairs as a journalist, scholar, and author. In our discussion, he offered his insight on the latest machinations of the ruling tandem, the prospects for modernization, and the state of Russian civil society.

Enjoy.

Listen to or download the podcast below or subscribe to "The Power Vertical Podcast" on iTunes.

Power Vertical Podcast, No. 1

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A group of government economists are arguing that Russia needs to fundamentally alter its political system in order to modernize its economy.

The daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta" is reporting that a revised version of Strategy 2020, the Kremlin's development plan for the coming decade, argues that "without the radical reform, the gap between Russia and the advanced countries and emerging markets will continue to widen."

The authors include Vladimir Mau of the Russian Academy of Economics and Civil Service, Yevsei Gurvich of the Economic Experts Group, and Yevgeny Yasin of the Supreme School of Economics.

Economically, the group argued for budgetary discipline, the fostering of true competition, severing the close ties between government and business, and allowing weak enterprises to fail, regardless of their political connections:


But for this to happen, the authors argue that wholesale political changes are necessary:


The Strategy 2020 economists' call for political reform followed a similar appeal by Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin. That, however, drew an angry response from the ruling United Russia party, which would have much to lose from political reform.

It will be worth keeping an eye on what kind of elite reception the Strategy 2020 recommendations receive.

-- Brian Whitmore

This week, the Power Vertical will debut its new podcast, which will feature interviews with Russia-watchers and discussions of the forces shaping Kremlin politics today.

In the first installment of the Power Vertical Podcast, which will be available online on March 2, I sat down with David Satter, a longtime observer of Russian affairs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. David is also the author of several books on Russia, including "Darkness At Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State" and the forthcoming "It Was A Long Time Ago And It Never Happened Anyway: Russia And The Communist Past," which is due out in November.

Below are some highlights from our chat.

Since it is a topic that is impossible to avoid, I asked David what his take was on the state of Russia's ruling tandem and whether he thought the occasional appearances of disagreement between President Dmitry Medvedev were real -- or if he saw them as simply pokazukha. Here is what he had to say:


David was equally skeptical about the prospects for Medvedev's campaign to modernize the Russian economy to make it less dependent on commodities exports -- at least under the current political arrangements:


This past summer -- in the wake of the Khimki forest demonstrations, the blue bucket protests, and the emergence of musicians young rappers like Noize MC and veteran rockers like Yury Shevchuk as voices of opposition -- I blogged about an apparent awakening of Russian civil society. Here's David's view on that:


And finally, here's David's view in what he calls Russia's "moral crisis":


Check back tomorrow for the full podcast!

-- Brian Whitmore

The massive assault on the business empire of former Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and his wife Yelena Baturina is one of those rare instances that gives both main factions of the Russian elite something they want.

It allows President Dmitry Medvedev to pretend that he is serious about his stated goal of strengthening the rule of law in Russia by going after such a big fish as Luzhkov.

It gives the technocratic side of the elite, which has long loathed Luzhkov, the thrill of seeing an old adversary discredited, humiliated -- and possibly prosecuted.

But most importantly, it allows Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his siloviki allies the opportunity to pick apart and devour that juicy morsel that was Luzhkov and Baturnina's sprawling Moscow business empire.

These factions might have disagreed about removing Luzhkov from office --  Medvedev and the technocrats wanted him out while key siloviki like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin wanted him to stay.

But now, both sides have something to gain from the new situation.

The changing of the guard in Moscow, meanwhile, picked up considerable steam over the week.

On February 16, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin tapped Luzhkov's successor, Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, to head the Moscow branch of the ruling United Russia party. No big surprise there.

Then, the next day, police raided the offices of the property developer Inteko, the flagship business of Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina.

According to press reports, the police held Inteko's staff in a separate building while they conducted their search. They also searched the office of the Bank of Moscow and the homes of its directors.

Investigators say they were looking into the alleged embezzlement of 13 billion rubles ($444.3 million) in public funds from the Bank of Moscow that had turned up in Baturina's personal bank account.

According to investigators, the Bank of Moscow (which is 46.5 percent owned by the city of Moscow and 20.3 percent owned by two Luzhkov cronies, bank CEO Andrei Borodin and senior manager Lev Alaluyev) paid the Inteko an grossly inflated price for some outside Moscow in 2009.  The money then ended up in Baturina’s personal bank account.

