WASHINGTON -- Despite days of military exchanges between the US and Iran, Washington insists it remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution, with technical talks continuing behind the scenes.
To better understand Washington's negotiating posture and the strategic calculations behind the latest escalation, RFE/RL spoke with James Jay Carafano, senior counselor to the president and E.W. Richardson Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
RFE/RL: The US has targeted roughly 170 sites across Iran over the past 48 hours, including coastal surveillance assets and drone storage facilities. From a purely strategic standpoint, does a bombardment of this scale signal the definitive end of the diplomatic framework with Tehran, or is it a calculated pressure campaign designed to shape the terms of a new agreement?
James Jay Carafano: I think it could be either. The reality is that this US president really does hold all the cards. The US is engaged in a conflict with Iran for one reason: Iran is the chief destabilizing force in the Middle East. If the US wants to reduce its direct military burden while working more closely with regional partners, Iran cannot have its finger on the veto button every time we try to make progress in the Middle East.
What [US President Donald] Trump has already done is take off the table virtually everything that made Iran a threat to the region and the world. Today, Iran could not build a nuclear weapon even if it wanted to; it simply no longer has that capability. It cannot threaten its neighbors with massive barrages of ballistic missiles or drones. It may be able to launch a handful, but it certainly cannot conduct attacks on the scale it once could. Nor can Tehran direct its regional proxies to wage war against Israel or anyone else -- not the Houthis, not Hezbollah, and not militias in Syria or Iraq. It also cannot remove 20 percent of the world's oil from the market. That is simply no longer possible. Even its ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz continues to decline. Everything that made Iran a major threat has essentially disappeared, and it is not coming back anytime soon.
James Jay Carafano
The more important question for the US is what comes next. How do we capitalize on the strategic position we now have? That means reconstruction in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. It means strengthening cooperation between Israel and Arab states to build a collective security architecture against future Iranian threats. It means expanding resilient transportation and trade networks across the region, such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Middle Corridor through the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Those are the developments that will determine whether the US succeeds in making the region more stable, prosperous, and secure. What ultimately happens inside Iran is almost secondary. I don't want to say it's a footnote, because it isn't, but I don't believe the administration sees regime change as a prerequisite for achieving these broader goals. In fact, regime change would introduce an entirely new set of problems, and many US partners in the region don't even want it.
Now, could the government collapse? Possibly. But I don't believe that is an explicit objective of US policy. Nor is the US simply going to walk away and allow Iran to rebuild its capabilities. Frankly, I think much of what we're seeing from Tehran now is intended for domestic consumption. The leadership wants to demonstrate strength to its own population. They claim they are attacking Americans, even though most of their missiles are intercepted. They threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, even though they no longer have the ability to do so. They talk about retaliation that they cannot realistically deliver.
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Christopher Walker: The West Must Stop Treating Russia, China, And Iran As Isolated ChallengesTrump, by contrast, sees himself as holding the stronger hand. He can increase or decrease pressure as he sees fit because the risks to the US remain relatively low. He faces no meaningful domestic political pressure forcing him to stop. There is no international pressure compelling him to stop either. He's the one with his foot on the accelerator, and he can speed up or slow down whenever he chooses. Whether the Iranian regime decides to make a deal -- or honor one -- is ultimately up to them. But from the administration's perspective, that doesn't fundamentally constrain the US. If Iran refuses to negotiate or breaks an agreement, Washington still believes it comes out ahead.
RFE/RL: The Heritage Foundation has long argued that diplomacy is most effective when backed by credible military strength. Has this latest military campaign increased Washington's leverage at the negotiating table?
Carafano: It certainly has. That doesn't necessarily mean Iran will agree to a deal or honor one -- that always takes two sides -- but it has unquestionably strengthened America's negotiating position. What the president has demonstrated is that he is not constrained by domestic politics, including the upcoming midterm elections. He's not deterred by criticism from abroad, and he's willing to use military force decisively when he believes it is necessary.
