Wider Europe Briefing: New Visa Rules For Georgian Diplomats

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: Visa liberalization suspension for Georgian diplomats and EU-Kosovo relations after Brussels easing sanctions on Pristina.

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Briefing #1: EU Set To Suspend Visa Liberalization For Georgian Diplomats This Month

What You Need To Know: The European Union is set to follow through this month on a plan to suspend visa liberalization for all Georgian diplomatic and service passport holders after saying Tbilisi has “violated numerous commitments undertaken during the visa liberalization dialogue.”

The European Commission hinted the move was imminent when it issued its annual report on December 19, 2025, on how countries that enjoy visa liberalization with the bloc have fared on a number of issues. The Georgia assessment was scathing, with Brussels slamming Tbilisi’s controversial legislation on “transparency of foreign influence” and “family values and protection of minors," noting that “in most areas, no corrective measures were reported and, in several others, the situation has further deteriorated.”

Deep Background: While Brussels will suspend part of the visa-free regime due to democratic backsliding, other issues were also highlighted in the report, including a lack of alignment with EU visa policy for those from some third countries. The report notably highlights the growth of the Russian diaspora in the South Caucasus country, with the document stating that 160,000 Russian citizens have emigrated there since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago.

“There is an increasing concern that Russian presence in Georgia may be exploited to carry foreign influence operations. Another area of concern is the potential misuse of Georgian citizenship, especially when obtained via simplified naturalization procedures by Russian nationals,” the text states, adding: “Such cases raise both illegal migration risks and broader security implications for the EU.” Other complaints include Georgian nationals “remaining illegally in the EU to access medical care or to apply for asylum on medical grounds,” as well as the lack of progress on anti-corruption measures such as the need for a dedicated asset recovery office or the recent gutting of the anti-corruption bureau.

Drilling Down:

There are, in other words, quite a few reasons for the European Commission to make use of the suspension mechanism. And with new European legislation entering into force at the end of 2025, making it easier to trigger the mechanism, the EU executive is wasting no time.
One of the changes is that the commission in theory can decide on its own to suspend the visa-free regime for certain passports. It will, however, still consult with the 27 EU member states and a vote will be held.
The process is known as an “implementing decision,” meaning that the European Commission will start by presenting a legal act. This document can be already ready by the week that started on January 12, sources told RFE/RL.
Then something known in the EU as “comitology” begins. This means that a specific “comitology committee” will convene at a yet unknown date. All EU member states are represented here, and the European Commission should then ask for a formal opinion on the act in question.
This formal opinion usually takes the shape of a vote that isn’t legally binding but tends to be respected. If a qualified majority of the 27 capitals (55 percent of EU countries representing 65 percent of the total EU population) vote in favor of the proposed implementing act, it is adopted.
It is widely believed among EU diplomats that RFE/RL has spoken with that such a majority exists. To prevent the act from becoming valid, a qualified majority must vote against whereas the European Commission must come back with a revised act if there isn’t a qualified majority either for or against.
The timeline is not yet known but the vote is likely to take place in January. There is, however, a visa working party on January 23 in the council where home affairs experts of all the member states sit. They expect that they will get a briefing from the European Commission on the road ahead on this issue.
While suspending visa liberalization is very rare, the European Commission has taken a lighter version by just targeting diplomatic and service passports, not the entire Georgian population. And while Brussels has hinted that this might be the next step if things don’t improve, few EU member states have so far shown any desire to go for a blanket suspension.
This also means that the step is largely symbolic as all diplomats and bureaucrats also have regular passports they can travel on.
In many ways, the move is a way to tighten an EU decision made in early 2025 when the bloc decided to suspend parts of a visa-facilitation agreement with Georgia, meaning that Georgian diplomats had to apply for visas to travel to the EU member states that decided to implement the decision.
Nineteen out of 27 have so far done so. With the impending suspension of visa liberalization for diplomats and other officials, all 27 will have to carry out the decision.

Briefing #2: As The EU Eases Sanctions On Pristina, What's Next For Kosovo?

What You Need To Know: The European Union says it will start lifting sanctions this month first imposed on Kosovo in summer 2023, when Pristina implemented the results of controversial elections in the Serb-dominated north despite warnings from Brussels. The move could potentially resuscitate the Balkan country's EU hopes, allowing this to be the year its EU membership application, submitted in late 2022, can finally be assessed by the European Commission.

