Well, I can't say that I saw this coming.

In an interview with the Associated Press that hit the wires on July 3, U.S. President Barack Obama dropped this little bombshell on the eve of his visit to Moscow:


Obama's comments appear calibrated to drive a wedge right down the middle of the Russian establishment. It's a calculated risk that just might work.

The president's remarks came at a time when the Moscow elite is more divided than it has been in nearly a decade, with different factions drawing diametrically opposed lessons from the deepening economic crisis.

Some are arguing that the economic nosedive has exposed Putin's social contract -- under which Russians give up a measure of freedom in exchange for prosperity -- as hollow. They are urging political liberalization and a diversification of the economy away from its dangerous dependence on energy exports. 

The most vocal advocates of this position are establishment intellectuals like Igor Yurgens, chairman of the Institute for Contemporary Development, a think tank with close ties to Medvedev, and Yevgeny Gontmakher, director of the Center for Social Policy at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

These establishment intellectuals appear to have at least the tacit support of government technocrats like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, and Economy Minister Elvira Nabiullina.

Others -- like the powerful Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, the informal leader of the so-called "siloviki" clan of security-service veterans, and first deputy Kremlin chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, the regime's informal ideologist -- are furiously trying to maintain the status quo. They have been supported by their own crop of public intellectuals like the pro-Putin political consultant Gleb Pavlovsky.

Obama's comments came just a day after Boris Nemtsov, one of the founders of the opposition group Solidarity, said the following at a speech at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York:


Obama is also making explicit overtures to Russia's pro-democratic forces. He has given an interview to the opposition newspaper "Novaya gazeta" that is due appear on newsstands on July 6, just as he arrives in Moscow. He is scheduled to meet with civil society groups and human rights activists on July 7. And there are even rumors circulating in Moscow, albeit unconfirmed, that he may meet with leading opposition figure Garry Kasparov.

Speaking to reporters this week, Michael McFaul, the White House National Security Council's senior director for Russian and Eurasian affairs, said Obama is seeking to establish "a direct relationship with the Russian people" -- not just with the government:


In run-up to Obama's Moscow visit, a lively debate emerged in RFE/RL's central newsroom about the president's "reset" with Russia -- and what clues we could take away from Obama's performance on Iran.

Some argued that Obama's softer, pragmatic approach would only encourage Russia's more retrograde elements. According to this argument, Obama's cautious reaction to the political upheaval in Iran set the precedent that bad behavior will go unpunished.

Others argued that the U.S. president is playing a sophisticated long-term game with both Tehran and Moscow. Advocates of this position say Obama's opening to Iran, his offer of talks and improved relations, helped widen existing cracks among the elite in Tehran  and expose the fragility of what earlier appeared to be a monolithic and static political system.

Obama appears to be making a similar gambit with Russia.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 03 July 16:59   1 comment

Is the Russian Academy of Sciences soliciting informants to expose sinister plots within its ranks to falsify Russian history?

This letter to senior staff of the Historical-Philological Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences -- which was obtained by RFE/RL's Russian Service -- seems to suggest they are (here is a link to a scanned copy of the letter, from the head of the department's history section, Valery Tishkov, in the original Russian):


In an interview with Vladimir Tolts of RFE/RL's Russian Service, Tishkov appeared defensive about the letter, claiming that it was just a draft and was written by his research assistant.

Tishkov also suggested that he had problems with President Dmitry Medvedev's decree on the falsification of history, adding: "I made this request so I can formulate my own position on this issue, and perhaps write an article about it for 'Izvestiya' or Rossiiskaya gazeta.'" (You can read the entire interview in Russian here)

Tolts and RFE/RL's Russian Service plan to continue following this issue closely -- and the Power Vertical will continue to blog what they find.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 01 July 16:34   0 comments

Members of Vladimir Putin's inner circle have long viewed Yury Andropov's brief rule as the path not taken, the great "what if," the missed opportunity.

If Andropov had lived, the argument goes, Moscow would have pursued a program of authoritarian modernization, introducing market mechanisms similar to those in China while preserving one-party rule. He would have reformed the economy, kept the Soviet Union together, and avoided the chaos and deprivation of the Perestroika period and the 1990s.

So it is not surprising that on the June 15, the 95th anniversary of Andropov's birth, Russia's Channel One aired a nostalgic laudatory  film titled "Yury Andropov: 15 Months Of Hope." (The video is available in Russian here. Paul Goble over at Window On Eurasia has an insightful write up about it here)

But was Andropov's path to reform really the road not taken? For nearly a decade, Putin and his team have been systematically working to implement a 21st century version of Andropovism.  And when oil prices were soaring near $150 a barrel, it even seemed to be working.

