Accessibility links

Breaking News

China In Eurasia

Then-Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite (right) welcomes Chinese National People's Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang prior to their meeting in Vilnius in April 2017.
Then-Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite (right) welcomes Chinese National People's Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang prior to their meeting in Vilnius in April 2017.

A diplomatic spat between Lithuania and China over Taiwan has pushed Europe's relations with Beijing back into the spotlight as the European Union struggles with how to define its increasingly shaky relationship with the world's second-largest economy.

The latest episode between Vilnius and Beijing kicked off on August 10, when China recalled its ambassador to the Baltic country in response to Lithuania's decision to set up a diplomatic office in Taiwan. This was followed by China demanding that Vilnius recall its ambassador from Beijing.

Beijing's anger centers around Lithuania's move to open a representative office in Taipei under the name Taiwan. While Taiwan has a diplomatic presence in more than 70 countries, most representative offices use Taipei, its capital, in the official name.

China views the island of Taiwan as part of its territory and asserts the right to unify both sides, with Beijing pushing countries to renounce ties with Taipei as a condition of establishing relations under what it calls the "one-China principle." Consequently, only 15 countries recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.

The Chinese Embassy building in Vilnius
The Chinese Embassy building in Vilnius

Beijing's tough response to Lithuania is seen as a warning shot to other countries in Europe looking to follow suit and comes amid changing sentiment across the 27-member EU toward China.

Brussels has found it increasingly difficult to balance growing concerns about human rights in China and the bloc's desire to gain deeper access to China's lucrative markets. But many of the EU's smaller countries -- such as the Baltic states -- and Romania have led the charge toward a deeper shift in how to engage with China.

"Lithuania has been at the forefront of this trend," Frank Juris, an expert at the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute under the International Center for Defense and Security, told RFE/RL. "The traditional Chinese approach of singling out small states and pressuring them is proving to be counterproductive."

The recent escalation with Beijing comes after a previous diplomatic row between China and the Baltic country of 2.7 million in which Vilnius quit the "17+1" platform -- a Beijing-led format for engaging with Central and Eastern European countries -- and could have ripple effects across the wider region.

Vilnius has also been an increasingly vocal critic of China's actions in Hong Kong and its western province of Xinjiang -- the country's parliament described Beijing's treatment of its Uyghur minority there as "genocide" in May -- and has donated vaccines to Taiwan throughout the pandemic.

"What has been happening is part of an evolution in foreign policy that is several years in the making," Konstantinas Andrijauskas, a China expert at Vilnius University, told RFE/RL. "The economic promises of engagement with China have not come and [Beijing's] behavior is seen as threatening the rules-based international order that Lithuania has benefited from."

The New Era

In an August 15 interview with the Financial Times, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said his country would not back down from its dispute with Beijing. "We would like to also have relations with China based on the principle of mutual respect," Nauseda said. "Otherwise the dialogue turns into unilateral ultimatums, requirements which are not acceptable in international relations."

Additionally, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman expressed solidarity with Vilnius during an August 13 phone call with Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, and EU foreign affairs spokeswoman Nabila Massrali said the episode could impact wider EU-China relations and that Brussels stood behind its member state.

"We do not regard the opening of a representative office in or from Taiwan [as opposed to an embassy or consulate] as a breach of the EU's one China policy," Massrali said in a statement.

In May, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to freeze the process for ratifying the EU's investment pact with China unless it lifts sanctions against the bloc's lawmakers that were imposed after Brussels placed sanctions on Chinese officials over the mass internment of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

Since then, debate in Brussels has continued over where the EU should place itself amid an intensifying global rivalry between Beijing and Washington and a more aggressive posture from China.

Amid the current diplomatic spat between Beijing and Vilnius, Lithuania has found itself as a target of China's state-run media, which has characterized the Baltic country as a U.S. proxy intent on derailing relations between China and the EU.

