WASHINGTON -- Russia's deepening partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea -- creating an "axis of upheaval" --represent one of the most significant geopolitical realignments driven by the war in Ukraine.
Yet according to Andrea Kendall-Taylor, senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), viewing this grouping through the lens of a traditional military alliance misses the bigger picture.
In an interview with RFE/RL, she explains what Moscow gains from this network designed to erode American influence, undermine Western sanctions, and secure Russia's standing in a multipolar world.
The interview has been edited for clarity and length.
RFE/RL: In practical terms, what makes this dynamic network so dangerous to Western security?
Andrea Kendall-Taylor: The way I summarize the impact of the axis of upheaval is that these partnerships amplify the military capabilities of all of the US' and its allies' adversaries while simultaneously diluting the foreign policy tools, such as sanctions, that we rely on to confront them.
Because of their cooperation, these countries are becoming more militarily capable, while our sanctions and other forms of pressure are becoming less effective.
RFE/RL: What does Vladimir Putin gain from these partnerships that Russia could not achieve alone?
Kendall-Taylor: The benefits have been most visible during the war in Ukraine, which has served as a major accelerant in deepening these relationships.
China, Iran, and North Korea have each enabled Russia to sustain the war in ways that simply would not have been possible without their support.
North Korea has supplied vast quantities of ammunition. Even if much of it has been low quality, the sheer volume has been critical at key moments. We also know North Korea deployed troops to Russia's Kursk region and elsewhere, providing another significant form of assistance.
Iran, early in the war, supplied drones and other munitions. Russia has since localized much of that production and improved the technology, but Iran's initial support represented a major battlefield advantage.
China has been the most important partner overall. It has enabled Russia to bypass Western sanctions and export controls, allowing access to semiconductors, component parts, and other critical technologies needed to sustain Russia's defense industry. Equally important, China has continued purchasing large volumes of Russian oil, injecting essential revenue into the Russian economy and helping finance the war.
Even after the war in Ukraine ends, I believe Russia will continue to value these relationships because its confrontation with the West -- especially the US -- is not going away. The Kremlin believes it is less isolated and less vulnerable when it operates alongside like-minded partners, and that places Russia in a stronger position for a prolonged strategic competition.
RFE/RL: If these partnerships are driven more by opportunity than ideology, what actually holds them together? What could eventually pull them apart?
Kendall-Taylor: The simplest answer is their shared opposition to the US and its power. All four countries believe the current international system does not provide them with the influence and status they think they deserve. Working together allows them to challenge that system more effectively.
China, for example, gains from instability that distracts the West. Iran benefits by tying down American military resources in the Middle East. Collectively, they understand that coordinated pressure can overstretch the US.
Over the next several years, I find it difficult to identify forces that would drive them apart. These governments increasingly view today's international environment as one in which power determines outcomes and weaker states remain vulnerable. That perception strengthens the incentives to cooperate.
Their partnerships help ensure each remains influential and better positioned to compete with the US that, from their perspective, is increasingly alienating its allies. They are stronger together.
An Alliance Without A Treaty
RFE/RL: Because this grouping operates as a fluid coalition rather than a traditional treaty-bound alliance, does that inherent ambiguity make it significantly harder for the US and its partners to counter?
Kendall-Taylor: Yes. There has been considerable debate in Washington and among allied governments over how to characterize these relationships. Some question how deep and durable they really are. Others worry that describing them as an emerging bloc could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by pushing them even closer together.
Because this is not a formal alliance but a set of flexible, pragmatic partnerships, it becomes harder for the US and its allies first to agree on the nature of the threat and then to develop an effective policy response. Without a shared understanding of the challenge, building a coherent strategy becomes much more difficult.
RFE/RL: The war in Ukraine has made Russia increasingly dependent on its partners. What is Moscow providing in return?
Kendall-Taylor: That is one of the central questions. Much attention has focused on what Russia receives, but it is equally important to understand what it is giving away. Russia is significantly strengthening the military capabilities of each of its partners.
Its relationship with North Korea has probably changed the most during the war. The two countries now have a mutual defense agreement, and although much of the cooperation remains covert, we know North Korea seeks assistance with satellite technology, missile accuracy and range, submarine capabilities, and other advanced military systems. Russia possesses expertise in many of those areas.
China is a somewhat different case because its military modernization has reduced the number of areas where Russia can contribute. Still, technologies related to nuclear submarines -- particularly reducing their acoustic signature -- remain highly significant. Such capabilities would have direct implications in a Taiwan contingency.
Russia is also sharing operational lessons learned from Ukraine. That experience is especially valuable because China's military lacks recent large-scale combat experience. Joint exercises and battlefield lessons help Beijing address one of its principal military disadvantages.
In Iran's case, we are seeing cooperation unfold in real time. Russia has reportedly provided intelligence support and transferred updated drone technologies derived from battlefield experience in Ukraine. Those improvements are enhancing Iran's military capabilities today rather than in some hypothetical future scenario.
RFE/RL: Despite offering military technology and political backing, Moscow has consistently shied away from getting directly involved when partners like Iran face security crises. What explains this strategic restraint?
Kendall-Taylor: Iran illustrates perfectly how the axis of upheaval operates. The cooperation is genuine and increasingly consequential, but it is always constrained by each country's own priorities, tolerance for risk, and desire to avoid direct confrontation with the US.
