WASHINGTON -- As Washington and Tehran appear to edge toward a preliminary agreement, renewed fighting in Lebanon has cast uncertainty over the diplomatic track. Iran has warned that continued cease-fire violations in Lebanon could derail indirect talks with the US, while President Donald Trump insists negotiations are still moving ahead at a “rapid pace.”
RFE/RL spoke with Kirsten Fontenrose, former senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, about whether diplomacy can survive the latest escalation, how Iran is trying to link the Lebanon and nuclear tracks, and what signs she will be watching for in the coming days.
RFE/RL: Forty-eight hours ago, the story appeared to be that Washington and Tehran were moving closer to an agreement. Today, the question is whether the talks can survive the crisis in Lebanon. What changed, and how concerned should we be that diplomacy is slipping away?
Kirsten Fontenrose: I actually think the changes during this weekend are a sign that diplomacy is still very alive. We saw developments on two different fronts. First, there is the question of Lebanon. Israel was pushing harder into southern Lebanon, further than it had before, and was taking territory it once held between 1992 and 2000, when it first pushed Hezbollah out of that crusader castle Hezbollah had been using to attack Israel.
We then saw President [Donald] Trump ask Israel not to go into Beirut because there is concern on the diplomatic front that Israel holding some of the territory it has been retaking would stop negotiations and eliminate the chance for peace. President Trump has essentially said: “Please do not go into Beirut. There are too many populations we do not want to lose there. We are not looking to scare the Lebanese people. This is between Israel and Hezbollah, not between Israel and the Lebanese people, not the population of Beirut. Dahieh is one little neighborhood. Let’s handle this another way.” That means diplomacy is still alive. It does not mean this is done, but it at least means the discussion is happening.
The other change was that President Trump held a meeting at the White House on [May 29] to discuss the draft framework being circulated. A lot of opponents of the draft were interested in what would come out of that meeting, and what came out of it was essentially a non-decision. On [May 31], following that meeting, President Trump sent a list of requirements for a memorandum of understanding framework to interlocutors to deliver to Iran. What we understand is that this version is a little more stringent. The asks have become harder. President Trump asked some tough questions during the meeting. For example, he questioned the loose language surrounding the nuclear program. If Iran agrees to export or downblend its enriched uranium, what happens if sanctions are relieved or the blockade is removed and revenues begin flowing? What prevents Iran from simply purchasing a nuclear weapon from another country?
Those of us who follow nuclear issues think about places such as North Korea, China, or even Pakistan, depending on global conditions. As a result, the team worked on tightening the language. There are now more specifics in the US draft regarding where and how enriched uranium would be exported, and more specifics regarding reopening the strait. From what we understand, it is more of a reward-for-action structure. Iran will not receive the economic lifeline it is seeking before it takes action to address international concerns.
Those who have watched Iran for a long time advised the president that once Tehran gets that economic lifeline -- once sanctions are lifted or the blockade is removed -- it will no longer make concessions on other issues. You will not see concessions on the nuclear program, missile program, or support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, or militias in Iraq. The president listened to those concerns. So now you are seeing the US side say it is not willing to separate the blockade issue entirely and restore revenue flows without guarantees regarding the framework for follow-on negotiations. For example, it may not be enough simply to restart nuclear talks after 30 days. There may need to be concrete results. All of that depends on Tehran’s response.
We do not know when to expect that response because, as far as Washington understands, the remnants of the regime are difficult to reach. They are being very careful not to reveal their locations. They are hiding in bunkers and cannot rely on technology to pass drafts or messages. It could be a week before an answer comes back, and then Washington will have to determine whether the response came from someone with actual authority.
RFE/RL: Iran is effectively arguing that what happens in Lebanon affects whether it can negotiate with Washington. Is Tehran creating new leverage for itself? Can US negotiators still compartmentalize these crises, or has that become impossible?
