WASHINGTON -- Diplomatic efforts to contain the widening Middle East crisis entered a critical phase this week as US officials sought to keep alive negotiations with Iran amid mounting regional tensions.
On June 2, the same day Israeli and Lebanese officials held a fourth round of US-mediated talks in Washington, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress he remained optimistic that nuclear negotiations with Tehran could resume despite growing uncertainty over a fragile cease-fire and renewed threats surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Rubio also insisted that sanctions relief would remain tied to Iran's nuclear program and not to any reopening of key shipping routes.
Meanwhile, Iran-linked actors across the region continued to test the limits of the uneasy truce, with Hezbollah rejecting a "partial cease-fire" proposal and US military officials reporting new Iranian missile activity against regional targets.
To better understand the state of the Iran talks and whether the region is moving toward a new strategic order, RFE/RL spoke with Dania Arayssi, program head and senior analyst at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, whose work focuses on Lebanon and the broader Middle East.
RFE/RL: As Washington pursues both Israeli-Lebanese talks and broader negotiations with Iran, how significant are today's meetings? Do they represent real progress, or are they largely symbolic at this stage?
Dania Arayssi: Iran always likes to bring Lebanon into any negotiation with the US, but I think it's important to distinguish these two elements. What's going on in Lebanon is that the Lebanese government is trying to reclaim its sovereignty, its territory, and control over its borders, and that's something it has been trying to do for a very long time.
But I think Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization in Lebanon, is trying to follow orders from Tehran, and the continuation of launching missiles and strikes on Israel often comes at times when there are slowdowns or setbacks in negotiations between Iran and the US. Tehran is using Hezbollah as an element in Lebanon to sustain pressure on Israel. The Lebanese government has been very clear that it wants to work with Israel to resolve these issues and disarm Hezbollah. I think today's meetings were productive and positive, and I expected them to be because both parties agree on the same objective.
Dania Arayssi, program head and senior analyst at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy
My expectation is that we are going to see Lebanese authorities working with Israel, under US mediation, to share intelligence on Hezbollah, particularly regarding weapons and arms stockpiles in Lebanon. This could help achieve mutually beneficial goals. I also expect the cease-fire between Lebanon and Israel to continue and potentially be expanded, with the US playing a key mediating role.
When it comes to Iran, I think Tehran is also trying to use Lebanon as leverage in negotiations. Iranian officials have made statements suggesting that Israeli military activity in Lebanon affects the pace of negotiations with Washington. Again, Lebanon is being used as a tool to slow down talks and complicate efforts to resolve the broader conflict. The US has been clear that Lebanon should not be part of these negotiations and that it is a separate sovereign country.
That being said, I do not expect negotiations with Iran to produce a meaningful outcome unless there is movement on the nuclear file. The current administration proposed a 20-year freeze on Iran's nuclear activities, which Tehran rejected. Any future nuclear agreement will also need to take Israel's security concerns into account because Iran is viewed as a major threat to Israel from a geographic and strategic standpoint.
Hezbollah's Mixed Messages
RFE/RL: Hezbollah has alternated between signaling openness to a cease-fire and rejecting key elements of proposed arrangements. How should we interpret these mixed messages, and what do they reveal about the pressures facing the group?
Arayssi: Hezbollah is divided internally over what peace should look like and how to pursue it. On one side, the group receives orders and directives from Iran regarding retaliation and military operations against Israel. On the other side, Hezbollah also has a constituency inside Lebanon -- people who support the group and have elected representatives linked to it and who are increasingly tired of this prolonged conflict.
So I think there are elements within Hezbollah that genuinely want a cease-fire and an end to the conflict. At the same time, they have to balance conflicting demands and pressures. With the pressure being applied by the Lebanese government and public opinion, I think Hezbollah will ultimately have to accept a cease-fire.
One of the key disputes during previous negotiations was over sequencing -- whether Hezbollah should stop launching missiles first, whether Israel should stop first, or whether both sides should halt operations simultaneously.
