David Schenker, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Affairs, told Current Time that all options are on the table for President Donald Trump as the US and Iran remain "very far" apart as they head into negotiations in Pakistan.
In an interview on April 10, Schenker, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2019 to 2021, said he viewed the US operation in Iran as a significant conventional military success.
However, he said that some of the most significant issues in the conflict, such as Iran's uranium enrichment program and control of the Strait of Hormuz, have yet to be resolved. He also said Iran's leadership may be "less flexible" than it was before he war.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFE/RL: First of all, this cease-fire, what do you consider it to be? A strategic victory for the US or some kind of a chance for the Iranian regime to regroup itself? What do you see?
David Schenker: I think that the cease-fire reflects a growing frustration from the administration in Washington that they weren't able to effect regime change and that the prices of oil and global commodities were spiking. For Iran, they've taken, absorbed, an enormous amount of punishment and are also looking for a way out of this war.
No doubt the United States has accomplished much on the battlefield. The US military has degraded Iran's conventional capabilities, further set back their industrial base, their nuclear program, their navy. And at the same time, [they] don't have a good political outcome.
There's still the persistent problem of Iranian enrichment, the possession of the 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, and now the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. So, these are on the agenda at the talks, but I think both sides are very far away. I think Iran believes that it holds the leverage right now.
RFE/RL: What went wrong in this case? Was it some kind of misjudgment at the beginning, a plan not good enough, or maybe something else?
Schenker: No, I think that the military had a great plan to degrade Iran's industrial base for production of advanced ballistic missiles and drones, to set back even further the nuclear program, to take care of the navy, the Air Force, the ability to have anti-aircraft systems, and also to target senior regime officials.
The problem was, and I think the administration was aware of this beforehand, it is exceedingly rare to be able to change a regime with air power, and the administration is reticent to use ground forces for the high risk of casualties.
So, I think the administration had a success in setting back Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions, but still hasn't got something in place -- an agreement that's going to take on the nuclear program. So, it's still to be determined, the final outcome. But, as it stands, it's some accomplishments, but insufficient, I think, for where the administration had hoped to be.
RFE/RL: As for the regime itself, do you think it has become actually stronger in this month than it was before all those strikes?
Schenker: No, I think that there has been leadership change, but not regime change. I think that regime is still there. Essentially, what you had before was Ali Khamenei with the IRGC, [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards Corps, being the power behind the throne. I think now the IRGC is actually sitting on the throne. I think they actually have full control over the nature of the country. And that perhaps it's even more ideological, less pragmatic, and probably less flexible than it was prior to the war.
But I wouldn't say that it's stronger. I think they've lost a lot. Even with the Strait of Hormuz closed while oil prices are up, the United States could, if the closure of the Strait of Hormuz persists, prevent any ships from leaving the Strait of Hormuz. And this would be particularly painful for Iran in addition to the other countries, our friends on the west side of the Persian Gulf, who currently aren't exporting through the Strait of Hormuz anyway.
RFE/RL: You mentioned the ground forces. Do you think there is no possibility that some kind of ground operation will start, or are the chances above zero?
Schenker: I wouldn't say the chances are zero. I think it depends on the outcome of these negotiations, if the Iranians are willing to make a concession on enrichment, on the disposition of the 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which, by the way, is enough to build ten bombs or so. I think that a solution can be found to wind down this war.
But, as we saw in the day leading up to the cease-fire, the threats from the president, not only the expletives in the tweets, but also the threat to wipe out Iranian civilization, clearly the president was frustrated with the status quo, with the ongoing operations not pushing the needle, and so was looking or considering some sort of escalation, not only to include threats against perhaps the electric grid, but also desalinization.
So, I wouldn't take the troop deployments off the table. The president has talked about Kharg Island, Iran's main oil export location. But there are other areas and islands that can be looked at as well. But all these entail greater risk. Once again, I think the president has preferred, traditionally, the shorter, highly intensive military campaigns that don't use or deploy ground forces just because of the high level of risk.
RFE/RL: I also wanted to ask you about the US-NATO relationships because there's been some frustration there. How do you think these relationships will develop in the future? Because it looks like at the moment they're on completely opposite sides on a lot of issues.
Schenker: The relationship between the Trump administration [and NATO], both during the first term and particularly during the second term, has been problematic, a real challenge. During the first term, the president really pushed NATO states to meet their obligations to spend 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. They were well short of it. I think the president's harping on this issue proved to be prescient. The Europeans were in a terrible position when Russia invaded Ukraine, unable to do what's necessary to help defend Ukraine or provision Ukraine.
Now, it's focused on demanding assistance from NATO with the Persian Gulf, with restoring the freedom of navigation. The president never consulted our partners, our allies on the war. And now he's expecting them to deploy. In the first instance, these states don't have large and highly capable navies. So, they don't really have the assets necessary. But, they're also reticent to do so, to put their own people in harm's way, particularly after the president didn't consult them.
I think from the president's side, the US side, there is one issue that is important, which is for decades the United States has guaranteed freedom of navigation around the world by itself, largely without any assistance. And the question is whether the United States should be expected to do so alone and in perpetuity. I think that given the demands not only on the United States, but on the US military around the world, and the use of these waterways, not only the Strait of Hormuz, but Bab al-Mandab, the South China Sea, and elsewhere, what the involvement should be of other countries, including NATO partners -- I think that's the question on the table now.
I think the Europeans probably could have handled this a little better than just saying no. But, this remains an extremely important and effective alliance, particularly to counter Russian aggression. I think it would be a shame if the president discarded it or walked away from it because of differences over the Persian Gulf.
RFE/RL: Talking about Russian aggression, do you think that Vladimir Putin is one of the biggest winners at the moment because of this war? Oil prices went up, he can now continue the war [against Ukraine] without looking back at his budget. Who do you think are the biggest winners and losers at the moment?
Schenker: Putin is the main benefactor. Higher oil prices, less attention being paid to Ukraine. But at the same time, I think it's important to mention, Iran was quite an ally to Russia, sending Russia drones, advanced missiles, helping Putin in the war effort. I think they're going to be hard pressed to do so going forward.
China is now, I think, in the catbird seat diplomatically. It has the most influence over Iran of perhaps any other country and can benefit from a diplomatic role here. On the other hand, prior to the war, China was buying Iranian oil at $30 a barrel, well below the $60-70 market price. That's not happening anymore. But, to be fair, I think China does benefit from the US having this war. They get to see firsthand US capabilities and operating procedures. And the US has also expended a great deal of munitions during this campaign, which makes us, the United States, less prepared for any future contingencies in Asia, perhaps.
Finally, I think the big losers so far are the countries of the Persian Gulf, which have endured significant missiles and drones over the past 50 days. They have withstood it. They are highly resilient. But, they're quite worried right now that the United States is not going to cut a deal with Iran that takes their concerns into consideration. And of course, they're most concerned that this war will end with Iran having a greater degree of control over the Strait of Hormuz.
RFE/RL: If you were asked a month ago whether you supported this kind of operation, would you still support it?
Schenker: Listen, I think it depends what the objective was. If the objective was to set back Iranian capability to meddle in Arab countries, destabilize the region, I think from a conventional point of view that has been accomplished.
On the other hand, the president's stated objective, he had many. One of them was regime change. That's fallen short. The other was getting to an acceptable solution or endgame on the nuclear front. And we're still not there. I can't say whether I'd support it or not until I find out what the final agreement is in Pakistan. If there are concessions on the nuclear front and the strait is open, I think it's quite possible this past 50 days all would have been worth it.