Hanna Notte: US-Israeli Attack On Iran 'Will Only Harden Russia's Position On Ukraine'

Attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran and the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will likely have little effect on the battlefield in Ukraine, but it may make Russian President Vladimir Putin “even more adamant that he has to come out on top” in the full-scale war he launched four years ago, Hanna Notte, an expert on Russian-Iran ties, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Notte, a Berlin-based analyst who is director for Eurasia at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, among other roles, spoke to RFE/RL on March 1.

RFE/RL: This comes after [former Syria President Bashar] al-Assad’s demise and [Nicolas] Maduro's…. So, how big a blow is this after the Syria and Venezuela situations for Russia or [for Russian President Vladimir] Putin's global standing and prestige?

Hanna Notte: I think there's two ways of looking at the question…On the one hand, it's hard to argue that this is not a blow to Russia's reputation because we have now seen a string of actions against Russia's partners and allies -- Assad, Maduro, Khamenei -- that make Russia look rather passive. You have this accumulation of Russian partners coming under pressure. There's concern in Russia that Cuba might be next this year. That would then be the fourth Russian ally to come under pressure. So that's one thing.

But then if we ask about the concrete, tangible consequences for Russia, that's where I am less sure that this is really consequential for Russia's global standing. And I'll give you a few reasons. The first is that I don't think that these developments have a direct bearing on Russia's ability to prosecute the war against Ukraine. And I think there's an understanding that how the war in Ukraine ends and how Russia fares in that war, that's the ultimate referendum on Russian power -- not what happens in Venezuela or in Iran but what happens in Ukraine.

And in fact, if the Americans now get sucked into a protracted war in the Middle East, then that could alleviate some pressure on Russia in Ukraine. So that's the first thing to say here.

And then I think when it comes to…non-Western attitudes towards Russia and the question of whether Russia's reputation is suffering because of its inability to protect its partners, I would also be cautious to draw any firm conclusions… Because there is in the Global South a reading of the war in Ukraine, according to which Russia is not just fighting Ukraine, but all of NATO…And that in a more forgiving judgment on Russia's power projection elsewhere. Meaning, what you'll hear, I think, in the Global South is, ‘Well, of course, Russia can't save Maduro or Iran. It is fighting a war in Ukraine against the entire collective West.’ So, I'm not sure that Russia's reputation is going to massively suffer as a result of this war.

What remains to be seen is what this will do to Russian interests in the Middle East. And that will very much depend on how this war shakes out further, and on internal developments inside Iran…I think the future of the Russia-Iran partnership will hinge on the extent to which Iran emerges very weakened out of this war and who will assume leadership. I think if there's continued clerical rule or if the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) takes over, then there are good chances that the Russia-Iran partnership will endure. But if there's regime change and forces take over that want more pragmatic relations with the West, with the United States, then that could have a bearing on Russia's relationship with Iran. But it's too early to tell where we're headed on this.

RFE/RL: Maybe it’s hard to say, but do you think that there's…a good chance that it could continue with clerical rule or with the IRGC?

Notte: I just don't know. I think we're all speculating on what's going to happen inside Iran over the next weeks or months. I think so far there's indication that the regime structures remain in place, and that what could replace Khamenei would likely see some continuation in Iranian foreign policy as opposed to a complete break.

But we also don't know how this war is going to shake out over the coming days. I think a key question to watch will be who else the United States and Israel will target in terms of... senior leadership structures, mid-tier, lower tier -- who will be left, basically, at the end of this war? What kind of internal dynamics will this usher in?

The other thing I'll say is that…many dynamics led to this point, but it's also the reality that the economic situation in Iran has been absolutely dire for a long time and hasn't been greatly alleviated by Russian or Chinese support. And so I think sanctions relief and economic relief will be also key for Iran emerging from this, which might be another factor prompting [Tehran] towards some pragmatism vis-a-vis the West. But again, it will be contingent on many factors.

RFE/RL: And do you think there's anything that Russia can do, or is maybe doing, to try to steer the outcome to something that's closer to what would enable it to retain some relationship?

Notte: What we know is that Russia is very swift in moving in to salvage its interests once it is presented with an undesirable situation. After events in Venezuela, the Russians immediately started to engage Delcy Rodriguez and probably other elements within the Venezuelan system to try to preserve their interests. In Syria, we saw that play out, too, where the Russians, after the fall of the Assad regime, moved in swiftly to leverage their relationships to preserve their interests and their influence. And they did so fairly successfully in Syria.

