Iran War Will Reshape Dynamics Ahead Of Trump-Xi Summit, Says Former US Official

A long-awaited meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping will take place in Beijing on May 14-15 after Trump said Washington asked to delay the summit originally planned for April due to the war with Iran.

The summit in Beijing comes after the two leaders met in South Korea in October 2025 and and follows successive US military action in Venezuela in January and the war with Iran, which began with US-Israeli strikes in late February. While the Trump-Xi meeting is set to focus on lingering trade and economic disputes between Beijing and Washington, the American moves against two Chinese partners add a new geopolitical backdrop.

For a better understanding of how the war in Iran will affect the upcoming summit, RFE/RL spoke with Dennis Wilder, a former top US official focused on China.

Wilder is now a senior fellow at Georgetown University. He previously served as director for China on the National Security Council and as senior director for East Asian affairs under President George W. Bush. He also served as senior editor of the President's Daily Brief to former President Barack Obama and as the CIA's deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific.

RFE/RL: US President Donald Trump said he will meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14-15. This comes after delaying a previous summit that was slated for April due to the war in Iran. How does having the war going on change these dynamics for the diplomacy leading up to this summit?

Dennis Wilder: Both sides realized that the delay was necessary. The optics of the president leaving in the middle of a war -- going to Beijing, being feted, and having a million people greeting him in the square -- when there could have been a disaster would have been terrible optics.

While the war is going on, a similar dynamic exists for the Chinese. My impression from Chinese interlocutors is they were relieved Trump decided against going because, for them, we're pummeling their friend in Iran. That's not a great look for Xi Jinping, either.

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What Does War In Iran Mean For China?

But both sides really want this meeting, and both sides really want the pause in the trade war to become permanent.

In terms of the war in Iran, what has struck me talking to Chinese interlocutors -- and, frankly, surprised me -- is their myopic view of what's been happening. Instead of seeing Venezuela as an American attempt to deal with a regional problem in President Nicolas Maduro, they saw it as us taking Venezuela away from them.

They also see the pressure on Panama [Editor's note: Panama's Supreme Court ruled in January that license terms granted to a Hong Kong-based company to operate two strategic ports at either end of the Panama canal violate the country's constitution] as the United States pressuring to take away their influence in the Western Hemisphere.

In Iran, they see this as us going after a Chinese partner, and now they see the pressure on Cuba in a similar way. From their point of view, there's a lot of paranoia right now.

Of course, the US National Security Strategy puts a greater emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, and there are some Americans who say that it's really about China. But most of us don't actually think that way; it's a secondary issue. Still, it will be in Xi Jinping's mind; he's going to be trying to assess what the United States is doing.

Is Trump actually on a very clever strategy to get China out of the Western Hemisphere and limit its international influence? I think that's going to be the new wrinkle in this summit that I hadn't considered before.

RFE/RL: How might some of these new dynamics be carried over to the summit? Before Venezuela and Iran, the thinking was that this would be very trade-heavy and focused on supply chains, critical minerals, and issues like that. But this adds a whole new geopolitical shadow over it. Could all of this drown out the trade talks?

Wilder: Trump is still looking for a big, beautiful deal with the Chinese.

I equate the trade war to two heavyweight boxers who got in the ring last year and punched each other out. Both of them got hurt, but neither of them got knocked down. By the end of the year, Trump decided he had done enough punching and it was time to kind of call the fight. I think the Chinese feel the same way.

On the trade front, I don't think this will have a big influence. There's already a 500-plane Boeing deal that's just sitting there waiting for the final signature in Beijing. The deal is totally cut. There's also US soybeans exports to China and maybe more investment in the United States. That is something US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is reportedly considering.

On the Chinese side, Trump has already done some of the things they want, such as the decision on Nvidia's H200s [Editor's note: The H200 is a supercharged chip designed specifically to accelerate generative AI training that faced US export restrictions to China until they were partially eased in 2026].

