UN Set To Expand Scope Of Mandate
The proposed mandate, which is expected to be ratified by member states next week, would pave the way for the largest UN mission on the ground in Iraq since 2003.
That year, the UN pulled its expatriate staff from the country following the August bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad that killed UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and 22 others.
The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was established in June 2004. By then, the UN had allowed a small staff (no more than 35) of expatriate workers to return to Iraq. However, the staff size and lack of security largely prohibited the UN from carrying out much of its mandate.
Small, But Worthwhile Steps
Despite the lack of any significant presence inside the country, the mandate has been renewed each year, and the UN has taken small but worthwhile steps toward reestablishing its presence on the ground, through supporting efforts to draft a new constitution, observing elections in January and December 2005, and supporting Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's 24-point national-reconciliation initiative.
Together with the Iraqi government, the UN launched the International Compact with Iraq in July 2006. The initiative sought to "bring together the international community and multilateral organizations to help Iraq achieve its national vision" over five years. The program would work to institutionalize good governance while addressing outstanding political, economic, and security issues.
Through the participation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the Iraqi government would develop a strategy for economic reform and regeneration that would help reintegrate Iraq into the broader region and, by extension, the international community.
Sectarian Tensions Affect Relations
The official launch of the project was delayed for several months due to security issues in Baghdad, as well as reluctance by neighboring Arab states to support the Shi'ite-led Iraqi government. The Arab states -- with primarily majority Sunni populations and Sunni Arab leadership -- fear a Shi'ite government in Iraq and the possible consequences of relations that government may have with Iran.
On May 3, representatives of Iraq's neighboring states, as well as the UN and the United States, gathered in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, for a conference in support of the compact. Representatives from more than 50 countries and international organizations attended the meeting.
In an effort to elicit Arab regional support for the compact, a key article in the conference's final declaration noted that participating states would support the Iraqi government as long as it ensured "the basic right of all Iraqi citizens to participate peacefully in the political process through the country's political system."
Arab states signed onto the compact, albeit grudgingly, but largely ignored their commitments in the months that followed. Unfortunately, the current state of relations among Iraqi political parties does little to prompt Arab states to do more.
Reaching Out To Neighbors
Rather, the decision of the Sunni-led Iraqi Accordance Front this week to withdraw its ministers from al-Maliki's cabinet is likely only to worsen Iraq's relations with neighboring Arab states. And although regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia committed this week to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, it is unlikely to follow through with the commitment anytime soon.
The ability of the UN successfully to expand its role in Iraq will largely depend on its ability to encourage regional states to engage constructively with Iraq in terms of political and economic initiatives. While the United States has worked actively to encourage such engagement, persuading regional states to engage will require a more proactive approach from other Western nations, particularly the EU.
The new draft UN resolution calls for an extension and expansion of the current mandate for one year and would authorize UNAMI to facilitate regional dialogue, including on border-security issues, energy, and refugees, according to AP, which viewed the draft.
It also paves the way for the UN to help facilitate national dialogue and political reconciliation, resolve disputed internal boundaries, and advise and assist in a constitutional review and a national census.
The draft also calls on the UN mission to help plan, fund, and implement reintegration programs for former combatants, signaling that a deal may be nearing between the Iraqi government and nationalist insurgent groups. The UN has tried to support talks with native insurgent groups, who are largely comprised of disaffected Iraqis who lost their military or technical jobs following the fall of the Hussein regime in 2003.
Cabinet Shaken As Domestic Political Rifts Widen
The front issued the threat one week ago, saying it would withdraw unless al-Maliki agreed to meet 12 demands, including releasing Sunni Arab detainees held without charge in U.S. and Iraqi detention centers; dissolving and disarming militias and officers and enlisted military personnel tied to militias; dismissing the defense minister; appointing competent, nonpartisan Iraqis to serve as technocrats; and improving relations with Arab states.
According to media reports, the front will only withdraw its ministers from government; the bloc's 44 parliamentarians will return to their jobs on September 4, following the legislature's one-month summer break.
Parliamentarians from the front had previously walked out of parliament for five weeks, returning to work on July 19 following negotiations among Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish leaders over the dismissal of parliament speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani in early June.