Fontenrose: You are really hitting on an excellent point, because that is exactly what Tehran is trying to do. If you are Tehran, it is understandable. First, it drives a wedge between the United States and Israel, which is one of your goals. Second, it throws a lifeline to Hezbollah, which is the prized fighter in the stable of groups Tehran sponsors. Right now, without Iran being able to resupply Hezbollah, the group is at a very weak point.
Israel is making the argument that this is the moment to finish its military operations and extinguish Hezbollah’s ability to pose a terrorist threat. Tehran does not want that to happen because its largest investment would be crushed. Hezbollah is not only Iran’s sharpest point against Israel; it is also its training squadron. It is the group Tehran sends around the world -- whether elsewhere in the region or in Latin America --- to train other operators and carry out activities that allow Tehran to keep its own hands clean.
If Iran loses Hezbollah, it loses a major mechanism for spreading influence and destabilizing activities globally. So Tehran very much wants to link these issues because it knows President Trump wants a deal directly with Iran. Tehran does not think it can persuade him to halt Israel’s operations in Lebanon unless the two tracks are tied together. That is very much what Iran is trying to do. Israel is very much trying to prevent it. In Washington, it is a very intense debate.
RFE/RL: Ahead of a new round of diplomacy, reports suggest Hezbollah may be willing to halt attacks reciprocally. Could that create new diplomatic space, or is the trust deficit already too deep?
Fontenrose: The trust deficit is extremely deep. But anything that creates diplomatic space is welcome. The challenge is that talks between Israel and Lebanon are not talks with Hezbollah. The cease-fire between the governments of Israel and Lebanon does not include Hezbollah.
Frankly, Hezbollah does not have a seat in these government-to-government discussions. So Hezbollah almost has to offer something, or it risks being left out entirely. Otherwise, the international community will pressure the Lebanese government to rein in Hezbollah.
The group has to make itself relevant by saying, “We will offer something,” or, “We will spoil something,” because otherwise it has no voice at the table. It is not a government.
RFE/RL: Is Israel becoming the decisive variable in whether these talks ultimately succeed or fail? Does it effectively have a veto over the process?
Fontenrose: Israel has its own say simply because it is not part of the United States. Whatever Washington agrees to, Israel does not automatically have to agree to. Most analysts believe Israel would avoid openly defying the United States because it would not want to damage that relationship.
At the same time, the Israeli government has said repeatedly that Israel cannot be put in a position where it is expected to absorb attacks without the ability to respond. That would make it a sitting duck. I do believe there is a point at which Israel could say: “All right, President Trump, you asked us not to go into Beirut, and we won’t. You want a cease-fire while talks continue, and we will honor that.”
But if Israel continues taking attacks from Hezbollah or others -- even while the United States is pursuing a cease-fire -- I do believe Israel would act.
RFE/RL: We have seen missile interceptions, attacks on shipping, and accusations of cease-fire violations. How fragile is the cease-fire right now?
Fontenrose: I know it sounds counterintuitive, but I actually think the fact that all sides continue to describe these incidents as cease-fire violations -- rather than declaring the cease-fire dead -- is a good sign. It suggests all sides want to keep escalation contained. They are not seeking a wider conflict.
By traditional definitions, some of these actions are not compatible with a cease-fire. But as long as none of the parties responds in a truly escalatory manner, and everyone continues pretending the cease-fire remains in place, that in itself is a positive indicator about the direction they want to go.
RFE/RL: Big picture: when negotiations appear close to a breakthrough, tensions often spike. Are we seeing both sides maximize leverage before a deal, or is this something more dangerous?
Fontenrose: I think it is exactly what you described. We have seen it in these negotiations and in many others. Every good negotiator tries to maximize leverage, and in this case all sides are strong negotiators. Each party enjoys the negotiation process.
There is a truth in international relations that the side most willing to make a deal often has the most leverage because it believes the agreement will be favorable. The challenge is persuading the other side.
The Iranian side is trying to exploit US weaknesses, including domestic political pressure and concerns about issues such as oil prices. They are running psychological operations aimed at amplifying those concerns among the American public.
