Wider Europe Briefing: The EU's Plan To Defeat Russia In Armenia And Belarus After US Potash Sanctions Lifted

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU's game plan for Armenia and Belarus's prospects as the US lift sanctions on potash.

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Briefing #1: The EU Plan To Keep Russia Out Of Armenia's Election

What You Need To Know: European Union foreign ministers last week gave the green light to send a so-called hybrid rapid response team to Armenia to help the South Caucasus republic combat issues such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and cyberthreats ahead of the country's parliamentary elections on June 7.

The mission statement for the rapid response team, seen by RFE/RL, states that Armenia "has been facing intense hybrid activities, with concerns over an intensification of actions taken by adversaries to undermine democratic institutions, processes and societal trust" and that these sorts of threats "are highly likely to escalate further in the run up to the elections."

According to the paper, the team, which will consist of nine to 14 experts, will be sent to Armenia in late March or early April for 10-15 working days with the stated goal of advising the Yerevan government on crisis management plans and intelligence sharing in various electoral scenarios.

One of the expected results for the EU is that "Armenian political authorities have a clearer understanding of their roles and responsibilities in complex crisis management and hybrid threat detection and response, particularly in relation to the upcoming elections."

Other actions will include help on tracking and prosecuting illicit financing and to launch "a public awareness campaign related to the elections on FIMI, with support in targeting key demographics and promoting media literacy and critical thinking."

Deep Background: The EU dispatched a similar team to Moldova ahead of its parliamentary elections last year, in which the pro-EU forces retained their power. There are hopes among EU officials RFE/RL has been in touch with to repeat "a success story" in Armenia.

While it is unclear whether the hybrid response team is returning to Armenia closer to the election date, its presence in the early spring will produce a report to guide Brussels' next steps vis-a-vis Yerevan.

This could include a fully fledged civilian EU mission to Armenia to replace the current EU mission, EUMA, which was created in 2023 to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia adjacent to Azerbaijan. Such a mission would, however, need unanimous backing from all 27 EU member states.

In parallel with the hybrid response team, the EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service also distributed to EU member states a longer document titled Political Framework For A Crisis Approach (PFCA) For Armenia.

The 28-page-file, also seen by RFE/RL, argues in favor of a new Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission, stating it is "in the EU's vital interest to build on the growing bilateral relationship with Armenia and contribute to domestic and regional stabilization, notably by disentangling Armenia from polarizing foreign interferences. CSDP options should be explored to this end, with a view to complementing existing EU tools and in view of the possible phasing out of the current EU CSDP mission as the (Armenia-Azerbaijan) peace process takes hold."

Drilling Down:

The paper makes it clear that Moscow is the main adversary for Brussels in Armenia. It notes that "Russia has intensified its coercive posture toward Armenia amid Yerevan's gradual reorientation toward the EU, exploiting Armenia's deep economic dependency and the fragile regional security environment."
The "destabilizing tactics" the document lists are Russian threats of gas price hikes and selective trade slowdowns, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and "psychological operations (PSYOPs) to undermine confidence in electoral integrity and regional stability."
The paper also points out that the Kremlin "is expected to leverage existing tensions and fears with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, which further complicates the regional picture and the course of the peace process."
While Yerevan has approached the EU in recent years, including by hoping for visa liberalization at some point and toying with the idea of one day applying for membership in the bloc, the document is clear-eyed about how closely intertwined the country still is with Moscow.
It notes that "Armenia remains heavily dependent on Russia in security, economic, and energy spheres." The Russian military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri and Russian FSB border guards patrolling Armenian borders with Iran and Turkey as well as providing Armenian border guard service are listed as geopolitical factors to be considered.
On the economic side, there are clear indicators that Moscow's influence in Armenia remains considerable. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which makes Moscow the country's main energy supplier and biggest trade partner with close labor-migration ties. Russian firms also control major Armenian gas, rail, and telecom infrastructure.
The document is also surprisingly frank about what the EU stands to lose if it doesn't step up in its engagement with Armenia. It warns Brussels risks "diminished EU influence on key processes, including the implementation of peace arrangements, the shaping of Armenia's security reforms and its broader strategic orientation" if it doesn't match political statements of support with concrete actions.
Again, the fear is Russia will step in if Brussels doesn't. The paper concludes by saying, "The EU would miss a historic opportunity to enable regional actors to free themselves from Moscow's embrace at a moment of Russian weakness in the region."

Briefing #2: What Now For Belarus's Potash Trade?

What You Need To Know: The United States announced on March 19 that it is easing sanctions on several Belarusian companies, including Agrorozkvit, Belaruskali, and its marketing arm, the Belarusian Potash Company, after a deal was agreed to release 250 prisoners being held in Belarus.

The measures have been in place since 2021, when the regime of authoritarian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko forced a commercial jet en route from Greece to Lithuania to land in Minsk to detain Belarusian journalist Raman Pratasevich and his partner, Sofia Sapega. The easing of sanctions and the prisoner release -- the latest in a series of such moves -- highlights a thaw in relations between Washington and Minsk that began with the start of the second term of President Donald Trump.

