WASHINGTON -- Developments around the Strait of Hormuz are moving fast, two days after the start of a US naval blockade.
While US Central Command initially stated no ships had made it past the blockade of Iranian ports and six vessels had turned back, later reports indicated that around 20 commercial vessels had transited the strait in the past 24 hours.
The US blockade specifically targets ships entering or leaving Iranian ports; ships transiting to or from non-Iranian ports are still permitted to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
In an interview with RFE/RL on April 14, Azeem Ibrahim, a longtime Middle East observer and director of special initiatives at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, D.C., said the Strait of Hormuz is increasingly becoming more than just a chokepoint for oil, describing it as a space where economic pressure, military risk, and geopolitical ambition converge, with significant implications for what comes next.
RFE/RL: Two days into the blockade, what do you see as its core objective? Is it pressure or leverage?
Azeem Ibrahim: It's difficult to say because US objectives have been shifting. Around 88 percent of the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is non-Iranian. That means Gulf countries -- and major consumers like China, which gets roughly a third of its oil from this route -- are heavily affected.
We've already seen signals from Beijing pushing back, emphasizing that its energy arrangements with Iran are not open to outside interference. Reports indicate that some ships -- particularly Chinese -- are bypassing the blockade altogether.
If vessels can pass through, then it raises serious questions about whether this is a blockade in any meaningful sense.
'Long-Term Capacity To Absorb Pain'
RFE/RL: But the US were seeking leverage. How quickly could that translate into real concessions?
Azeem Ibrahim
Ibrahim: That's one of the central challenges. This conflict won't be decided by who can inflict the most damage, but by who can endure the most. The US unquestionably has superior military power. But Iran has demonstrated a long-term capacity to absorb pain.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran endured immense losses, including chemical attacks, yet did not capitulate. For Tehran, this is existential. Conceding could mean the end of the regime.
Iranian leaders have also studied US conflicts like the Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan. In both cases, the US achieved battlefield success but ultimately withdrew. Tehran believes Washington lacks the patience for prolonged confrontation.
So Iran is likely to wait it out. Its system has been structured over decades to endure precisely this kind of pressure.
RFE/RL: If Iran continues to resist, what is the next step for Washington -- more pressure, or a shift in strategy?
Ibrahim: If I had to guess, I would say the blockade may simply fizzle out. Ships -- especially those backed by major powers -- will continue to pass. Eventually, the US may declare a form of victory and withdraw.
But the long-term consequences could be significant. Iran has effectively weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global oil flows. This creates an opportunity for Tehran to monetize access, potentially charging vessels for safe passage.
At the same time, we're seeing a shift in sanctions enforcement. Some previously restricted oil -- both Iranian and Russian -- is reentering the market to stabilize supply.
Perhaps most concerning is the strategic lesson Iran may draw. With [former Supreme Leader] Ali Khamenei gone and his religious prohibition on nuclear weapons no longer binding, Tehran may conclude that only a nuclear deterrent can prevent future conflicts. That outcome would run counter to the goals of nearly all international actors.
Could Iranian Retaliation Be Contained?
RFE/RL: If there is retaliation, how contained can this remain? And what does that say about the risk of broader escalation -- are we already approaching a point where the conflict could widen beyond the Strait of Hormuz and draw in additional regional or external actors?
Ibrahim: Iran has already signaled it could target desalination plants across the Gulf. In a region where water scarcity is acute, that would be catastrophic.
At the same time, US military bases -- long considered secure due to air superiority -- are increasingly vulnerable to drones and missile strikes. The battlefield has changed.
There's also external involvement. Support from Russia in intelligence and from China in materiel complicates the balance. Iran still holds significant asymmetric leverage.
RFE/RL: Where do US allies stand in this?
Ibrahim: The challenge is that countries most affected by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz may not blame Iran -- they may blame Washington.
The US is the world's largest oil producer and less vulnerable to supply shocks. But countries heavily dependent on Gulf energy could face severe consequences. Many are already exploring independent diplomatic channels with Tehran.
We're seeing signs of fragmentation in the international order the US helped build. Some governments are openly considering bypassing Washington in negotiations. That's a significant shift.
RFE/RL: Are China and Russia benefiting from this situation
Ibrahim: Yes. They see the US becoming entangled in another costly and complex Middle Eastern conflict. Meanwhile, Washington is expending vast resources and depleting key munitions.
This also exposes limitations in the US and European defense industrial base. Sustaining a long-term, high-intensity conflict is proving difficult.
For China in particular, there are strategic opportunities. Hypothetically, even a blockade of Taiwan could shift global pressure dramatically, especially given Taiwan's central role in semiconductor production.
RFE/RL: Ultimately, what would a successful outcome look like?
Ibrahim: Ideally, it would mean a negotiated agreement in which Iran commits to abandoning nuclear weapons ambitions, allows full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and takes steps to reduce regional tensions. In return, it would receive sanctions relief and a degree of economic reintegration into the global system.
But that outcome, in my view, looks increasingly unlikely. From Tehran's perspective, even compliance may not provide durable security guarantees. The leadership may calculate that agreements can be reversed or undermined over time and that confrontation with the United States and its partners is therefore effectively inevitable.
On that basis, they may conclude that the more rational long-term strategy is to absorb pressure now and emerge later with more deterrence capabilities rather than rely on a deal that may or may not hold. That's the challenge the US has to confront as we move forward.