Then there's the interesting question of Taiwan. What is Trump ready to give? Maybe a little in terms of linguistics on Taiwan, moving from saying Washington is opposed to not supporting Taiwanese independence? I think he's ready if he's got the right deal. But again, this is causing great consternation in his administration and on Capitol Hill because, while he sees it as simple semantics, people in Taiwan don't see it that way and it will have an impact.

If US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is there, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will try to probe him about US strategic priorities right now. Cuba will be a big question. Is the United States going to move on Cuba? China has huge intelligence collection sites in Cuba, and they're really the main supporter of Cuba these days, with the Russians basically pulling out. I don't know if they'll ask it directly, but indirectly they're going to want to know: Is that the next shoe that's going to drop?

RFE/RL: You've been a part of a lot of these meetings in the past between previous American and Chinese leaders and you know what goes on in both the leadup and aftermath. The White House said it's planning to also welcome Xi to the United States later this year. It's unclear when, but can you provide some insights on what might be happening on the US policy side between this upcoming summit and the next one?

Wilder: The Trump administration does this differently from the administrations I served. But the Trump way of doing this is really to put somebody in charge, an envoy -- in this case, the envoy is definitely Bessent -- and so the important discussions are happening between him and [Chinese Vice Premier] He Lifeng.

I would expect that between the two summits they will have a series of discussions about the economic issues. The thing that I understand has disappointed the Chinese is that Rubio has not shown much interest in discussions with them, but he's someone that carries the hat of the national-security adviser and secretary of state, so on geostrategic issues, they'd like to engage him.

So far, he doesn't seem to want to engage the Chinese at this point, and that's going to be a problem for them if he continues to stand back. That sends a message to Beijing in and of itself. He's so associated with the Cuban question, and they will wonder whether he's standing back because he has plans and doesn't want to talk to the Chinese about them.

In past administrations, you'd have the State Department, Pentagon, and everybody discussing deliverables and sending proposals to the White House, and then people like me at the White House putting those together in a package of options and presenting them to the president. Instead, for this administration, it's all happening in the Oval Office. That makes the president his own action office, and that's what makes it all more unpredictable.

RFE/RL: Does this unpredictability, coupled with military action in Iran, offer negotiating benefits for the United States?

Wilder: This does give Trump a bit of an edge because he can call an audible on Air Force One going to China.

You'll remember that the decision on Nvidia happened in Busan, South Korea, right before Trump and Xi met [in October 2025] where [Nvidia CEO] Jensen Huang gets the ear of the president, and he makes a decision on the ground to ease export curbs.

There is no true policy process and therefore, without a policy process, Trump has great freedom and latitude. As one Chinese interlocutor said to me, we have the most predictable leader in the world engaging with the most unpredictable leader in the world, and it is a bizarre sort of relationship. Trump seems on the surface to get along with Xi. What Xi thinks of Trump, I wouldn't even hazard to guess.

RFE/RL: What about the flip side of this? Are there benefits from this approach and war with Iran that the Chinese might be seeing and feeling they're in a better position now?

Wilder: In my very recent discussions with Chinese interlocutors, they note the fact that we're having to move equipment because we don't have enough of it. That we're using up drones. We're using up missiles -- THAAD missiles, Patriot missiles -- at an alarming rate, and they know exactly how many our defense industries can produce a year.

They're counting the numbers, and they're saying, 'You're not going to have anything left in East Asia in reserve,' so they see it as a very real benefit to them. They also -- and this is in contrast to what I've said earlier -- they also see the emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as turning attention away from East Asia.

I think from the Chinese point of view, there is good news in this, that the United States will be potentially bogged down in the Middle East. Some of them are already using a Vietnam analogy and calling it a quagmire, but that's also a hope to many on the Chinese side rather than necessarily a reality.

So yes, they definitely see some real benefits if everything plays out the way they'd like to.

The interview below has been edited for length and clarity.