To me, this reinforces an important principle. The idea that soft power and hard power exist separately is misguided. Credible hard power dramatically enhances diplomatic influence. Whether Iran cooperates remains to be seen. But I can tell you we'll get more cooperation from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, and Iraq. We've already made significant progress in deepening our partnership with Baghdad. We'll also see greater cooperation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The combination of military strength and diplomacy significantly strengthens America's position throughout the region.
Victory For Tehran Means 'Simply Staying In Power'
RFE/RL: You alluded to Iran's internal political dynamics. At the moment, US strikes have coincided with a pause in negotiations during the mourning period following the ayatollah's funeral. With the regime managing an uncertain political transition alongside pressure from hard-liners, does Tehran still have a stable negotiating partner?
Carafano: I honestly don't know. And I would be skeptical of anyone who claims they do unless they're directly involved. The Iranian response after the funeral wasn't particularly surprising. The leadership clearly felt it had to demonstrate that it was avenging the ayatollah, so it carried out retaliatory actions knowing full well that those actions would provoke another US response.
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The Iran Deal Couldn’t Restore Old Maritime Order, Analyst Raydan SaysThe important thing to understand is that the regime defines victory very differently from the US. For the Iranian leadership, victory simply means remaining in . As long as the hard-liners maintain their grip on the country, everything else is secondary.
From the American perspective, that's a meaningless definition of success. It may matter domestically because the regime wants to project strength, but I think the greater danger for Tehran isn't that the US destroys it militarily. The greater danger is that the regime continues imposing hardship on the Iranian people until they simply refuse to tolerate it any longer. At the same time, the government's ability to suppress widespread unrest is considerably weaker than it was even a year ago.
Has The Regime Changed?
RFE/RL: Judging by Tehran's latest actions -- including strikes targeting US facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait -- it doesn't appear the regime has fundamentally changed its behavior. How significant is this direct involvement of America's Gulf partners, and what does it mean for regional stability.
Carafano: I actually think it makes Iran look increasingly weak. Sometimes they launch missiles that don't hit anything. They even fired missiles toward Jordan. If you think about it, how strategically foolish is that? The Jordanians intercepted them. Does that make Iran look stronger, or does it make people conclude these guys aren't nearly as formidable as they claimed? I think it makes them look weaker.
A few years ago, when Iran retaliated after the death of Qassem Soleimani (senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander who was assassinated by the US in 2020), it essentially fired missiles into empty areas while quietly signaling to the US that it wasn't looking for a major escalation. That was largely for show. I think this latest round of Iranian bluster is much the same.
This is a region where honor translates into power, and where you're respected if your enemies fear you. But the Iranian regime's biggest enemy isn't the US -- it's the Iranian people. So the regime has to tell its own population: "We're fighting the Americans. We're standing strong. We're invulnerable. We remain firmly in control." That's primarily a domestic message.
It's not really directed at the rest of the region, because nobody in Iraq believes it anymore. Nobody in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan -- or certainly Israel -- believes it either. The Israelis know this regime has been substantially defanged.
In the US, I think there are three broad reactions. One group insists everything the administration does is a failure because they're politically opposed to Trump. Another group is simply confused. Americans often think victory means one side surrenders and the war ends. This conflict doesn't look like that, so they're unsure how to interpret it. Then there's a third group that says, "Well, this isn't how I would have done it." Some believe success requires complete regime change in Iran. That's a legitimate opinion, but they're not the president of the US.
From Trump's perspective, protecting American interests means neutralizing Iran's ability to threaten the region. He believes he's accomplished that and will continue doing so. The regime can continue its rhetoric if it helps domestically, but I don't think it has any meaningful impact on Donald Trump.
Ironically, I think it creates greater risks for the regime itself. Trump has floated the idea of investing roughly $300 billion in rebuilding Iran's economy. Every day the regime rejects that possibility, ordinary Iranians -- who are struggling economically -- have reason to ask why. They're likely wondering why they're being denied economic recovery simply so the current leadership can remain in power. I don't know how sustainable that is.
Again, I don't think the US is seeking regime change. Everyone understands the risks -- mass migration, internal conflict, instability. But if change comes, it will likely be because the regime remains stubborn, not because Washington made regime change its objective.
RFE/RL: Oil markets have reacted, though far less dramatically than many analysts feared. What indicators are you watching that would signal this crisis is becoming a broader global economic problem rather than simply another regional security crisis?