For Russia, the war in Ukraine remains the overriding priority. Putin's willingness to accept risk is largely consumed by that conflict. He is reluctant to undertake actions elsewhere that could escalate tensions with Washington or undermine Russia's primary military effort.
That restraint could change after the war. As Russia rebuilds its military and regains confidence, it may be willing to provide substantially greater support to its partners.
At the same time, none of these governments wants a direct war with the US. Their objective is to preserve friendly regimes and raise the costs Washington faces in multiple regions.
From Russia's perspective, a prolonged conflict involving Iran benefits Moscow because it ties down American military resources, consumes US air defenses, and diverts attention away from Ukraine. Even if active fighting subsides, Russia will continue to value Iran's ability to distract the US through lower-level confrontation across the Middle East.
RFE/RL: From Moscow's perspective, does China remain Russia's indispensable partner, or have Iran and North Korea become equally important over the long term?
Kendall-Taylor: China remains Russia's most important partner by far. Putin has no closer relationship than the one he has with Xi Jinping. We've heard the phrase "no limits partnership," and while there are certainly limits, the relationship remains exceptionally important.
Russia has become deeply dependent on China economically. Many observers believed Putin would resist becoming the junior partner in such an asymmetric relationship. But because he views the war in Ukraine -- and the broader confrontation with the US -- as existential, he has been willing to accept that growing dependence.
Ultimately, Putin is an opportunist. I think he believes that once the immediate crisis passes, Russia may be able to recover some of the leverage it has lost since the war began.
RFE/RL: Some analysts argue this grouping is merely a partnership of convenience rather than a lasting geopolitical realignment. Where do you come down in that debate?
Kendall-Taylor: I think these are durable partnerships. International relationships become stronger through repeated cooperation. Shared experience builds trust and creates institutions and habits that can last.
Russia and Iran fought together in Syria. Iran then supported Russia during the war in Ukraine. Now Russia is helping Iran. Even though there are real limits and significant distrust, those repeated interactions are building the foundations of a more enduring relationship.
Iran is probably Russia's most replaceable partner. China is different.
The Russia-China relationship predates the war in Ukraine by decades. It has been steadily deepening since the latter years of the Cold War. Economic ties continue to expand, and cooperation increasingly extends beyond top leaders to lower levels of government and society. The longer those connections continue, the stronger the scaffolding becomes for a partnership that could endure for many years.
RFE/RL: Is there a major fault line between Moscow and Beijing that Western policymakers should try to exploit?
Kendall-Taylor: The asymmetry in the relationship remains the most important issue from Russia's perspective.
The fact that Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China -- and risks becoming China's junior partner -- is a source of unease in Moscow. Reinforcing that perception and highlighting Russia's growing dependence could feed into concerns that already exist within the Russian elite.
That said, I think exploiting those tensions is difficult. Policymakers should continue looking for opportunities, but they should also recognize the limits of what outside actors can accomplish.
RFE/RL: If the defining feature of the axis is flexibility rather than formal commitments, does that require a different policy response from Washington?
Kendall-Taylor: Yes. I would spend less time trying to drive wedges between these countries.
Russia and China have disagreements over the Arctic, Central Asia, India, and other issues. There are genuine fissures in the relationship. But what we've seen is that their shared determination to counter the US consistently outweighs those differences. They compartmentalize disagreements because preserving the broader partnership is more important than resolving every dispute.
The US has relatively little leverage to exploit those divisions. Instead, Washington should work around the axis rather than confront it directly. That means strengthening relationships with important swing states such as Turkey, Brazil, Vietnam, and South Africa, limiting the axis' access to technology, preventing it from expanding its military footprint, and reducing its influence beyond its current members.
Ultimately, the goal should be to contain the network rather than assume it can be broken apart.
RFE/RL: Is the US military prepared to deter an axis capable of creating simultaneous crises in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific?
Kendall-Taylor: There are really two parts to that question. First, as the US alienates allies, it weakens one of its greatest strategic advantages. While the axis of upheaval is deepening cooperation, Washington risks undermining its own alliance network, which remains one of America's greatest strengths.
Second, from a military standpoint, encouraging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense is the right approach.
The US is not structured to fight major conflicts simultaneously in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. If Europe can build stronger conventional deterrence against Russia, it allows the US to concentrate more resources on the Indo-Pacific should a crisis emerge there.
That would leave Washington in a much stronger position to manage the simultaneous challenges this axis increasingly presents.
RFE/RL: Looking beyond the immediate conflict in Ukraine, what indicators or turning points should observers watch over the coming years to gauge whether this network maintains its momentum?
Kendall-Taylor: Leadership is one of the most important variables.
There are no obvious signs that Vladimir Putin faces an imminent challenge, but both Putin and Xi Jinping have been the principal architects of the Russia-China relationship. Their close personal relationship has driven much of the cooperation from the top down.
If there were eventually a leadership transition in Russia, it would be important to watch how a new leader approached China. Any future Russian government will value stable relations with Beijing -- they share a long border and have strong strategic reasons to maintain cooperation -- but a different leader could alter the tone, depth, or direction of the partnership.
Another important indicator is whether the axis expands. I will be watching whether additional countries -- such as Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, or others -- become more closely integrated into this network. If the axis succeeds in broadening its membership or influence, that would be a significant development and an important measure of its long-term trajectory.