But as Leon Aron shows in an article in the latest issue of "Foreign Policy," reality is finally setting in (the whole piece is well worth a read):


Instead of building a modern economy when oil prices were high, Putin built "Sovereign Democracy" and the "Power Vertical." That was the real missed opportunity.

This is the subtext of the criticism now coming from the likes of Igor Yurgens, Yevgeny Gontmakher, and others.

And as Aron correctly points out, the regime's most vocal critics now are "not professional 'dissidents,' long ago marginalized by the Kremlin, but members of the intellectual establishment." Rather than an Andropov revival, Aron argues that Putin's efforts have unintentionally recreated the political climate of the early Perestroika period:


I'm not quite ready to go that far yet. Almost, but not quite. But as I have written here and elsewhere, something important is clearly happening in Russia. If not yet a thaw, I think we are witnessing the early stages of a great awakening among a key part of the intellectual establishment. The scales are falling from people's eyes. The old fear -- while not gone -- is clearly fading. The Kremlin no longer looks all powerful.

In fact, as Aron points out, it is looking more and more vulnerable:


The shattering of the Putin myth, the of the changing intellectual environment, and the increased willingness of angry Russians to take to the streets is shaping up to be a potentially deadly cocktail for Russia's current rulers.

More than two decades after his death, we are witnessing the logical conclusion of the Andropov legacy.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 30 June 18:04   2 comments

Yevgeny Gontmakher's war of words with Vladislav Surkov just won't let up.

Gontmakher, director of the Center for Social Policy at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, published an article in "Vedomosti" back in March comparing Surkov to Leonid Brezhnev's chief ideologist, Mikhail Suslov.

One would think that Surkov would consider this a compliment. After all, as Kremlin first deputy chief of staff, Surkov has styled himself as the regime's semi-official ideologist, responsible for terms like "sovereign democracy" and the "power vertical."

But apparently he wasn't amused. In an article published last week in "Vedomisti," Gontmakher described the reaction (you can read the whole article in the original Russian here, or in the English-language version published by "The Moscow Times" here):


This wasn't Gontmakher's first run in with the Kremlin.

Back in November, he published a provocative article -- again in "Vedomisti" -- warning that anti-government riots similar to those that took place in Novocherkassk back in 1962 were possible as workers in single-factory towns reeled from the economic crisis.  This was when the Kremlin was twisting itself into knots trying to argue that the crisis was an American problem and wouldn't effect Russia.

Hoping to silence Gontmakher and his ilk, the authorities gave "Vedomosti" a prompt warning that the article could be considered an incitement to extremism. Instead, it led to more people reading the article, and probably encouraged more public intellectuals to come forward with criticisms of the regime.

In his article last week, Gontmakher wrote that he has learned four key lessons from his ongoing battle with Surkov:


I've been giving these ongoing verbal sparring matches a disproportionate amount of space on this blog because I think something very important is happening in Russia right now.

Brave public intellectuals like Gontmakher and Igor Yurgens are risking their careers by chipping away at the philosophical justification for Russia's authoritarian regime. This may all come to nothing. But it could potentially change Russia's internal political narrative into something closer resembling the truth.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 26 June 17:47   1 comment

Did the Kremlin's chief ideologist just get punked by a regional leader whose political obituary was written months ago? Early signs seem to suggest that he did.

Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of Russia's Bashkortostan Republic, appeared to get himself in a bit of hot water a few weeks ago when he publicly compared the level of centralization in Russia today to that in the Soviet Union. 

When the Kremlin sent its powerful First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov to Ufa for a little chat with Rakhimov on Friday, pundits were wondering whether the wayward regional boss would survive the weekend with his job intact.

Authorities in Moscow had been systematically undermining Rakhimov's authority for months. They removed Bashkortostan's FSB chief, Interior Minister, and the heads of region's Supreme and Arbitration Courts -- all of whom were loyal to Rakhimov -- and replaced them with figures obedient to the Kremlin.

But when Surkov arrived, there was no reckoning to be had. Instead, with a straight face he praised the level of democracy in the region and lauded the locals who had rallied to support their leader.

Nikolai Petrov, an expert on regional politics at the Moscow Carnegie Center, suggests that when faced with a potential backlash from Rakhimov's supporters and other regional barons, the Kremlin blinked:


As Pavel Baev points out at the Eurasia Daily Monitor, as the economic crisis deepens, authorities in Moscow are facing an increasingly restive group of regional leaders who are increasingly adept at exploiting the widening schisms in the Moscow elite:


Rakhimov is 75-years-old and the Kremlin has had it out for him for sometime now. He could very well get the boot at some point in the near future.

