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According to the author, a Kyrgyz bazaar is a well organized economic territory where no form of anarchy is possible.
According to the author, a Kyrgyz bazaar is a well organized economic territory where no form of anarchy is possible.

"Qishloq Ovozi" is pleased to once again introduce one of the up-and-coming talents in the field of Central Asian studies. This time we meet Nari Shelekpayev, who reviews a book by Boris Petric titled "On a mangé​ nos moutons: le Kirghizstan, du berger au biznesman" or "They Ate the Sheep: The Kyrgyz, from Shepherd to Businessman," which examines the foundations of Kyrgyz society in the years of independence from the point of view of "the historian or anthropologist."

The field of Central Asian studies is not oversaturated with publications. Among the few books and articles that appear every so often, a majority of the publications relate to political science and/or international relations, whereas relatively few are produced by historians or anthropologists.

For this reason alone, Boris Petric's book deserves some attention. The fruits of a decade of labor, this is original research presented by a scholar who knows Kyrgyzstan from the inside out (he says he speaks Kyrgyz and Russian) and may as such contribute to a better, nonfiction understanding of this Central Asian country and the peculiarities of its economic and political systems. On the other hand, Petric perspicaciously questions a number of "universal" cliches, such as "good governance," "globalization," and "state," thus trying to classify his book exclusively into Central Asian studies would perhaps be an oversimplification. In sum, an intelligent proportion of the local and the global, coupled with a simplicity of the narrative, makes reading Petric's book a rather enjoyable exercise.

Several times I found myself questioning whether the author deliberately avoids any kind of frameworks or theoretical generalizations. Whether depicting a complicated north-south relationship in Kyrgyzstan, or the intersection of Chinese, Russian, and American interests as external influences, Petric does not attempt to apply to them a "clash of civilizations" or an "imagined community." Likewise there is no a trace of a "liquid modernity" or a "microphysics of power" in the Kyrgyz bazaars and NGOs which are the central node (or the main protagonists?) of Petric's investigation. Bibliographical references are minimal. On the other hand, the author describes in details who and under what circumstances he met and talked to, and how the trajectory of his research had been transformed.

It happened that the years of Petric's survey coincided with a series of dramatic events in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan's political history. However, although various political issues occupy an important place in the book, the two revolutions, that of 2005 and another one five years later, were mentioned briefly and artlessly. Indeed, what really interests Petric are not the events and politics as such, but the practice and the tactics of their production in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.

Economically, Kyrgyzstan hardly benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, during the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, 96 percent of its population voted to remain in the union. Petric points out that independence was not perceived by the majority of the Kyrgyz population as a victory over Russia. After 1991, deindustrialization, caused by the collapse of economic relations with the former U.S.S.R. countries, combined with extensive neoliberal reforms (Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO in 1997, before the Baltic states, Russia, or Ukraine) resulted in the decline of a productive economy and made Kyrgyzstan dependent on its neighboring countries.

A part of the population began to create small-scale trading companies; thus the term "biznesman," employed by Petric, has been appropriated by Kyrgyz society. At the same time, another part of the population emigrated to Kazakhstan and to Russia for seasonal or permanent work. As for the Kyrgyz state, it evolved, according to Petric, into a "traffic territory," dependent on the income generated from Chinese imports and their subsequent resale to the neighboring countries. Another source of income became international aid, provided and redistributed by numerous international governmental and nongovernmental agencies. These two phenomena, traffic territory and international agencies represented by their agents, are the central themes of the book.

A Kyrgyz bazaar (Dordoi bazaar is depicted in detail, but others are mentioned as well) is a well organized economic territory where no form of anarchy is possible, argues Petric. De-exoticized and hierarchized, the physical and psychological space of the bazaars is an essential part of Kyrgyz society. It is a place where encounters and exchanges take place; where one can easily find temporary and/or permanent work, and both political and financial capitals are created. In short, the bazaar is a new alternative "locus" of power "a la kirghyze."

Another such site of power is dispersed among numerous foreign organizations settled in Kyrgyzstan. The money derived from international institutions is spent on various projects by international civil servants and local NGOs. But the goal of so-called development aid is sometimes questionable. Aiming to promote democracy and "good governance," some international organizations and NGOs are far from being neutral and interfere overtly in the internal political affairs of Kyrgyzstan. Thus, according to Petric's investigation, the OSCE manipulated the prioritizing of information techniques, and as such contributed to a delegitimization of the parliamentary elections organized by the former president, Askar Akaev. Subsequently, the same agencies helped to legitimize the presidential elections organized by Akaev's opponent, Kurmanbek Bakiev.

Petric portrays the men and the women whose interests and ideas buttress each institution. These ideas and interests may be a consequence of clientelist relations, ideology, and/or strategies of the states these actors come from. Sometimes they have their own ideas about how the situation in the country should develop. Therefore, another contribution of Petric's book is to show that the so-called NGO-ization of Kyrgyzstan is not a spontaneous awakening of a civil society; rather it is a result of intense interactions between global and local actors.

Kyrgyzstan is a territory where the interests of great powers intersect. But what would be then the role of the Kyrgyz state vis-a-vis these interests? Devoid of a possibility to define the rules of the game, does it simply try to ensure itself a presence in the polyphony or the co-construction of others' strategies?

Petric does not abandon the idea of the state. His conclusions are rather that what happens in Kyrgyzstan is not a collapse of the state, but a number of "contradictory, heterogeneous, plural connections allowing to develop a particular form of sovereignty and a unique type of the exercise of power" (my translation from French, p. 197).