A day after the Inteko and Bank of Moscow raids, on February 18, the Prosecutor-General's Office called for the Interior Ministry's Investigative Committee to open a criminal case against Dmitry Gayev, the former head of the Moscow Metro.

Prosecutors allege that Gayev, a close Luzhkov ally, "created in the organization of a system of personal enrichment, due to which Moscow's budget has lost more than 100 million rubles."

But while the assault on Luzhkov gives Medvedev a chance to play Elliot Ness and gives the siloviki a new financial-industrial carcass to pick bare (much as they did to Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Yukos after his arrest in 2003), it has left those who truly yearn for the rule of law in Russia a bit cold.

As RFE/RL's Russian Service reports (see Robert Coalson's excellent write-up in English here), opposition politicians see the anti-Luzhkov campaign as little more than a massive shake-down.

Opposition figure Vladimir Milov, a leader of the newly formed Democratic Choice who co-authored two reports with former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov on corruption in the Moscow mayor's office thinks Luzhkov will be let off the hook while low-level figures will take the fall:


Likewise, Leonid Gozman, a leader of the opposition Right Cause party, says the goal of the operation is to pressure Luzhkov and Baturina to sell off the assets in their empire cheap -- especially the juiciest morsel, the Bank of Moscow -- or else:


The conventional wisdom before Luzhkov was ignominiously removed in September was that he was offered the opportunity to go quietly, keep most of his assets, and retire in dignity. He instead chose to hold out and fight -- and he lost.

If Milov and Gozman are correct about what is going on now, the Kremlin is offering Luzhkov another deal: give up your business empire on the cheap, or face prosecution.

It looks like another offer he can't refuse. Will he?

-- Brian Whitmore

Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin has always enjoyed something of a privileged place within the Russian elite.

He is believed to be extremely close to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, an association that goes back to the early post-Soviet period when both served in the government of St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak.

Kudrin is rumored to be the only member of the Russian elite allowed to use the familiar "ty" -- reserved for close friends and family -- when addressing Putin in private. (although like most Russian rumors, this one is very difficult to confirm.) This closeness to the national leader has given Kudrin a degree of immunity in Russia's perennial clan battles.

And he has sometimes needed it.

With his insistence on some semblance of sound fiscal management, Kudrin has long been a thorn in the side of the siloviki clan of security service veterans surrounding Putin, most notably Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin.

In early 2009, Sechin and other siloviki, hoping to benefit from largesse from the state as the financial crisis took hold, unsuccessfully sought to weaken -- and potentially oust -- Kudrin.

Today, however, it is Kudrin who has gone on the offensive.

In a speech at the Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum on February 18, Kudrin said that in order to make difficult and painful economic choices, the government will need a "mandate of trust" from the Russian people:


Russia's political season is about to kick off in earnest, with local elections scheduled for next month, to the State Duma in December, and for the presidency in March 2012.

Speaking to "Kommersant," Boris Makarenko of the Center for Political Technologies, said Kudrin's speech was a direct challenge to the party least likely to benefit from free and fair elections -- the ruling United Russia:

And United Russia did not take challenge very well.

"Instead of concentrating on the economic strategy, the finance minister keeps trying to shift responsibility," Sergei Neverov, acting secretary of the Presidium of the General Council of United Russia, told "Kommersant."

Neverov went on to call Kudrin's statement "ambiguous" and suggested that the finance minister was "indirectly challenging the existing mandate necessary for economic reform."

Neverov also criticized Kudrin for playing politics when he should be focusing on the economy.

"Nothing prevents Kudrin himself from diligent work to solve the existing financial and economic problems," he said. "Why does he keep postponing decision-making on account of political nuances?" Neverov said.

It isn't exactly new that the technocratic wing of the elite is arguing that political reform is necessary to modernize Russia's economy and the siloviki wing wants to keep things pretty much as they are.

After all, people like Igor Yurgens have been making this argument for a long time now.

But Kudrin rarely weighs in on political matters. And his forceful speech in Krasnoyarsk therefore raise an interesting question: Was he speaking with Putin's blessing?

-- Brian Whitmore

The saga of courtroom whistleblower Natalya Vasilyeva continues.

