Kosovo: Is EU Set To Recognize Independence?
By Patrick Moore
Graffiti in Pristina that says: 'No Negotiations -- Self-Determination'
In fact, no breakthrough is generally expected in the latest negotiations, which the EU and Russia insisted on having despite U.S. and Kosovar Albanian objections that further talks are just a waste of time. During the summer, Washington made the concession to Brussels over negotiations but stressed that this was the last extension. The United States supports the demand by Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic-Albanian majority for independence, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made clear on September 24. The United States, like UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari and UN diplomat Kai Eide before him, argues that independence is the best way to bring stability to the region. According to this view, insecurity and a lack of clarity regarding the province's political status led to unrest in March 2004 and could lead to violence again.
Washington and Pristina fear that Moscow and Belgrade want to prolong talks indefinitely in the hope that the Western countries will lose interest in the region and that Serbia can then try to reassert the control it lost over Kosovo in 1999. In June of that year, NATO forces occupied the province after former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's crackdown of 1998-99 forced several hundred thousand Kosovars to flee their homes.
The positions of Russia, the United States, NATO, Belgrade, and Pristina on Kosovo's future have, in fact, never been in doubt. The real question is whether the EU, which together with Russia and the United States makes up the international "troika" mediating the talks, will be able to overcome its internal divisions and formulate and stick to a coherent policy. This will be particularly important if the Kosovars declare independence soon after December 10, presumably with U.S. and British backing.
Signs Of Growing EU Unity
In recent months, there have been signs that a critical mass is emerging within the EU to support Kosovar independence if the latest talks lead nowhere. One important development during this time was the replacement of Jacques Chirac by Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France. As Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner recently put it, France's foreign policy is no longer determined by reflexive anti-Americanism. In just a few short months, Sarkozy has reaffirmed internationally his reputation as a dynamic and determined leader who does not hesitate to break with old policies that no longer work. Perhaps more importantly, Kouchner himself is highly familiar with the situation in Kosova, having served as the UN's special representative there from 1999-2001. In short, France now seems likely to join the United States and Britain in recognizing an independent Kosova.
A second development that might have contributed to a growing support within the EU for Kosovar independence was the rejection by Russia and Serbia of the plan proposed by Ahtisaari, which calls for carefully supervised independence. In most of Europe, Ahtisaari's work was regarded as balanced, thorough, and worthy of the best diplomatic traditions of the UN. Moscow's and Belgrade's decision to reject it met with little understanding within the EU, particularly in the Nordic and those other countries where a UN label almost automatically commands respect.
A third factor is the apparent growing awareness within the EU that because Kosovo is part of Europe, its future is primarily a European matter, and that a failure to form a unified EU policy on Kosovo will mean that the bloc is incapable of speaking with one voice on anything in international affairs. In other words, Kosovo is increasingly regarded by many as the make-or-break issue for a unified EU foreign policy.
On October 24, Germany's "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" published an interview with German Ambassador to Britain Wolfgang Ischinger, who represents the EU in the troika. He strongly defended holding the current round of talks, arguing that they have proved more innovative and fruitful than most observers expected. He noted that one approach to resolving the dispute over Kosovo that has received attention recently is the model of the 1972 agreement between East and West Germany. On the basis of that treaty, Bonn and East Berlin established what in practice were diplomatic relations without, however, West Germany being forced to compromise its political and legal principles on the subject of German unity. Ischinger suggested that such creative statecraft might have its applications in the Balkans today.
But the most important aspect of Ischinger's interview was his insistence that the EU has moved in recent months towards a unified policy on Kosova. He argued that "for the first time in the history of the Kosovo conflict, the EU has become an actor in its own right and even the one with the most responsibility." Many would argue that Washington and Moscow will have the final say, as did the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" itself on October 18. But Ischinger stressed in his interview that Europeans increasingly believe that it is not acceptable that "in 2007, European crises are resolved in the United States."
The reasons for this belief are rooted in years of frustration since 1991 over the failure of the EU to help manage the breakup of former Yugoslavia without the political and military leadership of the United States. This frustration might be called a "Jacques Poos complex" after the foreign minister of Luxembourg who made the erroneous prediction in 1991 that the dissolution of Yugoslavia would be the "hour of Europe."
