Joey Hood: What Did The US, Iran Learn From Five Weeks Of War?

WASHINGTON -- Veteran ambassador Joey Hood, a career diplomat who has served with a focus on the Middle East under multiple US administrations, says the United States and Iran have each drawn stark lessons from the violent new chapter in decades of hostility.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Hood -- who served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs during President Donald Trump’s first administration, and previously as deputy chief of mission in Iraq and Kuwait -- said Tehran has learned the US can eliminate senior leaders at will, a reality that will shape future Iranian decision-making.

At the same time, he said, Washington has learned that Iran -- or even non-state actors -- can effectively disrupt the Strait of Hormuz using low-cost tools such as drones, mines, or even credible threats, without deploying conventional naval forces.

If reported Iranian negotiating points are accurate, Hood said, the gap between the sides remains wide. Absent what he called a “political earthquake,” the risk of new escalation remains high, as each side still believes it can impose significant costs on the other.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

RFE/RL: I want to start with the lessons both the US and Iran have learned from this latest chapter of a conflict that has been going on since 1979. What are those lessons, in your view, and how should they inform US strategy in both the short and long term?

Joey Hood

Joey Hood: I think you're right to say that this is merely the latest chapter in a conflict that's been going on for 47 years now, because there's a long history here that started with the taking hostage of our diplomats by this regime in Tehran for 444 days in 1979 and 1980. And it's gone through other iterations, including the tanker war in the late 1980s and, of course, the many, many, many attacks by Iranian-supported militias in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon against US forces and diplomatic personnel.

In terms of the lessons learned, I think that Tehran has learned that the United States can eliminate virtually any leader at any time that it wants to do so. So that's going to have to factor into the thinking of any Iranian leader who ascends into a leadership role and, consequently, their negotiating position -- knowing that if they go too far beyond America's red lines, they could be the next ones eliminated.

Second, I think the United States has learned that Iran, or even other actors for that matter, can control the Strait of Hormuz by just launching a few cheap drones or mines, or even merely the threat of employing them. It doesn't take an armada now to block the strait, or even deep minefields. All it takes is sufficiently scaring insurance companies so that ships will no longer move -- because insurance is too expensive, simply not available, or the shipping companies themselves decide they don’t want to take that risk.

And this is actually something that's not totally in the control of Washington or Tehran. Both sides can say, “OK, we have a temporary cease-fire so ships can move.” But if insurance and shipping companies don't agree, then the ships don’t move. And, so far, not a lot of ships have been moving into position to cross the strait.

RFE/RL: You have served in multiple administrations dating back to George W. Bush. Given that Iran's leadership structure has remained relatively consistent over time -- and the new insights the US has gained about Iran’s decision-making and risk tolerance, including the US capability to eliminate senior leadership -- how do you think this affects the mindset of Iranian decision-makers today, particularly as they enter negotiations or consider escalation?

Hood: Well, they have to understand -- and I'm sure that they do -- that if we don’t arrive at a negotiated solution, then a re-escalation or a resumption of armed conflict could mean, personally, that they will no longer survive.

So I think that gives them an incentive to be more serious, maybe to move faster than they otherwise would have, because we have seen from experience that it takes months and sometimes years to arrive at a solution with them. I go back to 1979–1980, when the Algerians helped us arrive at the liberation of the diplomatic hostages -- but that took many, many months. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the so-called nuclear deal of 2015, took years to negotiate.

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And I think that's one of the things that prompted President Trump to launch military hostilities now, because he was not convinced that the Iranian negotiators were serious. He said they were “tapping along,” as if you tap your foot just to keep time with the music.

So I think they probably understand now that they're going to have to move faster than they otherwise normally would have.

Trying To Bridge The Gaps

RFE/RL: Turning to the reported negotiation frameworks: If the Iranian proposals mentioned in the media are accurate, you’ve suggested the two sides remain far apart. What are the biggest substantive gaps, and how difficult will they be to bridge without what you’ve called a “political earthquake”?

