Qishloq Ovozi (Archive)

Usually, when Tajik President Emomali Rahmon visits Saudi Arabia the trip does not generate much news outside of Tajikistan. But Rahmon's January 2-4 visit, though it was undoubtedly planned months in advance, came as both Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia found themselves in fresh disputes with Iran.

Reports about the official portion of Rahmon's visit to Saudi Arabia mention a meeting with Saudi King Salman, the signing of new bilateral agreements, and discussions about combating terrorism, extremism, narcotics trafficking, and transnational criminal organizations.

The word "Iran” is absent from these reports, though it was surely on the minds of Tajik and Saudi officials, and Rahmon's visit to Saudi Arabia was likely something officials in Iran were watching closely as well.

Tajik-Iranian ties have been good for many years, in part because Iran sees Tajikistan as a natural gateway for Iranian policies in Central Asia. But at the end of December, Iran invited the leader of the recently banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IPRT), Muhiddin Kabiri, to attend an international conference on Islamic unity in Tehran. Kabiri had fled Tajikistan months before, as it became clear the Tajik government was intent on closing the party. Since his departure, Tajik authorities have accused the IRPT leader of attempting to overthrow the government.

At the conference in Tehran, Kabiri was seated next to the head of Tajikistan's state-backed Islamic Council. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei met with Kabiri on the sidelines of the conference.

Kabiri's presence at the event drew sharp criticism from Tajikistan. The Tajik Foreign Ministry released a statement on December 29 saying it was "greatly concerned” that the leader of an "extremist and terrorist” organization was invited to the conference. Tajikistan's chief mufti, Sayidmukarram Abdulkodirzoda, spoke about Iran during Friday prayers on January 1, saying Iran had always claimed to be Tajikistan's friend but "at the conference we saw that Iran clearly showed disrespect to the Tajik nation and government.”

Saudi Arabia's recent trouble with Iran has been well publicized. The execution of one of Saudi Arabia's leading Shi'ite clerics, Sheikh al-Nimr, on January 2 sparked protests in Iran, including the torching of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. The next day, while Rahmon in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia cut its ties to Iran.

For Saudi Arabia, the Rahmon visit was an opportunity to dampen Iran's relations with Tajikistan, a country with which Tehran maintained excellent ties even as it came under international sanctions and was considered an international pariah. Prying such a good ally away from Iran would suit the Saudi government, which has warned about what it sees as growing Iranian influence in neighboring Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

For Tajikistan, Rahmon's visit -- which concluded with a pilgrimage to Mecca -- was a timely reminder to Tehran that Tajikistan has other friends in the Islamic world; friends in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia pledged to provide some $108 million through the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) for the construction of major roads in the poorly connected eastern Tajikistan. It was pocket change for Saudi Arabia, but seeing as the IDB allocated only some $84 million to Tajikistan from 2002 until 2015, Rahmon came away from the trip with something more than usual.

Probably a few people remembered during Rahmon's visit that the majority of Tajikistan's people are Sunni Muslims, as in Saudi Arabia, not Shi'a, as in Iran. That fact has always tempered Tajikistan's relations with the Iranian regime.

Saudi-Iranian ties have been bad for some time now and are likely to remain so. But Tajikistan cannot afford to engage in political brinksmanship with Iran for long. Dushanbe needs Tehran.

When calling Iran an "accomplice to traitors” in last Friday's sermon, Tajik Mufti Abdulkodirzoda noted the linguistic and cultural affinities that helped Tehran forge ties with Dushanbe since the early days of Tajikistan's independence. Iran used those similarities to also gain an economic foothold in Tajikistan.

Iran is helping complete the Anzob or Istiqlol Tunnel (far behind schedule and dubbed by some the "tunnel of death”) to better connect northern and southern Tajikistan by road.

More importantly, Iran invested some $180 million, and endured countless objections from Uzbekistan, to help build Tajikistan's Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant, which has already become an indispensable supply of electricity for Tajikistan.

However, Iran retains ownership of Sangtuda-2 until about 2029 under a "BOOT” (Buy-own-operate-transfer) deal and that hinges on Tajikistan repaying the Iranian investment. Currently, both Sangtuda-2 and the Russian-built Sangtuda-1 hydropower plant are tens of millions of dollars in debt.

Iran has invested in many other projects in Tajikistan and, in return, Dushanbe has backed Tehran in international disputes, such as Iran's right to have nuclear power.

The Tajik government's strong reaction to Kabiri's attendance at the conference in Tehran is somewhat surprising.

Iran was one of the main players in arranging talks between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during Tajikistan's 1992-97 civil war. The IRPT was the backbone of the UTO and IRPT leaders sheltered in Iran during much of the war. The peace accord Iran helped broker included providing the Tajik opposition, including the IRPT, with places in the Tajik government.

That deal unofficially ended when, after nearly 18 years, the IRPT lost its last places in the government after the March 2015 parliamentary elections that some feel were rigged by the Tajik government.

Iranian officials reacted to Tajikistan's complaints by pointing out Kabiri and his party had been invited to Islamic Unity conferences in years past, before the IRPT was banned and declared an extremist group by Tajik authorities.

Tajikistan's position in world politics is not good at the moment. Western interest in the region is on the wane, while Russia and China appear interested in Central Asia but their domestic economic situations preclude significant investment or attention in the near future.