It may also allow for a restart of the Brussels-facilitated dialogue with Serbia after a two-year hiatus. The sanctions raised eyebrows when first adopted as they lacked precedent when it came to the bloc's relationship with an EU hopeful. For starters, they were not sanctions in a strict political and procedural sense and have been referred to as "measures" in the "corridor lingo" of Brussels. EU sanctions must be presented to the 27 EU member states in a formal legal act and then unanimously agreed. This was the case, for example, when Brussels imposed asset freezes and visa bans on individuals from EU candidate country Turkey in 2019 due to the unauthorized drilling for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Deep Background: With Kosovo, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, the EU foreign policy chief at the time, Josep Borrell, wrote a letter to EU member states outlining the measures and recommending the capitals implement them even though there was no obligation. The directorate-general for enlargement, the EU's department dealing with countries wanting to join the bloc, then informed Kosovo of what would hit them. These measures were mainly EU-related, meaning funding for Kosovo from the bloc's common budget would be frozen, high-level visits would be on hold, and the Stabilization and Association Council -- the main political conduit for Brussels-Pristina relations -- would not meet until further notice.

Intriguingly, while there was no formal EU unanimity to impose the sanctions, member states later stepped in to demand unanimity to lift them. In one of his last acts before leaving office in 2024, Borrell asked for the measures to be removed, but there was no consensus and the initial decision stood. Some momentum in Kosovo's favor came with the new European Commission team starting at the tail-end of 2024 as diplomats noted that outgoing Hungarian Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi had "a soft spot" for Serbia and prevented any real movement in favor of Pristina.

An approach of "gradual lifting" of the measures was announced, though what it entailed wasn't spelled out. Both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and new EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited the country in 2025, dismissing the notion of a ban on high-level visits even though no high-ranking Kosovar politician came to Brussels on a bilateral visit that year. The political breakthrough came at an EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels on December 17, when Von der Leyen announced that the measures would be lifted. This came after what Brussels called "smooth and peaceful" local elections in north Kosovo in October reversing the move from 2023. But that wasn't the end of the story. In the run-up to the summit France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain pushed for a two-step lifting in which roughly half the frozen money -- 216 million euros -- could be released for Pristina imminently.

The remainder, some 205 million euros, would be distributed first after the national parliamentary elections on December 28; they argued that incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti could benefit too much electorally if all the cash was released immediately. A new condition had been set by largely the same countries had been instrumental in Serbia avoiding similar EU measures later in 2023 after Serb militants with alleged Belgrade backing attacked Kosovar police in the northern village of Banjska, leaving one law enforcement officer dead.While other EU member states grumbled that pro-Serbian member states yet again were causing anti-Kosovo moves, they eventually agreed as they wanted to avoid another political impasse.In the end, Kurti increased his vote share and the EU promptly put out a statement saying the second part of the frozen funds would be released in early 2026.

Drilling Down:

The issue now is that while the political decisions have been taken to lift all the measures, the actual technical work hasn't yet kicked in. In fact, the first batch of money has been "programmed" -- meaning earmarked for various Kosovo recipients -- but has not yet been received. According to EU officials RFE/RL has spoken to, Brussels has not made the formal move to "program" the second batch even though it is expected to be a formality made later in January.
As these measures were imposed in an unprecedented way in 2023, there is discussion in Brussels about what is needed to technically lift them. For example, do EU member states need to be consulted again in writing or in some council working group or committee, or can the commission just go ahead regardless?
What is clear, however, is the European Commission wants to re-engage with Kosovo. Few in the building believe Serbia and Kosovo will be happy to take part in the dialogue to normalize relations anytime soon, but the Brussels envoy for the talks, Danish diplomat Peter Sorensen, recently had his mandate renewed for another two years.
It is believed that Kallas, who has yet to host a single dialogue at the highest political level, is keen to try to achieve something in the Western Balkans after a bruising start as the bloc's top diplomat.
With Brussels increasingly sidestepped on issues such as peace talks about Ukraine, the Gaza war, and the situation in Iran, EU officials half-jokingly note that getting Serbia and Kosovo to agree might be the "lowest-hanging fruit" available for the bloc at the moment.
There could also be a chance that EU member states finally agree to send over Kosovo's EU membership application to the European Commission for the EU executive to assess whether Pristina can join the club down the line.
The last country that truly tried to tackle the issue is the Czech Republic, which received the application during its six-month presidency of the council in the latter half of 2022. The five Kosovo non-recognizers Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain blocked any movement, however, and have made it clear to fellow EU member states holding the rotating council chair that they won't entertain the issue.
We can expect that nothing will happen in the first half of 2026 while Cyprus is at the helm, but there might be a change when Ireland takes over in July. Dublin has indicated it is pushing hard to conclude EU accession negotiations with Montenegro by the end of the year and hopes to push Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the club as well. With EU enlargement being one of Ireland's top priorities, it may even test the waters on Kosovo.
Rumors are swirling in Brussels corridors that Spain -- often the most hardened of the non-recognizing quintet -- will finally allow the commission to give an assessment so long as the process doesn't force member states to immediately tackle the issue of Kosovar statehood.

Looking Ahead

Perhaps the most anticipated event this week is the meeting between U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Danish counterpart, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, which is set to take place on January 14. There is hope, at least in Copenhagen, that the meeting will give more clarity on what the United States wants regarding Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. The White House has recently said that it cannot rule out taking the territory by military force, while Rubio has indicated that a potential purchase is more likely.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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