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China In Eurasia

G7 foreign ministers pose for a photo at the start of a meeting in London on May 4.
G7 foreign ministers pose for a photo at the start of a meeting in London on May 4.

Since it was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has channeled hundreds of billions of dollars into foreign infrastructure, boosting trade, and clearing the way for China to forge political and economic links around the world.

The massive undertaking -- which Xi dubbed “the project of the century” -- has become a pillar of Chinese foreign policy and a strategic tool for Beijing as it has deepened its partnerships and boosted its influence in the process.

The BRI has since been supported by international organizations and more than 150 countries -- including many in the West -- as it has expanded in scope from ports, pipelines, and roads to include digital technology, health care, and green energy.

But a combination of growing disillusionment among partner countries with the resulting projects, room for more investment, and increased unease about the strategic implications of the BRI might have opened the door for an alternative to emerge.

Ahead of June’s Group of Seven (G7) summit in the United Kingdom, U.S. President Joe Biden has proposed to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson setting up a Western-led infrastructure plan that would rival China’s flagship BRI.

“There is a real opportunity right now. The sheer global need for investment in infrastructure far exceeds the ability of any country to meet it,” Jonathan Hillman, the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told RFE/RL. “Even the most exaggerated estimates of BRI will not meet the world’s needs.”

China will feature prominently on the agenda of the June 11-13 summit, which will bring together the traditional group of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States, plus representatives from Australia, India, and South Korea.

Forming an alternative to the BRI may come into sharper focus as Biden presses ahead with plans to establish an alliance of democracies to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Biden said in March that he would prevent China from passing the United States to become the "most powerful country in the world," and his administration has outlined plans to boost collaboration with its allies.

The European Union and India already inked a connectivity partnership on May 8 that aims to increase cooperation on digital and hard infrastructure, with an emphasis on strengthening regulatory standards on emerging technologies.

U.S. President Joe Biden says that he will not allow China to surpass the United States during his first formal news conference as president in the East Room of the White House in Washington on March 25.
U.S. President Joe Biden says that he will not allow China to surpass the United States during his first formal news conference as president in the East Room of the White House in Washington on March 25.

Hillman said the timing is right for advanced economies to offer alternatives to the BRI that can focus on providing more transparency for higher-quality projects across the developing world.

With their combined resources and a growing convergence among allies on how to approach development, especially Brussels and Washington, Western infrastructure plans could receive a boost that they’ve recently lacked.

“The United States is now much more aligned with its European partners when it comes to environmental issues, and that creates more opportunity for collaboration,” said Hillman. “There is a heft and confidence behind these talks that wasn’t there before.”

A Window Of Opportunity

The current push comes as the developing world struggles with the economic pressures brought by the pandemic and as the BRI brand has been tarnished by controversy.

The World Bank has said that COVID-19 will plunge the world economy into the worst recession since World War II and the world’s infrastructure needs -- estimated at $94 trillion over the next two decades -- are still unmet.

The BRI has also been undercut in recent years with questions regarding the commercial value of many of its projects, growing debt worries over murky lending practices, and concerns over the initiative being a vehicle for Chinese control.

Montenegro asked the European Union in April for help repaying a $1 billion Chinese loan for an ongoing highway project in that small Balkan country.

Debt and transparency concerns also surfaced in May as Hungary announced a $1.5 billion loan to build a Chinese university. This followed a controversial move by the government in April 2020 to keep all details classified around $1.9 billion borrowed from China for a railway project connecting Budapest to Belgrade.

Wider aspersions have been cast on the terms of deals for BRI projects, which a recent study of 100 Chinese contracts by the Center for Global Development found contained uniquely restrictive secrecy requirements and clauses that could allow Chinese entities to influence the policies of debtor countries.

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“The shine is now gone from the [BRI],” Theresa Fallon, the director of the Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels, told RFE/RL. “Positions towards China have been hardening and this is a chance for Europe to start thinking more strategically in their own neighborhood and beyond.”

The terms of what a Western alternative could look like are still being discussed but will likely seek to build off past agreements and rely on a mix of public and private funds.

The European Union launched a connectivity plan in 2018 and signed a deal with Japan in 2019 in what former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called a “sustainable, rules-based connectivity from the Indo-Pacific to the Western Balkans and Africa.”

