WASHINGTON -- Despite renewed US strikes on Iran, attacks around the Gulf, and President Donald Trump's shifting proposals on the Strait of Hormuz, veteran Middle East scholar Francis Gregory Gause argues that diplomacy is still alive, and that both Washington and Tehran are once again maneuvering to strengthen their positions before an eventual return to negotiations.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Francis Gregory Gause III, professor emeritus at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington, D.C., discussed the latest escalation between the US and Iran, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, the impact of a renewed US blockade, and why he believes diplomacy remains the only realistic endgame.
RFE/RL: We've seen four consecutive nights of US strikes inside Iran. Looking at the past 72 hours, what has changed strategically between Washington and Tehran? Despite the fighting, are meaningful diplomatic channels still alive?
Francis Gregory Gause: I think diplomatic channels are still alive. I think even the [US] president has indicated that he's more than willing to engage diplomatically. I mean, I think there was a fundamental inability to come to a meeting of the minds between the two sides, even in the memorandum of understanding.
It's clear that the Trump administration thought the memorandum of understanding meant that the straightforward move would return things to the status quo ante. It was equally clear that the Iranians read the memorandum as giving them a direct role in managing -- and eventually the ability to charge ships for using -- the Strait of Hormuz. The fact that the two sides couldn't even agree on something as basic as that indicated that the memorandum of understanding was seriously flawed.
Despite the resumption of military strikes by both the US and Iran, I don't see an alternative to coming back to the table because neither side can completely defeat the other. We saw that during the most intensive period of the conflict back in April and May. Eventually, the same incentives that drove both Iran and the US back to negotiations are going to take hold again.
RFE/RL: How much of the current military pressure is about the battlefield, and how much is really about shaping the next round of negotiations?
Gause: I think it's all about shaping the next round of negotiations. It's unlikely that a new round of air strikes, which is what we're seeing now, is suddenly going to produce regime change. I just don't see that.
So I think the military strategy is basically trying to increase the economic pain, military losses, and infrastructure damage in Iran in order to get Tehran back to the table. Then perhaps a more professional negotiation on the American side can produce an agreement, a memorandum of understanding, or a cease-fire that can actually stick.
'The Blockade Is More Effective Than Air Strikes'
RFE/RL: President Trump has abandoned his proposal for a 20 percent toll on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, but the administration is now moving ahead with a renewed blockade of Iranian ports. In practical terms, what does such a blockade actually look like?
Gause: I think it practically means that the US Navy sits outside Iranian ports and outside the Strait of Hormuz and stops ships that it has information are heading toward Iranian ports.
It was relatively effective the first time around, and I think it was one of the things that brought the Iranians to the table. It will be interesting to see how long Iran resists returning to negotiations once the blockade begins to bite.
I think the blockade is probably the more effective tool in the American toolbox right now than military strikes. The Iranian regime has endured similar military strikes for months, but the blockade, first implemented in May, was the thing that eventually led the Iranian leadership to conclude that it needed to get those restrictions lifted for its own economic survival. That is what originally brought them to the table.
RFE/RL: So you still believe the blockade could have a significant impact on Tehran's calculations?
Gause: Oh, yes. I think it is the thing that will have the greatest practical effect on the calculations in Tehran.
RFE/RL: Iran has continued to demonstrate that it can create uncertainty in the Gulf. Does that give Tehran leverage in future negotiations, or does it risk further isolating the country?
Gause: I think it gives them immediate leverage -- leverage over the short term.
In the longer term, though, if we're talking about years rather than months, it's going to encourage all kinds of actors to find alternative ways of moving products into and out of their countries without relying on the Strait of Hormuz.
We're already seeing the UAE announce plans to greatly expand pipeline capacity to the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Arabia already has a major pipeline to the Red Sea, and there's discussion about expanding that as well. Iraq has also signed a new agreement with Turkey to make greater use of the Kirkuk pipeline to the Mediterranean.
So I think we're going to see a lot of investment in alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. In the short term, Iran can leverage the control it has asserted over the strait for the first time. But over time, that leverage becomes a wasting asset.
'Each Side Is Testing How Much Pain The Other Can Absorb'
RFE/RL: If both sides continue exchanging limited strikes while avoiding a much larger war, is that a sustainable strategy, or does it become increasingly difficult to control
Gause: As long as missiles are flying, there's always the possibility that an inadvertent strike could trigger further escalation. That's always a risk.
But it seems very clear that the Trump administration is extremely reluctant to take a major escalatory step such as introducing ground troops. Likewise, I think the Iranians have developed a way of retaliating against Gulf states that damages them, sends political messages, and encourages those countries to press Washington toward negotiations, while avoiding an overwhelming American military response. So there seems to be a pattern developing here. Both sides are engaged in the classic, if foolhardy, game of chicken. Each is testing how much pain the other can absorb.
On the Iranian side, that's economic and infrastructure damage. On the American side, it's higher gasoline prices, the domestic political consequences of those increases, and growing international pressure to end the conflict and restore the flow of energy.
We know from the first round that both sides eventually saw an interest in ending the fighting, or at least reaching a cease-fire. It seems to me that we'll get there again, probably sooner rather than later.
What To Watch For Next
RFE/RL: You believe diplomacy remains possible. What confidence-building measures would signal that serious negotiations are resuming?
Gause: It seems to me that we've had mediators before -- the Pakistanis and the Qataris. If they become active again, that would be an important sign that both Tehran and Washington are willing to consider returning to some kind of cease-fire.
But the most important indicator will be whether Iran is willing to accept what the Trump administration believed had already been agreed to in the original memorandum -- namely free transit through the Strait of Hormuz. If the Iranians accept that, then it seems to me there is every chance this conflict can come to an end.
Now, Iran could accept free transit for more than 60 days without abandoning its longer-term claim that it should eventually play some role in managing the strait. But in the immediate term, allowing the free flow of shipping is the key to stopping this round of fighting.
RFE/RL: Conversely, what developments over the coming days or weeks would convince you that the window for diplomacy is actually closing?
Gause: I'm not sure that the coming days are the right time frame. Each side is going to test the will of the other. On the American side, the political costs come from rising gasoline prices, and that may take weeks rather than days to have a real impact. Likewise, the blockade won't immediately damage the Iranian economy, but it will fairly soon.
So I would expect this exchange of fire to continue for more than just a few days -- perhaps a few weeks -- before serious negotiations begin, as both sides continue testing the other's willingness to bear the pain.
