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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) and the Taliban government's acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Kabul in August 2025
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) and the Taliban government's acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Kabul in August 2025

Since the withdrawal of international forces and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Afghanistan’s once-diverse media landscape has collapsed under a lack of funding and restrictions -- and Chinese state media is looking to fill the void.

Hundreds of outlets have shut down, thousands of journalists have lost work, and those remaining face censorship, intimidation, and severe economic pressure. Against that backdrop, China’s media footprint has become highly visible and is aiming to grow further.

China has significantly expanded its media presence in Afghanistan since the Taliban seized power in 2021, with Afghan journalists telling RFE/RL that Chinese outlets in the country are producing content that highlights Beijing’s positive role while avoiding stories about poverty, repression, or human-rights abuses.

A Kabul-based Afghan journalist who has worked for a Chinese outlet told RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi that reporters face tight editorial control.

“Our work focuses only on positive issues. We are told to produce documentaries and reports that strengthen [China’s] relations with the [Taliban] government," a Kabul-based Afghan journalist who has worked for a Chinese outlet in the country told RFE/RL under condition of anonymity. “We see hunger and hardship when visiting fields, but those stories are not wanted. The reality is hidden.”

RFE/RL spoke with several Afghan journalists working for Chinese outlets in Kabul. All said they were warned not to speak with other media and risk losing their jobs if they did.

Former Afghan employees of China Central Television (CCTV) and China Global Television Network (CGTN) who spoke to RFE/RL said that Chinese outlets used to provide news content to Afghan channels promoting Beijing’s “constructive role," although Chinese coverage also often stressed corruption, insecurity, and political dysfunction -- content that supported Beijing’s rivalry with Washington.

“When I worked with them, it was clear China wanted stories that made the previous government look weak and ineffective, focusing mostly on problems, challenges, and negative issues,” said one former CGTN journalist granted anonymity. “It didn’t feel like a constructive role, though it served their political interests.”

A senior Afghan manager at a Chinese media organization told RFE/RL that coverage has shifted toward regional political and security issues since the Taliban's takeover, particularly tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

He said Chinese outlets have deepened cooperation with Taliban-controlled state media, such as the Bakhtar News Agency, through joint programs, content sharing, and technical support.

Expanding Through Local Partners

Analysts told RFE/RL that the effort is part of Beijing’s broader push to strengthen its political and economic influence in Afghanistan as Western outlets withdraw and local media struggle under current Taliban restrictions.

Hazrat Bahar, a researcher at Leipzig University in Germany, said China’s expanding influence in Afghan media serves both strategic and economic goals.

“Countries that support foreign media often do so for political and cultural reasons, and China is one of them,” he told RFE/RL. “You can even see it on social media, through CRI Pashto or programs like China Flowers on Facebook. After Western media collapsed and left a vacuum, China saw an opportunity to expand its influence”

Bahar’s recently published research shows Beijing’s involvement has grown through support for Afghan media outlets and through the expansion of its own networks.

According to him, private broadcasters such as Shamshad TV and Axon Media have received Chinese financial assistance. Axon’s CRI Pashto, part of the China Radio International network, runs twice-daily programs in Kabul and Kandahar and has attracted millions of followers online.

Chinese state networks, including CCTV and CGTN, maintain offices in Kabul producing English-language content.

Some Afghan stations, such as Kabul News, previously aired documentaries about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the trillion-dollar infrastructure project launched by Beijing in 2013.

Bahar’s research was included in a 2025 report by the Center for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), an Indian think tank, and found that China’s presence in Afghan media has expanded significantly since 2021. The report cites financial backing, content partnerships, and training programs for Afghan journalists as key tools in promoting a pro-China narrative.

The report describes this effort as part of Beijing’s “soft power” diplomacy, using information outreach to shape public opinion and project an image of China as a stable partner in a turbulent region.

Hamed Obaidi, head of the Afghan Media Support Organization (AMSO), said Chinese funding also serves economic aims.

