The problem, many Iraqis say, is that the insurgency's goal is convoluted; none of the so-called resistance groups have ever offered up a clear ideology. The "honorable resistance" that includes "nationalist" Sunni Arab forces claims their goal is to drive multinational forces from Iraq. Al-Zarqawi and other hard-line Islamist groups claim the same goal, but add that their intention is to form an Islamic state in Iraq. The difficulty in separating these two strands comes in the fact that both are responsible for unbridled attacks against civilians. Moreover, al-Zarqawi justifies the targeting of civilians by defining his enemy as "anyone who cooperates with multinational forces or the transitional government," without offering any real differentiations to support his position.
Al-Zarqawi Enters The Debate
The Al-Qaeda leader has entered the debate on the honorable resistance himself, claiming in a 5 July audiotape attributed to him on the Internet (http://www.tajdeed.org.uk) that only those armed fighters in Iraq that belong to his group should be labeled "honorable resistance":
"The honorable resistance is the one that makes its jihad an international jihad not based on color, race, or land, for the believers are all one nation whose blood is of equal worth.... It is not the so-called resistance that bases its objectives on the Sykes-Piko borders.... The honorable resistance is the one...that rose up and pushed itself and relied on God...not the resistance that every time it suffers a hardship or tribulation, it lost its way and sought help from anyone.... [The honorable resistance] is not the resistance that...does not mind befriending and cooperating with those that disobey God and His Messenger for the sake of realizing some interests and gains. Those who were described as not belonging to the honorable resistance are the ones who have been fighting for the sake of God for more than two years...they are the ones who sacrificed their scholars, leaders, and cadre. Upon whose shoulders did the battles of Al-Qa'im rest? Whose blood was spilled in Al-Ramadi, Al-Fallujah, and Al-Hadithah?"
For al-Zarqawi, the ultimate betrayal of his cause has come from those Islamic scholars who criticized his insurgency in Iraq. "Is this what our scholars can produce?" al-Zarqawi asked in his statement. "How long would the scholars continue to avoid the battlefields of jihad, issue the rulings and counsel while they are distant from the reality of this nation?"
What To Do?
While most Iraqis critical of the nationalist insurgency agree that the only option now for the Sunni Arab-led nationalists lie in them joining the political process, many Iraqis remain torn about how to reconcile that with some 30 years of Ba'athist oppression and the past two years of devastating attacks against Iraqis in the name of resistance. Iraqi commentaries in the media tend to consider the reported talks between multinational forces and insurgent groups as an insult to civilians who have suffered at the hands of these groups. Some Iraqi newspapers have criticized the talks, saying that such discussions equate to U.S. support for bringing back the Ba'athist regime.
Shi'ite Arabs have found it particularly disturbing that such talks would be carried out without the participation of an elected Iraqi government, and the transitional administration has been quick to disassociate itself from the talks.
While a few Iraqis have called for a public reconciliation, it is unlikely at this point in time to be a real option. The regime loyalists that make up the "nationalist" insurgency are in no way apologetic for the crimes of the Hussein regime, let alone the crimes carried out in the name of resistance over the past two years.
Sunni Arab "nationalists," by failing to disassociate themselves from the likes of al-Zarqawi -- even if innocent from the crimes that are attributed to them -- have by default implicated themselves by not making any real distinction between their cause and the cause of the Islamists. Should these nationalist resistance fighters lay down their arms and join the political process, they will find themselves vulnerable to attacks by pro-regime and Islamist forces opposed to such action. They could also find themselves vulnerable to Shi'ite and Kurdish groups seeking revenge. The current environment essentially leaves Sunni Arab resistance groups willing to lay down their arms stuck between a rock and a hard place.
Courting The Arab World
The Arab world, whether ready or not, is being pulled into the debate with growing frequency. A number of prominent Iraqis have called on Arab states to take firm positions against insurgent attacks in Iraq, claiming that the portrayal of terrorism as resistance in the Arab media has deluded many Arabs.
Meanwhile, Sunni Arab religious leaders, such as Muslim Scholars Association spokesman Muthanna Harith al-Dari, have called on regional powerhouse Egypt to publicly recognize the right of the Iraqi people to resist occupation.
The Iraqi government has attempted to pressure Arab states to do more than pay lip service to the transitional Iraqi government by offering concrete assistance and through opening embassies on the ground. The kidnapping and killing of an Egyptian envoy by al-Zarqawi's group was meant as a clear warning signal to Arab governments not to establish relations with Iraq.
An 11 July commentary in the "Jordan Times" offered up advice to non-Islamist insurgents in Iraq, while offering continued support for the insurgents' cause. The commentary suggested that if the goal of "nationalist" insurgents is to drive multinational forces from Iraq, then civilians should no longer be targeted, since such attacks garner little support for their cause.
Iraqi commentators have called on the region's Islamic leadership to take a decisive stand on terrorism through a fatwa (religious edict) "before Iraq is destroyed." Muslim leaders stopped short of commenting on terrorism in a meeting in Amman, Jordan last week.
The three-day meeting brought together Islamic scholars from the eight Sunni and Shi'a schools of thought. Participants did, however, state emphatically in their final statement that fatwas should only be issued by clerics with religious authority. They also agreed that Muslims cannot label fellow Muslims as takfir (apostates), nor can Muslims kill fellow Muslims for what they deem "religious reasons." Islamist fighters in Iraq have regularly justified attacks on civilians in Iraq by labeling their victims apostates. Al-Zarqawi's group has gone so far as to label all Shi'ites apostates, and has established a unit to assassinate Shi'ite members of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq's (SCIRI) Badr Organization.
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, meanwhile, has called for a meeting of Arab interior ministers to produce a unified stance on the issue of terrorism. Such meetings, however, produce little real change. What is really required is for Arab states to take action against insurgent Islamist groups working for Iraq within their borders. Few states are likely to do so, however, fearing a backlash at home.
For Iraq, the consequences are dire. If the Iraqi "resistance" continues along the same lines, all Sunni Arabs in Iraq will, at some point, pay the price. The Sunni Arab community in Iraq needs to put action behind their outright condemnation of the so-called "resistance" by turning in armed fighters and demonstrating against the terrorism currently taking place. While it appears that public support for the tactics employed by the "honorable resistance" is waning, it is likely that the tide will only turn when there is a blanket change in the mindset of Sunni Arab Iraqis.
There are enormous consequences for the Arab world as well. States who do not take a firm position on terrorism must accept that at some point, Al-Qaeda will turn and target the Arab regimes, as the group expands its mission to depose what it sees as tyrannical Arab regimes and establish Islamic rule. Some regimes -- such as Syria -- may have falsely assumed a future immunity by their current aiding of Islamist terrorists. Stagnant economies lead to extremism and with more than 50 percent of the Arab world under the age of 18, more and more young people are susceptible to Islamist extremism. Arab leaders, meanwhile, appear to be under the delusion that if the fight is in Iraq, it won't be fought at home.