The United States also passed the Build Act in 2018, which is intended to boost investment from the private sector in the developing world, and also launched the Blue Dot Network with Japan and Australia in 2019 as a way to uphold standards for infrastructure projects.

None of the initiatives, however, has yielded much in terms of concrete results, raising concerns that the West is unable to offer a true alternative to the state-backed economic vision put forward by Xi.

According to Fallon, Western nations should not be focusing on matching Beijing in terms of the volume of financing, but should instead be looking to use an infrastructure push to help spread higher standards for executing projects and integrating more transparency into contract negotiations.

“Simply being present on the ground already increases the leverage on China by making them have to improve what they offer and be more transparent in order to compete,” said Fallon.

A Patchwork Of Projects

While efforts to come up with alternatives to the BRI are gaining steam, they also face growing obstacles.

Western countries currently lack a centralized point to coordinate infrastructure partnerships. This makes it unlikely that one unified initiative to rival the BRI will materialize. Instead, analysts say, any future Western initiatives are likely to remain a mix of separate but coordinated projects between various players like the United States, the European Union, Japan, and India.

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at a press briefing at the end of the final day of the Belt and Road Forum at Yanqi Lake outside Beijing on April 27, 2019.
Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at a press briefing at the end of the final day of the Belt and Road Forum at Yanqi Lake outside Beijing on April 27, 2019.

“Political interest around this is moving, but actually pulling an alternative together and showing what it looks like is not developed yet,” Andrew Small, a fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, told RFE/RL. “It’s been hard enough for each country’s system to do this on their own, let alone to get them all to cooperate and coordinate together.”

Another potential obstacle is funding. While public institutions from G7 nations can step in to provide funding, a large amount of financing would need to come from the private sector, which is traditionally hesitant to get involved in large-scale infrastructure projects.

Moreover, many players are also cautious about setting up initiatives that would be seen as direct rivals to BRI or anything that could be seen as an anti-China alliance.

Rather, said Daniel Markey, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a former State Department official, any future alternative should be looking to make partnerships based on shared standards and norms.

The growth of China’s domestic tech companies through the BRI has allowed them to take up a dominant position across the world and with that allow Beijing to set the standards for many next-generation technologies. Markey said that any alternative initiative should look to focus on crucial sectors instead of simply investing broadly in infrastructure.

“Rather than crafting a direct response to BRI, Washington's approach should play to the strengths of the United States and its allies rather than attempting to beat China at its own games or on its home turf,” he said.

Government supporters hold a banner of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping at a demonstration outside parliament in Belgrade in May 2020.
Government supporters hold a banner of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping at a demonstration outside parliament in Belgrade in May 2020.

BELGRADE -- With a Chinese university project in Hungary drawing controversy over a lack of transparency and concerns about academic freedom, Beijing's influence in higher education in neighboring Serbia continues to grow.

A strategic agreement signed between Hungary and Shanghai's prestigious Fudan University in April made international headlines and sparked a backlash at home.

The decision to build a Budapest campus by 2024 using a $1.5 billion loan from a Chinese bank put a spotlight on Prime Minister Viktor Orban's close ties to Beijing and raised concerns about the long-term impact of such a project on the country's higher-education system.

But in Serbia -- where Beijing enjoys a close relationship with President Aleksandar Vucic and has been steadily deepening its ties over the last two decades -- growing cooperation with Chinese universities and schools continues unabated.

Currently, three Serbian universities -- the University of Belgrade, the University of Novi Sad, and the University of Nis -- have signed a cooperation agreement with Shanghai's Jiao Tong University, opening the door to deepening educational and cultural bonds between Serbia and China.

The agreements, which were signed in 2018, set up broad terms for cooperation that can grow deeper over time. They include new student and staff exchanges and scholarships, as well as growing Chinese financial support and Chinese-language classes.

In addition to the agreements with public universities, Serbia also hosts two Confucius Institutes, in Belgrade and Novi Sad. The government-run entities, which offer language and cultural programs abroad, have been accused by critics of being a means for Beijing to spread propaganda under the guise of teaching and to interfere with free speech on campuses.

Vucic has cemented relations with Beijing, cooperating on infrastructure, tourism, and technology projects that have brought in more than $10 billion in foreign direct investment since 2005. But the growing education and cultural focus represents a new phase of Chinese engagement in the Balkans and Europe more broadly.

