WASHINGTON -- The recent military escalation between the US and Iran may have subsided for now, but the geopolitical consequences are only beginning to unfold.
As uncertainty hangs over the Strait of Hormuz and regional security, governments across Central Asia are quietly rethinking decades of strategic assumptions about trade, connectivity, and access to global markets.
Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on Eurasian affairs, has just returned from Central Asia, where he says one message stood out above all others: countries that once viewed Iran as their natural gateway to the sea are increasingly looking elsewhere.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFE/RL: You have just returned from Central Asia. What is the biggest strategic shift governments there are quietly making in response to the Iran conflict?
Ken Moriyasu: The biggest takeaway for me is the change in attitudes toward Iran.
Earlier this year, after the conflict in February, there were discussions at think tanks around March where Central Asian ambassadors spoke about the possibilities if stability returned to Iran.
If Iran moved toward a pro-business administration, they argued, it would provide the shortest route to warm-water ports for Central Asian countries. There was considerable optimism about what could happen if Iran became stable.
But on this trip, it became very clear to me that Central Asian countries are moving away from that option. They are talking much more about Pakistan and Afghanistan -- using Afghanistan as a transit route to Pakistan.
Even though Afghanistan and Pakistan have their own tensions, they believe resolving those issues is more realistic than waiting for regime change in Iran or for a level of stability that would convince Israel to stop attacking Iran. For them, that now appears to be a very distant possibility.
So, they are looking first at Afghanistan, and if that does not work, then at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On paper, CPEC is a fantastic idea. In reality, it has not progressed as much as expected. But even so, Central Asian countries believe a China-Pakistan connection is still more achievable than waiting for circumstances inside Iran to improve.
RFE/RL: Afghanistan remains deeply unstable (under its de facto Taliban authorities, who seized power after the collapse of the internationally recognized Afghan government in 2021). Why are Central Asian governments now willing to see it as part of the solution rather than part of the problem?
Moriyasu: One of the biggest issues for Central Asia is water. Much of the region's water originates in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan before flowing downstream to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Afghanistan is a major concern because it is building a new canal that draws water from this system. Technically, Central Asian countries should be very upset with Afghanistan, and I think they are.
But Afghanistan also offers significant strategic benefits if stable relations can be established. So, despite these tensions over water, I sensed real enthusiasm to engage more closely with Afghanistan.
RFE/RL: How important is Pakistan suddenly becoming in Central Asia's long-term trade strategy?
Moriyasu: Pakistan is unique because of its geography. It is both a continental country and a maritime country.
That is very different from India. India is effectively separated from Eurasia by the Himalayas and by Pakistan. It does not really have direct access to Central Asia.
Pakistan is different. It has direct access to Central Asia while also possessing major ports at Karachi and Gwadar that connect to the sea.
Field Marshal Asim Munir (Pakistan’s powerful army chief) also has a good relationship with [US President Donald] Trump. President Trump has recognized that and has clearly decided to lean on Pakistan -- not only for mediation involving Iran, but also because he sees Pakistan as a crucial partner in the broader strategic competition across Eurasia involving China and Russia.
RFE/RL: Is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor now emerging as Central Asia's preferred alternative to Iran?
Moriyasu: What's interesting is how Pakistan is playing this. Pakistan is engaging more with the United States, but that does not mean it is shifting away from China. It is very important for Americans to understand that by engaging more closely with Washington, Pakistan is actually encouraging China to become even more committed to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Pakistan is using both sides, and it is working. If you look at the recent meeting between Pakistan's senior leadership and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Kyrgyzstan, China said it highly appreciated Pakistan's mediation efforts between Iran and the United States and would provide as much support as possible for those efforts.
That was in July. Just two months earlier, when [Pakistani] Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited [Chinese President] Xi Jinping, China's language was much more restrained. Beijing appreciated Pakistan's efforts but did not offer additional support.
In just two months, China significantly upgraded its position, and I think that is a direct consequence of Pakistan becoming closer to President Trump.
RFE/RL: Does the Iran conflict ultimately strengthen China's influence across Central Asia?
Moriyasu: The feedback I received is that Central Asian countries are worried about replacing dependence on Russia with dependence on China. But the reality is that China is increasingly becoming the only practical option.
Iran is desperate not to lose this war, but through its own actions it is losing Central Asia."
A good example is Kazakhstan. Its main oil export pipeline to the Black Sea has effectively been disrupted because of drone attacks, most likely linked to Ukraine's campaign against Russian infrastructure. Around 80 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports normally move through the Black Sea.
Kazakhstan has two alternatives. One is the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. The other is the existing pipeline to China.
Although Kazakhstan would prefer the Middle Corridor, oil must first be transported by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Baku, which limits capacity.
The quickest solution is simply to send more oil to China, and I think that is what will happen.
So, despite Central Asia's concerns about becoming overly dependent on China, that dependence is increasing unless countries such as the United States and Japan invest in Caspian infrastructure that would expand oil shipments between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
RFE/RL: From Tehran's perspective, could losing Central Asia become Iran's biggest strategic setback since sanctions were imposed?
Moriyasu: Yes. Iran is desperate not to lose this war, but through its own actions it is losing Central Asia. At the same time, it is not only Iran that is pushing Central Asia away. US policy is also contributing.
For example, there have been attacks around Chabahar, the southern Iranian port where India has invested to create an alternative to Gwadar. Those developments make it much harder for an Iran-based trade corridor to compete with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
So, this is partly Iran's responsibility, but it is also a consequence of US policy. Together, they are making the Iran route far less relevant.