The question now is what effects these sanctions, particularly the easing of restrictions on Belarusian fertilizers, can have on both Minsk and globally as the world faces ever-growing price hikes due to the war in Iran.

Potash is crucial for food production. Together with nitrogen and phosphorus, it is used in fertilizers needed to sustain the entire crop-growing cycle in crucial foodstuffs such as wheat, rice and maize -- products that provide over 40 percent of global caloric intake.

In the Northern Hemisphere, spring is the most important time of year when it comes to fertilizers. It is currently the season for wheat, sugar beet, and rapeseed to receive a crucial second or even third round of fertilizer application. A shortage of fertilizers due to spiraling costs can lead to food scarcity in poorer parts of the world and increased food prices in developed countries.

Deep Background: All this is important for Belarus, in particular, as various types of potash-based fertilizers have been the country's top exported commodity, bringing in over $1 billion in 2024, according to estimates.

Belarus accounts for around 15 percent of the global share of fertilizer production. It used to have an even greater share before it was targeted by various Western sanctions imposed after a deadly crackdown on the opposition and civil society that followed a 2020 presidential election in which Lukashenko claimed victory despite widespread claims of fraud.

That year, the sector totaled almost $2.5 billion from fertilizer trade. Locked out from lucrative US and European markets, Belarus instead targeted big fertilizer importers such as Brazil, China, and India. Despite that, trade volumes have dwindled.

But will the EU also lift its Belarus sanctions? It certainly doesn't look like it.

In late February, the EU unanimously extended its economic sanctions on the country by another year. Those measures include an import ban on Belarusian potassium-based fertilizers and targeted sanctions on companies such as Belaruskali. According to several EU officials that RFE/RL spoke to on condition of anonymity, the United States has not put pressure on the bloc to ease its restrictive measures or allow the transit of these Belarusian products through its territory.

While nitrogen-based fertilizers still can be imported, they are slowly being phased out, as well. Last year, the EU added duties of 40-45 euros ($45-50) per ton on top of a 6.5 percent tariff on the product from both Belarus and Russia. That duty is set to rise to 60 euros per ton this summer and to 80 euros next year, before finally going up to 350 euros per ton by 2028.

The increases essentially make it economically unviable for markets abroad to buy Belarusian products. The question is whether European farmers -- one of the strongest lobby groups in the EU -- will want to lower or abolish those tariffs if production costs keep rising this year.

Europe's own fertilizer production is considerably more expensive due to stricter environmental legislation and a lack of cheap gas. A qualified majority of the 27 EU member states is needed to reverse the current sanctions policy and, with markets squeezed, it could be one to watch.

Drilling Down:

The Iran crisis could affect this in several ways. With strikes being launched at targets around the Persian Gulf, shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz has virtually ground to a halt. The waterway carries about one-fifth of the world's energy.
It also handles some 20-30 percent of global fertilizer exports, including around 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade -- a key component in synthetic fertilizers. Critically, 50 percent of all global sulfur shipments pass through the strait; as a byproduct of oil and gas processing, sulfur is an essential ingredient in phosphate fertilizer production.
Since the outbreak of the war, global fertilizer prices have increased by 25 percent and are expected to soar. Asia is particularly vulnerable. It takes a majority of both the LNG and fertilizer exports traveling from the Persian Gulf.
India, which is in desperate need of potash before the monsoon season starts in June, is perhaps the country to watch but also sub-Saharan Africa. While the Continent is not a big fertilizer importer in relative terms, many African farmers don't have the financial capacity to absorb global price increases and might instead cut yields creating local food insecurity.
Higher global oil and gas prices will also have implications for farmers in the West as post-production costs such as transportation, refrigeration, and milling are expected to soar.
So can Belarus expect increased export revenue soon? Potentially, although it is not that straightforward. Brazil, China, and India could increase their potash imports now, as the likelihood of being punished by secondary US sanctions have diminished further. But there are also complications.
For starters, EU sanctions remain on potash, meaning that Belarus can't transport the product the fastest and cheapest way: via the ports of the Baltic states, notably Klaipeda in Lithuania. That means that Belarus will still have to ship its potash on Russian railways to St. Petersburg, which takes a longer time.
These routes are also overloaded with Russian potash, which takes precedent. Russia is the world's second-largest producer of the product, claiming one-fifth of global exports and is looking to exploit the market opportunity presented by the Strait of Hormuz closure.
It is also unclear whether the US, another major fertilizer importer, is particularly interested. Getting the stuff all the way from Belarus may not make too much sense as Canada, by far the global leader in fertilizer exports, is a closer and easier option.

Looking Ahead

On March 26, there is an important EU court ruling as five Russian businessmen, including the influential Dmitry Mazepin, will find out if the judges will remove them from the EU's sanctions list or if they will remain blacklisted.

The quintet has all previously lost in the EU's general court and are now at the appeals stage at the higher EU Court of Justice. According to the bloc, all five are politically close to the Kremlin and have financed Moscow's war effort in Ukraine through their business activities.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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