WASHINGTON-- Iran’s war effort extends beyond the Middle East. By supplying Russia with drones and enabling its long-range strikes in Ukraine, Tehran has already become an active participant in a major war on European soil -- a development that analyst Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says represents a critical turning point in both Iran’s confrontation with the West and the broader alignment of authoritarian powers.
In testimony before the Helsinki Commission earlier this week, Taleblu warned that this alignment reflects more than tactical coordination. The commission is an independent congressional agency that monitors human rights and security cooperation across Europe and Eurasia. While countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea differ in ideology and political systems, Taleblu argued they are increasingly bound by shared traits -- repression at home and revisionist ambitions abroad.
In an interview with RFE/RL on April 24, Taleblu outlined how the Russia-Iran partnership has evolved from pragmatic cooperation into what he calls a “transformational” relationship -- one that is reshaping modern warfare and linking conflicts from Ukraine’s front lines to instability across the Middle East.
RFE/RL: You have described a burgeoning “Axis of Aggressors” comprising Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. How coordinated is this grouping in practice, and should it be understood as a formal alliance or a looser alignment?
Behnam Ben Taleblu: I think we in the West are spoiled by the definition of an alliance, particularly after World War II, when allies look alike and talk alike. But the real definition of an ally, or at least a partner -- particularly in the old world and for many thousands of years -- has really just been two countries or two actors shooting in the same direction for a sustained period of time.
That is a partnership, that is an alliance, and that defines the shared interest of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to work together more. There are lots of things that divide these countries -- from politics to ideology to different systems -- but what unites them is that they are a constellation of anti-American actors who are authoritarian at home and predatory abroad, and they have revisionist intentions.
Behnam Ben Taleblu
Increasingly, what we are seeing in the world is that they are more willing to coordinate these days than ever before. And even when they do not coordinate, they intonate -- they learn from one another, and they draw on capabilities different actors have tested in other theaters.
The willingness of at least some of these actors -- Russia and China, Russia and Iran -- to be more directly involved in each other’s conflicts is a very troubling sign for foreign policy ahead, especially for countries that consider themselves pro-stability and pro-status quo.
RFE/RL: Focusing now specifically on the Russia-Iran dynamic -- given the historically complicated and often uneasy relationship between these two countries -- what makes this current phase, which you describe as “transformational,” different from earlier periods of cooperation? What has changed?
Taleblu: In my view, in the post-Cold War period, we saw the Islamic republic, after the Iran-Iraq War, turn to Russia to rebuild its conventional military capabilities, as well as to grow its missile and nuclear programs.
But as much as the Islamic republic has looked to evolve from a junior partner to a full partner of Russia and China, they have selectively used the Islamic republic to push back on the Western alliance system.
The turning point came, in my view, sometime after the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) experience, and much more importantly amid the Syrian civil war and then following that into the Ukraine crisis.
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RFE/RL: Speaking of Ukraine, you argue that Iran is effectively participating in the war through its provision of drones and other systems. How significant has that support been on the battlefield?
Taleblu: There is no doubt in my mind that Ukraine is the real turning point. The conscious choice by the Islamic republic to downplay its historical differences with Russia and to emphasize similarities based on shared adversaries is what made this relationship move from transactional to transformational.
That support has enabled Russian long-range strike capabilities -- that is really what Iran has been doing in the Ukrainian theater for some time.
As you know, Russia uses drones in layered attacks to kill not just European civilians but also to strike European critical infrastructure and civilian infrastructure. Drones allow Putin to conserve more expensive and more powerful long-range strike assets like missiles.
It also allows him to maintain cheaper long-range strike options to erode the will of Ukraine -- and the will of the West -- to stay in the fight.
That military relationship, that material support, coupled with sanctions-busting assistance and enabling of the Russian “ghost fleet,” marks a major shift, in my view, in Iran-Russia relations.
RFE/RL: Beyond sustaining Russia’s war effort, is Iran also influencing how Russia fights?
Taleblu: Certainly, when it comes to drone production, the Iranians have helped with Russia’s ability to produce one-way attack drones on Russian territory.
