WASHINGTON – The United States and Iran appear close to reaching a deal to end a 12-week war, although a final agreement is not considered imminent and key details remained unsolved.
The emerging deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil supplies, but would put off negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program until a later stage, according to reports.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Jason H. Campbell, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and former Pentagon official during Trump’s first administration, said that the reported deal is “probably the least bad one available to the administration at this point.”
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Trump Says Any Deal With Iran Will Be 'Great,' Tehran Says Nothing 'Imminent'RFE/RL: President Trump says a deal with Iran is close. From a military and strategic standpoint, what must still be resolved before any agreement is signed?
Jason Campbell: I think the biggest unresolved issues are not really connected to military outcomes. They are more strategic, and that’s where the details of whatever is being negotiated right now become crucial.
What we are hearing, admittedly through leaks and unofficial reporting from several sides involved in the negotiations, is that this increasingly looks like a memorandum of understanding that would create a temporary cessation of hostilities. Under that arrangement, the US Navy would reportedly pull back from the blockade it has carried out over the past several weeks, and Iran would again allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, at least for a 30-to-60-day period.
But if those reports are accurate, Iran would also gain access to upwards of $25 billion in unfrozen assets and retain some, if not full, capability to sell oil on the open market. At the same time, the central strategic issue for the United States -- the future of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and its broader nuclear program -- would effectively be deferred for later negotiations.
So when you look at the balance of this, it's really in large part trying to get back to some status quo from before the onset of Operation Epic Fury in late February, but this time with Iran having much more leverage vis-à-vis the Strait of Hormuz and now access to billions of dollars that it otherwise didn't have. Again, these details are unofficial at this time, but I think President Trump is going to have a difficult time trying to sell this as a positive unless, over this 30- to 60-day period the MOU would cover -- which again is still somewhat unclear -- it results in some sort of agreement on the nuclear side that looks better than the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] signed a decade ago by the Obama administration.
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Iran Is Aiming To Use Chinese Technology To Permanently Throttle Internet AccessRFE/RL: How confident can Washington realistically be that Iran nuclear pathway has been significantly disrupted?
Campbell: One of the details that has surfaced unofficially is that Iran may agree to relinquish or transfer control over roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which would account for the majority of its stockpile.
However, even if that happens, Iran would still retain enough uranium enriched to 60 percent that, if further enriched to weapons-grade levels, could potentially be used for one or two nuclear warheads. So, while Tehran may be giving up part of its stockpile, it would still preserve some degree of nuclear capability.
And in the bigger picture, they're continuing to insist that, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they retain the right to continue enriching uranium going forward. So, the details here are going to matter very much.
RFE/RL: You’ve argued that the Strait of Hormuz remains Iran’s key source of leverage. Has Tehran shown that even under pressure it can still disrupt global energy markets?
Campbell: At this point, absolutely. Iran has demonstrated that through asymmetric tactics it can significantly disrupt international shipping. Quite frankly, given that this is a private-sector endeavor, it doesn't necessarily take the actual sinking of ships to negatively impact the flow of traffic. Just the threat that they would be willing to reengage in some of these tactics -- to lay mines, perhaps, in the strait -- can absolutely halt traffic going forward.
So, how that gets addressed is going to be very important and delicate moving forward. I think we're already starting to see some Gulf states and other countries addressing their own immediate security concerns. They're signing defense agreements with Ukrainian companies, for instance, that are very capable of using drones as defensive weapons against some of the Shahed drones and lower-flying cruise missiles Iran has preferred this time.
So, we're starting to see changing dynamics right now, but for the foreseeable future Iran is still going to retain at least the threat of being able to control the strait.
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US Officials Say Iran Deal Is 95% Done, But Not Ready for SignatureRFE/RL: The US naval blockade appears to be putting economic pressure on Iran. Is it changing Tehran’s behavior?
Campbell: Right now, I think it is hardening the regime’s resolve, especially given the leadership changes that followed several high-profile assassinations.
The current leadership appears more ideologically rigid and less willing to place trust in either the United States or Israel during negotiations. So, you're seeing a regime that is increasingly strident, that understands some of the leverage it does hold. Right now, I think they -- with some justification -- feel they can withstand the economic pressure of the naval blockade more than the global economy can withstand the continued closure of the strait.
