WASHINGTON -- As tensions across Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf roll down parallel tracks, a new conventional wisdom is taking hold -- namely, that the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are no longer isolated events but two fronts in a single, evolving global struggle.
This week’s high-level contact between Vladimir Putin and senior Iranian officials underscored the Kremlin’s delicate positioning, even as new reports point to Russian support for Iran’s capabilities to target sites around the Middle East.
For years, Moscow has cultivated a reputation as a flexible power broker in the Middle East -- able to engage Iran, Israel, and Gulf Arab states simultaneously. In Washington meanwhile, President Donald Trump is recalibrating US foreign policy priorities, and in Gulf capitals increasingly wary of Iranian escalation, questions are mounting about whether Moscow’s “strategic ambiguity” is sustainable -- or backfiring.
RFE/RL spoke with Mark Katz, Professor Emeritus at George Mason University and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council about how Moscow is walking a narrowing tightrope -- one that could reshape its influence both in Tehran and far beyond.
RFE/RL: Russia says it is staying out militarily in Iran. Is that restraint real, or is it better understood as strategic ambiguity?
Mark Katz: Well, I think it’s more strategic ambiguity. There’s been a lot of reporting, and US government officials have indicated that the Russians are helping the Iranians with targeting, in terms of Iranian drone and missile attacks throughout the region, including on US bases, even indications that they are providing some weaponry, although exactly what doesn’t seem clear.
So it does seem that Russia is obviously not sending ground forces, not sending major weapon systems. But I think that their actions make clear that they are definitely supporting the Iranian government.
RFE/RL: A meeting took place this week between Vladimir Putin and senior Iranian officials. Who needed it more -- Tehran or Moscow? And did Iran come away with anything tangible, or mainly rhetorical support dressed up as partnership?
Katz: That’s a good question. It strikes me that at this point Iran definitely needs Russia more. They’re the ones who have been under Israeli attack, and despite the fact that they have survived, obviously the US and Israel have done an awful lot of damage. I think that the Iranians want as much help as they can get from the Russians.
The Russians clearly -- Putin said nice things, was very supportive -- but certainly in the public record there hasn’t been any indication of any kind of concrete support. That doesn’t mean that there hasn’t been any, but it’s not something that the Russians are boasting about or broadcasting.
It strikes me that there’s a limit to what they want to publicly admit that they’re doing, and that shows a degree that they want to keep it limited. One reason is that Putin really doesn’t want to spoil his relations with Trump. Trump’s cutting of US military assistance to Ukraine by 99 percent has been a real boon for Putin, and if Trump is angry about Russian help for Iran, he could restore this. That’s not in Putin’s interest.
I think also Putin has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with the Gulf Arabs. Trade, especially through the United Arab Emirates, has been very helpful to Russia in circumventing Western sanctions. And the Iranians have especially targeted the UAE.
Another factor is that various Middle Eastern states have turned to Ukraine for assistance with air defense against Iran. This is not in Putin’s interest at all. This is a bad thing for Putin.
RFE/RL: Iran has requested S-400 air defense systems to address gaps exposed by recent US and Israeli strikes. Has Putin effectively said no -- and if he does, would that signal the limits of Russia’s role as Iran’s security guarantor?
Katz: My sense is he hasn’t said no. He just hasn’t quite said yes -- a very different thing. And I think partly it may be that Putin needs these for himself. In other words, he can’t really spare S-400s. And I also think that sending S-400s would really be a red flag to the Gulf Arab states in particular.
So he might do so at some point, but it doesn’t seem that he’s rushing to provide this system to the Iranians, and that must be very disappointing to Tehran.
RFE/RL: Is Moscow effectively acting as the “brain” for Iranian targeting while withholding the “brawn”?
Katz: Well, you know, it’s not clear exactly what role they’re playing in the decisions to target. In other words, are they actually making recommendations, or are they just simply providing the information which the Iranians are then free to use? It’s not exactly clear.