As I blogged earlier in the week, Vasilyeva, an aide to Viktor Danilkin, the presiding judge in Mikhail Khodorkovsky's recent trial, told "Gazeta.ru" that the verdict and harsh sentence in that case resulted from pressure from high officials.

Vasilyeva said Danilkin was summoned to the Moscow City Court on December 25, just days before he was to rule on Khodorkovsky's fate, and met an "important person who had to give him clear instructions about the verdict."

On December 30, Danilkin ruled that Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev must remain in prison until 2017.

Danilkin has rejected Vasilyeva's allegations, calling her interview "a provocation." He has since said, however, that he does not intend to file criminal slander charges - or even civil libel charges -- against her.

For her part, Vasilyeva has said that she "did not intend to accuse Danilkin of criminal behavior" in rendering the guilty verdict against Khodorkovsky. "I just wanted to clear my conscience, and to an extent, his," she said.

Meanwhile, a group of human rights activists on Tuesday sent a letter to Prosecutor-General Yury Chaika calling for a criminal investigation into Vasilyeva's claims.

"Natalya Vasileva revealed information relating to several crimes, including putting pressure on a judge and violating confidentiality," Lev Ponomarev, director of the group "For Human Rights" and one of the signatories of the letter, told RFE/RL's Russian Service. 

"We appeal to the Russian Prosecutor-General of Russia to look into this matter. If the prosecutor can confirm these facts, then several criminal cases must be opened."

Russia's Association of Human Rights Organizations (AGORA), meanwhile, says it will assist Vasilyeva should she encounter any problems due to her revelations. Pavel Chikov, the head of AGORA, says the group will seek to "minimize any possible negative consequences resulting from Natalya Vasilyeva's revelations."

As I blogged earlier in the week, whistleblowers in Russia -- be they police officers, prosecutors, or socialites -- have regularly suffered "negative consequences" for their actions.

-- Brian Whitmore

What will now happen to Russia's latest whistleblower?

Natalya Vasilyeva is reportedly "on vacation" after revealing that the judge in Mikhail Khodorkovsky's recent fraud trial was pressured from on high into handing down a guilty verdict and stiff sentence.

Vasilyeva, an aide to Viktor Danilkin, the presiding judge in Khodorkovsky's trial, made her allegations in an interview published today in "Gazeta.ru."


WATCH THE FULL VIDEO OF THE INTERVIEW (IN RUSSIAN):




"I can say that the whole judicial community understands very well that this is a made to order case and a made to order trial," Vasilyeva said, adding that top officials were concerned that Danilkin would not impose a sufficiently harsh sentence on Khodorkovsky.

Judging from Danilkin's conduct in the courtroom, perhaps those fears were justified.

During the long trial, which began in March 2009 and wrapped up in late December, Danilkin often appeared to be doing something remarkable for such a politically charged case -- considering it on its merits.

He treated Khodorkovsky with more respect than anyone dared expect. He admitted testimony from government officials who defended Khodorkovsky like German Gref, the head of Sperbank and Russia's former economy minister, and Viktor Khristenko, the former industry and trade minister.

And when the prosecution made mistakes and committed gaffes, he laughed along with defense lawyers and Khodorkovsky's supporters. Indeed, one wonders how anybody could keep a straight face throughout the trial give the ludicrousness of the charges -- Khodorkovsky was accused of stealing oil from his own company!

Welcome to Absurdistan.

"Danilkin began to write the verdict. I suspect that what was in that verdict did not suit his higher ups, and therefore he received another verdict, which he had to read," Vasilyeva said.

Vasilyeva said Danilkin was then summoned to the Moscow City Court on December 25, just days before he began reading the verdict, where he was to meet an "important person who had to give him clear instructions about the verdict."

On December 30, Danilkin sentenced Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev to 14 years in prison. The first eight years were to run concurrently with the eight-year sentences for tax evasion and fraud that the two had been serving since 2003 and which were set to finish this year. It was precisely the sentence prosecutors were asking for.

For his part, Danilkin dismissed Vasilyeva's allegations, calling them "nothing but slander." More ominously, Anna Usacheva, a spokeswoman for the Moscow City Court, accused Vasilyeva of carrying out a "provocation" and a "well planned PR act," adding that she was "certain" that "Natalya Vasilyeva will yet renounce her  comments."