"It's a textbook example of a soft-power move," Stefan Vladisavljev, an analyst at the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, told RFE/RL. "While China is still trailing countries like Russia [in the Balkans], this can bring a lot of people closer to Beijing. The idea is to make China more accessible and more familiar and leave an imprint on society as well."

Serbia is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative and one of the main cheerleaders of the 17+1 format, a Beijing-led forum launched in 2012 for China to engage with Central and Eastern European countries.

But China's strong ties with Belgrade, analysts say, have allowed Serbia to function as an economic, political, and economic hub for Beijing to expand across the Western Balkans and serve as a showcase for the merits of Chinese initiatives, from surveillance to cooperation on the coronavirus pandemic.

"Serbia is a poster child of cooperation in the region and one of the countries that Beijing points to when it wants to show what a successful relationship can look like," Vladisavljev said.

Deepening Ties

As Tena Prelec, a researcher at the University of Oxford, told RFE/RL's Balkan Service, Beijing's growing imprint on Serbian higher education should be seen in the wider context of China investing in universities across the globe as part of a broader effort promote its culture, language, and international ties.

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"China's desire is to shape the way it is presented on a global level, and I think it was only a matter of time for having a stronger presence in the academic sphere in Serbia," Prelec said.

But Serbia also represents a relatively safe space to expand in higher education, where China enjoys a great deal of goodwill among the population, public backing from the national government, and where initiatives like the Confucius Institute don't face the same level of scrutiny that they currently do across the European Union, where several of its chapters have recently been shut down.

While such programs offer new opportunities for students and faculty, University of Belgrade professor Dragana Mitrovic says these efforts at cultural diplomacy are part of a larger effort by Beijing to help spread a "Chinese narrative" on global affairs. "Strengthening Chinese cultural influence is an integral part of this cooperation [with Serbia] and a goal of the Chinese government," Mitrovic told RFE/RL's Balkan Service.

Cooperation isn't limited to ties between universities, either. Chinese companies are also becoming involved with Serbian higher education.

Kragujevac, a city in central Serbia, signed an agreement in February 2020 for its local university to cooperate with the Chinese company Dahua Technology, which focuses on video-surveillance technology.

The Chinese company Linglong, which is bilding a nearly $1 billion tire factory in Zrenjanin and is the leading sponsor of Serbia's top soccer league, created a scholarship program in March 2020 for Serbian students.

A New Phase

"The Chinese are diversifying their approach to education and academic cooperation in the sense that they are now going well beyond state institutions," Vladimir Shopov, a fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told RFE/RL.

This type of cooperation, which Shopov says is designed to develop relationships and embed its influence across society, politics, and the economy, is already moving beyond the traditional scope of cooperation with universities and through Confucius Institutes.

Instead, a growing emphasis is being put on working with local authorities, private companies, and different Chinese organizations.

A Chinese cultural center in Belgrade that will focus on arts, literature, and other areas of cultural engagement is slated to open in 2021. It will be modeled after other centers in Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. The center in Belgrade is being built at the symbolic site of the Chinese Embassy that NATO planes bombed in 1999 and will function as a showcase for Chinese art, literature, and language.

"This type of engagement is the logical next step for Beijing's presence in the region," Shopov. said "China sees the way its moves are interpreted around the world and it's clear to them that they need to be more active about getting their story across."

In Serbia, China's expanding footprint has faced little resistance, but recently workers and environmentalists across the country have voiced concerns over pollution from investment projects owned by Chinese companies.

Protests over environmental degradation in Belgrade on April 10 drew thousands and led to the government ordering the Chinese-run Zijin copper mine in the southern town of Bor to halt work for failing to comply with environmental standards.

It also ordered a Chinese-owned recycling plant near Zrenjanin to stop production because of environmental damage.

But China's broader push into Serbian education and cultural life is poised to continue.

"We are at the beginning of this cooperation, it's still something that is being developed," Vladisavljev said. "We are witnessing the inception right now."

Written by Reid Standish in Prague based on reporting by Ljudmila Cvetkovic and Maja Zivanovic in Belgrade

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China In Eurasia
Reid Standish

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this biweekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

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