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Iranian Man 'Going To Prison' For Filming Tehran's Tiananmen MomentHezbollah is realizing that its own constituency, particularly Lebanon's Shi'ite population, has been among the groups most affected by the conflict. Continuing the war risks further harm to its own community, which is why I think acceptance of a cease-fire is becoming increasingly necessary.
RFE/RL: From a political, economic, and strategic perspective, can Hezbollah afford to reject a peace deal at this stage? Or is its hard-line rhetoric partly aimed at masking internal weaknesses?
Arayssi: From a political economy standpoint, I don't think Hezbollah can afford this war. One major source of Hezbollah's funding has traditionally come through Syria, including smuggling networks and financial support linked to Iran. With tighter border controls and changes in Syria, Hezbollah has lost many of those revenue streams. The Lebanese government has also shut down a number of Hezbollah-linked financial institutions, including Al-Qard Al-Hassan. In addition, many Hezbollah officials and affiliates remain under US sanctions.
Beyond that, Hezbollah no longer has the financial capacity it once had to support displaced communities affected by fighting. People who have had to leave their villages often lack adequate support. Some are living in tents or temporary shelters and are increasingly frustrated. Even Hezbollah fighters are facing shortages of resources and support. Taken together, these factors suggest Hezbollah lacks the political and economic means to sustain a prolonged war and will eventually have to accept a cease-fire.
RFE/RL: Who is making the key decisions in Lebanon today? Are the officials participating in Washington talks the real decision-makers?
Arayssi: I think we are witnessing something very important in Lebanon: genuine power-sharing. Decision-making is no longer concentrated in the hands of a single actor. It involves the president, the prime minister, and Lebanon's diplomatic leadership working together.
For the first time in a long time, we are seeing collective decision-making focused on peace, security, and reconstruction. Previously, power was heavily concentrated among Hezbollah and its allies. The emergence of a broader governing consensus is a significant development.
This is one reason why the US has worked to prevent further escalation in Beirut. There is a genuine belief among Western governments, particularly in Washington, that Lebanon is attempting to reclaim authority from Hezbollah and reduce Iranian influence.
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Former Senior Trump NSC Official Says Diplomacy 'Alive' As US, Iran, Battle For LeverageRFE/RL: Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is becoming increasingly involved in decision-making. What does that tell us about the stability of the Iranian system?
Arayssi: I think there is considerable uncertainty about decision-making inside Iran. Leadership structures have been disrupted, and there appears to be less clarity about who is responsible for major decisions and negotiations.
In a wartime environment, replacing senior figures and maintaining continuity becomes very difficult. Security concerns further complicate internal communication and coordination.
As a result, decision-making appears more concentrated among a smaller number of individuals, which can make consensus-building and negotiations more difficult.
RFE/RL: Is Washington negotiating with a unified Iranian leadership, or are internal divisions becoming more visible
Arayssi: There are divisions within Iran. There are individuals who favor accepting certain terms and pursuing a more pragmatic relationship with the international community. There are also more hard-line figures who continue to emphasize Iran's right to maintain a nuclear program.
These competing views create challenges for negotiations and make it harder to reach a final agreement.
A New Regional Order?
RFE/RL: Looking at the broader picture, do these crises point toward the emergence of a new regional order, or should each issue be addressed separately?
Arayssi: I think the US needs to recognize that a new regional order is emerging. Iran is an important regional actor with its own interests and worldview. The challenge is to build mechanisms of trust and communication that reduce risks and prevent conflict.
We are already seeing discussions about civilian nuclear capabilities elsewhere in the region, including in Saudi Arabia. That means the focus should be on building frameworks that ensure nuclear technology is not used to threaten other countries.
Ultimately, regional stability depends on sustained dialogue, communication, and cooperation among major actors.
RFE/RL: Some opposition groups in Iran once received significant attention abroad but seem less visible today. Why
Arayssi: I think there is growing recognition that political change in Iran must be driven by Iranians themselves. The US does not want to be perceived as imposing a political outcome or choosing Iran's future leadership.
There is also recognition that external attempts to engineer political transitions elsewhere in the region have produced mixed results. Policymakers are cautious about repeating those experiences.
If Iran's political future changes, it will need to be through a process that reflects the will of the Iranian people themselves rather than having outside actors select leaders on their behalf.