She wouldn't be the first to do so. As I blogged here last week, after testifying in court that he falsified police reports on the New Year's Eve arrest of opposition figure Ilya Yashin, a move that severely embarrassed the authorities, Moscow police sergeant Artyom Charukhin later recanted his testimony.

Other recent whistleblowers who have stuck to their stories have found themselves in varying degrees of trouble (read journalist Aleksei Siderenko's excellent rundown here.)

Anastasia Volochkova, the socialite and former prima ballerina, has reportedly had her television show cancelled by Channel One after she revealed that she had been tricked into signing a 2005 letter denouncing Khodorkovsky.

Aleksei Dymovsky, the original YouTube cop who went public with corruption allegations against police in the Black Sea port town of Novorossiisk faced prosecution and harassment.

Mikhail Yeseyev, an investigator in the northwestern city of Ukhta, was prosecuted and sentenced to a penal colony after he accused police in November 2009 of falsifying evidence in an arson case.

Grigoriy Chekalin, Ukhta's deputy prosecutor, received an 18-month sentence after making similar allegations in the same case.

In her interview with "Gazeta.ru," Vasilyeva appeared poised and confident, albeit very aware of the gravity of what she was doing. When asked why she decided to go public, she replied: ""Because I am disappointed" in how the judicial process really worked.

"I wanted to become a judge. And when I saw how things really work on the inside, my belief that judges are subject only to the law and nothing else melted," she said.

Vasilyeva's motive is as inspirational as it is heartbreaking. Inspirational because Russia needs honest and sincere people like this in its judicial system. And heartbreaking because, well, Russia needs honest and sincere people like this in its judicial system.

"For a person who had good career prospects to suddenly ruin everything and make such a statement, I see no other motive but her conscience," human rights attorney Yury Shmidt, a member of Khodorkovsky's defense team told RFE/RL's Russian Service.

-- Brian Whitmore

NOTE: THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED

So now Artyon Charukhin says he didn't falsify that police report after all.

On December 31, Charukhin claimed that opposition figure Ilya Yashin violently attacked police during a New Year's Eve protest in Moscow.  Yashin spent five days in jail on the basis of Charukhin's official police report, and is now challenging the legality his detention in court.

In a hearing on February 4, Charukhin testified in a Moscow court that his report was bogus, that he didn't see Yashin attack police officers, and that he wrote the falsified report on the orders of his superiors.

After Charukhin's bombshell, initial media reports indicated that he had been fired. Police officials later said, however, that he had in fact not been sacked. His status today is unclear.

Then, in a video posted on a Moscow police website on Wednesday, Charukhin changed his story yet again, saying the original report was accurate and that Yashin and his lawyer pressured him into recanting it.

So how was a Yashin able to intimidate a police officer? This is how Charukhin explains it:


In the video, Charukhin said he was nervous about appearing in court to begin with, that the conversation with Yashin made him even more distressed, and that once he testified, he just said “whatever came into my head.”

WATCH THE VIDEO HERE:



Speaking to RFE/RL's Russian Service, Yashin said that he found it strange that Charukhin considered someone quoting the Bible and the Russian Criminal code to be inappropriate.

In his original report, Charukhin wrote that when he was detained, Yashin was together with Boris Nemtsov, another opposition figure. "During Nemtsov’s detention, Yashin actively resisted; he pushed me and Police Sergeant Kondrashov away from Nemtsov; he did not respond to lawful orders to stop his illegal actions."

Yashin has posted a video on his website clearly showing Yashin and Nemtsov getting arrested separately with no resistance from either.

WATCH THE VIDEO HERE:




It isn't clear where this very strange episode is heading. But Yashin's video, which was shown in court, blatantly contradicts Charukhin's original report.

And according to other whistle blowing police officers, Aleksei Dymovsky and Yekaterina Rogoza, police reports are routinely falsified.

The obvious conclusion is that Charukhin's superiors threatened him with more than termination. After all, many Russian whistleblowers end up getting prosecuted themselves.

UPDATE: Despite Charukhin's flip-flops and the video evidence refuting his original police report, a Moscow court has rejected Yashin's challenge of the legality of his detention. In an interview with "Kommersant," Yashin called the court's ruling "strange" and vowed to appeal, all the way to the European Court of Human Rights if necessary.

-- Brian Whitmore

Is the tandem two-step beginning to wear thin?