If Ischinger argued that the EU will take a unified approach to Kosova, some persistent but unconfirmed German media reports during the same week as his interview indicated that Berlin has already decided to join Washington, London, Paris, the Nordic capitals, and several others in recognizing an independent Kosova. If such statements attributed to unnamed German government officials by public broadcasters Deutschlandfunk and Deutsche Welle are true, it would mean that there is now a critical mass in the EU in support of such a step, despite the continuing objections of some smaller states like Greece and Cyprus, which are traditional supporters of Serbia.
Gert Weisskirchen, the parliamentary spokesman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which controls the Foreign Ministry, denied on October 24 in an interview with Deutschlandfunk that Berlin has already made its decision. Instead, he said, "let's give diplomacy time." But as one German Balkan expert said to RFE/RL, "what would you expect [the government] to do? They obviously made the leaks but then denied them when confronted with a direct question."
See also: Kosovo: Former U.S. Envoy Says It's Decision Time For Europe, Serbs
Kosovo: Former U.S. Envoy Says It's Decision Time For Europe, Serbs
RFE/RL: Is there any solution to the Kosovo question that would satisfy both the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians?
James O'Brian: No. I think the Serbs from Belgrade have taken a position that they would not accept independence. I expect that they will be forced to see Kosovo become independent.
It's important, though, for the people of Serbia to decide whether they see their future as part of the European Union -- and perhaps of NATO as well. If they make that choice, then this border choice will be of somewhat less significance. I understand it's going to be painful, but this is going to be a very difficult time.
One advantage right now is that people are exhausted by this issue. I think each side thought the issue would have been resolved almost a year ago, perhaps even more quickly, two years ago. And by now their ability to play out the issue is coming to an end.
RFE/RL: Considering the current circumstances, what will be the most likely outcome of Kosovo's status?
O'Brian: I think that the most likely outcome is that Kosovo will be independent. Because what the Serbs in Belgrade are not willing to see is that the Kosovars have a significant voice in governing Serbia, so at that point I think there is really no way in which you can regard Kosovo as part of Serbia.
Now, how will we get to that point -- and this will require some professional diplomacy. There are three envoys now from Russia, the European Union, and the U.S. They are going to conduct negotiations through the end of November. No one expects that they will succeed -- they've scheduled their last session for November 26-27. They will then report to the [UN secretary-general, who will report their failure.
And at that point it will really come down to the United States, the European Union, and Russia deciding on what the process will be going forward, and the U.S. has made clear it's ready to recognize an independent Kosovo; the Russians have made clear that essentially they will not; so, it will be up to the European Union, and that's the battle right now.
RFE/RL: A few weeks ago, EU envoy Wolfgang Ischinger proposed a conference similar to Dayton for Kosovo. The situation is a bit different than 12 years ago in Bosnia, when war was going on. What would be the goal of such a conference?
O'Brian: I think the only real goal is to persuade the leaders of the European Union that it's time to make a decision, and stick with that decision. So the real question is, are they ready to recognize an independent Kosovo. This diplomatic process is to reassure everyone that every effort has been made to reach a settlement that is satisfactory to both sides. And I think even the most reluctant leaders in the European Union now recognize that there is no way to negotiate this or to delay a decision further.
RFE/RL: Some experts say that Russia is trying to use the Kosovo issue to show off its new power vis-a-vis the United States. What are Russia's geostrategic, economic, or even emotional interests in the Balkans?
O'Brian: I think it is always hard to sort out what it is. Every Balkan negotiation, except maybe Dayton, has had the same pattern. At some point, the Serbs say they will compromise no more -- whether they are right or wrong they simply refuse to move. The West, broadly speaking, tries to mover further. The Russians say privately, "we don't agree with the Serbs, but don't make us decide against them publicly." And the solution is always the same -- it's to come up with a way forward where the Russians can criticize, but aren't forced to say "no" or to say "yes" in a public way.
So going through the Security Council was always going to be extremely difficult. A solution that does not go to the Security Council, is legal, and it will allow the Russians to say, "well, we don't like this" but it will not force the Russian to override the Serb position. That's always been the most likely outcome, and I think that's what it will be here just as it was in the early 90s. So in that sense, even though Russia is more powerful today than it was then, the realities of the politics in this particular issue haven't changed.