EU's foreign ministers gather in Ireland on September 1-2 for the traditional beginning of the autumn-term informal foreign affairs council, known in Brussels corridors as Gymnich after the German castle where the first of such meetings were held over 50 years ago.
The informality of the Gymnich means no decisions are taken, but the upside is that it allows for more in-depth discussions without the flock of aides and officials who normally surround the ministers at more regular council meetings.
This meeting aims to determine EU strategy ahead of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the end of September as well as the rest of the year. As in recent years, Europe's support for Ukraine is left, right, and center of this strategy: more specifically, how to help finance the country, continue to sanction Russia, and get other countries to increase their support for Kyiv.
SEE ALSO:
'Shanghai' Grouping At 25: Rifts, Rivalries, And A Show Of UnityFor now, sanctions might be easiest thing to agree on. Since the difficulties of getting the bloc's 21st package across the line in July and the many opt-outs when it came to the various sectoral sanctions proposed, the EU will now shift tactics.
The new plan is simply to concentrate on rolling, monthly updates to its asset freezes and visa bans blacklists. The list, which currently contains over 3,000 names, might add an additional 1,600 more in October as the EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service, is sending out proposals for new inclusions.
Most of these listings are expected to be agreed upon quickly as the majority aren't household names but rather officials and businesspeople involved in the defense sectors of Russia and Moscow-allied countries.
EU Looks To Allies
There's also the issue of rallying other non-EU countries to Ukraine's cause, and it is significant that the foreign ministers of non-EU Canada, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, and the United Kingdom are slated to attend the Gymnich.
The EU side will press these officials to step up funding for Ukraine and help improve Ukrainian air defense amid incessant Russia attacks. However, EU diplomats speaking under condition of anonymity believe the best bet of getting interceptors quickly for Kyiv now is if Japan, South Korea, and possibly Saudi Arabia could step up in this regard.
SEE ALSO:
Russia's Jet-Powered Drones: A Major New Threat To Ukraine Amid Speeding Arms RaceThe EU also hopes its closest allies can help ahead of UNGA regarding the situation in the Black Sea. With Russia targeting Ukrainian ships and Kyiv responding by hitting nearby Russian grain export terminals, the developing world is increasingly nervous about spiraling food prices akin to 2022 when the full-scale invasion started. Brussels and friends hope to secure some sort of cease-fire deal at least when it comes to Black Sea shipping of grains.
Addressing A Shortfall For Ukraine
Most of the talks will center around the need to finance Ukraine going forward. This comes after Ukraine estimated a 23 billion euro shortfall needed for personnel, social support, and weapons purchases that also includes some 6 billion euros in advance payments for deliveries due at the beginning of 2027.
The EU agreed on a 90 billion loan for Ukraine in late 2025 that would make up a large part of what Kyiv needed for both this year and next, but it's now clear that won't be enough. Ukraine has asked whether most of the funding could be provided sooner, rather than being split evenly between 2026 and 2027, with 45 billion euros allocated to each year. EU officials are currently assessing whether this would be feasible.
SEE ALSO:
Ukraine's Drone War Exposes An Uncomfortable Reliance On ChinaAhead of the Gymnich, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain & Sweden -- reflecting the north-south and east-west EU axis -- sent a letter to the European Commission to again look into the possibility of leveraging the 210 billion euros' worth of Russian frozen assets in the club.
The text, seen by RFE/RL, states there is "no sign that Russia is willing to end the aggression" and that "Ukraine needs more financial support in both the short and long term."
The idea of using Russian state assets, most of which are held by Euroclear, was last autumn's big idea even though it eventually was rejected, notably by Euroclear's host nation Belgium.
Brussels has not changed its stance, with the country's diplomats first leaking the quartet's letter to the media in order to drum up opposition.
But now it looks like Euroclear might be willing to move as there was considerable reputational damage for the company by simply holding onto the assets the longer Russia's assault on Ukraine's civil population continues.
There's a political argument holding that the issue of frozen assets is what truly matters to Russia as it was something Moscow pushed for repeatedly in its dealings with the United States when Washington was trying to settle the conflict.
Brussels, in other words, senses this is a card one can play to bring Russia back to the negotiating table.
SEE ALSO:
Aggressive Recruiters Are Rounding Up Russians To Fight In Ukraine. In One Town, They're Pushing BackThis would be for the next long-term EU budget for the period of 2028-2034 on which EU countries hope to reach consensus before the end of this year. In the original proposal, some 100 billion euros would be set aside for Ukraine.
There are three issues at play though. The first is that this money will only become available in 2028, so if there's not enough money for Kyiv for next year, some sort of stopgap is needed.
The second issue is the urgency to agree on the next long-term EU budget before next year, when several key European countries such as France, Italy, and Poland hold elections -- votes that could bring in populist governments that may not be too positively inclined toward Kyiv or toward bigger EU spending in general.
Then there's the third issue. The EU budget, which is likely to be around 1 trillion euros, is largely made up of contributions from member states relative to their gross national income. With money needed for so many items such as European defense, agriculture, and support for new tech innovations, the argument then goes: Why not use another pot of money such as Russian assets to pay for at least the Ukraine part of the budget?