Such a conclusion (if it is a conclusion) may perhaps be criticized for being a conceptual overstretch, and other questions, articulated differently, could possibly produce different results. It is also possible that historicizing the phenomena of traffic and circulation, totally absent from the book, might help the reader to better sense the relativism of the situation. But for this kind of criticism, the answer is straightforward: other research should be done to clarify and develop what is missing.

Petric's book raises many questions. What is "good governance" and, ultimately, a good democracy? Are these two universally implantable? Is it ethically appropriate to fit local traditions in favor of "universal norms" that are a form of "interiorized governmentality of individuals"? And finally, how do we define the state in such a context of multiple competing spheres of influence? Given the broad and meaningful questions that the book nurtures, it provides rather profound conclusions given the title's premise to tell the story of who ate someone's sheep.

-- Nari Shelekpayev

Nari Shelekpayev is originally from Kazakhstan but currently lives in Canada, where he is working on a Ph.D. dissertation at the history department of the University of Montreal. He got a B.A. in political science from Nankai University in China, an M.A. in history from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, as well as a master in international law from University of Paris II. Previously worked for UNESCO, Xinhua News Agency in Beijing, and taught in several institutions. Currently he is teaching and research assistant at University of Montreal and member of CESMI executive board since April 2013.
Has Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh put a major crimp in Turkmenistan's gas plans?
Has Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh put a major crimp in Turkmenistan's gas plans?

It appears Turkmenistan is about to lose its second-best customer for natural gas, Iran.

Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said on August 11 that his country no longer needed gas from Turkmenistan. Zanganeh went so far as to say, "Iran is importing Turkmen gas just because it is important to promote political and economic relations with Turkmenistan."

The oil minister's comments could be bargaining tactics, as Iran has frequently sought to convince Turkmenistan to lower the price for its gas, or it could reflect a potential shift in Iran's role in the international gas market.

Zanganeh said that with Iran about to boost domestic gas production by some 200 million additional cubic meters starting in March next year, the country could "abandon completely gas imports from Turkmenistan." This contrasts with his statements in May that Iran would continue to import Turkmen gas at existing levels.

It is quite a turn of events for Turkmenistan. In early 2010 a new, second pipeline bringing Turkmen gas to Iran was launched. At that time leaders in the two countries spoke about gas imports to Iran reaching up to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. A new gas-compressor station started operation in western Turkmenistan in December 2013, built specifically to export more gas to Iran.

The first gas pipeline connecting the two countries -- the 200-kilometer Korpedzhe-Kurdkui pipeline -- was launched at the end of 1997. It was also the first pipeline that gave Turkmenistan an export route to somewhere outside the former Soviet Union. Iran funded construction of the pipeline to import some 8 bcm of gas a year, mainly to areas of northern Iran that were not well connected to the gas fields of the south.

Russia remained the biggest purchaser of Turkmen gas until a suspicious explosion along the pipeline connecting the two countries occurred in April 2009, amid tense negotiations between the two over the price for Turkmen gas. The ruptured pipeline cut off gas flows entirely for months.

Iran then became for a brief time the main buyer of Turkmen gas, until the new pipeline from Turkmenistan to China started operation at the end of 2009.

Supplies of Turkmen gas to Russia were eventually renewed, but in greatly diminished volumes, leaving Iran the No. 2 customer for Turkmen gas, after China.

International sanctions on Iran have hindered the country from developing its gas sector and from constructing an infrastructure to distribute gas for domestic use. Iran has the second-largest proven gas reserves in the world (Russia has the most) but again, due to sanctions there has been little opportunity to take advantage of that resource.

As talks progress between Tehran and major world powers about Iran's nuclear program, and sanctions are slowly eased, there are new prospects on the horizon for Iran and gas exports are a big part of that.

The same day Zanganeh spoke of the end of Turkmen gas imports, the deputy oil minister in charge of international affairs, Ali Majedi, told journalists Iran was ready to supply Europe with gas via the Nabucco pipeline project.

Nabucco was recently shelved after more than a decade of shareholders trying to get potential gas suppliers to sign contracts for supplies, which gas suppliers were hesitant to do since it was unclear how soon, or even if, Nabucco would be built.

Nabucco was originally envisioned to bring gas from Caspian Basin countries -- Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, possibly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan -- and also possibly from Iraq to Europe by way of a 3,300-kilometer pipeline.

Nabucco was all but scrapped after Azerbaijan opted last year to use the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline to feed into the Trans-Adriatic pipeline across Southern Europe.

Majedi claimed two European countries had already shown interest in reviving the Nabucco scheme and that "Iran with its major gas fields could supply gas to Europe via Nabucco." And Nabucco's map of its proposed route envisioned the possible inclusion of Iran, so the route is already set.

In such a scenario Turkmenistan changes from Iran's gas supplier into Iran's competitor for a space in a pipeline across northern Iran into Turkey and on, eventually, to Austria.

If Oil Minister Zanganeh was sincere in his remarks, this is very bad news for Turkmenistan. It leaves Turkmenistan with two customers for its gas – China and Russia. China is a guaranteed long-term and virtually insatiable customer. Russia has always mixed politics with business in gas dealings with Turkmenistan, an arrangement Ashgabat hoped it was breaking as the Central Asian state showed it was diversifying its export markets.

-- Bruce Pannier, with contributions from Toymyrat Bugayev of RFE/RL's Turkmen Service

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.​

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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