Iran-US Talks 'A Dangerous Game,' Says Ex-Pentagon Official Michael Patrick Mulroy

WASHINGTON -- As Washington and Tehran weigh diplomacy against the risk of renewed conflict, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Michael Patrick Mulroy, says both sides now have strong incentives to prevent the crisis from escalating again if they are prepared to compromise.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Mulroy, who served under the first administration of President Donald Trump, said there is “hope” for an agreement because both Washington and Tehran “have an interest in seeing this come to an end,” while cautioning that negotiations could still collapse if either side overplays their hand.

RFE/RL: President Trump said during the cabinet meeting that Iran “very much wants to make a deal,” but also warned that “maybe we’ll just have to finish the job.” He ruled out sanctions relief in exchange for uranium concessions. From your perspective, how close are we to either a diplomatic breakthrough or direct military escalation?

Michael Patrick Mulroy: I think we are closer than we have been. I know a lot of people have seen the comments that keep coming out that we're on the verge, and we never get there, so they're very skeptical -- and I think that's fair.

But it's clear to me that President Trump does not want this to go into a stalemate that just continues and continues. Although I think he is willing to use military escalation, he understands that would come with significant consequences.

Iran, of course, is not just going to absorb another round of air strikes. They're going to launch a counterattack. Obviously, it would be against US forces, but also against Gulf countries, as they have already proven both their willingness and capability to do.

SEE ALSO:

US Confirms New 'Defensive' Strikes In Iran

That would further exacerbate the very issue Iran believes gives it leverage -- dramatically increasing the cost of energy around the world, including in the US, at a time when the US is heading into midterm elections.

At the same time, the [US] blockade and naval pressure have put serious strain on the regime’s ability to fund itself. So both sides have an interest in seeing this come to an end. I think there is hope. But the question is whether both sides are willing to compromise, because that’s how negotiations work.

RFE/RL: Tehran insists recent US strikes strengthened its position, while President Trump says Iran is now “negotiating on fumes.” What is the biggest risk of miscalculation from the Iranian side?

Mulroy: I think Iran may believe that the midterms are such a major domestic political concern for President Trump that he will be forced to concede things that are even better for Tehran than the JCPOA. I don't think that's going to happen. Obviously, he does not want his party to lose control of the House and Senate, but he is also going to view this as a legacy issue for his presidency.

Part of that legacy is that he cannot agree to something equal to or less restrictive than the JCPOA [the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers] that he withdrew from in 2018. Otherwise, historians will ask: what was the point of leaving the agreement in the first place?

When the US was still in the JCPOA, Iran did not have nearly the level of highly enriched uranium it has now. Today we are talking about roughly 440 kilograms enriched to 60 percent -- material that could potentially be used for almost 1,000 bombs if further processed. Under the JCPOA, enrichment was capped at 3.67 percent, very far from weapons-grade material.

So I think any future agreement has to be more restrictive than the JCPOA. The Strait of Hormuz also has to be fully reopened. And the highly enriched uranium has to be either destroyed in place -- something the president appears increasingly open to -- or removed to a third country.

RFE/RL: You have previously warned that Iran uses maritime pressure as leverage. With reports suggesting Tehran may seek partial control over shipping coordination in the Strait of Hormuz alongside countries such as Oman, could the strait become a long-term bargaining chip?

Mulroy: It already looks like it has become one. It's important to point out that although it appeared the US was caught by surprise by Iran’s seizure of the strait, it really should not have been. This has been an issue since at least the 1980s. The intelligence community certainly knew this was Iran’s intent. In fact, the Iranian parliament had already passed a decree stating that Iran would seize the strait if the US attacked. You didn’t have to be at the CIA to know this was likely to happen.

SEE ALSO:

Trump Says Iran's Internet Reopening Is A Sign It Wants A Deal

But I think it is unacceptable to allow Iran to have any sovereignty control over the strait. It is an international waterway. The US does not have the authority to grant sovereignty over it -- we are just one of 193 countries. If every country adjacent to a major maritime choke point decided it could attack ships and then profit from controlling trade, it would seriously damage the global economy. We are already seeing the effect from this one crisis alone. So I think the international community -- not just the US -- needs to speak up and say this is unacceptable.

RFE/RL: President Trump and the secretary of state, [Marco] Rubio, have both said the strait will be reopened “one way or another.” Militarily speaking, what would it actually take for the US and its allies to guarantee that?

Mulroy: The US military can do it if given the task. I'm biased, obviously, as a product of the US military, but I believe it can be done.

The US has already positioned two Marine Expeditionary Units in theater, elements of the 82nd Airborne, a large portion of JSOC [the US military’s Joint Special Operations Command], and, I’m sure, significant CIA assets. Militarily, reopening the strait is possible. But it would come with consequences. It would not happen without casualties, including potentially substantial US casualties.

The bigger issue is the end state. Say the US secures the key terrain around the Strait of Hormuz and pushes back Iranian offensive capabilities. Then what?

Does the US permanently guarantee freedom of navigation there with a long-term military presence in an active combat zone? That would be a massive political decision.

The war is already extremely unpopular in the US. Introducing ground forces would make it even more unpopular. You can already see resistance in the Senate, where there have been discussions about a War Powers Resolution specifically prohibiting ground troops in the conflict -- even though ground forces would probably be necessary to fully control the strait.