An August 13 editorial from the Global Times, an outlet controlled by China's Communist Party, criticized Lithuania's policies towards Beijing and went on to call for a joint effort with Belarus and Russia to "punish" Vilnius as a warning to other countries. "China and Russia should take proper opportunities to strike against a country that has lost its mind. This should be the new content and guidance for China-Russia strategic cooperation," the editorial said.

"Moscow is seen as the main threat for Lithuania, and Russia and China's closer relationship is a cause for worry among policymakers [in Vilnius]," Andrijauskas said. "Whether or not China and Russia would actually work together against Lithuania, this rhetoric is confirming some of the worst fears about Beijing."

The New Limits

Despite the harsh words from Beijing, Lithuania has limited economic exposure to the world's second-largest economy -- China is the country's 12th-largest trading partner -- which has allowed it more room to maneuver in its dispute with China. Similar situations exist for other smaller countries in the EU that have signaled their displeasure with Beijing.

During the 17+1 summit in February, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia chose to send ministers instead of their head of state or government, despite Chinese President Xi Jinping chairing the meeting for the first time. The move was seen as a rebuke of the grouping and a sign of growing skepticism toward China in Central and Eastern Europe.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) speaks during the virtual summit of China and Central and Eastern European countries in Beijing on February 9.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) speaks during the virtual summit of China and Central and Eastern European countries in Beijing on February 9.

Romania is another country that has taken a tougher line against China recently, with Bucharest pushing out Chinese companies from core sectors like nuclear power and telecommunications. The moves are partly possible because Romania does not have to defend the interests of large national companies with stakes in China and the government's desire to boost domestic companies.

Andreea Brinza, vice president of the Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific, told RFE/RL that while Bucharest enacted policies in regards to Beijing, "Romania hasn't expressed any interest in following in Lithuania's footsteps," pointing to how in contrast to Vilnius, Bucharest has been quiet on human rights issues in China.

According to Brinza, Bucharest -- like many countries in the EU -- is still taking most of its cues on China policy from Brussels and "the big EU countries' positions," mainly France and Germany.

Germany, Europe's largest economy, will hold federal elections in September and Annalena Baerbock of the Greens, a candidate for chancellor -- has pushed for a more China-skeptic foreign policy. Armin Laschet, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union and another chancellor candidate, has also begun to adopt a more pragmatic stance toward China after initially calling for a continuation of Chancellor Angela Merkel's middle path with Beijing.

Tamas Matura, an assistant professor at Corvinus University in Budapest, told RFE/RL that Hungary will be watching the German elections closely. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban maintains close relations with Beijing -- including controversial plans to establish a branch of a Chinese university -- and China looms increasingly large in the country's politics.

Matura said disputes such as the one with Lithuania and a general worsening of relations between the EU and China may make Budapest "even more important in the eyes of Beijing" as a regional player in the bloc eager to engage with China, but that the outcome of the German vote and other shifts across Europe could cause Hungary to pull back.

"If the pressure gets too high in the long run, especially after the German elections, Budapest may have to reconsider its position as well," Matura said.

Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the military exercises Vostok 2018 in September 2018.
Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the military exercises Vostok 2018 in September 2018.

In the latest display of deepening ties between Beijing and Moscow, Chinese and Russian troops kicked off five days of military exercises in northwestern China on August 9.

More than 10,000 troops from the Chinese and Russian militaries are participating in the Zapad/Interaction 2021 drills in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region that will involve large numbers of aircraft, weapon systems, and vehicles.

The military exercises come as the security situation in Eurasia continues to shift, with the U.S.-led foreign military withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to increased fighting between the Taliban and government forces and shaking up the wider region.

This year's training marks the fourth consecutive exercises between Beijing and Moscow and the first joint drills held in China. The maneuvers will focus on stability in neighboring Central Asia as both countries look to showcase the growing cooperation between their militaries.

"This exercise is a natural progression of stronger military ties between the two countries, but the situation in Afghanistan adds an important new layer," Zhang Xin, an associate professor at the Center for Russian Studies at Shanghai's East China Normal University, told RFE/RL. "Both sides are worried about spillover into Central Asia and the new types of security challenges to the region that it could pose."

Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said on August 5 that the goal was to "consolidate cooperation" and "maintain regional peace and security," focusing on counterterrorism and establishing a joint command center for better cooperation on joint reconnaissance, early warnings, joint strikes, and electronic and information attacks.

Driven together by shared antagonism toward the United States as well as similar strategic concerns for Central and South Asia, ties between China and Russia have grown increasingly close in recent years.

Both Beijing and Moscow have shown an increased willingness to tackle international issues together and the current military exercises focused on security in Central Asia and Afghanistan are the latest display of this evolving dynamic.

But according to Zhang, while military ties continue to expand and the countries find new ways to work together, China and Russia are not progressing toward "a military alliance in the traditional sense."

"This kind of exercise shows a move towards a closed but flexible collaboration between two militaries without entering into a full-scale alliance," Zhang said.

Beijing And Moscow's Evolving Ties

While the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan continues to draw the attention of political and military leaders in China and Russia and presents opportunities for collaboration, ties between the two countries are expanding across several sectors.

Russia-China collaboration accelerated in 2014 following the Kremlin's seizure of Crimea, where Russia was placed in the crosshairs of Western sanctions.

Since then, Beijing and Moscow have seen their relationship grow closer, with expanded trade, high-tech cooperation, and growing political support for each other, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. In June, both sides renewed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation as they celebrated its 20th anniversary.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28.

Military ties have also been a focal point.

Chinese and Russian forces have been regularly doing drills together in some form -- bilaterally or through a multilateral organization -- since 2005, and those have expanded to also include joint naval exercises.

Starting in 2018, Beijing and Moscow expanded to larger-scale exercises, which emphasize training top-level commanders to work together and were marked that year by high-profile drills in Russia.

But despite the warming military and political ties, analysts say there are limits to the type of partnership that China and Russia are looking to forge with one another.

Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Moscow Carnegie Center, told RFE/RL that neither side wants to be locked into an alliance where they would be brought "into a fight where the other doesn't have skin in the game," pointing to disparities in China's positions toward Ukraine and Russia's toward Taiwan.

"They try to stay out of each other's fights and instead find those areas of overlap in mutual interest," he said. "China and Russia are very pragmatic and both oppose the United States, but both see themselves as great powers and are religious about their strategic autonomy."

A New Consensus

Following the current weeklong exercises, the Russian military and China's People's Liberation Army will also train together in September in drills organized under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian security bloc helmed by Beijing and Moscow.

Like the maneuvers under way in China, the SCO drills will also have a counterterrorism focus.

The SCO -- which in addition to China and Russia consists of India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- has become a vehicle for Beijing's growing security ties across Eurasia, which are poised to grow against the backdrop of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Russia has traditionally seen the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as its own sphere of influence, but Beijing's rise as the dominant economic force has changed the dynamics in the region.

In recent years, China and Russia have looked to balance their interests in Central Asia between "Russian military muscle and China's wallet," Anton Barbashin, editorial director at the online journal Riddle Russia, told RFE/RL.

But he says this "consensus is no longer as solid as it was a decade ago" and that moving forward, the evolving situation in Afghanistan and its future effects on Central Asia will play a growing role in shaping China and Russia's future security cooperation in the region.

"We might be looking at the beginning of wider security cooperation over Afghanistan between China, Russia, and the Central Asian states," Barbashin said. "How this progresses will show if the SCO is a real organization capable of deterring the inevitable risks coming from Afghanistan or not."

Load more

RFE/RL has been declared an "undesirable organization" by the Russian government.

If you are in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine and hold a Russian passport or are a stateless person residing permanently in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine, please note that you could face fines or imprisonment for sharing, liking, commenting on, or saving our content, or for contacting us.

To find out more, click here.

About The Newsletter

China In Eurasia
Reid Standish

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this biweekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

XS
SM
MD
LG