Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed directives to amend military-technical cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, potentially opening the door to deeper defense ties with the two Central Asian states.
As Western sanctions and Ukrainian long-range strikes strain Russia’s military industry, the move may signal that Moscow is seeking to relocate parts of its military-industrial base to reduce its vulnerability to attack.
After Putin signed the directives last month, the Kremlin has not said what changes it is seeking to the agreements, which cover the supply and upkeep of weapons and military equipment and other forms of defense cooperation.
Since the agreement with Kazakhstan entered into force in 2015 -- following its initial signing in Moscow in 2013 -- Astana has acquired a range of Russian military equipment, including fighter jets, helicopters, and air defense systems.
Similarly, the 2016 agreement with Uzbekistan expanded military-technical cooperation between the two countries, with Tashkent acquiring Russian attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and tactical drones.
'The Kremlin Is In A Difficult Position'
Yermek Seitbattal, a Kazakh military analyst specializing in defense and security issues, said that the timing reflects growing international pressure on Moscow.
"I believe the Kremlin is in a difficult position," Seitbattal said. "The 21st package of [EU] sanctions is on the horizon. There have been no notable successes on the battlefield...and at the same time the European Union and the United States...are increasing the level of assistance to Ukraine."
According to Seitbattal, another source of pressure comes from Ukraine's enhanced long-range drone campaign, which he said is disrupting Russia's domestic military supply chain and highlighting Moscow's need to establish production and repair facilities farther from the front.
“This can be qualified as an attempt to bring stability to the Russian military-industrial complex by expanding its base into neighboring countries that are located outside of combat zones,” Seitbattal said.
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“Anything they can get operating on the territory of another country will only complicate operations for Ukraine. I think Ukraine has certainly become bolder in its operations, but they will not want to launch drone strikes on Kazakh territory. That would be regarded there as a serious escalation, and that is not something the Ukrainians would want to do. I think Russia knows this," he said.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan currently host key facilities that provide maintenance and modernization for Russian military equipment. Key sites include Kazakhstan's Semey Engineering, which works on armored vehicles, and the Aviation Repair Plant in Almaty, which specializes in helicopter overhauls. Uzbekistan's Chirchik Aircraft Repair Plant also services Soviet-designed military aircraft.
Soviet Collapse
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia sought to preserve its military influence over the newly independent Central Asian states through bilateral agreements and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established in 1992. The bloc has helped keep the region's militaries tied to Moscow through joint exercises, arms sales, and military-technical cooperation, while serving as a Russia-led counterweight to NATO in the post-Soviet space.
The military relationships of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with Russia are closely intertwined with the CSTO. Uzbekistan has more strategic autonomy, exiting the alliance in 2012 to manage its military relationship with Moscow strictly through bilateral agreements.
Defense analyst Seitbattal said that Moscow may now be seeking to move beyond its traditional role as a supplier of military equipment and spare parts.
"Under the existing agreements, Moscow may have been dissatisfied with the concept of one-way cooperation. In other words, it sells weapons and military equipment, as well as spare parts for their repair and limited modernization, to CSTO member states, while they are expected only to pay and comply with the rules by refraining from purchasing other types of weapons from countries outside the CSTO."
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Kazakhstan's Defense Ministry, responding to an RFE/RL inquiry about the military-technical agreement with Russia, said such matters remain under review by the relevant state authorities and declined to discuss the substance of the proposed amendments.
The ministry added that any agreements or protocols ultimately adopted would be implemented “in strict accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”
Uzbekistan's Defense Ministry did not respond to RFE/RL's request for comment.
Hidden Agenda?
Pavel Baev, a political scientist and research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), questions whether Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have much reason to deepen military-technical ties with Moscow, particularly with Ukraine's growing ability to penetrate Russian air defenses and strike military, industrial, and energy infrastructure deep inside the country.
Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities have expanded substantially during the war, with Kyiv now able to reach targets hundreds or even more than 1,000 kilometers from the front.
“The fact of the matter is that something has already changed dramatically. Russian air defense systems have proven to be an epic fail, so for the neighbors, cooperation in this sphere now makes little sense,” he said.
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Central Asia Emerges As Strategic Energy Player Amid Oil CrisisBaev added that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could simply refuse to reopen the agreements or prolong negotiations.
"Nuances can be many, but a plain signal that they see no need in renegotiating is entirely possible. The interesting question is whether they can coordinate a joint response," he said.
He added that delaying negotiations would be easier if Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan acted together.
Asked whether accommodating Moscow's demands could expose Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to potential Western sanctions, Baev said that could be part of the Kremlin's calculation.
"That may be a hidden agenda in Putin's instruction, and he may try to pull them apart by playing on the difference, as Kazakhstan is a CSTO member," Baev said. "It is, however, entirely in their interests, as well as in their power, to break his not-very-clever plan."