Hood: To go back to your earlier question, I think the US is going to have to adapt its way of thinking and planning for keeping commercial shipping open through the Strait of Hormuz. That’s going to involve new technology, new alliances with some of the Gulf countries, and probably further conflict, unfortunately, as long as the regime in Tehran doesn’t fundamentally change its outlook and strategy vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

Now, what do both sides want? Both sides want to be the dominant power in the Middle East, and both cannot achieve that at the same time.

So unless there’s a political earthquake on one side or the other, they’re not going to be able to find a negotiated solution that satisfies most -- if not all -- of their strategic objectives. So unfortunately, I don’t think there’s a lot of optimism for this temporary cease-fire, or for a comprehensive end to this conflict that’s been going on for 47 years.

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For the regime in Tehran to accept US dominance in the region, it would have to change its entire ideology, which is based on resisting the United States and the West. And we’ve seen what that approach has brought to countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Iran does not have a single friend, partner, or ally that is prosperous and stable. Instead, it relies on militias -- armed groups operating in other countries with the objective of resisting the kind of economic development and stability seen under the US security umbrella in Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Balance Of Power In Tehran

RFE/RL: Given that assessment -- and recent comments by US officials referring to Iran’s leadership as a “new regime” -- how well do we actually understand the internal balance of power in Tehran? And how much does that distinction matter in practice?

Hood: I think we collectively understand a lot about the Iranian system. But that collective understanding is not necessarily reaching President Trump.

There are only a handful of people advising him, and many experienced staff across civilian, military, and diplomatic institutions have been fired, pushed into retirement, or otherwise left. So I don’t think the best analysis and recommendations are getting to the person who matters most.

Now, as for what he says about the regime -- he is technically correct that it has changed, in the sense that the United States and Israel have taken out much of the senior leadership that existed just a few months ago. So the personalities have changed.

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But has the ideology changed? Have the objectives changed? I see absolutely no evidence of that.

The regime’s goals remain to resist the United States and the West, and to export its revolution -- those are its words, not mine. That does not lead to a peaceful region.

So no, I don’t see fundamental regime change. I do see new leaders, and their vulnerability may make them more cautious in negotiations -- but we’ll have to see.

RFE/RL: There also seems to be confusion about what the declared cease-fire actually covers -- particularly with continued strikes involving Israel and activity in places like Beirut. How significant is that ambiguity, and what risks does it pose to maintaining the cease-fire?

Hood: I think it’s significant, because it gives any spoiler the ability to say, “The other side violated the cease-fire, so I’m going to keep attacking.”

That may very well be what Iran does -- or at least some actors within the Iranian system. Because how can we be sure the system is fully cohesive? How do we know, for example, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will follow orders from [the] new leadership? These are things that will become clearer over time.

Even after the cease-fire was declared, we’ve seen attacks on Gulf countries. And Israel has said Lebanon is not part of the cease-fire at all.

We have to remember that Israel, while closely aligned with the United States, is a sovereign country and can make its own decisions. If President Trump were to publicly demand that Israel stop operations in Lebanon, that would put Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a very difficult position. But absent that, Israel will continue pursuing its objectives.

RFE/RL: Finally, you noted that both sides still believe they can impose significant costs on the other. In practical terms, what are the most likely triggers for renewed escalation -- and what signals should policymakers watch to distinguish between routine posturing and a real slide back into conflict?

Hood: Obviously, the number and impact of Iranian attacks on Gulf countries will be a key indicator. If those don’t stop, then there isn’t really a cease-fire.

It will also be important to see whether Iran refrains from threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz -- and yet ships still don’t move. How President Trump interprets that is hard to predict.

We also need to watch internal dynamics in Iran. There may not be full command and control by any single leader. If factions begin to disagree, you could see spoilers -- actors who reject negotiations and launch attacks on their own.

And how those actions are interpreted by the United States -- that’s going to be one of the most difficult questions to answer.