WASHINGTON -- In a significant shift in energy policy, the United States has confirmed it will not renew sanctions waivers that previously allowed the purchase of certain Russian and Iranian oil, handing Kyiv a sought-after victory.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the move on April 15 from the White House podium, signaling the end of a "general license" for oil that was already in transit before mid-March -- a mechanism the administration had used to stabilize global energy prices amid volatility in the Strait of Hormuz stemming from the US-Israeli war with Iran.
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's commissioner for sanctions policy, told RFE/RL in an interview that any relief for Moscow only serves to extend the war.
RFE/RL: The United States has decided not to renew waivers that had allowed certain purchases of Russian and Iranian oil. What did that decision mean when it was first announced, and what does it mean now for Ukraine?
Vladyslav Vlasiuk: We certainly didn't like any waivers or extensions of sanctions. We would like to have sanctions against Russia that are as tough as possible, and this is something that we've constantly been asking from our partners. Why? Because we see that sanctions are working well, and the more sanctions are applied against Russia, the quicker we will see success in peace negotiations. This is a very simple hypothesis.
Of course, we were disappointed when the waiver on Russian oil was imposed a month ago. Likewise, we are happy now it has not been extended. Even better, there is no indication that it will be extended in the future. This is very good. We did not know the specific reasons behind the waivers. We've seen public statements suggesting they were introduced to mitigate market volatility driven by the Hormuz blockade, but to us that seemed ungrounded.
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Azeem Ibrahim: Iran Conflict Will Be Decided By Who Can 'Endure The Most'The Hormuz trade accounts for something like 30 percent of global oil shipments, whereas Russian oil is only about 4 percent or 5 percent. That calculation was never going to work, anyway. It seems everyone understood this from the very beginning; it did not work and it did not help. Perhaps that was taken into account when the decision was made not to extend any waivers. So, we are happy that no waiver is being prolonged.
We are pleased that the sanctions against Russia, Rosneft, and Lukoil are still very much in force. We see many indications that those sanctions are particularly meaningful against the Russian economy. In February, we saw a record low in Russian oil revenues since the full-scale invasion -- below $10 billion.
That's a clear sign sanctions are working. We also believe that because of those waivers the Russians gained an extra $2 billion to $4 billion, of which $1.7 billion was denied thanks to the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducting "kinetic sanctions" against Russian ports in Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Novorossiysk. This is an ongoing situation. Ukraine has every right to protect itself with these types of sanctions, but we will also continue our work on applying more restrictions to deny Russia oil revenue. This is key.
RFE/RL: US officials have argued the waiver was a short-term measure to prevent larger economic disruptions. Do you see any merit in that argument?
Vlasiuk: That could be. But again, the quantity of Russian oil available on the market and the quantity of oil blockaded because of the Hormuz trade are not comparable. You cannot save a market facing a deficit of roughly 16 million barrels per day by allowing back only two or three million barrels per day. The calculation simply doesn't match. It couldn't have worked from the very beginning.
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Ukraine Must Remain A Priority Amid Iran War, Estonian FM Tells RFE/RLRFE/RL: In terms of Russia's war chest, how did these financial gains from the waiver period translate into their actual battlefield capacity and military budget?
Vlasiuk: Good question. They continue to increase the total amount of money spent on their war efforts. We believe this year's war budget is around $60 billion. Even $2 billion, $3 billion, or $4 billion is a significant portion of money that they will use exclusively for war purposes.
They've cut many other budget expenditures to accommodate this. What we've observed is they reached their planned annual budget deficit in only three months. From now on, the deficit continues to increase toward record highs. They are really struggling economically.
RFE/RL: When the United States applies these periodic, temporary waivers, does it undermine the long-term structural integrity and psychological impact of the broader sanctions regime?
Vlasiuk: We were told from the beginning that this temporary waiver would never impact the general weight of the sanctions. While it allowed the Russians to make some extra money, it did not allow them to solve their structural economic problems.
We are glad this waiver was not extended. We see that Russia is spending more and more on the war effort while their profits and overall revenues are decreasing. It may not be a popular opinion yet, but we believe time is playing against Russia. Their economy is struggling, and they cannot survive many more years of this level of war effort.
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Everyone Wants Ukraine’s Drones. This German Joint Venture Is Trying To Get Ahead Of The CurveRFE/RL: During this waiver period, we saw major players like China and India increase their intake of Russian oil. With the waivers now expired, how difficult will it be to reverse those trade flows and ensure full enforcement?
Vlasiuk: Before the full-scale invasion, India was not buying Russian oil. Afterward, India became the No. 1 buyer, and we do not like this. It seems unfair to call for a quick resolution to the war while simultaneously helping one side with effective budget revenues. Nobody should be buying Russian oil as long as Russia is not negotiating for peace in good faith.
Sanctions help to disincentivize potential buyers. This is why we were so happy when the administration applied sanctions against Russian oil, and why we've worked so much with the EU, UK, and Canada to keep the pressure on exports. All of this helps to deny Russia revenue. It works: we see a record deficit and no GDP growth. All countries that truly want Russia to withdraw from Ukraine should not be buying Russian oil or gas.
RFE/RL: Considering the broader US perspective, the administration is juggling tensions with Iran and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. How can Washington maintain a maximum pressure campaign via sanctions without triggering a global economic crisis?