Iran is a different position. With sanctions on exports of Iranian oil and gas expected to be lifted soon, Tehran will receive a lot of attention and offers, making this an inopportune time for Tajikistan to aggravate a relationship that for nearly 25 years has benefitted both countries.

Based on material from RFE/RL's Tajik Service, known locally as Ozodi

The year 2015 was rough for Central Asia and though it’s unwise to forecast, I’ve got a feeling 2016 is going to be a very eventful year in the region -- and not in a good way.

The year that’s coming to a close saw a drastic economic downturn in Central Asia and an increase in security concerns as the situation in northern Afghanistan deteriorated and the threat of the Islamic State (IS) militant group grew in the minds of Central Asian government officials.

To be fair, many experts in the field of Central Asian studies contend that the security fears are overblown and being used by Central Asia’s governments as a pretext for eliminating perceived domestic opponents.

So was 2015 a temporary setback for Central Asia or the first signs of a longer-term turn for the worse?

RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, known locally as Azatlyk, assembled the Majlis, a panel, to discuss events in Central Asia in 2015 and what those events might portend.

And for this one, the Majlis brought in people who follow events in Central Asia as closely as anyone in the world.

Azatlyk Director Muhammad Tahir moderated the discussion. Participating from RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk, was Director Venera Djumataeva; from RFE/RL's Tajik Service, known locally as Radio Ozodi, was Ozodi Director Sojida Djakhfarova; and from RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik, was Senior Correspondent Sirojiddin Tolibov. I also sat in on behalf of RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq.

There were some important elections in Central Asia in 2015, both parliamentary and presidential.

Tajikistan conducted parliamentary elections on March 1 and brought to an end any hint of political pluralism. As Djakhfarova pointed out, after 18 years of a government that included members of genuine opposition parties, the 2015 parliamentary elections “deprived two major opposition parties from seats in the parliament.”

Before the end of 2015, one of those opposition parties -- the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan -- would have its registration canceled by a court decision and later was declared to be an illegal extremist group.

Kyrgyzstan provided one of the bright moments of 2015 when it conducted its parliamentary elections on October 4. “It was a big political testament in Kyrgyzstan for parliamentary democracy, for the young parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan, which [is] the only one that exists in Central Asia so far,” Djumataeva said.

Those elections did have some shortcomings and the new deputies have yet to prove they can meet the high expectations the electorate has for them, but the campaigning process was, arguably, the best Central Asia has ever seen.

There were presidential elections also in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, the only two leaders in the CIS who have ruled their countries since the first day of independence (and even before that), conducted early elections and received fresh mandates to lead their countries.

There was speculation that the two wanted new terms before the reality of the expected economic crisis in Central Asia really took hold.

Karimov was reelected on March 29 and Nazarbaev on April 26, both officially receiving more than 90 percent of the vote.

Economic Crisis

The economies in their countries, and the other Central Asian states, were already showing signs of severe strain, with several factors combining to the detriment of the region.

There were some states that had grown reliant on remittances from migrant laborers, mainly in Russia. The devaluation of the Russian ruble, caused by falling oil and gas prices on world markets and Western sanctions on Russia for the Kremlin’s role in fighting in eastern Ukraine, impacted millions of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia.

Millions of people from Uzbekistan have been sending home money earned in Russia for many years, some $6.6 billion in 2013. Tolibov pointed out “remittances from Russia and abroad decreased by 40 percent,” in 2015 and he added some migrant laborers are returning to Uzbekistan where “the unemployment rate is increasing.”

This has also been a problem in Kyrgyzstan, one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world.As has been true throughout Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan’s national currency -- the som -- has depreciated in value. Djumataeva noted during 2015 that “Prices jumped up much higher than 30 percent; it is around 50 percent,” which she said led to “half of the construction companies [in Kyrgyzstan] facing bankruptcy.”

And the problem is even more acute in Kyrgyzstan’s agricultural sector.

Kazakhstan’s national currency -- the tenge -- started the year with an exchange rate of some 180 tenge to $1 but as the year drew to a close the rate was some 330 tenge to $1.

In Kazakhstan’s case the cause was more the falling price of oil, the country’s major export, coupled with the economic woes of two of its main trading partners -- Russia and China.

The falling price of natural gas created similar problems in Turkmenistan, where for the first time in many years there were reports of layoffs in the gas sector and even a strike by gas workers in the eastern Lebap Province.

Added to economic troubles were problems south of the Central Asian borders, in Afghanistan. Foreign forces completed their drawdown at the end of 2014 and the previously, relatively peaceful northern provinces saw a large uptick in violence. The provincial capital of Kunduz, not far from Tajikistan, briefly fell into the hands of Taliban and foreign militants in late September. Fighting farther west reached the Turkmen border in several places during the last few months of 2015.

And then there was the specter of the Islamic State (IS) militant group. Hundreds of Central Asians have gone to Syria and Iraq to join the world’s richest terrorist group. Most had been recruited in Russia, where they were working as migrant laborers. But some, including notably the head of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry commando units, left from Central Asia to join IS.

Russian officials warned Central Asian governments about the growing threat from IS throughout 2015, but these officials were essentially preaching to the choir. The Central Asian governments needed little urging to initiate legislation and measures that simultaneously allowed them to neutralize potential domestic regime opponents, both religious and secular.

The panel discussed these issues in greater detail as well as dealing with other topics.

Listen here for the full audio:

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Central Asia In 2015

by RFE/RL

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