Iran Has Tested the Gulf. Now Washington Must Rethink Its Security Role, Says Former Trump NSC Official Allison Minor

WASHINGTON -- Iran’s latest missile attacks on US forces and bases in the region have exposed growing strains in the decades-old US-Gulf security partnership, according to Allison Minor, director of the Atlantic Council’s Project for Middle East Integration and former director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the White House National Security Council during US President Donald Trump’s first term.

In a recent Atlantic Council analysis co-authored with Alina Romanowski, a former US ambassador to Kuwait and Iraq, Minor argued that Washington and its Persian Gulf partners should move away from a US security guarantee and toward regional integration, shared capabilities, and stronger partnerships.

RFE/RL spoke with Minor about why she believes the traditional US security model in the Gulf is no longer sustainable -- and what should replace it.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

RFE/RL: Iran has carried out attacks targeting US forces and bases in the region. What does this moment reveal about the vulnerabilities of the current US security posture in the region?

Allison Minor: I think this latest round of strikes just underscores the really tough situation that the US has found itself in, with an escalatory spiral that has proven extremely hard to get out of. The Iranian regime is making it clear that they will end this conflict on their own terms, and that they’re not afraid of continued confrontation with the US.

So, getting back to some sort of de-escalation, a cease-fire, and a new agreement on the Strait of Hormuz is going to be extremely difficult in these circumstances.

RFE/RL: Your Atlantic Council article argues that this is a turning point for the US-Gulf security partnership. Why do these latest attacks make a reset necessary now?

Minor: The tensions in US-Gulf security partnerships go back years. There’s been this overriding sense that the idea of a US security guarantee -- this idea of the Carter Doctrine (then-President Jimmy Carter's 1980 pledge to use US military force to defend vital American interests in the Persian Gulf) that has been in place for decades, and really was the overriding assumption in the region following the Gulf War -- has been fading.

And it’s been clear to Gulf partners that the US is not interested in living up to that commitment or capable of living up to that commitment, and many in Washington are questioning whether that is the right approach. So I think the Iran war has only exposed the tensions in this assumption of a US security guarantee in the Gulf, and Gulf partners were frustrated with Washington. They were not consulted before the outbreak of this war that really put them on the front lines and saw them face really unprecedented assaults.

RFE/RL: For decades, large US military bases have been the foundation of American power in the Persian Gulf. If the traditional security model is no longer sufficient, what should replace it?

Allison Minor: I think we should start with the question of what the US role should be. In a recent piece, I’ve argued that the US needs to really embrace this idea, which has been talked about for years, of transitioning from a guarantor to an integrator.

So the idea here is the US is not supposed to independently guarantee the security of Gulf countries. It can be a partner. It can work with those Gulf countries to help them come up with defenses against external threats and work collaboratively with them to help address broader regional instability.

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But it should not be the US going in independently and leading a campaign as it did with the Iran war, and certainly not without the consultation of key partners in the region, again, as was the case during the Iran war.

So, I think if you start with a conversation about what that new US security role in the region looks like, the answer of what US basing should look like will follow more naturally.

RFE/RL: Just so we are clear, should the US move away from being the region’s primary security guarantor and toward being more of a partner that helps Gulf states build their own capabilities? Is that your position?

Allison Minor: Exactly. Gulf states, I think, realize now they cannot rely on the US to guarantee their security. That was quite clear. The US has proven incapable of addressing the Iranian threats to the Gulf either via military action or via negotiations, so the idea of the US as the security guarantor in the Gulf -- that idea is already gone.

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RFE/RL: How can Washington reassure Gulf partners while avoiding deeper military entanglement in a conflict that could continue to expand?

Allison Minor: I think there’s the immediate challenge of how the US can reassure Gulf partners as the Iran conflict continues to rage on.

That needs to be dealt with first. The US needs to get back to a more sustainable cease-fire agreement with Iran, and one that addresses the challenge in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s attempts to control the strait, which essentially gives them a noose around the neck of Gulf economies. So that needs to be dealt with first.

RFE/RL: US officials and others have highlighted the need for stronger regional capabilities. You also served during President Trump’s first term at the National Security Council. Is this an entirely new idea? Should the priority be integrated missile defense, intelligence sharing, cyber resilience, maritime security, or something else?

Minor: It’s definitely not a new idea. The idea of the US pivoting from a guarantor to an integrator in the Gulf has been talked about certainly during the first Trump administration, but even before that.

And again, it’s formally addressed in the 2023 CENTCOM operation plan. So it’s not a question of embracing the idea. It’s a question of actually operationalizing it and changing the way that the US operates in the region.

RFE/RL: We have also seen Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasingly seek greater strategic independence. What role should those Gulf powers play in leading regional security moving forward?

Minor: I think that they do need to play a larger role. Look, we need to be clear that there are very significant divisions between Gulf countries, and especially right now, we’re seeing this rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE as both seek to vie for varying levels of regional leadership.

It’s not the time for a fully unified Gulf security architecture, but that’s why the US role is so valuable.

Allison Minor

RFE/RL: Beyond military cooperation, what diplomatic or political changes are needed to create a more durable, Iran-proof security architecture in the Gulf?

Minor: Until we end the Iran war, all of this is going to be very difficult. It’s an extremely difficult environment. All actors, whether it’s in Europe or in the Gulf, are hesitant to get entangled in the US-led campaign in Iran.

The first step is ending the Iran war, and then it’s having this conversation with partners about where are the opportunities, how can we rebuild some sort of consensus policy on dealing with regional threats…How can we rebuild a consensus policy with our partners on that critical regional issue?

RFE/RL: Looking ahead, what would success look like if the US and its allies succeed in creating a new security posture and architecture in the region? How would we know that this reset in US-Gulf security relations is actually working three to five years from now?

Minor: That’s a great question. The early indicators would be a lowering of tensions between Washington and Gulf capitals because there’s this shared understanding of what that relationship should look like, and a sense that we’re both living up to those commitments.

In the longer term, the primary purpose of these kinds of security partnerships is deterrence.

It is providing the level of peace and stability because potential foes, competitors, non-state actors believe that that security architecture is so strong.

So I think if we can actually build a stronger integrated Gulf security architecture that is supported by the US, that is supported by other trusted partners in Europe and beyond, that is seen as sufficiently robust, sufficiently resilient, sufficiently diversified, that actors -- whether it be a future Iranian regime, non-state actors like the Houthis -- feel that this security architecture is strong enough that they don’t even want to go up against it.