Iran: U.S. Experts Discuss Russia And The Nuclear Issue

  • By Andrew Tully
Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani (right), and Vice President for Atomic Energy Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh in Moscow in March (epa) WASHINGTON, May 26, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- The United States and three European Union nations -- Britain, France, and Germany (the EU-3) -- remain determined to prevent Iran from moving ahead with its nuclear program, which they suspect is meant to develop nuclear weapons. But Russia seems to be an obstacle.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a Washington-based policy-research center, held a seminar on the problem on May 25 that focused on Russia's role in resolving the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program.


Despite Russia's statements against nuclear-weapons proliferation, one of the leaders of the meeting said it would be hard to say that this is Moscow's overwhelming concern.


Stephen Sestanovich, a CFR senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies, said Russia's unwillingness to get tough with Iran is due in part to Russia's commercial interests in Iran and Moscow's tendency to oppose UN sanctions in general.


Is Russia's Postion Shifting?


Sestanovich said that events surrounding the Iran issue over the last year -- these events include Iran's behavior regarding inspections and inflammatory statements by Ahmadinejad -- suggest Russia might take a harder line with Tehran in the future.


Also, Sestanovich said, Russia sees that the United States and the EU have been more unified than they were ahead of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.


Sestanovich said the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has made some effort to persuade Russia to side with the West, such as raising the possibility of full membership of the Group of Eight (G8) leading industrialized nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO).


But, given Russia's strong economy driven by high world energy prices, these incentives may seem weak to Moscow, Sestanovich said.


At the same time, Sestanovich said, he believes recent U.S. lectures about the state of Russia's democracy probably haven't driven much of a wedge between Moscow and the West, at least on the Iran issue. He said the Russian leadership is used to such lectures and doesn't tend to link them with matters such as Iran.


What may be lost in all the talk of efforts to get Russia to agree with the West, Sestanovich said, is what he called Moscow's clear and straightforward approach to Iran.


A Different Approach


"The U.S.-EU discussion so far has been about carrots and sticks, sort of what we threaten the Iranians with or what we offer them," Sestanovich argued. "And the Russians are coming into this discussion in a slightly different way. They're saying, 'We need to rethink what we're demanding of the Iranians, and not what price they'll pay or what benefits they'll gain.'"


Sestanovich said Moscow agrees with the West that the Iranian government is doing wrong by proceeding with its nuclear program, but that Moscow also believes Tehran can "be redeemed." He said the United States and the EU believe such an attitude from Russia undermines their efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.


The other leader of the seminar was Charles Kupchan, the CFR's director of Europe studies. Kupchan said the Bush administration eventually may have as much trouble persuading the EU-3 to get tough with Iran as it now has persuading Russia.


U.S.-EU Agreement In Danger?


Kupchan said he expects the current cohesion between the United States and the EU to last only a relatively short while, so long as punitive actions against Iran include what he called "light sanctions," such as denying visas to Iranian leaders and freezing some assets.


A sign in Russian at the Russian-built nuclear power plant at Bushehr (Fars file photo)

"But I would guess that if it goes beyond that, and it may well, to the imposition of serious sanctions -- the withdrawal of investments, an economic embargo, trying to prevent the sale of Iranian oil or the import of gasoline -- that the cohesiveness will disappear," Kupchan said.


He added that Washington's policy is more combative than the EU's. For one thing, the United States very much wants regime change in Tehran. Also, the Bush administration is far more convinced than the Europeans that harsher sanctions will be effective.


Third, and most important, Kupchan said, is that the EU is far more reluctant than Washington to take military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.


Direct Contact


Kupchan said this opposition eventually may persuade the United States to open some kind of contact with Iran. Washington and Tehran have shunned one another other since the 1979 Iranian revolution that overthrew the shah, but recently Iran has made overtures about contacts with the United States.


Some European leaders reportedly have urged Bush to open direct talks with Iran. Kupchan said German Chancellor Angela Merkel did so during her recent visit to Washington. So far, however, Bush has rejected such calls.


"If that [more direct U.S.-Iran contact] doesn't happen, I think it will leave Europe in a position of saying [to Washington], 'You didn't try, you didn't move down the diplomatic route, therefore the reason to take the next step toward sanctions or the use of military force isn't there. You've got to exhaust all diplomatic options first,'" Kupchan said. "My guess is that sooner or later, the Bush administration will engage, if only because it realizes that the imperatives of alliance management require it."

What Would Sanctions Mean?

What Would Sanctions Mean?

Economic sanctions could further undermine Iran's already shaky economy (Fars)

MOVING TOWARD SANCTIONS: If the United Nations Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran, domestic support for Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad will wane, according to ALEX VATANKA, Eurasia editor for Jane's Information Group.
Vatanka told a February 24 RFE/RL briefing that "economic sanctions will hurt the average Iranian" and, consequently, many "will blame the ruling clerics" for making life difficult and "impairing the country's long term development."
Vatanka said sanctions would be a serious challenge to the Iranian government. If harsh economic sanctions were imposed, Iran's poorest population will be hurt the hardest -- and might react "as they did in the 1970s and protest in the streets." Sanctions on travel, Vatanka said, would hurt a many Iranians because "Iran is a nation of small traders" who depend on the ability to travel to earn an income. According to Vatanka, unemployment in Iran is estimated at 30 percent, "so small trading is essential to survival." Although current U.S. sanctions "haven't worked," he said, "Iranians fear an oil embargo." He stressed that "oil revenues are a major part of the economy, so it is critical to look at this sector."
Should negotiations with the European Union and the UN fail, Vatanka believes that Iran would follow a "North Korea model," since Ahmadinejad's base of support among the "Islamist militias" has been "urging withdrawal from the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]." The Iranian government's "tactic" so far, Vatanka said, is governed by the belief that "by shouting the loudest, you'll get concessions [from the West]."


LISTEN

Listen to the complete panel discussion (about 60 minutes):
Real Audio Windows Media


THE COMPLETE STORY: RFE/RL's coverage of the controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear program.


CHRONOLOGY

An annotated timeline of Iran's nuclear program.