Vlasiuk: One of the takeaways from the Hormuz situation should be the level of threat that dual-use items pose. Iran has shown that operating cheap drones can cause massive economic damage. For instance, the Qatari LNG facility was put on hold just because of two Shahed UAVs. Each costs maybe $30,000, yet they impacted a facility representing 20 percent of the global market.
The awareness of the threat posed by UAVs is something we've talked about for years, and that awareness has finally risen. We are trying to use this momentum.
Beyond energy and freedom of passage, the key point is the components used by Iran to destabilize multiple countries. This is the game changer. Hopefully, more countries will now pay attention to supply chain evasion and sanctions efficiency. It isn't just about having the money to buy something; it’s about the ability to obtain specific tools and parts.
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Iran Conflict Disrupts Private US Humanitarian Aid For UkraineIf a country wants to build UAVs to destroy those around it, it will buy the necessary parts. This is why we talk so much about critical components with our partners. We must ensure that the microchips manufactured by Western companies are not freely available on the market for terrorist regimes like Russia or Iran. It's about availability, not just revenue.
RFE/RL: Ukraine has repeatedly documented the presence of US-made components within Iranian and Russian drones. Have you addressed this specific issue with your US counterparts, and what has been their response regarding the failure of export controls?
Vlasiuk: Yes. For the last three years, we've been observing American microelectronics in Russian weapons. It is even worse in the Iranian drones we saw in 2022 and 2023. This creates a lot of challenges for the US export control system and for manufacturers. We raise this issue constantly. We know the US government is prioritizing this and working to deny these items to terrorist regimes, but it remains a pressing challenge.
It was a highlight of my meetings today. It is not an ideal situation. In late March, a vast territory of Ukraine was attacked by Shahed UAVs that appeared to have been produced that same month. In those drones, there were American components apparently produced as recently as late 2025. I say "apparently" because a portion of the American parts turn out to be counterfeit, but many are genuine. American, Japanese, German, and Chinese parts are unfortunately still available to the Russian defense sector.
We believe that the day Russia stops receiving Western parts, they will no longer be able to produce Shahed UAVs or cruise missiles. It is that critical. Some countries, like the Emirates, were initially hesitant, saying "business is business," but that has changed. I have a good feeling that key countries in the region have changed their attitude toward these dual-use items and will no longer help Russia or Iran obtain them.
RFE/RL: Are there joint investigations under way with the United States on this issue?
Vlasiuk: Yes, quite a lot of work is being done by law enforcement in the US, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Germany, and others. The truth is that these supply chains are not easily shut down. The Russians are very creative about infiltrating markets. Furthermore, they don't need a massive volume; to produce 50,000 Shahed UAVs, you only need 50,000 specific microchips. That is a small enough amount to be purchased through various indirect means.
RFE/RL: Can you identify the specific US tech companies whose products are most frequently recovered from the battlefield?
Vlasiuk: It's not a big secret. Any big American tech company -- like AMD, Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, or Linear Technology -- produces microelectronics that are then found in Russian UAVs or missiles. They know it, and they have been trying to address it. We are pragmatic: As long as we find new American parts in Russian weapons, it is a clear indication that current efforts are not enough.
RFE/RL: We have seen strong calls from lawmakers like senators [Lindsey]Graham and [Richard] Blumenthal for even tougher measures. Have you been coordinating directly with them on potential legislation?
Vlasiuk: I have a lot of respect for senators Graham and Blumenthal for their actions against Russia. They are truly on the side of Ukraine. However, it seems the key decisions on sanctions are taken at the White House rather than on Capitol Hill. That doesn't mean the pressure from Congress isn't helpful; it probably is. I would love to see some of those bills passed and signed.
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With Israeli Strike On A Caspian Port, Iran War Could Endanger Russia's Trade Route With TehranRFE/RL: Specifically, what unique enforcement tools or authority would the current bills in Congress provide that the administration doesn't already possess?
Vlasiuk: These tools would essentially oblige the government to take action against anyone who buys Russian oil. It is one of the strongest instruments available because it cannot be ignored by buyers. It is simple but efficient.
On the other hand, we shouldn't limit ourselves to just tariffs; we must continue regular sanctions work: Let's target the shadow fleet, their captains, and further list Russian oil majors. I support the bills, but I also think the US government should explore more "classical" sanctions instruments, as increasing the pressure will help us negotiate for peace properly.
RFE/RL: I ask because US officials, including the secretary of state, have occasionally suggested the "low-hanging fruit" is gone and there are no targets left to sanction. Is that an accurate assessment from your perspective?
Vlasiuk: I’ll give you one number: Over the last year, Ukraine has adopted 60 sanctions packages against Russia. Clearly, there are still many potential targets. You can always sanction the oil industry further or turn back to the LNG sector. There are many targets in the military-defense sector, the oligarchs, and the financial sector. Maybe 50 banks are under sanctions, but there are 250 more waiting. There is also the area of Russian nuclear energy, which is not yet sanctioned.
RFE/RL: Finally, looking at the geopolitical nexus between the Strait of Hormuz, global oil prices, and the front lines in Ukraine, what is the most critical takeaway for the US public?
Vlasiuk: We think Russia received an extra $2 billion to $4 billion in oil revenue because volumes were released and prices went up. They benefited significantly. We have tried to mitigate those benefits through our own "kinetic" sanctions quite successfully. We really hope the situation in Hormuz will be resolved soon, and we expect Russian oil revenues to continue to shrink. That is what is truly important.