Wider Europe Briefing: What Can The EU Target In Its Next Round Of Sanctions On Russia?

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU’s next sanctions package on Russia and a potential NATO-led “Arctic Sentry” operation.

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Briefing #1: A Maritime Ban In The Next EU Sanctions Package?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is slowly preparing a new round of sanctions on Russia, its 20th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the goal of having the measures approved by all EU member states at the end of February to coincide with the fourth anniversary of Moscow’s attack on its neighbor.

The idea is that the European Commission, which proposes new packages, will have its round of “confessionals” in which proposed new measures and potential “red lines” are discussed with member states as early as the upcoming weekend of January 24-25.

Few EU officials believe that the measures will be sweeping and hard-hitting given that unanimity is needed in the bloc and there is a reluctance in Brussels to go for measures that could also hurt the already spluttering European economy.

Some things, however, are clear: the EU will add more names to its visa ban and asset freeze blacklist, which already includes around 2,700 individuals and entities.

There will also be more vessels belonging to the Kremlin’s shadow fleet that will be slapped with an EU service ban -- with that list already comprising some 600 ships that Brussels thinks are carrying Russian oil in violation of an oil price cap imposed by the Group of Seven that now stands at $47.60 per barrel.

Deep Background: The EU estimated late last year that around 35 percent of all vessels transporting Russian oil did so in compliance with the oil price cap, while 65 percent were part of the shadow fleet violating the cap.

Perhaps the biggest potential new sanction is a so-called full maritime service ban against any ship transporting Russian carbon-based resources that would target both the above-mentioned categories.

This “maritime ban” has been put forward in informal discussion papers on further Russia sanctions authored respectively by Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Sweden -- all seen by RFE/RL.

Now, this quartet are all known as “sanctions hawks” in the bloc, so the measure might not fly in the end, but RFE/RL understands that the idea is gaining traction in Brussels.

The idea of the ban is that it prohibits all EU economic operators in the bloc from providing services to any vessel transporting oil, gas, or coal from Russian ports.

This goes beyond the current price cap in several ways.

First, it includes gas and coal. Second, it would target all vessels, not only those already sanctioned. And third, the oil’s sale price becomes irrelevant.

In reality, this would stop EU vessels from transporting Russian energy completely while non-EU boats could continue but wouldn’t be able to rely on EU port services and insurances.

Curiously, the Netherlands is also arguing for a way for shadow fleet vessels to be scrapped and recycled by creating an exit mechanism. Quite how this would work isn’t spelt out in the Dutch paper, but it would likely involve big financial incentives for vessel owners to cooperate with EU port authorities rather than working for the Kremlin.

Drilling Down

The documents by the quartet also propose other energy sanctions on Russia that are unlikely to be accepted considering they have been vetoed so far by various other EU capitals. These include sanctions on energy giant Rosneft and Lukoil, something that Britain and the United States have already imposed.
Similarly, there is still hesitation to hit Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company even though there could be scope to target the company’s leadership with sanctions, banning all new contracts with the firm and potentially even stopping uranium imports into the bloc from Russia, worth more than $116 billion a year, given that the EU could get it from other sources.
Lithuania is also arguing for sanctions on PipeChina, a company owned by Beijing that is involved in buying liquefied natural gas from Russia.
With Brussels increasingly open to showing that it can also target China for its financial and political support of Moscow’s war, this could potentially happen, even though many EU member states are wary about being too tough on Beijing due to the economic stakes involved and the fear of retaliation.
Expect instead that the new measures will focus on plugging gaps in sanctions already imposed by shortening phase-out dates for import bans on Russian iron, steel, and nickel from later this decade to potentially the end of this year.
Many also want to phase out Russian fertilizer imports, which the bloc imported to the tune of $1.6 billion last year. In 2025, the bloc agreed to gradually impose tariffs on Russian fertilizers, but these measures won’t become prohibitively steep until 2028 when they hit 430 euros ($500) per ton. Therefore, there could be a move to raise the tariffs substantially much earlier than originally envisaged.
Then there is the issue of sanctions circumvention, which is also likely to be addressed. As an example of such activities, Latvia in its sanctions paper pointed out that it has seen “uncharacteristically high export volumes of birch plywood from third countries with limited or no significant local production capacity such as Georgia, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan into the EU market.”
The belief is that the product in fact comes from Russia and Belarus -- which both have regions with commercial birch forests.
Birch plywood from Belarus and Russia already faces an EU import ban, with the measures recently extended to Kazakhstan and Turkey after Brussels said it had identified sanctions circumvention. Expect these sorts of measures to expand further in the near future.

Briefing #2: Can A NATO-Led 'Arctic Sentry' Resolve Tensions Over Greenland?

What You Need To Know: One potential way to defuse the current political tension between Denmark and the United States regarding the future status of Greenland could be a NATO-led “Arctic Sentry” mission.

The idea was aired when the ambassadors of the military alliance met in Brussels on January 8 to discuss the White House's recent expression of interest in potentially taking over the autonomous Danish territory -- with Washington not ruling out a military intervention to achieve this goal.