RFE/RL: If negotiations collapse and fighting resumes, what would the opening phase of military operations most likely look like?
Campbell: What should be understood at the outset is that the military options available to the United States are actually fairly limited. We've already seen upwards of four to six weeks of persistent bombing and air strikes that ultimately were not able to change the regime or adequately degrade its military capabilities -- certainly not enough to move the strategic needle in Washington's favor.
Given the military assets currently in the region, the US could resume those types of strikes for a limited period of time, but without a major mobilization of US forces, you really couldn't have what would be considered a major escalation.
President Trump has threatened to target key civilian infrastructure in renewed strikes as a means of pressuring the regime back to the negotiating table. The problem there is we've already seen that Iran would likely retaliate throughout the Gulf and across the Arab world against key US partners with similar strikes that could be just as damaging to them.
That could leave the US and some of these countries -- whose stockpiles of munitions have already been depleted considerably over the last few weeks -- in a very difficult position. So, while the administration is holding on to the threat of military action if talks fail, the reality is that the options likely to move the needle in Washington's favor without taking on extraordinary risks are pretty limited.
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Defying The US, Iran Is Cementing Its Control Over The Strait Of HormuzRFE/RL: What do US military planners now understand about Iran and the region that they may not have fully appreciated 11 weeks ago?
Campbell: I think what's going to come out of this is the realization that relatively basic asymmetric capabilities can overwhelm some of the more sophisticated systems that the US and its regional partners have invested in, particularly when it comes to air and missile defense.
That is going to force a complete rethink in how the US plans for future contingencies. It’s also going to require investments in munitions and systems that may not be as high-priced or “flashy,” but have proven absolutely necessary.
That applies on the naval side as well. For instance, the ideal ships to lead escort operations through the Strait of Hormuz would be frigates. But the US Navy phased out frigates years ago and no longer has anything small enough to effectively conduct such an operation. The US also no longer has mine-sweeping vessels permanently based in the region.
So, what this conflict exposed is that despite the US military’s considerable strength and capabilities, it was vulnerable in this type of contingency and is going to have to rethink how it handles similar situations going forward.
RFE/RL: Has this conflict changed how US partners in the Persian Gulf view Washington and regional security?
Campbell: I think certainly. In the grand scheme of things, the US is still going to remain an important partner -- and the partner of choice -- for many of these states on security and defense matters.
But some of the unwritten assumptions in these relationships -- particularly the idea that the US would always be able to come to the rescue if these countries were attacked by Iran -- have been degraded.
You’re already seeing that play out regionally. For example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have formalized a security agreement. You're also seeing more talks between Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt.
So, while the relationship with the United States is going to remain important, it’s also going to continue evolving, and some countries are going to look for alternative -- or at least complementary -- regional security arrangements.
RFE/RL: Given the events of recent days, does the Iranian leadership believe it is negotiating from a position of strength?
Campbell: I think they absolutely believe that. Iran appears determined to secure guarantees that neither the US nor Israel will carry out further strikes against Iranian territory or allied groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.
That could create a difficult dynamic between Washington and Israel because any durable agreement would likely require a comprehensive cease-fire, rather than the kind of partial or temporary pauses in fighting we have seen in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere.
There are also longstanding differences between Washington and Israel over priorities regarding Iran. Israel has historically focused heavily not just on Iran’s nuclear program, but also on its missile program and regional proxy network. By contrast, the Trump administration’s recent public messaging has focused much more narrowly on the nuclear issue.
So that strategic divergence between Washington and Jerusalem is going to remain important moving forward.
RFE/RL: After months of conflict, tensions in the Gulf, and fears of wider war, do you believe the region is moving toward a real diplomatic resolution or simply preparing for another phase of confrontation?
Campbell: I think the White House is increasingly confronting two very difficult choices.
One option would involve a major military escalation requiring an enormous commitment of forces and resources. The other is reaching a political agreement that, once fully examined, may look less comprehensive than earlier nuclear agreements that were heavily criticized in Washington.
So, I think we're feeling our way toward that latter option, which may not be a good option, but is probably the least bad one available to the administration at this point.