Carafano: Markets always react whenever anything happens in the Middle East. The fact that prices have risen only modestly compared with previous crises actually demonstrates how much confidence markets have gained that Iran can no longer trigger a major global oil shock. Serious investors understand that Iran simply lacks the capability to create a worldwide energy crisis.
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Zineb Riboua: The Islamic Republic Is Weaker Than It Wants The World To BelieveOf course, there will always be short-term market movements driven by fear and speculation. Prices fluctuate whenever headlines emerge. But we're not going back to six-dollar gasoline across the US -- perhaps with the exception of California. I think we've moved beyond peak fear.
Most Americans simply don't believe the Middle East is about to explode into World War III. They see the headlines, but they're largely continuing with their daily lives. Eventually, people stop reacting every time someone predicts catastrophe. I think we've reached that point.
The Future Of Negotiations
RFE/RL: Iran continues to argue that sanctions relief and economic recovery must remain central to any agreement. Is there still room for negotiations on sanctions without appearing to reward military escalation?
Carafano: Absolutely. But there is no such thing as getting something for nothing. From the US perspective, everything has to be earned. Iran doesn't receive sanctions relief simply because it demands it. The reality is that Tehran has very little leverage. Its only bargaining chip is saying it might stop fighting. But Washington's response is essentially: "If you stop fighting, that's your decision. That alone doesn't earn you concessions."
Trump is fundamentally a negotiator. He doesn't like unnecessary wars. He doesn't want American lives at risk, even though the risks to US forces remain relatively low. But he's also not going to give away concessions for free.
The idea that Iran should receive benefits simply because it demands them carries no weight in Washington. Likewise, demanding at the negotiating table what you failed to achieve on the battlefield is never likely to succeed with Donald Trump. The weaker Iran becomes, the less incentive Washington has to offer additional concessions. That's one reason I believe much of Iran's current rhetoric is directed inward. I don't think it's intended to influence American policy because I don't believe it can. International pressure isn't going to change Trump's calculations either. So who is Tehran really speaking to? Its own people.
RFE/RL: If negotiations resume, what has fundamentally changed since before this latest escalation? Are both sides likely to return with different objectives, or simply tougher negotiating positions?
Carafano: I can't speak for the Iranians. What I can say is that if they return to the same approach they've taken so far, they're likely to get more of the same from Donald Trump. Every time Iran escalates, it emerges weaker than before.
The US has struck major transportation infrastructure, damaged ports, targeted airfields, and steadily degraded Iran's military capabilities. And that wasn't even a full-scale campaign. Every time Tehran pushes back, it suffers additional losses that make long-term recovery even harder. They can continue playing what I'd call stupid games, but they'll continue winning stupid prizes.
The only thing really constraining Donald Trump is his humanitarian instinct. He would prefer the fighting to end because death and destruction are ultimately senseless. He's perfectly willing to stop. But it will happen on his terms -- not Iran's.
RFE/RL: Finally, looking beyond the next few days, what should observers watch most closely? Another round of military escalation? Quiet diplomatic contacts? Or signs that both sides are preparing for a much longer confrontation
Carafano: What we should really be watching is whether the US continues strengthening regional partnerships. Are we deepening cooperation with Iraq? Are we moving ahead with reconstruction efforts in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza? Are we building stronger collective defense arrangements among America's regional partners? Are we expanding transportation and commercial corridors like IMEC and the Middle Corridor? Those are the developments that will determine America's long-term success in the Middle East.
Too many people follow the conflict with Iran the way someone obsessively checks their retirement account every single day. The investment is long-term, but they're fixated on every small fluctuation. Watching the Iran conflict that way misses the bigger picture.
We should focus on the long-term trends that will shape security, prosperity, and stability -- not whether another missile was launched today.
It reminds me of an old joke: A police officer sees a man searching under a streetlight late at night and asks what he's doing. "I'm looking for my car keys," the man replies.
“Where did you lose them?”
“Down the street.”
“Then why are you looking here?”
“Because the light is better.”
That's what we're doing with Iran. We're looking where the light is instead of where the real answers are.