President Dmitry Medvedev's most recent rhetorical feints and nods to the reform-hungry side of the elite have produced as much skepticism as hope among the urbane intelligentsia. Everybody, it seems, has seen this movie too many times over the past two-and-a-half years and the results have thus far been disappointing.

Moscow-based political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin, who is a pretty decent barometer of the liberal side of Russia's chattering class, sums up the mood well in a recent piece in "Novaya gazeta":


The countdown to the 2012 transition -- or non-transition -- is well underway and people both inside and outside the halls of power are getting anxious and craving certainty. Just as the liberal intelligentsia is skeptical and wary of being disappointed by Medvedev, the bureaucracy is becoming increasingly restive and weary of the ambiguity over who will be in charge.

Writing "Vedomosti," Dmitry Badovsky, assistant director of the Institute of Social Systems, argues that the ambiguity is bound to last throughout much of the coming year:
How destabilizing this all could be is hard to say. The upcoming political season -- Duma elections in December and the presidential vote in March 2012 -- is unfolding in an atmosphere of economic anxiety (despite rising oil prices) and under the shadow of potential contagion effects from Tunisia and Egypt.

The contrast with the confident political elite that entered the 2007-8 election season could not be sharper. Then, Putin kept the suspense going until December 10,  2007 -- less than three months before the March 2, 2008 presidential election -- when he anointed Medvedev as his chosen successor.

As I have blogged here, I think Plan A is for the tandem to remain intact after 2012, with Medvedev remaining as president and Putin remaining in charge as a national leader, backed by the security services, who controls the deep state.

I agree with Badovsky that keeping the suspense going serves both ends of the tandem at this point, regardless of what the plan is. But in today's restive environment, another year of such uncertainty may be more than the system can bear.

-- Brian Whitmore

Another police officer has decided to go rogue. Following in the footsteps of Aleksei Dymovsky, Yekaterina Rogoza, and others, Artyom Charukhin decided it was time to tell the truth -- and it cost him his job.

But unlike Dymovsky and Rogoza, who made public their knowledge of police abuse and corruption via the Internet, posting videos on YouTube, Charukhin made his revelations in a Moscow courtroom.

The story began on New Year's Eve on Moscow's Triumfalnaya Ploshchad, where the Strategy 31 movement was holding a rally that was broken up by police. Opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, and others were arrested and accused of attacking police.

In his official police report of the incident, Charukhin wrote that Yashin violently assaulted police officers in an attempt to prevent them from detaining Nemtsov:


Yashin and Nemtsov  ended up spending five and fifteen days in jail, respectively.

But a funny thing happened last week when Yashin challenged the legality of his detention in court. Charukhin disavowed his report, saying that he wrote it on the orders of his superiors.

The transcript of the following extraordinary exchange was posted on Yashin's blog on LiveJournal and republished by RFE/RL's Russian Service and the weekly "Novaya gazeta.":


This is pretty remarkable stuff.

Russian media initially reported that Charukhin had been fired for making “contradictory and puzzling” statements and failing to respond to questions from his superiors. But "Novaya gazeta" reported today, citing Moscow police spokesman Viktor Biryukov, that this was not the case.

Yashin's hearing is scheduled to resume on Thursday, February 10 and it promises to be fascinating.

Truth telling appears to be contagious of late, and not just among the police. Several celebrities who signed an open letter denouncing jailed former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky back in 2005 -- the so-called "Letter of 50" which was published in "Izvestiya," have recently recanted, saying they were tricked or coerced into doing so.

RFE/RL's Russian Service, meanwhile, has initiated a project in which they will attempt to speak to all 50 signatories of the letter to find out how many more will now recant.

-- Brian Whitmore

Here we go again.

At a closed-door meeting with his Human Rights Council last week, President Dmitry Medvedev said he would allow a panel of legal experts to review the case of jailed former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Medvedev's comments led to speculation in the Russian media that he was considering pardoning the former Yukos CEO, who recently had an additional six years tacked on to the eight-year sentence he was close to completing.

And since conventional wisdom holds that a pardon would not sit well with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, another round of "the tandem is quarreling" chatter began spreading like wildfire.