The Russians have copied not just the Shahed-136 but also more advanced variants, marking a shift toward systems with improved navigation, anti-jamming capacity, and even jet propulsion rather than conventional propellers.
This reflects not just assistance, but adaptation -- and that is what makes this relationship more dangerous over time.
RFE/RL: On the other side of the relationship, Russia’s support for Iran appears more complex and sometimes less visible. What forms of assistance from Moscow are most concerning right now?
Taleblu: Part of the limitation may be about avoiding Western red lines. A big part is also that Russia is unlikely to transfer systems it urgently needs for its own war in Ukraine.
Another factor is that, given the relatively poor military capacity of the Islamic republic compared to powers like Israel or the United States, Russia may not want its hardware to be destroyed quickly in a conflict.
So there is a cocktail of reasons -- including mistrust -- limiting the level of direct military transfers. But in a world where Russia is providing satellite imagery and assistance with targeting, it is still able to support the Islamic republic.
If we look at the broader picture -- cash, gold, captured Western weapons, cyber support, intelligence assistance, and now targeting -- it becomes a powerful and lethal mix of support.
When you combine that with political backing at the United Nations and other international organizations, it is clear why Iran believes the risk of this partnership is worth the reward.
RFE/RL: You mentioned satellite cooperation and missile development. How close does Russian assistance bring Iran to achieving a true intercontinental ballistic missile capability?
Taleblu: That remains an open question. We do not know the full extent of Russia’s involvement in Iran’s space program, particularly when it comes to space launch vehicle capabilities.
However, it was significant enough for the US intelligence community to raise concerns in 2023, after just one year of Iranian material support to Russia.
The fact that Russia has helped put multiple Iranian satellites into low Earth orbit also means it is assisting Iran in building a militarily applicable space architecture -- even though Tehran claims these systems are for research or civilian purposes.
RFE/RL: To what extent is Russia learning from Iran -- particularly in areas like sanctions evasion and drone warfare? Is this becoming a two-way exchange that strengthens both sides?
Taleblu: Yes, this is increasingly a two-way exchange.
Iran has long experience with sanctions evasion, including the use of “ghost fleets,” and Russia is clearly benefiting from that playbook.
At the same time, cooperation in drone production and battlefield tactics shows how both sides are learning from each other and adapting capabilities tested in different conflicts.
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Taleblu: The choice for Moscow is not as zero-sum as it appears. Turning its back on the West does not automatically mean Russia will enable the Islamic republic of Iran to become a nuclear power.
For many years, that has been a concern of Russia -- to prevent the Islamic republic from becoming too strong and threatening its own interests, whether in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Caspian basin.
But the more tension Moscow has with the West, the more likely it may be to turn its back on global nonproliferation norms -- the norms that are increasingly under strain and increasingly in jeopardy.
RFE/RL: If the bond is tightening, the West must look for the seams. Given this trajectory, you’ve argued that the US should exploit “fault lines” in the relationship. Where do you see those vulnerabilities, and how could Washington act on them?
Taleblu: Those cracks remain in the mistrust that not just both countries have, but more importantly both polities and populations have of one another.
There is a lot that US-supported international media can do to emphasize that history and highlight those differences in reporting. More importantly, policymakers should put the relationship in a bright light -- exposing cooperation whenever it occurs -- to increase the political cost for both countries.
That may not prevent the relationship, but it can slow-roll it in the end.
RFE/RL: Finally, is this still a marriage of convenience, or are Russia and Iran becoming strategically bound for the long term? What is the single most urgent step Washington should take?
Taleblu: Even marriages of convenience, no matter how long they last, can be important. The question is whether the West can do something to make them less impactful.
For me, the terminology is less important than the practice. An alliance is not just what the West has with itself -- it is two actors willing to shoot in the same direction for a sustained period of time.
Here, it is not just strategy, but values -- these countries are anti-American, authoritarian at home, and predatory abroad. So even if this is temporary, I am worried about the impact that it can have.
In terms of what Washington should do, I would say twofold: continue highlighting the historical mistrust between these countries and consistently expose their cooperation at the highest political levels to raise the costs of that relationship.