What they seem to want to do is to help the Iranians, but to keep themselves with a degree of plausible deniability. In other words, that the Trump administration in particular doesn’t come out and say, “Russia is helping kill American troops in this region.” They don’t want to be so associated with this operation that they’re blamed by the US.
Even to the extent that this is recognized, the administration may not want to frame Putin in this way right now. But if Putin does more, then they may not be able to avoid identifying him as really aligned with the Iranians against the US.
RFE/RL: If Iran comes under sustained pressure from advanced Western systems, does that force Moscow’s hand -- or expose the limits of what it is willing or able to do?
Katz: It could be a little bit of both, in the sense that once attacks are taking place -- American and Israeli attacks -- Russia is not going to get directly involved in such conflicts. What I think is that the Russians want to provide the Iranians with enough to survive.
I think also that perhaps in Putin’s thinking, it’s simply a degree of revenge. In other words, American assistance to Ukraine has helped Ukraine launch missiles at targets inside of Russia. So Russia is doing the same. I think there was even a Putin statement to the effect that Russia would stop providing help in this manner for Iran if the US stopped providing it to Ukraine, which suggests that he is providing it.
But statements like that, the Iranians must not be very happy at all. They are always worried that Putin would sell them out if he can reach a deal with the US -- that Iran is simply a card for Putin.
RFE/RL: Stepping back, what is Russia’s broader endgame in Iran -- ensuring regime survival, or positioning itself to control the broader geopolitical chessboard?
Katz: Well, survival of the regime, certainly. In other words, it’s not like Syria, where the Assad regime falls and Russia quickly pivots to having good relations with the new regime. Now, if the Iranian regime did fall, I am sure that Putin would very quickly try to establish good relations with a new regime in Tehran, but he doesn’t want that contingency to come up.
Beyond that, I think what they would like to see is US influence decline everywhere. Divisions between America and Europe -- whether over Ukraine or over Iran -- are beneficial from Putin’s point of view.
Ultimately, what they would like to see is that the Gulf Arab states decide they really cannot rely on the US, and that they might need Russia somehow to help contain Iran. Whether that’s realistic is another issue.
RFE/RL: Is Putin, perhaps unintentionally, strengthening Kyiv by pushing Gulf states closer to Ukraine?
Katz: Well, yes, I don’t think he anticipated this -- that Ukraine would make this offer and the Gulf Arabs would accept it. And apparently it has been fairly effective. This is something that they don’t want.
If hostilities begin again -- if the US and Israel attack Iran and Iran responds by attacking Gulf Arab states -- I think we will see more Ukrainian assistance. I don’t think Putin wants that. So I think he would really like to see this conflict, if not resolved, at least remain in a stalemate and not become active conflict again.
RFE/RL: Could this be the first time Russia’s Middle East strategy is backfiring on its war in Ukraine?
Katz: That’s a very good question, because up until now Putin has been very successful in supporting opposing sides simultaneously -- working with the Iranians but also with those who fear the Iranians in the region.
But now we’re seeing that it’s more difficult for Russia to maintain that balance. He has done a lot to help the Iranians to attack Gulf Arab states, and they are not going to forget this.
They may still try to maintain some relationship with Russia in hopes of restraining Iran, but if that doesn’t work, then they will start to draw conclusions. At the same time, they are also trying to play both sides -- cooperating more with Ukraine without cutting ties to Russia.
That kind of balancing is typical in the Middle East, but it is becoming harder for Russia to sustain its own version of it.
RFE/RL: Finally, does Putin ultimately see Iran as a partner to protect -- or as a bargaining chip in potential negotiations with the West?
Katz: That’s a question that they’re asking in Tehran right now. Because I think the Syrian experience showed that if a regime falls, Putin will move very quickly to establish ties with a new regime.
Now, could there be some kind of grand bargain between Trump and Putin which would involve Iran? That’s possible, but then why hasn’t it happened yet? They’ve had plenty of opportunity.
I think the very fact that this question is being asked -- by many in Tehran -- shows that Putin cannot be relied upon as the most trustworthy ally. That’s for sure.