Iran will be no exception to this rule. [Russia] will try to do the same. But, you know, at the moment we have a hot war ongoing. So there’s little, I think, that the Russians can do at this point because they, like everyone else, have to watch how this military operation shakes out… It's highly unlikely not like Russia could now provide emergency military assistance to Iran or deliver air defenses or deliver weapons while you have a hot war ongoing. Maybe there's intelligence support that Russia can provide, but in terms of military equipment, they can't.

And so in terms of steering the actual military exchanges, Russia is very limited in what it can do. Maybe they would weigh in behind the scenes diplomatically to try to add pressure on the US and Israel to end the war. I'm sure that Russian diplomats are involved in those kinds of efforts. We saw Russia at the UN Security Council yesterday. But again, the question here is, to what extent are the Russians being listened to?

But then when it comes to getting their ducks in a row for like a post-Khamenei future, I'm sure that this is already in the works and Russia will do what it does, which is to try to turn adversity into opportunity and make sure that its interests are preserved to the extent that it is possible, like they did in Venezuela and Syria.

RFE/RL: I do have two more questions. One is about Ukraine and…the idea that the drones or the weapons that Russia is getting from Iran [are] not a huge factor anymore, or not much of a factor even, because Russia is making the drones itself now and has the technology.

Is it true that this [attack on Iran] would probably have little effect on the battlefield. But then the second part of the question… Is the hope in the Kremlin simply that the US will be distracted and will either walk away from Ukraine or that this will somehow lead to the US putting more pressure on Ukraine to accede to Russia's demands?

Notte: On the first question, yes, it's my assessment that Russia's ability to prosecute the war in Ukraine does not depend much on Iranian support at this point because of the localization of Shahed [drone] production. It doesn't mean that there was no...defense cooperation between Russia and Iran in the recent past that benefited Russia. I think there were still some newer drone designs that they were cooperating on…but by and large the ability to churn out high numbers of improved Shaheds -- the ones that we've seen hit Ukraine's energy infrastructure through the winter -- that is no longer dependent on Iranian support, so I don't see that Russia's war against Ukraine will be materially affected by what's happening with Iran.

And as to the second question: From the limited commentary that we've seen come out of Russia -- Russian experts weighing in, elites -- I think there is some hope [in Russia] that the benefit that might accrue to Russia from this situation would be a distraction of the United States in the Middle East, the US getting bogged down, which would then enable Russia to get a beneficial deal in Ukraine.

RFE/RL: The last question is mostly about Putin… Is this a personal blow to him, in terms of showing that the US and/or Israel can kill a foreign leader? People say that [the death of Libyan leader Muammar] Qaddafi…had a big effect on Putin. Supposedly, that was one of the main factors in him returning instead of letting [Dmitry] Medvedev stay in power [in 2012]. Do you think that aspect of it is a big deal for Putin, and that this may somehow change his attitude towards Ukraine, making him…even more determined to get what he wants? [And] could these developments [change Putin’s attitude toward] the Trump administration or the US?

Notte: First, I would say is that if I read Putin's remarks this morning correctly, he was harsh in terms of characterizing the killing [of Khamenei]…but he did not directly label Trump or the United States…

So to me, this suggests that Putin's overarching play from the last year, which is to not antagonize Trump and to try to stay on decent terms with Trump, has not changed and will not change as a result of this.

I don't see Putin or the Kremlin, as a result of this war and the killing of Khamenei, turning against the United States or being prepared to see their relationship with the United States sour. I think what we'll see is a continuation of this bifurcated rhetoric on the Russian side, where the Russian [Foreign Ministry] and other Russian voices will be allowed to go all in in terms of criticizing the United States, and Putin and the Kremlin will refrain from doing so.

Having said that, I think this is shocking for Putin -- to see the ease with which Trump can swoop in and take Maduro and then swoop in [in Iran, where Khamenei was killed during US and Israeli air strikes on February 28.]

I think that is very unwelcome from the Kremlin's point of view, and [Russian foreign policy analyst] Fyodor Lukyanov insinuated that in a way what's happened with Khamenei is even worse than with Qaddafi, because Qaddafi's killing, while enabled by external intervention, was carried out by Libyans, whereas in Iran's case, outside forces directly killed Khamenei…

And I think all of this will only harden Russia's position on Ukraine. That’s my gut feeling: That [it will make] Putin even more adamant that he has to come out on top in Ukraine.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.