That chatter got even louder when, a day after his meeting with the Human Rights Council, Medvedev called it “inadmissible” to declare that the January 24 terrorist attack on Moscow’s busiest airport was solved:


Medvedev's televised comments came shortly after Putin had -- wait for it -- said the crime had been solved.

The daily "Vedomosti" editorialized on the squabbling diarchy meme today, writing that "the impression is that the rift within the ruling tandem is widening," that their respective "spheres of influence are getting blurred" and that "turf wars" were breaking out.

Bud the daily wisely notes that this could all be just more pokazukha.

"The day when the tandem is supposed to nominate their would-be candidate for president is drawing nearer. The closer this day, the  fiercer the polemics within the tandem," "Vedomosti" opined. "Or is that something suggested by political technologists?"

The "Vedomosti" editorial points out, correctly in my opinion, that both Putin and Medvedev are interested in maintaining suspense until the last possible moment, which keeps the bureaucracy on their toes and allows both parties to keep their options open:


I have recently come to the tentative conclusion that Putin and Medvedev are actually on the same page and that Plan A at this point is for the tandem to remain in place, with Medvedev remaining president and Putin remaining in charge -- either as prime  minister or in some other post, possibly head of United Russia. As long as the Russia's deep state -- Putin's siloviki allies -- continue backing him, his official position is unimportant. (The most comprehensive post I have written to date is here.)

But Plan A today could easily be derailed by events before it is time to make a decision who will stand in the March 2012 presidential elections. So they need to keep up the illusion of suspense.

This, however, carries serious risks.

As "Vedomosti" points out in its editorial, today's pokazukha conflict could become the real thing tomorrow -- especially since for Putin's and Medvedev's respective loyalists, the conflict is already pretty real:


-- Brian Whitmore

Yury Luzhkov is mad as hell and he's not going to take it anymore.

As corruption probes mount against the former Moscow mayor, Luzhkov accused his enemies of initiating a campaign of "political bullying" against him -- and vowed to resist.

"I will stay in Moscow and fight for my honor and name," Luzhkov said. He made those comments from Salzburg, Austria in a telephone interview with the Britain's "Financial Times."

Days earlier, news reports emerged that Luzhkov had applied for a British visa, ostensibly to visit his children who are studying there.

And last month, Latvia rejected Luzhkov's request for a residency permit, citing the hostile comments he made about that country in the past. (Famously nationalistic, Luzhkov has described Riga's policy toward its Russian minority as "genocide.") Latvian officials say Luzhkov is on a blacklist of people banned from even entering the country.

Luzhkov's visa and residency permit hunting has naturally sparked chatter that he was preparing to emigrate, following the lead of other former insiders who fell out of favor with the Kremlin.

Despite the ex-mayor's strenuous denials that this is not the case, these are nevertheless nervous times for the man who once ruled Russia's glitzy capital like a feudal lord.

Sergei Stepashin, chairman of Russia’s Audit Chamber, says his investigators have uncovered financial violations in Luzhkov's City Hall totaling 230 billion rubles ($7.8 billion) in 2009 and 2010 alone.

Sergei Sobyanin, the man President Dmitry Medvedev appointed as Moscow's new mayor after firing Luzhkov last autumn, says he plans to review 100,000 contracts concluded by his predecessor's administration.

"There is a second information campaign against Luzhkov, comparable in scale to the one that led to his resignation in September 2010," the Russian daily "Vedomosti" wrote today.

Of course, the fact that corruption was endemic throughout much of Luzhkov's rule should surprise nobody.

"Considering all the impropriety and kickbacks, it would be easier for me to tell you the places where there wasn't any corruption. In public transportation, the metro, road construction, the abuses were enormous," Dmitry Katayev, a former member of the Moscow City Duma told RFE/RL's Russian Service in an interview today.

But as long as Luzhkov was politically useful, Katayev said the Kremlin turned a blind eye:


Indeed, the opposition's longstanding allegations against Luzhkov, who denies any wrongdoing, became relevant when the authorities decided they wanted to get rid of him. Before that they were ignored.

But of course we've seen this movie before. The Kremlin uses corruption as a means of controlling the elite -- letting it slide as long as one is useful and sufficiently deferent to the regime, all the while compiling a dossier that can be opened up at any time.

Today it is Luzhkov's turn to get thrown under the bus. Sooner or later, it will be somebody else's turn as well.

-- Brian Whitmore