It follows two similar NATO missions launched in 2025, first the Baltic Sentry operation, responding to numerous undersea sabotages in northern Europe, and then Eastern Sentry, which was launched shortly after a big Russian drone incursion into Poland.

Both “sentries” are still ongoing. They are also considered big successes, according to NATO officials RFE/RL has been in touch with on condition of anonymity.

But can something similar be repeated around -- and possibly in -- Greenland?

Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken has publicly endorsed the idea and London and Berlin are also warming to it.

At the meeting in Brussels, there was broad agreement that NATO needs to step up in the Arctic region.

“Canada has been screaming about the need to up the game in the High North for years, so Washington is hardly the first one to bring this up,” is how one European diplomat put it.

Seven of the eight so-called Arctic countries are members of NATO, with Russia being the glaring exemption. And while the waters around Greenland aren’t full of Russian and Chinese ships right now, that could change as Arctic ice melts and new sea lanes open up.

Deep Background: The NATO supreme allied commander (SACEUR) and the top US general in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, recently noted at a military conference in Sweden that Russian and Chinese vessels “are not studying the seals and the polar bears,” adding that they are "out there doing bathymetric surveys and trying to figure out how they can counter NATO capabilities on and under the sea. So that’s something that could grow very quickly, and we need to be mindful of it and ready.”

At the same time Grynkewich added that any concrete NATO mission right now is “premature.”

Speaking in Berlin earlier this week about a potential Arctic Sentry operation, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also noted that such an undertaking is still months away.

Yet, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte is busy discussing with Washington how the alliance can step up -- one way or another.

European diplomats have told RFE/RL that an “Arctic Sentry” initiative would potentially neutralize the argument that the United States needs to have Greenland and prove that Europe can handle two flanks at the same time -- Russia in the east and potentially Russia and China in the Arctic.

“In many ways it's about burden-sharing here as well” one of them said, adding that one potential scenario could involve Europeans handling air and sea surveillance while the US increases its troop presence in Greenland.

The United States currently has some 200 personnel there on one base, looking after ballistic missile early warnings and space surveillance. During the Cold War, however, there were up to 10,000 US troops on the island spread out across 17 bases.

Drilling Down

This was based on a 1951 deal between Copenhagen and Washington that allows the United States to have military assets, including bases, as long as NATO exists. This treaty remains valid and puts no limits on the US military presence, even though Denmark will have to consent -- something that is likely to be given.
This would also open up the possibility for the United States to use Greenland in its “Golden Dome” missile defense program, which US President Donald Trump has mentioned in his comments about the giant island.
What European countries would do instead is focus on guarding the airspace and maritime routes of what is known as the “the GIUK gap,” meaning the vast area between Greenland on one side and Ireland and the United Kingdom on the other.
This gap has been described as a “loaded pistol” in the face of the United States because it is an entry point for actors like Moscow and Beijing to do anything from underwater sabotage to seizing potential territory, according to a source familiar with military planning.
Nations likely to contribute could primarily be the UK and France, but also countries like Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Spain, which all have naval assets.
This would, of course, require several types of vessels, notably cruisers and frigates but also submarines and especially icebreakers. Together the alliance only has about 40 of the latter, fewer than Russia even though there is a push to produce more.
Expect the alliance’s defense chiefs to discuss this in more detail when they meet in Brussels on January 21-22 and then again when NATO defense ministers assemble in the Belgian capital on February 12.
However, there is also hesitation within the alliance as to whether an Arctic Sentry operation is feasible. There are many practical obstacles. For example, hundreds of ships would be needed to cover such a vast area, including vessels that supply military craft.
Apart from the Nordic countries and Canada, there are few troops that have the experience of operating in harsh Arctic conditions -- hence the current Danish-led “Operation Arctic Endurance” in and around Greenland, in which troops from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway are taking part.
And while not everyone needs to contribute, everyone has to be on board to launch such a mission. And will the Americans go along with this? At the NATO meeting of ambassadors on January 8, Denmark and the United States agreed that this is a bilateral issue for now.
This led to a meeting in Washington on January 14 of the foreign ministers of Denmark, Greenland and the United States, hosted by the US Vice-President JD Vance.
The Danish foreign minister, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, noted after the meeting that the United States hadn’t changed its position on Greenland but also that a high-level working group will be set up with US and Danish officials to discuss the issue in the coming weeks.
People in Brussels see this as a sign that there can be “a deal” that suits all with an expanded NATO role. While nervousness exists about a military intervention, most of those RFE/RL has spoken to still see this as “unlikely” and that the US president is using the same strong-armed business negotiating tactic he employed when he secured a 5 percent defense-spending commitment from all allies at The Hague summit last year.
Now, it’s about the Europeans spending more and spending it faster -- and not just focusing on their eastern flank.

Looking Ahead

All eyes are turning to the Swiss Alpine resort of Davos which is hosting its annual World Economic Forum most of this week. And it is quite a lineup with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaking on January 20, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on January 22 and -- perhaps the most anticipated address of the week -- U.S. President Donald Trump takes the floor on January 21. With plenty of transatlantic tension over Greenland and tariffs in recent days and weeks, the forum is a must-follow in the coming days.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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