Does Former Georgian Minister's Arrest Mark A Political Watershed?
By Liz Fuller
Former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili (file photo)
October 4, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- The September 27 arrest of former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili -- just 48 hours after he publicly accused President Mikheil Saakashvili of corruption, protectionism, and proposing the liquidation of a political opponent -- was hardly surprising. But the Georgian authorities could not have anticipated that Okruashvili's detention would serve as a catalyst for large-scale antigovernment protests.
A trained lawyer, Okruashvili, 34, is a longtime close associate of Saakashvili, having served as deputy justice minister in 2000-01 when Saakashvili headed that ministry. He was long considered one of the most capable and versatile members of the Georgian leadership, having served since 2004 as a regional governor, prosecutor-general, interior minister, and then from December 2004 as defense minister.
Saakashvili explained Okruashvili's dismissal in November 2006 from that latter post and his appointment as economy minister on the grounds that Georgia's economy "is now our battle front," and that Okruashvili's managerial and organizational talents would be best deployed there. Okruashvili, however, saw things differently and stepped down just days after being named economy minister, affirming that his heart was with the armed forces.
Rumors that Okruashvili planned to found his own political party in opposition to Saakashvili, and possibly even run against the incumbent president in the presidential ballot theoretically due in 2009, have been circulating in Tbilisi for six months but increased in intensity in recent weeks. Okruashvili returned to Tbilisi from abroad last month, as unsubstantiated reports began appearing in the Georgian press that the prosecutor-general had opened an investigation into his activities as defense minister, and despite the arrest on corruption charges of two of his close associates, former Poti Mayor David Kantaria in late August, and former Shida Kartli Governor Mikheil Kareli on September 23.
Critical Of Saakashvili
Speaking at a press conference on September 25, and then in a live interview on the independent Imedi television channel later that day, Okruashvili accused President Saakashvili of adopting the mantle of a crusader against corruption and injustice while selectively permitting members of his entourage and close family to amass huge fortunes illegally. "Saakashvili's ruling style...has turned immorality, injustice, oppression, reprisals, the demolition of homes and churches, and...murder...into norms of everyday life," he said.
"Saakashvili's ruling style...has turned immorality, injustice, oppression, reprisals, the demolition of homes and churches, and...murder...into norms of everyday life." -- Former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili
Okruashvili claimed that three years ago, as interior minister, he arrested Saakashvili's uncle for accepting a $200,000 bribe, but at Saakashvili's request subsequently released him. Okruashvili criticized Saakashvili for failing in early 2006 to give the green light for a military operation that would have brought back under Tbilisi's control the breakaway republic of South Ossetia.
Okruashvili further claimed that Saakashvili raised the possibility of assassinating oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili in a car bombing, and said he knows for certain that former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, whose body was found in a rented apartment in Tbilisi in February 2005, was killed elsewhere. Okruashvili accused Saakashvili of resenting, and trying to sow dissent within, the Georgian Orthodox Church, and of rewriting Georgian history to understate everything achieved before his advent to power. Saakashvili dismissed all those accusations on September 29 as lies.
New Opposition Movement
But while members of Saakashvili's United National Movement shrugged off Okruashvili's allegations as "utter nonsense [and] hysterical and groundless slander," and as too "absurd" to merit a response, Georgian citizens of all ages and walks of life reportedly flocked on September 26 to sign up as members of his new opposition movement For a United Georgia. And on September 28, the day after his arrest, up to 10,000 people congregated in Tbilisi -- the largest manifestation of popular protest since the November 2003 Rose Revolution.
But as the English-language daily "Messenger" noted in an analysis on October 1, the majority of those present were there not simply to support Okruashvili, but to vent their anger and frustration with Saakashvili's leadership, chanting "Misha fandarast!" ("Farewell, Misha!" an allusion to the "Kokoity fandarast!" campaign launched by the Georgian authorities earlier this year as part of their efforts to topple the de facto president of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia).
This is not to say that Okruashvili is not popular: on the contrary, opinion polls have consistently suggested that he is one of the most popular politicians in Georgia. For example, "The Georgian Times" on September 27 ranked Okruashvili second after Saakashvili, while "Mteli kvira" on October 1 claimed that 12 percent of respondents it questioned said they would vote for Okruashvili if presidential elections were held now, as compared to 10.8 percent support for Saakashvili. But according to the "Messenger," although popular, Okruashvili "is not trusted." To that extent, other opposition politicians may well simply seek to capitalize on the anger his arrest has triggered.
Participants in the September 28 demonstrations put forward a number of demands, including Saakashvili's resignation and the holding of parliamentary elections in April 2008 as required by the constitution, rather than in the fall of that year as decreed by Saakashvili, RFE/RL's Georgian Service reported on October 1.
Ten opposition parties from across the political spectrum, including the People's Party, the Labor party, the Republican party, the Conservative party, Georgia's Way, Tavisupleba, Chven Tviton (We Ourselves), and Okruashvili's For a United Georgia have aligned in a National Council that is headed by a five-person Emergency Committee whose members include former Minister for Conflict Resolution Goga Khaindrava and parliamentarians Levan Gachechiladze (New Conservatives/New Rightists) and Koka Guntsadze, who defected from the New Rightists and is now a leading member of Okruashvili's party. The council reportedly plans to mobilize people across the country under the slogan "Georgia Without Saakashvili," to lobby for Saakashvili's resignation and the abolition of the presidency, and to stage a major demonstration on November 2.
Meanwhile, activists of Okruashvili's own fledgling party are collecting signatures in support of a demand for his release from the two-month pretrial detention to which the Tbilisi Municipal Court sentenced him on September 29. The party plans to unveil its program in mid-November.