The US, meanwhile, understands that Iran’s weakness is its economic situation. That is why you see a naval blockade that could remain in place for months without direct military action. It is designed to prevent Iran from earning revenue from oil exports because Washington understands how badly Tehran needs that money.
Both sides are trying to maximize leverage by targeting the vulnerabilities of the other. Right now, it is a race to see who can squeeze the other side to the point of desperation.
RFE/RL: Iran has threatened to activate other fronts, including around key maritime chokepoints such as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. How concerned should policymakers be that this crisis could spread beyond Lebanon?
Fontenrose: Honestly, I am surprised it has not already. Anyone who is only becoming concerned now has not been paying attention. The fact that the Houthis have not become more heavily involved suggests to me that they are not convinced Iran will emerge as the victor. At the same time, they have been quietly rebuilding stockpiles, producing drones, staying under the radar, and maintaining a relatively cold front with Saudi Arabia. They may be preparing for future contingencies.
Whether they follow Tehran’s direction is another question. They could decide involvement does not serve their domestic political objectives and would only invite pressure from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Western countries.
Iran could also activate militias in Iraq or potentially sleeper cells elsewhere, including in Latin America. Iran’s global asymmetric threat remains powerful because it is impossible to prove sleeper cells do not exist.
If you are Iran and much of your conventional military capability has been degraded, playing the asymmetric-threat card is powerful because it forces the world to remain vigilant everywhere, all the time -- even if, in reality, there is very little behind the threat.
RFE/RL: Gulf states have a strong interest in preventing a wider regional war. What role are they playing behind the scenes, and could they ultimately help rescue diplomacy?
Fontenrose: They could. What is interesting is that they are almost using tools from both the Iranian and American playbooks. That means they understand both sides better than Washington and Tehran understand each other.
Some Gulf states are condemning Iranian actions and, in certain cases, participating in strikes against Iranian offensive capabilities. At the same time, they are encouraging discussions about a deal that would address the short-range missiles that threaten them.
And, as you know very well, the Gulf states are not monolithic. Each country has different interests. The UAE has borne the brunt of Iranian pressure because it has alternative export routes. Iran may believe it must hit the UAE harder to inflict real economic damage. Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait are more dependent on access through the strait, so Iran can hurt them simply by closing it.
Iran also wants to avoid provoking a large-scale Saudi military response because Saudi Arabia possesses significant military capabilities and represents a major regional power. Oman occupies a different position. Tehran has tried to pull Muscat closer by arguing that cooperation would benefit Oman economically. At the same time, Oman does not want to alienate either Iran or the United States.
Each Gulf state is therefore pursuing its own strategy—whether through mediation, military participation, economic resilience, or diplomatic pressure.
RFE/RL: What would convince you that diplomacy is gaining momentum rather than sliding toward a wider regional conflict?
Fontenrose: I will be watching whether Iran agrees to language in a memorandum of understanding stating not only that it will dispose of highly enriched uranium, but also that it will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapon elsewhere. That would tell us whether Tehran’s claims that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian are even slightly truthful.
I will also be watching whether the naval blockade becomes part of a step-for-step arrangement. For example, Iran reduces stockpiles by a certain amount, and the blockade is eased proportionally. The details matter. If Iran offers concessions on nuclear, missile, or drone issues, you could see parts of the blockade lifted. In that case, the regime would have a sliver of a chance of survival.
Ultimately, it is all about timing and sequencing. The same three things could happen—sanctions relief, lifting the blockade, and nuclear negotiations—but the order matters more than the events themselves.
If sanctions are lifted and the blockade is removed before nuclear issues are resolved, then Iran effectively wins because it regains its economy and has little incentive to negotiate.
If nuclear issues are addressed first, followed by easing the blockade and then sanctions relief, then you have a deal where the United States achieves its goal of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and Iran regains part of its economy. It is all about the order.