RFE/RL: Even if Iran officially reopens Hormuz, it could still rely on mines, drones, proxy forces, or harassment tactics to pressure global markets. Is that the more realistic long-term threat?

Mulroy: Yes. Even if Iran agrees to return to the pre-February 28 status quo, where the

Michael Patrick Mulloy (file photo)

strait was open, it will always retain the ability to close it again. Iran has thousands of naval mines. We may have destroyed many of them, but mines are relatively easy to manufacture. They can quickly redeploy them using small boats or automated drone vessels.

And all Iran really needs to do is convince the commercial shipping industry that the area is unsafe. That alone can effectively shut down maritime traffic. So the strait will remain a bargaining chip.

But the US also has leverage. We have the most powerful military in the world. We could restart air strikes. We are obviously very effective at finding and targeting key Iranian leaders. So leverage exists on both sides.

But yes, I agree that this will remain a pressure point for the foreseeable future.

RFE/RL: You have spent years studying asymmetric warfare in the Middle East. Has Iran’s naval strategy changed during this conflict, especially after losing key IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps] naval leadership?

Mulroy: I think we are seeing an evolution in warfare overall -- not just in how Iran fights. The US overwhelmingly dominates conventionally, but that may not matter as much anymore. Iran’s conventional navy is largely at the bottom of the ocean, and its air force has been heavily degraded. But its suicide drone capability has not been eliminated, nor has its ability to manufacture those systems.

So the question becomes: Does conventional superiority alone still decide wars? We are seeing similar developments in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have essentially won the naval battle in the Black Sea without even having a traditional navy.

SEE ALSO:

Former Ambassador Christopher Henzel: Deadlock, Optimism, And The Chance Of An Iran Deal

At the same time, we are witnessing the rapid development of automated systems and the integration of artificial intelligence into warfare. This means the US has to fundamentally rethink national defense strategy. Yes, we have the most advanced and expensive weapons systems in the world, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain interceptor missions and precision-guided munition campaigns because of both cost and manufacturing limitations.

There’s a phrase in Washington now: “throwing Ferraris at Frisbees.” We are using extremely expensive interceptor missiles against very cheap offensive drone systems. That math is not going to work long term.

So, the US is not going to abandon aircraft carriers or F-35s, but we also have to recognize that wars of attrition are increasingly becoming the modern battlefield. Low-cost systems can challenge even the most advanced militaries. The superpowers are going to have to adapt.

RFE/RL: Going back to peace talks, Iranian state media recently circulated what it claimed was a draft framework for an agreement -- something the White House dismissed as fabricated. What do you make of that?

Mulroy: This is very much in keeping with Iran’s negotiating style. Iran is completely comfortable dragging negotiations out. It took two years to finalize the JCPOA. The regime is also very willing to absorb significant pain, particularly among its own population. As long as Tehran believes the US pressure point is the November midterms, it will likely try to prolong negotiations to extract better concessions.

But it’s a dangerous game, because President Trump has already shown he is willing to use military force -- both during the 12-day war [the June 2025 Israel-Iran war that later involved direct US strikes] and in this current conflict, which is now under a cease-fire.

So it becomes a delicate balancing act. We will have to see how much Iran is willing to concede, and how much the US is willing to concede, in order to reach an agreement that actually lasts.

RFE/RL: President Trump has also linked these talks to a broader regional reset, including potential expansion of the Abraham Accords [US-brokered deals establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and several Arab states signed during Trump’s first term]. Is that realistic while the Iran conflict remains unresolved?

Mulroy: The Abraham Accords were certainly viewed as a foreign policy success of the first Trump administration, and obviously the president would like to expand them. My assumption is that President Trump realizes -- or has been told directly -- that many countries in the region want this war to come to a permanent end and do not want it to restart. Because of that, some countries may be more willing to consider joining the Abraham Accords.

SEE ALSO:

Defying The US, Iran Is Cementing Its Control Over The Strait Of Hormuz

That said, I do not see major expansion happening without broader regional resolutions, including progress on Gaza and Lebanon. But the president probably has a better understanding of where those conversations stand than I do, since he is speaking directly with regional leaders.

If countries are indeed considering joining the Abraham Accords, perhaps the president would be willing to make certain concessions to Iran to secure a deal. But again, I still do not think any agreement can be equal to or less restrictive than the JCPOA.

RFE/RL: If a memorandum of understanding is reached and shipping resumes, are we looking at a durable solution -- or simply a pause in the crisis?

Mulroy: Unfortunately, it could end up being just a long-term pause. If the blockade is lifted, Iran may conclude that the arrangement is acceptable for now. Over time, it will rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal, replenish its suicide drones and other unmanned systems, and restore revenue streams through energy exports, primarily to China. At the same time, Tehran could continue delaying a permanent nuclear agreement.

And of course, we still do not know the full extent of Iran’s clandestine nuclear efforts. We only know what we know. As long as the IAEA remains restricted, that will continue to be a major concern for the US.

I do think that eventually if the 60-day timeline expires without a permanent agreement, this conflict could restart. And I don’t think that is in anybody’s interest -- certainly not the region’s.