No Concrete Evidence
Still unclear is what Okruashvili himself hoped to achieve by going public last week with shocking and sensational allegations against Saakashvili for which he failed to provide any concrete evidence. Knowing Saakashvili as closely as he does, he must surely have anticipated swift retribution -- indeed the timing of his allegations must have come as a godsend to the Georgian authorities in that it served to eclipse completely the fallout from the September 20 shooting, reportedly in cold blood, by Georgian spetsnaz troops of two Russian citizens serving on contract as instructors to the Abkhaz armed forces.
If Okruashvili was gambling on Saakashvili not moving immediately to arrest him, then he is at the very least guilty of a major strategic error of judgment that casts doubt on his political skills. And as analyst Ramaz Saqvarelidze pointed out in a September 29 interview with the daily "Rezonansi," Okruashvili would have to have been "very naive" to anticipate the likelihood of arrest, and he is not a man who gives that impression.
Alternatively, Okruashvili may have anticipated, and possibly even sought to provoke, his arrest on the assumption that popular dissatisfaction with Saakashvili and his government has reached such a pitch that, sooner or later, the opposition will storm the jail where he is being held and release him, as hundreds of exultant Kyrgyz did former Bishkek Mayor Feliks Kulov after the March 2005 ouster of President Askar Akaev. But the timeframe agreed by the National Council may militate against that outcome: by announcing in advance a planned showdown in four weeks' time, the united opposition risks reprisals, including the detention of its leading members, prior to that date.
EU Envoy Calls South Caucasus A 'Broken Region'
By Ahto Lobjakas
Peter Semneby says the South Caucasus is in the grips of "old-fashioned, ethnically exclusive" nationalism
BRUSSELS, October 3, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- The European Union's special representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, offered an analysis rare in its candor in his annual address to the European Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee.
Summing up the collective woes of the three countries in the region, Semneby said on October 2 that although Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan share history, they lack a common identity. Soviet attempts to impose unity failed, Semneby says, and now the three countries are each in the grip of "old-fashioned, ethnically exclusive" nationalism.
Semneby said Europe could help remedy this situation.
"Given the rivalries between and inside the countries, this identity has to be larger than the region itself," he said. "An additional layer of identity, a European identity, is what comes to mind here. For such an identity, or for such a layer of identity to work as a catalyst for bringing this broken region together again, the countries and the communities in the region need, however, to understand that this identity is based on much more than just interests, but is fundamentally based on common values."
Yet the EU envoy was equally candid in making it plain that the EU at this point has little new to offer.
Georgia Both Ambitious, Vulnerable
Semneby identified Georgia as the most advanced country in the region and the most ambitious in its drive to move closer to the EU and NATO. However, he also characterized Georgia as being the most vulnerable -- largely due to the impact outside players such as Russia can have on its domestic affairs.
"I would mention as a particular [regional] concern the rising tensions in Georgian-Russian relations, which is illustrated, for example, by the continuing Russian sanctions against Georgia and the increasing number of security incidents in and around the conflict zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia," he said.
"Given the rivalries between and inside the countries [of the South Caucasus], this identity has to be larger than the region itself. An additional layer of identity, a European identity, is what comes to mind here." -- Peter Semneby, EU special representative
Semneby said there has been "no progress" in resolving the frozen conflicts in Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Upcoming elections in Russia, as well as talks on the future status of another frozen conflict, Kosovo, are contributing to what Semneby describes as "nervousness" in the region.
He also poured cold water on Georgia's attempts to sideline the separatist government in South Ossetia by setting up a rival, pro-Tbilisi administration. Semneby said the EU will continue working with the de facto government in Tsinkhvali, as it is key to addressing "the problem which needs to be resolved," though it does recognize that there are parallel authorities in the region.
The Georgian government is also not likely to be pleased by Semneby's observations that the EU will not send peacekeepers to Georgia without the consent of all involved parties, or join the Georgian government's new Commission on the Staus of South Ossetia. He also failed to say when the EU might relax its visa requirements for Georgian citizens to match the concessions already made for Russia -- and enjoyed by the huge number of Russian passport holders in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Semneby listed a number of recent EU confidence-building measures in Georgia, but acknowledged that the bloc's involvement in what are mostly training and liaison missions constitutes a "rather modest effort." in the security sector.
Nagorno-Karabakh Situation 'Fragile'
Addressing Armenia and Azerbaijan, Semneby noted their continued dispute over the unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. He said the stalemate remains "fragile" and that the situation could deteriorate in the run-up to elections in each of the two countries in 2008.
Semneby said the mediation efforts pursued by the OSCE Minsk Group in the region will intensify in the near future, adding that the EU will fully support them. As in Georgia, he said, the EU will focus on "confidence-building measures," among which he identified the promotion of people-to-people contacts to help minimize the isolation of those living in the conflict zones.
The EU special representative said little on Armenia aside from noting that the country's parliamentary elections in May were an improvement over previous polls. But he sounded a warning for Azerbaijan. Semneby said the EU's interest in Azerbaijan's energy resources and transit potential will not cause the bloc to turn a blind eye to its deteriorating rights standards.
"At the same time, we cannot close our eyes to other parts of the [EU] agenda -- the need to implement democratic reforms, to respect human rights, and freedom of the media, and so on," he said. "I mentioned [earlier] some of the problems we had with Azerbaijan in this context. I think it's important that [everyone] realizes that if these issues are also not taken seriously in the relationship [with the EU], this relationship will sooner or later run into trouble, and the interest-based part of the relationship will also suffer as a result."
Once again revisiting the region's frozen conflicts, Semneby noted Russia's role in negotiations, saying Moscow will remain a "key actor" in efforts to resolve the disputes and noting the EU's "common interest" in seeing such a conclusion.