“Media investment can be part of China’s broader economic and political strategy,” he told RFE/RL. “They want to promote their projects in Afghanistan and improve their image across the region.”

Managing The Message In Afghanistan

Jawed Qaim, the last ambassador of the former Afghan government to China prior to the Taliban's takeover, told RFE/RL that despite Beijing’s deepening engagement in Afghanistan, its role is still more pragmatic than transformational.

“Afghanistan is not extremely important for China, but in terms of security, including South and Central Asia, Afghanistan is part of China’s regional strategy,” Qaim said.

Is 2025 The Year Chinese Investments Take Off In Afghanistan?
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“Because it shares a border with [China's northwestern province of] Xinjiang, while China fears militant Islamist groups, China maintains relations with whoever is in power in Afghanistan, as long as no threat comes from there.”

Qaim also stressed that China "now is more involved, but not in a deeply strategic way -- just enough to exert control and maintain stability.”

According to him, Beijing’s media investment remains limited in financial scale but given the low levels of funding available in Afghanistan's media sector, it still gives Chinese officials influence over content and an opportunity to align it with Chinese state interests.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s independent media sector continues to face collapse.

Many journalists have fled, and numerous outlets face imminent shutdown. Whereas outlets once funded by Western donors have lost financial support. Taliban regulations have also imposed sweeping censorship systems, banned entertainment programming and films, and placed restrictions on women’s participation in media.

Vladimir Putin (right) and Chinese President Xi Jinping review a military honor guard at a ceremony in Beijing to welcome the Russian president on May 16, 2024.
Vladimir Putin (right) and Chinese President Xi Jinping review a military honor guard at a ceremony in Beijing to welcome the Russian president on May 16, 2024.

BRUSSELS -- The European Union will meet for high-level talks to discuss Beijing's increasing support for Moscow and to parse evidence that China may be sending weapons to Russia to be used on the battlefield in Ukraine, three EU diplomats told RFE/RL.

Foreign ministers from the bloc's 27 members will meet on December 15 for talks to discuss China's deepening ties with Russia, with an EU diplomat saying that Brussels sees "Chinese support increasing."

"What we are seeing is that without China's support for Russia in this war, Russia probably would not be able to do what it's doing," an EU diplomat told RFE/RL, speaking on condition of anonymity in order to discuss sensitive issues.

A separate EU diplomat added the meeting will focus on recent information of potential Chinese weapons deliveries to Russia that are being used in Ukraine, which, if confirmed, would mark a new level of support from Beijing beyond the steady supply of dual-use goods with civilian and military applications that has boosted the Kremlin's war effort since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The official did not comment on what types of Chinese weaponry or equipment could be deployed in Ukraine. Chinese parts have been a key component of Russia's drone industry, which forms a vital part of the broader war effort in Ukraine -- from surveillance to kamikaze attacks -- and Ukrainian intelligence said in October that China was passing on satellite intelligence to Russia on targets in Ukraine.

Beijing claims it is neutral in the nearly four-year war and repeatedly said it has not provided weapons to Russia, but China has also continued to deepen political and economic ties with Moscow, including maintaining its status as a top customer for Russian oil and a growing trade partner.

But China's deepening ties to Russia have put Beijing in Europe's crosshairs, with the EU saying in July that China, including Hong Kong, is responsible for "approximately" 80 percent of the circumventions of sanctions against Russia.

In addition to its signs of increasing support for Moscow, EU ministers will also focus on the bloc's economic ties with China, including Chinese export controls placed on strategic rare earth minerals, security issues in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and ongoing geo-economic tensions over the Dutch-based but Chinese-owned chipmaker Nexperia.

The French and German foreign ministers will also debrief other EU ministers on the recent visits to Beijing this month, where both delegations raised the issue of China's close ties to Russia.

In July, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas that Beijing couldn't accept Russia's defeat in the war as it would free up Washington to focus on China. The comments were first reported by the South China Morning Post and later confirmed by RFE/RL.

Ukrainian Service correspondent Zoriana Stepanenko reported from Brussels. China global affairs correspondent Reid Standish reported from Prague.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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