A Quarter Of The Cabinet Gone
The decision to withdraw from the cabinet while keeping parliamentarians in their posts aims to destabilize al-Maliki's cabinet while ensuring that Sunni representatives help challenge key legislation due to be examined and voted on following the summer break -- including the draft oil law.
Moreover, the departure of the six cabinet ministers from the Accordance Front, coupled with the departure of five ministers aligned with Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr earlier this year, leaves the cabinet devoid of any real opposition. The 11 ministers make up about 25 percent of the cabinet. Al-Maliki this week put forth a proposal to streamline the cabinet that would combine ministries and bring several posts under the oversight of national security adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubay'i. The proposal, offered before the Accordance Front's withdrawal, was rejected by the cabinet outright. It is unclear whether al-Maliki will attempt to push it through again.
President Jalal Talabani said this week that four major political parties -- the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Islamic Al-Da'wah Party, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) -- will continue to push for the formation of a moderates front in the parliament. Taken together, the four parties control a significant number of seats in the National Assembly, though they fall short of holding a majority.
It is questionable whether a moderates front -- billed as a nonsectarian grouping that will lobby for a united Iraq -- would have any legitimacy without the participation of Sunni Arabs. The forces behind the effort have been trying for several weeks to win the support of Sunni Arab Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's Iraqi Islamic Party. The Islamic Party is a key member of the Accordance Front. For the time being, al-Hashimi is not biting. As a key critic of al-Maliki's administration, al-Hashimi has said that he will not join any grouping without key concessions from the prime minister with regard to power sharing in government.
Meanwhile, former Shi'ite Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari has begun to push publicly for a cabinet reshuffle, a push that appears part of a broader plan by al-Ja'fari to unseat al-Maliki, who replaced him following the December 2005 elections.
Al-Ja'fari was reportedly behind media reports two weeks ago that called for replacing Kurdish President Talabani with a Sunni Arab leader. Al-Ja'fari met with Talabani in Al-Sulaymaniyah on July 27 to discuss the current political situation. Kurdish press reported that al-Ja'fari was seeking support to overthrow al-Maliki's government and insert himself as prime minister. Al-Ja'fari has denied the allegations, and he has also denied media reports suggesting that he is seeking to form a new political front of his own.
Newspapers in Baghdad have reported in recent days that al-Ja'fari is seeking support from the Iraqi Accordance Front -- hence his sudden call for a Sunni Arab president -- much to the dismay of Shi'a aligned with al-Sadr. Al-Ja'fari's approach may lead to problems for the one-time premier, as he would likely need support from al-Sadr loyalists in any attempt to unseat al-Maliki.
Sadrists and Sunni Arabs share some common positions such as opposition to federalism, the constitution, and key pending legislation. But even putting their sectarian tendencies aside, the differences that separate the two groups far outweigh their commonalities.
The sudden push by al-Ja'fari highlights old ideological fractures between the two main streams of the Al-Da'wah Party. But the move can also be seen in the context of recent efforts by the party to position itself in terms of issues and policies, rather than adopting a traditional sectarian stance.
Meanwhile, another former prime minister, Iyad Allawi, has seen little support for his proposed national-salvation government. Despite Shi'ite distrust due to Allawi's recent actions, Allawi has reportedly taken part in recent meetings with senior Iraqi officials and al-Ja'fari. However, he told Al-Jazeera television on August 2 that he has rejected a U.S. request that he put aside his aspirations to form an expanded secular bloc and join the moderates front.
The current posturing of political parties and blocs will eventually force al-Maliki to address demands for wider participation in decision making and, by extension, broader participation by Sunni Arabs in the political process. But it remains to be seen how far the prime minister is willing to go in order to pacify his Sunni detractors.
Despite pronouncements from all sides regarding their commitment to some form of a national-unity project, in reality the political currents in Iraq are employing a zero-sum-game approach in their relations with competing parties. This reality is complicated by interference from regional powerhouses Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are propping up their allies in Iraq (Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs, respectively) while throwing up obstacles in the path of political progress.