But Paul Goble over at Window on Eurasia writes that his survival of this latest scare -- and how it played out -- is sure to "resonate with other regional leaders," and could represent a watershed in Moscow's relations with the regions:


Just another sign that Vladimir Putin's vaunted power vertical is getting more and more wobbly.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 24 June 17:14   0 comments

Is Russia on the verge of a massive crime wave? Some analysts certainly think so.

In most countries, when an economy goes in the tank, crime rate tends to spike. But as political analyst Andrei Ryabov writes in "Vedomosti" this week, the well-established correlation between economic deprivation and crime takes on added -- and potentially sinister -- dimensions in Russia.

Ryabov argues that as Russians lose faith that the social and political system will continue to provide for their needs, turning to crime -- both petty and large-scale -- actually becomes a form of protest as well as a survival mechanism:


But what is really a cause for concern, Ryabov argues, is the tendency for the police to get in on the act as well.  As crime rates increase amid an economic downturn, law-enforcement bodies -- already notorious for rampant corruption -- are empowered to bring the situation under control.

But instead of addressing the problem, they instead use their new powers to ratchet up their own criminal activities:


The result, Ryabov says, is a vicious circle:


Ryabov's article, while well-argued and thought provoking, is largely speculative. But the scenario he outlines seems entirely plausible.

The legitimacy of the system Vladimir Putin created was based largely on three pillars: rising living standards, restoring social order, and resurgent (anti-Western) Russian nationalism.

The economic crisis has already undermined the first pillar. If Ryabov's argument is correct, a new crime wave could take out the second pillar as well.

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 23 June 18:02   1 comment

The godfather of Russia's "sovereign democracy" has been unusually visible this week.

Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the regime's chief ideologist, usually shuns the public spotlight. But there he was on Wednesday telling a group of young State Duma deputies that Russian democracy has matured, is stable, and needs to develop. He also raised eyebrows by calling on United Russia to cooperate with other parties:


Surkov's comments appeared to contrast earlier statements he made criticizing public figures who suggested that Russia's political system needed to be opened up. They also contradict the conclusions of the Public Projects Institute, a think tank close to United Russia, which released a report last week saying greater democracy in Russia would be harmful.

So what's going on? Prior to the economic crisis, some analysts believed that the Kremlin's grand plan was to create a virtual -- read fake -- multi-party system similar to the ones that existed in some Soviet satellites like Communist-era Czechoslovakia and East Germany. (Or, more accurately, to restructure the virtual -- read fake -- multi-party system it has now)

The idea was to bring erstwhile -- or potential -- opponents of the regime into the system where they could be controlled and co-opted. This was the idea behind making former opposition figure Nikita Belykh governor of Kirov Oblast in December, for example.

It was also the idea behind the creation of the new Kremlin-friendly party Right Cause from the remnants of the opposition Union of Rightist Forces.

The economic crisis and the public discontent it sparked clearly spooked the Kremlin and the plan appeared to have been mothballed. Are Surkov's comments an indication that the elite feels safe enough to proceed?

Perhaps, but apparently not everybody is on board. Speaking to the same event on Wednesday, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov said there was a chance in the late Soviet period to establish a multi-party system, but that chance was missed:


Gryzlov added that given United Russia's large majority in the Duma, the party should have more of its members represented in Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's government.

It is unclear whether this is one of those staged debates the Kremlin sometimes stages to meet its PR needs of the moment, or if a real argument is afoot about the need to make (cosmetic) changes in the system to stem rising discontent. My instincts tell me it is the latter. And the fact that both Gryzlov and the Public Projects Institute are so publicly opposing any changes suggests that at least part of the United Russia leadership -- which would lose a bit of patronage power under the scheme -- is not entirely on board.

Surkov made news again today with a high-profile trip to Bashkortostan to pay a visit to regional chief Murtaza Rakhimov -- who earlier in the month created a minor scandal by comparing the level of centralization in Russia today to that of the Soviet Union. The Interfax news agency quoted an unidentified as saying that the visit will give Rakhimov "the chance to correct the situation and save face."

At least publicly, there were no recriminations. "I am very glad that there is such a high level of democracy in Bashkortostan," Surkov said of the region that Rakhimov rules like a personal fiefdom. "There is no problem here."

-- Brian Whitmore

Posted At: 19 June 17:28   1 comment